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Intellectuals, particularly within Western societies, occupy privileged positions which enable 
them to scrutinize the actions of those in power – having the time, expertise, and resources to 
analyse motives, expose lies, and imagine alternative futures. This ability is not a given 
however, and it manifests in a multitude of ways as academics’ epistemological and ontological 
biases, normative interests, and career security are continually renegotiated in the face of 
increasingly neoliberal rationales. Since the foundation of Peace and Conflict Studies over half 
a century ago, these pressures have played out along a problem-solving/critical theory 
dichotomy, in which problem-oriented scholars produce knowledge to improve the current 
system, while critical theorists seek to transform the entire paradigm and establish more 
emancipatory and positive types of peace. By assessing how this contestation has played out 
within the discourse of international peacebuilding, this thesis seeks to understand how critical 
theorists have challenged the status-quo by exposing and challenging the epistemic, discursive 
and institutional barriers to radical and transformative peacebuilding critique. To do this, it 
undertakes a critical discourse and citation network analysis of 111 prominent Peace and 
Conflict scholars writing on peacebuilding between 2005 and 2017, synthesised by 
observations drawn from over 40 interviews. It evaluates the scale and limits of critique by 
exploring the questions and problems that scholars concern themselves with, the extent to 
which their studies reflect on broader systemic and conflict promoting factors, the alternatives 
and possible futures that are envisioned, and the ways in which academia and surrounding 
institutions constrain and dilute radical critiques.  
By systematically unpacking and assessing the problems addressed by academics and the 
arguments they make, the thesis identifies a lacuna of radical and imaginative writing which is 
further diluted and gentrified from within the academy itself as ideas are disseminated, 
popularized, and utilized. It finds that studies on international peacebuilding are overwhelming 
focused on perceived problematic ‘post-conflict’ locales within the Global South, and while 
the actions of Global North actors in these operations are often scrutinized, this does not extend 
beyond the immediate post-conflict environment. Paradigm critiques and reflexive challenges 
to institutions such as violence, the Westphalian state, and the international economic system 
are exceedingly rare and are most often problematized only in relation to the post-conflict 
paradigm. Furthermore, very few scholars engage with or offer a conceptualisation of peace 




within the Global North. Consequently, the possible futures and types of peace that are 
envisioned by scholars are iterative rather than revolutionary, seeking to integrate states within 
the existing international order rather than finding ways to challenge and produce new 
international orders which are more adept at responding to issues of environmental degradation 
and social justice.  
Ultimately, the negotiation between critical and problem-solving theories has erred on the side 
of caution and reflected the interests of power and order in the face of uncertainty and change. 
Where more critical work has emerged, its emancipatory intent is overlooked and repurposed 
by the performances of academia itself which transmit realisable empirical findings and 
problematize operational elements of peacebuilding at the expense of fuzzy and difficult 
transformations. More broadly, the subservience of academia to power in the face of neoliberal 
pressures and self-regulation has relegated the role of speaking truth to power to the subaltern, 
and while critical scholars increasingly turn their gaze to these locales to amplify their voices 
and identify alternative orders, these efforts are continually subsumed into the status-quo as 
interventions delve deeper into the private sphere, placating resistance and reshaping 
transformation. A radical reassessment of pedagogy is needed that repurposes engagement with 
the post-conflict other in favour of sincere transformation and resistance, led by renewed and 
extensive reflexive critiques on the structures and systems of power within the West which 
exacerbate inequality and promote social injustice. The potential for peacebuilding to offer 
emancipatory transformation of the international system remains, but post-conflict societies 
cannot, and should not need to undertake this task without being met by equal reflexive and 
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Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
 
Surely some revelation is at hand; 
Surely the Second Coming is at hand. 
The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out 
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,  
Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it 
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds. 
The darkness drops again; but now I know 
That twenty centuries of stony sleep 
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, 
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, 
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born? 
 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Noam Chomsky, perhaps the most famous Western academic alive today, observed that 
intellectuals are “typically privileged and that “privilege yields opportunity, and opportunity 
confers responsibilities” (2017, p. II). But what responsibility do intellectuals hold and to 
whom? Their relationship with institutions, practices, and individuals of power is one that has 
been contested and renegotiated for millennia. They have sat in the halls of power, alongside 
Queens and Kings, Emperors and Presidents, advising and justifying all manner of deeds, 
reaping riches for their loyalty and the expertise they conveyed. Contrarily, they have been 
persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, and murdered by these very same elites for their unorthodox 
stances and heretical claims. They may seek to improve human understanding and wellbeing, 
or they may simply be there to improve their own understanding and wellbeing. They have 
uncovered and discovered advances in all manner of pursuits, saving millions through medical 
and technological advances which have increased the quality and life expectancy of peoples all 
around the world. Equally, they have justified positions and created technologies and 
institutions that have been used to segregate, enslave, and murder millions of others. While 
intellectuals may have a responsibility, how they choose to act on this, has significant 
repercussions for all.  
The academic discipline of Peace and Conflict Studies (PACs) is one such grouping of 
intellectuals. Emerging during the Cold War, PACs identified itself in contrast to orthodox 
schools such as Political Science and International Relations through its explicit normative 
intent (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999; Boulding, 2017). Its scholars placed a commitment to 
peace at the centre of their analytical focus, and sought to understand the systems and processes 
of human interaction within and between their natural environment, each other, and the 
institutions which exacerbated and alleviated violent conflict. Today, it is an undeniably robust 
and influential field within world politics. Its physical centres, which have ebbed and flowed 
in response to shifts in funding, bureaucratic rationales, and existential threats, have grown 
exponentially alongside an ever-increasing number of scholars, journals and conferences which 
covet its mantle (Harris, Fisk and Rank, 1998). While it is difficult to estimate the total size of 
the field, given the variety of names and disciplines which contribute to it (ibid), a report in 
2008 established that there were over 400 research programmes worldwide, and growing 
(Micucci, 2008). Its most renowned members and ideas hold immense gravitas within 




academic/policy/practitioner divide. The rotating door that exists between these institutions 
enables numerous opportunities for scholars to influence the practice of politics, and whether 
rhetorically or aspirationally, its research outputs can be seen to circulate and permeate policy 
and practice within the humanitarian sector. 
Since its founding, it has undergone several significant discursive shifts in how its scholars 
understand and relate to conflict: from its regulation, to management, to resolution, to 
transformation – to a focus on building its antithesis, to peacebuilding (Avruch, 2013, pp. 10–
11). The scope of its focus and its interdisciplinary nature ensures that PACs is continually 
divided and contested by its acolytes, who, drawing on a range of epistemological and 
ontological backgrounds, both strengthen and weaken its intellectual utility through continual 
critical reflection and debate. While divisions in what peace is or should be and how to achieve 
it have torn the field apart since its founding, scholars are united in their concern to address the 
root causes of conflict, to undertake both analytical and normative work, and to focus on 
multiple levels of interaction and understanding (individuals, groups, states and interstates) 
(Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999). It is a critical discipline which seeks to challenge the status 
quo, recognising that while conflict can transform and bring positive social change  (Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2013), violence need not be considered inevitable to this endeavour (Avruch, 
2013, p. 26).  
To Chomsky (2017, p. II), the responsibility of intellectuals can manifest as one which serves 
power, or one which derogates it, that “advance[s] the causes of freedom, justice, mercy, peace 
and other such sentimental concerns”. From its foundations, we might expect that the scholars 
of PACs generally confer this latter responsibility as their own. Indeed, though its lofty 
ambitions are fuzzy and contested, its scholars have been quick to criticise more orthodox 
approaches for reifying and buttressing the status quo and oppressive elements of the 
international order. These criticisms have been raised from within and against its hallowed 
halls as well and a substantial component of PACs scholarship critically assesses its 
transformative potential. From its very emergence, the core of PACs struggled against divisions 
on how to best transform conflict, as scholars were torn between policy-oriented research 
which could improve practice (especially within Conflict Resolution centres in North America) 
and systemic critiques which might transform international structures and systems of 




These divisions have not been clear cut however, and funding constraints, the preference for 
policy oriented and technocratic knowledge, and the triumph of (neo)liberal and market 
rationales following the collapse of the Cold War increasingly pushed PACs (and many other 
disciplines) to eschew ‘value laden’ and critical endeavours in favour of knowledge that could 
be useful to policy makers and the structures of power (Schuurman, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2012; 
Chomsky, 2017). Indeed, whether due to being too close to power and informing shifts, or not 
close enough to be able to stop them, critical concepts of ‘human security’, ‘resilience’, and 
‘development’ were seen to be co-opted or securitised as research was distorted by those in 
power to justify nefarious acts – culminating in the murderous invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. While these acts have led to several recent attempts to reorient PACs and revitalise its 
critical and transformative capacity (see, for example Jackson, 2017b; Rigual, 2018; Thiessen 
and Byrne, 2018), these epistemological and spatial divisions have been evident since the 
discipline was founded (Beriker, 2015); where policy-oriented theorists, seeking to improve 
what they can, are seen to buttress power, their critical counterparts have shied away from clear 
normative stances (Jackson, 2015), turning to theories of complexity and descriptive 
pragmatism (Chandler, 2017b). The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of 
passionate intensity. 
Understanding whether PACs truly has a distinct point of departure from other fields is not 
only problematised by the divisions between North American and European scholarship, but 
convoluted and obscured by the systems of the neoliberal academy, where affiliation within or 
outside its institutions infers neither a commitment or eschewal of the values associated with 
PACs. Institutional, personal, and environmental pressures continually contest and disrupt the 
intent of academics. Thus, the theories and research produced by PACs scholars are a reflection 
of these material and epistemological barriers, which circumvent and distort how reality is 
perceived and interpreted, and how solutions are formulated and transmitted. While its scholars 
have advocated their utility by contrasting their discipline’s normative and transformative 
intent with that of others, they themselves are disunited on the balance between transformation 
and improvement, or problem-solving and critical approaches. This debate and struggle to 
contain the centre of PACs has permeated discussions by scholars since its emergence, between 
those who were seen to buttress the status quo and those who sought to transform it. 
But to what extent have those scholars utilizing critical approaches been successful in critiquing 
systems and structures themselves? Critical critique must entail possibility and the 




Recent research has shown however, that scholars often critique without providing alternatives, 
from fear that their theories might be co-opted by power and used to justify and inform practices 
that do not match their original intent (Visoka, 2018), like the theory and practice of resilience, 
human security, and development before. 
1.1: Research Question and Focus   
This thesis seeks to contribute to introspective studies of the field by offering a deeper 
understanding of how critical PACs scholars have contested and challenged each other’s 
transformative and emancipatory potential. It asks: how have critical approaches to 
international peacebuilding contested and contributed to the discourse? 1 The purpose of this 
is twofold: first, to uncover and account for criticality as it emerges in studies of peacebuilding 
and explore the breadth and limits of critique. Second, to account for these limits by discerning 
barriers to the production and transmission of critical knowledge within the neoliberal 
academy. 
Using the discourse of international peacebuilding as a case study, it is primarily interested in 
how academics have contributed to its transformation in recognition of its grim track record in 
achieving long-term stability and peace (Barma, 2017). In line with more recent critical studies 
which explore the social construction of peacebuilding and its epistemological and ontological 
barriers (see, for instance, Sillanpaa and Koivula, 2010; Kristensen, 2012; Gleditsch, 
Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014; Goetze, 2017; Bright and Gledhill, 2018; Thiessen and Byrne, 
2018; Visoka, 2018), the thesis seeks to organise and delineate the boundaries of critical 
critiques of peacebuilding as they appear in the works of critical PACs scholars. Drawing on 
contemporary systematic methodologies of data gathering and analysis used to ‘take stock’ of 
disciplines, this thesis seeks to unravel the arguments, questions and suggestions that emerge 
out of critical peacebuilding scholarship to identify its popular and marginalised areas of 
critique.  
Thus, while it is focused on conceptions of international peacebuilding, justice and peace, it is 
primarily interested in critiquing academia – the production, transmission, and utility of 
knowledge, as well as the ideas, aspirations and theories of academics. Reversing ethnographic 
approaches to focus on scholars, it seeks to understand their everyday lives: the institutions 
 
1 Peacebuilding (or international peacebuilding) within this thesis refers primarily to ‘international attempts to 
construct peace’ through the auspices of organisations such as the UN, EU, within post-conflict societies. These 




they work in, the conferences they attend, and the discussions and debates they partake in. It is 
about the geographical spaces that divide them, and the theories and ideas that unite them. Most 
of all, this study represents a normative challenge to scholars to stand more clearly on the side 
of the subjugated and oppressed, and to be more reflexive of the systems and structures of 
which they are a part, and which continue to perpetuate violent conflict. It is a call to arms for 
academics to push the boundaries of their critique and to let the political scientists and 
international relations theorists worry about what is possible, and instead concern themselves 
with what is desirable. 
1.2: Chapter Outline 
The structure of this thesis does not seek to break any academic conventions, and its first three 
chapters (2-4) contain the theoretical foundations of the thesis (literature review, theoretical 
framework and research design), chapter 5 contains high-level empirical findings, and chapters 
6-8 contain more detailed and nuanced investigations of this data. Chapter 9 contains the final 
discussion, and conclusion as well as further research suggestions. These are laid out in more 
detail below, before the major findings of this thesis are noted and a personal statement is given 
to explain the rationale for this research endeavour. 
Chapter 2 undertakes a review of the literature to identify why such a study is needed. Given 
that much of the literature on peacebuilding and its surrounding debates also form part of the 
analysis, deeper explorations and critiques of these works can be found throughout the thesis 
instead of being concentrated within this chapter. Instead, it details how international 
peacebuilding has been conceptualised and studied by critical PACs scholars, before assessing 
these shifts through an understanding of knowledge production and transmission. This is done 
to highlight the importance of critical approaches to the studies of peacebuilding, as well as 
their natural affinity to PACs. 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical and analytical framework utilized throughout this thesis, 
coined ‘subversive knowledge’. This melds the normative and prescriptive intent of PACs, 
with the structural focus of critical theory, and an understanding of parrhesia (speaking truth 
to power) to construct a framework through which scholarship can be assessed, based on its 
emancipatory, transformative, and imaginative potential. It also modifies the notion of 
compound friction (Millar, 2013) to provide a simple yet critical understanding of the 




Chapter 4 details the research design of the thesis, including how the data was collected and 
collated, and the various methods used to analyse it. Using bibliometric tools, a dataset was 
constructed containing scholars who had consistently adopted critical approaches to studies of 
international peacebuilding between January 2005 (approximately when the ‘critical turn’ in 
PACs and related disciplines began, see Schuurman, 2009; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; 
Randazzo, 2016) and December 2017 (when data was collected). Comprised of 111 primary 
scholars and 605 articles, this dataset was seen to provide a representative sample of the critical 
approaches to international peacebuilding through which the limits and foci could be 
ascertained. Loosely drawing on Foucault’s notion of discourse and Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
circle, it presents an interpretive research design drawing on critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
citation network analysis (CNA) and interviews with scholars to collate and analyse data whilst 
utilizing numerous feedback loops to nuance and deepen findings. 
Chapter 5 is the first analysis chapter, and lays out the high-level findings of the research which 
are then interrogated in more detail in chapters 6,7, and 8. It begins by exploring the makeup 
of scholars and works contained within the dataset, or the ‘discourse’ of critical peacebuilding 
studies – to show the diversity (or lack thereof) between its contributors. It then outlines the 
results from the critical discourse analysis (CDA), exploring the abstract patterns of focus and 
marginalisation that emerged throughout coding. Drawing on the results from the citation 
network analysis (CNA), the chapter then briefly lays out the bibliometric networks between 
researchers and their works, highlighting the theories and scholars that can be seen to dominate 
the dataset and discourse. 
Chapter 6 delves deeper into these findings and draws on interpretations of criticality to see 
how these aspirations have been emulated by scholars within the dataset. It provides a more in-
depth engagement of those narratives and research agendas that have been overlooked and 
argues that systemic and structural issues are largely unquestioned by scholars. Where critical 
engagements exist, it argues they appear to be rather muted in intent and radical alternative 
prescriptions. 
Chapter 7 expands on this last aspect to explore the transformative and emancipatory potential 
of critical scholars by understanding how the concept (or objective) of peace has been engaged. 
Through a critique of the post-liberal peace, it argues that where scholars rarely interrogate or 
explore the conceptualisations of peace to which their critiques of peacebuilding contribute, 




finding within the wider ‘pragmatic turn’ of peacebuilding (Chandler, 2017a), it argues that the 
analytic shift to the local has led to overly relativistic and descriptive research, reducing the 
capacity for scholars to offer transformative critiques and solutions of the international order. 
Chapter 8 expands on arguments made in previous chapters by applying them to the notion of 
hybridity. In a more empirical manner, it explores how the performances of academia contest 
and distort critical knowledge as it is being produced and transmitted. It draws on insights 
gleaned from interviews, the CNA and the CDA to construct a timeline of the emergence of 
‘hybrid’ terminologies within the dataset and probe the intents and origins of each term to 
understand how their interaction deradicalized critical and emancipatory potential. Focusing 
on the three primary conceptualisations of hybridity, the chapter argues that these differed in 
conceptual utility and normative intent yet were conflated and confused with one another as 
they were reproduced in various studies. The chapter concludes with the observation that 
critical scholars’ disdain for instrumental hybridity led to a series of cyclical and abstract 
philosophical debates which, whether justified or not, obfuscated other critical avenues in 
which the term could have been used. Rather than utilizing hybridity to produce radical and 
transformative critiques of peacebuilding, these scholars retreated to describing processes and 
critiquing international actors in the paradoxical hope that they might empower the local by 
drawing the attention of it to the interveners.  
While each chapter contains its own discussion and conclusions, chapter 9 serves to draw 
together the findings and arguments that have been woven throughout the thesis to answer the 
question of how critical approaches to international peacebuilding have contested the 
discourse. It reasserts the core findings and limitations of the study. It then reiterates the 
argument that PACs needs to draw more heavily on critical approaches to better challenge and 
transform structures of power and domination, and points to some further areas of research that 
could begin to more critically uncover how the neoliberal academy might be resisted by those 
within, to better achieve their normative commitment to reducing direct and structural violence 




1.3: Findings and contributions 
The main finding that this thesis posits is that since 2005 there has been a significant increase 
in the number of academics publishing on ‘peacebuilding’ who use critical methodologies, 
languages, and explanations in their studies (chapter 5). While this pattern of increased 
scholarship correlates with the rise of critical peacebuilding topics such as ‘hybrid’, ‘local’, 
and ‘emancipatory’ peacebuilding, it is unclear whether this has been caused by new scholars 
entering the field of PACs, or simply by scholars in adjacent fields (such as IR) adopting this 
popular, often anthropological, terminology. Regardless, the majority of work being published 
within this rubric appears to adopt a problem-solving approach, undertaking ‘field’ studies of 
particular peacebuilding practices to either condemn or improve them, generally through calls 
for increasing ‘local ownership’.  
While a substantial number of more critical texts exist, which scrutinize both the practices and 
objectives of peacebuilding, the outcome of these works is most often aimed at challenging 
explanations of particular phenomena and providing new frameworks of analysis or 
understanding. As such, peacebuilding’s critiques appear relatively limited, with discussions 
on the actual necessity of peacebuilding and the need for radical alternatives broadly remaining 
untouched since the end of the Cold War (chapter 5\6). Those efforts that do seek to provide 
alternatives to (neo)liberal peacebuilding and challenge hegemonic practices are cognisant of 
their epistemological barriers, perhaps to the point of fault. They are unable to construct viable 
alternatives to the ‘liberal peace’ given the possibility that these might also be oppressive and 
hegemonic (chapter 7\8).   
At the same time, scholars seem unwilling to shift their analytical focus away from the post-
conflict ‘other’ to challenge the broader hegemonic and neoliberal elements of the international 
system. Scholars have thus begun an emancipatory quest of identifying existing instances of 
peace and agency in post-conflict societies that were previously overlooked, instead of 
challenging the systems and societies of which they are a part, and constitute an environment 
which continues to require international peacebuilding (chapter 7). The deradicalization of 
critical critique is seen to occur through the performances and institutions of academia itself, 
which continually obscure the lacuna of alternatives and repurposes those efforts that have been 




1.4: Personal Statement 
In my journey through the world of PACs, I have met a multitude of people who have opened 
their arms (and minds) to my questions. From people who made their couches available for me 
to sleep on, to translating obscure and confusing road signs (and scholarship). There are those 
who have sat with me and discussed their life’s work, only to be met by a naïve student who 
inadvertently put on a critical cap and pointed out the obvious limits of their thinking that, 
through all manner of personal and institutional constraints, they were unable to enunciate 
within their writings. The love and genuine curiosity that I have been met with has shown me 
just how true and just these scholars are. While some of my questions and comments have been 
met with scepticism, there was an overwhelming willingness from participants, both formal 
and informal, to understand and assist me in my research. These weren’t scholars trying to hide 
their works, but open, challenge and develop them. Perhaps my most fundamental realisation 
was that most academic writing is published for academics themselves. One should not treat 
writing as static, and reading one article on a subject does not present an accurate reflection of 
that scholar’s view (regardless of how hard you try to hold them to it later). While publications 
may be static, ideas are alive. They travel with scholars, they transform, are reapplied, and 
abandoned when they become unwieldy, when better ideas emerge, or when they no longer 
appear to have anything to show – only to be picked up at a later stages by others, or indeed, 
that same scholar some years later on reflection of previous comments or with a new problem 
to resolve. Thus, while my thesis is a critique of critical approaches to international 
peacebuilding, it is not my intent to discredit or accost individual academics. Though at times 
I point to explicit instances which I consider to be problematic, these must be read with a 
sensitivity that reflects the myriad rationales and intents through which these instances emerged 





CHAPTER 2: ON POWER, PEACEBUILDING AND PEACE AND 
CONFLICT STUDIES 
After nearly thirty years of operationalisation, peacebuilding continues to evade a clear, 
coherent, and noncontradictory conceptualisation. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, an 
exceptionally wide array of scholars have engaged in debates on peacebuilding, intrigued not 
only by its potential to ‘do good’ but because of its intrinsic links to power, politics, ideology, 
and human nature. Increasingly popularised following the collapse of the Cold War, significant 
shifts have occurred in both how it is understood by scholars, and more contentiously, how it 
is practiced. The causes and consequences of these shifts have been hotly contested by 
academics who are disunited on almost every aspect of the phenomena beyond considering it 
problematic. While these discussions tend to reflect the epistemological and ontological divides 
of researchers, their connotations have real impacts on those experiencing peace interventions. 
At most, these debates have the potential to shape and transform peacebuilding practices and 
objectives, while at the very least they can challenge how peacebuilding is understood and 
framed by international actors and used to justify their obtrusive actions in post-conflict 
societies. This thesis seeks to understand these shifts in conceptualisation by analysing how 
scholars have sought to more radically critique and challenge the phenomena of peacebuilding. 
This chapter unpacks the core themes within this thesis and provides a critical review of key 
peacebuilding discussions to expose the lacuna in understanding how peacebuilding is 
deliberately contested and transformed. Given the focus of this thesis on how academics 
conceived, theorised, and advocated critical and emancipatory theories of peacebuilding, the 
emphasis is on understanding debates relating to the phenomenon of peacebuilding rather than 
evaluating the particular practices from which it is comprised.  
Section 1 undertakes a brief conceptual review of power as it has been utilized in peacebuilding 
literature. The aim of this is twofold, to understand how power could be emancipatory for 
subjects of intervention and to understand how power might affect peacebuilding scholarship. 
Highlighting postmodernist contributions, especially that of Foucault, the section concludes by 
outlining the merits of Richmond’s three faces of power framework (Richmond, 2014b) which 
has been used to evaluate and advocate critical variants of peace. In line with this thesis’ 
explicit desire to turn the tools of academics upon themselves, this is later combined with the 
normative intent of PACs to establish a theoretical framework upon which critical 




Section 2 traces the complications that scholars have had in conceptualising peacebuilding; 
what it is, and how it should be undertaken. It is more interested in understanding how scholars 
have understood peacebuilding than in understanding a genealogy of peacebuilding, excellent 
discussions of which can be found in Chandler (2017a) or Randazzo (2015). The section 
highlights the merits of recent literature which conceptualise peacebuilding as a flexible 
‘package’ of norms, ideas, practices, and theories which is used in this thesis to evaluate how 
peacebuilding theory and practice has changed. 
Section 3 expands on the disagreements inherent in peacebuilding discussions in the context of 
PACs and critical approaches. While PACs does not hold a monopoly on critiquing 
international peacebuilding, its scholars have had a comparatively significant impact on the 
discourse in relation to larger and more orthodox schools. It charts the origins of PACs to 
position it as a discipline founded on the critique of power and resistance to the status quo. 
While its scholars are often divided on conceptualisations of peace and the extent to which 
transformative critiques should trump iterative solutions, their willingness to engage in 
normative arguments enables an easier assessment of how ideas are contested and translated 
than other disciplines perhaps would. 
Section 4 provides the core element of this review, and critically assesses reflexive critiques of 
peacebuilding theorisation. It highlights more recent and radical scholarship which has accused 
both critical scholars and their problem-solving counterparts of being unable and unwilling to 
construct or implement more positive variants of peace due to their unwillingness to 
problematize the foundational liberal assumptions which constitute peacebuilding practices. 
These works illuminate a series of issues which are seen to stifle innovation and alternative 
solutions, reinforce conflict-promoting structures, and buttress rather than challenge the status 
quo and its oppressive elements. While many of these issues are caused by the various beliefs 
and biases held by scholars, it is contended that similar systemic issues may hinder the 
production and transmission of the very knowledge which seeks to critique such issues. It is 
also contended that there is a need to move beyond whether or not peacebuilding scholarship 
is guilty of reinforcing the status-quo to instead understand the structural and proximate factors 
which influence academia and distort the transmission of knowledge between academics, 
practitioners, and policy-makers. 
Drawing on understandings of technocracy and epistemic closure, it lays out two interrelated 




difficulties in knowledge transmission and utilization. It argues that while there appears to be 
an increasing willingness by scholars to problematise the transmission of knowledge to policy 
and to understand how academia informs peacebuilding practice, the institution of academia 
remains largely unproblematised and unaccounted for within these discussions. Specifically, 
there is a real need to understand how the performances of academia may equally distort, co-
opt and deradicalize critical and emancipatory knowledge before it is transmitted beyond its 
halls. 
Section 5 contextualises this need within emerging scholarship on the ‘critical turn’ and ‘post-
liberal’ theories of peacebuilding. It critiques recent calls to undertake macro-level evaluations 
of how peacebuilding is changing in response to the rebalancing of power within the 
international system, by summarising the significant gaps apparent in peace scholars’ 
conceptualisation of how theories are constructed and transmitted. Drawing on the plethora of 
existing micro-level analyses which focus on how local actors’ interaction (and resistance) to 
external norms produce new and potentially emancipatory ways of constructing peace, the 
chapter concludes by advocating the reversal of these studies to focus upon how academics are 
themselves in a process of resistance and interaction with orthodox conceptions of 
peacebuilding, scholars, and policymakers. 
2.1: CONCEPTUALISING POWER - THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF OPPRESSION 
AND EMANCIPATION 
Peacebuilding is fundamentally about politics and power (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013). 
Indeed, given peacebuilding’s focus on unpacking problems of legitimacy, state-society 
relations, and governance, questions of how power is wielded and by whom “cannot be 
divorced from, and indeed become central to, wider peacebuilding challenges” (McCandless, 
Abitbol and Donais, 2015). An inquiry into academia would be equally hollow if it failed to 
recognise the influence of power as it emerges in the interactions between practitioners, policy 
makers and academics: to problematise how ideas are contested amongst groups; and the 
disproportionate number of opportunities held by Western scholars to transmit them. The 
following section briefly unpacks how power has been conceived by critical peacebuilding 
theorists and outlines how this thesis understands power in relation to revolutionary knowledge 
production, transmission and implementation. The conceptualisation of power established here 
is important for this thesis in two regards: to understand how theories of critical peacebuilding 




theories and the academics who proposed them were themselves affected by power. While the 
ways in which emancipatory and everyday power can be wielded by subaltern peoples has been 
well established by other scholars (see, for instance, Scott, 1985, 2014; Pugh, 2011; Richmond, 
2011a; Mac Ginty, 2015), how power shapes the neoliberal academy and PACS research is less 
considered within peacebuilding scholarship. By positioning critical scholars alongside the 
marginalised and oppressed peoples of intervention, this chapter seeks to understand both tasks 
within the same multifaceted understanding of power utilized in chapter 8. 
Efforts to conceptualise power are numerous. Indeed, the sheer number of overlapping and 
contrasting definitions have led some to label it as an ‘essentially contested concept’, given 
how the processes of disentangling its theoretical and value-based disputes are themselves a 
‘political’ undertaking (Lukes, 2005, p. 63). Power permeates everything and the difficulties 
in conceiving power arise, in part, because our very conceptualisations of power are themselves 
shaped by it (ibid). The task of uncovering and identifying how power has been conceptualised 
is of significant importance to peacebuilding scholars, given how our understandings may be 
used to “reproduce and reinforce power structures and relations, or … challenge and subvert 
them” (ibid, p. 63).  
To Haugaard (2010), many of the ambiguities that arise in conceptualising power result from 
theorists attempting to locate the ‘single best definition of power’, rather than conceiving of it 
as a cluster of concepts. To overcome this, Haugaard (2010, p. 424) draws upon Wittgenstein’s 
notion of a ‘family resemblance concept’, in which multiple overlapping concepts can be united 
to reject a singular conception of power, even if they lack an overarching essence or contradict 
one another.2 Power is thus understood as a conceptual tool which acknowledges a series of 
overlapping definitions and types, where the “better definition is the one that accomplishes the 
task the theorists set for themselves” in that particular instance (Haugaard, 2010, p. 426).  
Expanding on this, this thesis conceives of power as a variation of the three broad and 
overlapping models used by social philosophers outlined below. The differences between these 
three models emerge out of the ontological and epistemological differences between scholars 
– namely, their response to the tensions derived from the problematic relationship between 
individuals and social or political orders (Saar, 2010). Each model has significant repercussions 
for where scholars believe power to be located (within subjects, or their interactions) and how 
 
2 Here the example of a game is given to demonstrate how disparate conceptions may belong to the same class. 
Where we often see games as competitive (i.e. chess), a boy hitting a ball against a wall would still be accepted 




power can be wielded (as an oppressive or emancipatory force), which significantly alters how 
researchers understand international peacebuilding and its potential for transformation. 
Traditional approaches to power: the ‘action-theoretical’ model 
The orthodox ‘action-theoretical’ model of power focuses upon an actor’s ability to obtain their 
preferences “despite resistance” or the contradictory preferences of others (Weber 1978, p. 53). 
Often conceptualised through the act of dominance (Dahl, 1957), power is manifested in 
relation to others, where an actor has power to the extent that another does not, and they are 
able to get them to do what they would otherwise not have done (Dahl, 1957; Saar, 2010).  
This notion of power, where it is linked to an actor’s “overt” and “actual behaviour” was 
conceptually deepened by Lukes (1974) whose study of asymmetrical power led him to identify 
how it could be wielded through coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation 
(Dowding, 2006, p. 136). Lukes (2005) conceptualises three faces of power within the action-
theoretical model: decision-making power (the most obvious form of power, seen in the 
enactment of policy), non-decision making power (seen in agenda setting, the act of choosing 
which topics may or may not be discussed), and ideological power (the power of influence and 
making people want things which are against their own self-interest, reflective of systemic 
power). 
While the focus of Lukes’ work on the action-theoretical model was primarily within the realm 
of domestic politics, Abrahamsen shows how conceiving of “power as domination” is also 
useful in analysing peacebuilding practices. To Abrahamsen (2005, p. 1458), good governance 
policies provide an example of Dahl and Lukes’ conceptualisation of “power over” as aid 
recipients are coerced into implementing neoliberal policies in accordance with their donor’s 
wishes rather than their own. Abrahamsen (2005, p. 1458) also points to how Luke’s 
conceptualisation of power as ‘non-decision’ is evident in the ability of actors (especially 
donors) to shape political agendas, particularly in the “non-negotiable character of economic 
liberalism”. 
While popular amongst more orthodox disciplines, the action-theoretical model has been 
subject to harsh criticism given its fixation on power as something that is ‘held over’ another 
which denies marginalised groups agency and fails to account for how actors are able to 
transform or empower themselves, i.e. the ‘power-to’ act.3 These critiques, which largely 
 
3 Wartenberg (1990) claims that ‘power-to’ is simply a different form of ‘power-over’ that is distinct from 




stemmed from then emerging critical schools (such as postmodernism, constructivism, post-
colonialism, and feminism), argue that power can also manifest as capacity or potential power 
even when it is divorced from action. Power does not need to be ‘over’ another and could 
simply refer to an actor’s power-to (or not to) act.4 
Systemic and Constitutive Power 
Out of these critiques two significant contenders (or perhaps extenders) have emerged which 
are relevant to how power is conceptualised in studies of peacebuilding: systemic power, 
advanced by sociologists such as Luhmann, and relational power, advanced by postmodernists 
such as Foucault.  
While both theories take umbrage with the notion that power can be possessed, Luhmann’s 
interest stems from rejecting the assumption that analysts can causally determine why an actor 
did something (A forced B to undertake X), whereas Foucault is interested in how societies 
continue to rely on a ‘discourse of sovereignty’ – a top-down conceptualisation of power  which 
was built upon a social structure that no longer exists (the juridico-political model) (Borch, 
2005). Both theories hold that power as a possession leads to its conceptualisation within zero 
sum terms (where an increase in A’s power leads to a decrease in B’s power). This is seen as 
both incorrect (for example, Luhmann demonstrates how organisational power can see both 
superior and subordinates increase power simultaneously) and problematic, as power would 
then be operated in opposition to freedom (exercising one’s power limits another’s freedom) 
which is incompatible with conceptualising power as an emancipatory force (Borch, 2005).  
To overcome these issues, both theorists focus on how power is exercised rather than what 
power is (Borch, 2005, p. 158). Here, systemic conceptions identify the ways in which our 
social systems (comprised of cultural, economic, historical, and political elements) can hinder 
or enable particular actions (Vanderstraeten, 2002; Borch, 2005; Haugaard, 2010, p. 425), 
while constitutive conceptualisations look at how both individuals and social systems are 
themselves constituted through their relationship to power. 
Power in peacebuilding critique 
While critiques of peacebuilding operations have emerged from a variety of disciplines and 
conceptualised power in myriad ways, postmodern and constitutive understandings of power 
have featured prominently in critical scholarship since the 2000s. Emerging from a growing 
 
4 Though Lukes did seek to give an account for potential power, power-to, in later works, his attempts at 
incorporating systemic aspects of power into his third face of power contradict his belief that “power entails 




disillusionment within modern societies and the levels of progress obtained since the 
enlightenment, postmodernists reject universals or meta-narratives and locate power within 
every social interaction – seeing people (or subjects) as products of power. Essential to this 
postmodern thinking is the focus on subaltern or marginalised groups which dominate current 
critiques of peacebuilding.  
One of postmodernisms most prominent thinkers, Michel Foucault, has had a significant impact 
upon the study of peacebuilding, often forming the basis for work undertaken by critical heavy 
weights such as David Chandler, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver Richmond. The interest in 
Foucault’s work can be seen to stem from his rejection of universal truth (or meta-narratives), 
and subsequently liberalism’s claim to ‘universal status’, and his understanding that knowledge 
and power are intrinsically interlinked (indeed, knowledge is a form of power). Unlike Marxists 
and Freudians who see power as fundamentally repressive, Foucault (1980, p. 194) believes 
that it can be emancipatory given the way it affirms, incites, generates and produces “reality; 
it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth”.   
It is this concoction of claims, that universal truths do not exist, that power can be 
emancipatory, and that subaltern or marginalised groups are worthy of focus, that so appeals 
to peacebuilding scholars who have rejected the primarily North American and problem-
solving approach to peacebuilding. The subjective nature of knowledge, which changes 
between societies and across time, enables critical peace scholars to reject the West’s moral 
right to intervene, which is premised upon the contentious claim of superior knowledge 
(Chandler, 2017b, p. 197). The social nature of power, where it is inherent in “everyday” 
interactions, allows critical theorists to focus on how subaltern groups resist external, 
hegemonic, or oppressive discourses – or international peacebuilding. 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power is not accepted holistically however, and his critics have 
deepened and strengthened its application to studies of peacebuilding in many ways. Fraser 
(1981) for example, argues that Foucault’s attempts to remain normatively neutral preclude 
him for providing reasons for why power should be resisted,5 while radical feminist critiques 
hold that Foucault’s desire to define subjects by power denies women agency through its 
masculine connotations and cannot therefore be emancipatory. In a similar vein, Hartstock 
(1990) claims that Foucault’s analysis of power is undertaken from the perspective of the 
 
5 Fraser (1981, p. 283) argues that “only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault 
begin to answer such questions. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is 




colonizer rather than the colonized and thus fails to theorize the structural relations that prevent 
subordination and thus emancipation. Moreover, Dowding (2006, p. 141) claims that 
conceiving of power without intentionality leads theorists to fall into a ‘Foucault hole’, where 
everyone is implicated within a structure of domination “in which all those who do not resist 
are dominators and from which there is no freedom since we are all ‘constituted by power’” 
(Lukes, 2006, p. 167).  
Summary: Conceptualising Power 
Despite these issues, Foucault and other postmodernists have had a significant impact on how 
peacebuilding scholars may account for power which has enabled extensive analysis against 
models of peacebuilding prominent in the early 2000s. In line with Haugaard (2010), and given 
the need to acknowledge that both structures and individuals can be responsible for abuses of 
power and wrong doing (Haslanger, 2013, pp. 22–30), this thesis holds that these expanded 
conceptualisations may be used to incorporate, rather than reject, traditional understandings of 
power such as those posited by Lukes, Dahl, and Weber.   
A similar conceptualisation is evidenced in the works of Richmond (2014b, p. 17) who, like 
Foucault, holds that power “circulates around its subjects” and emphasises particular aspects 
of the models outlined above. Richmond’s (ibid, p. 17) analysis of peacebuilding operations 
conceive three faces of power: direct or structural power (which reflects action-theoretical and 
system elements); governmental (Foucault’s expansion of systemic power which includes both 
soft and normative power which is directed “through discourses and knowledge as well as 
institutions”); and subaltern power which is exercised through everyday resistance and is 
designed to subvert the two former types of power. 
While this latter tenant of Richmond’s conceptualisation has suffered rather consistent critiques 
by scholars, dubious of its emancipatory potential and of researchers to accurately 
conceptualise it given their own epistemological biases (Chandler, 2010a), it remains a useful 
tool through which to assess the theorisation of peacebuilding. This conceptualisation which 
has been reflected in many studies of peacebuilding (though to different effect)6 is also fitting 
for this thesis, given its ability to account for both direct (action-theoretical) and indirect 
(structural or systemic) effects of power, as well as the way in which power (or knowledge) is 
resisted by ‘marginalised’ groups (subaltern power).  
 
6 See, for example, the robust debate between Chandler and Richmond (2015) where they discuss the implications 




Although relatively few studies in the field of peacebuilding have been undertaken to assess 
how theories have been generated and transmitted, with far more focusing on the distorting 
effects of how policy is ‘practiced’, the above conceptualisation of power is compatible with 
those limited studies on which this thesis expands. For example, it is able to account for 
structural constraints such as technocracy and epistemic closure that reduce the diversity and 
thus scope of research (Mac Ginty, 2012), the unconstructive ways in which ideas can be 
transmitted across disciplines  (Millar and Lecy, 2016), and power imbalances between Global 
North and Global South scholarship (Scholey, 2006) (discussed below).7 Drawing on these 
understandings of subaltern agency and resistance, numerous critical studies of international 
peacebuilding seek to provide knowledge which either increases the sensitivity of international 
peacebuilders to the local (or reduces their oppressive and hegemonic elements) or empowers 
local peoples to either build their own peace and societies, or resist and contest international 
ones (top-down peacebuilding). The following section discusses how international 
peacebuilding has been conceptualised and contested to show how its top-down practices are 
typically perceived negatively by critical scholars, who critique them and attempt to open 
emancipatory spaces for local ownership to emerge. The epistemological and ontological 
approaches of scholars are seen to greatly affect how they interpret and critique international 
peacebuilding.  
2.2: CONCEPTUALISING PEACEBUILDING 
This section outlines peacebuilding’s modern conceptual roots and broad divisions within 
scholarship. The act of peacebuilding is of significant interest to scholars, not only because of 
its normative intent to build peace, but because of the ethical, legal, and practical problems that 
arise through international actors’ intervention in the lives and societies of the post-conflict 
other. It begins by briefly highlighting the negative connotations that peacebuilding has, and 
which make it such an important area of study, before unpacking how it has been 
conceptualised by those scholars critiquing it. How peacebuilding is defined is of immense 
importance, given that assumptions of what it is and why it is necessary inform how it is 
practiced and contested. Perhaps because of this, there is no unanimously agreed upon 
definition of peacebuilding, and the section concludes by highlighting how recent attempts to 
 
7 This thesis draws on Duffield (2019, p. 9) to acknowledge that while the Global North and Global South are 
only “loosely associated with modernist distinctions between developed and underdeveloped countries… [and] 
no longer imply fixed geographical or social homogeneity… [they] retain a sense of a historic political and 




understand it through the lens of friction allow for a more dynamic conceptualisation which 
enables a deeper analysis of how critical scholars have contested it. 
While the modern concept of peacebuilding can be traced back to the 1960s, following a UN 
peace operation in the Congo (Goulding, 1993), the term is most often seen to have debuted 
with the publication of An Agenda for Peace (1992) by then United Nations Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Paffenholz, 2013).8 This seminal document categorised a host of 
humanitarian activities as acts of ‘peacebuilding’, a term which contentiously referred to 
actions that “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 204). While the current United 
Nations’ conceptualisation of peacebuilding states a broad intent to address the “root causes of 
violence” (UNPSO, 2010, p. 5), its nearly thirty years of implementation has done little to 
alleviate contestation regarding its practices, objectives and rationales, by those groups seeking 
to either narrow or strengthen its utility. 
The study of peacebuilding is of immense importance to PACs scholars, given its explicit desire 
to ‘build peace’ through international intervention. The significance of these discussions 
emerge from understanding that while peacebuilding has the potential to ‘do good’, it has a 
tumultuous history with imperial and colonial practices whereupon humanitarian arguments 
justified intervention and the subjugation or oppression of other peoples and cultures. Building 
on Easterly (2006, p. 21), who highlights the evolution of ‘humanitarian efforts’ from 
Missionaries, to Colonial Officers, to Development Experts, Chandler (2010a) argues that 
discourses of race, culture, and civil society have been used to justify and alter the purpose of 
Western intervention in post-conflict states throughout history on the basis that others were 
somehow flawed. For example, the discourse of race provided a hierarchical division of the 
world rooted within a natural basis of the West’s ‘right’ to rule during the colonial era, while 
“problematic cultural explanations” were used to justify intervention in the early and late post-
colonial era on the basis that there was a moral divide in which non-Western orders were less 
capable of exercising autonomy in a stable and rational manner (Chandler, 2010a, pp. 169–
187). The continual revisions of the colonial ‘Mission Civilisatrice’ (Paris, 2002) have typically 
coincided with a significant shift in ‘how we build peace’, as intervening actors alter their focus 
 
8 Indeed, a Google Scholar search for the term ‘peacebuilding’ turns up 116 results for the period of 1980-1990 




between the post-colonial state, its elites, and currently, the local subject, depending on where 
the perceived cause of conflict lies (Chandler, 2010a).  
Since the 1990s peacebuilding has undergone several discursive (and to a certain extent, 
operational) shifts: from a focus on statebuilding; civil society building; institution building; 
and currently an emphasis on local actors and resilience-based approaches (Chandler, 2017a). 
Each of these approaches have been seen to be firmly grounded within liberal epistemes but 
the most recent paradigm which has arisen in response to the top-down failings of the ‘liberal 
peace’ has been enthusiastically explored in relation to its emancipatory possibility (Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2013). Here, a substantial body of literature condemned the top down processes 
of peacebuilding undertaken by international peacebuilders which sought to construct Western 
and liberal stylised states with little regard to the existing socio-cultural institutions and 
understandings and called for peacebuilders to recognise and accommodate difference. 
Precisely how international peacebuilders should engage with the local (and who could be 
considered local) gave rise to a significant amount of discussion within academic circles, 
however there was general agreement that local agency and understandings needed to be 
acknowledged. For mainstream theorists, the understanding of difference could localise  
international norms and practices reducing resistance and increasing their uptake and 
acceptance by local communities, while for scholars drawing on those more critical 
conceptions of power noted in the previous section, local agency could resist and transform 
interventions to develop more contextually sensitive notions of peace and could be 
emancipatory by transforming understandings of peace and governance (Richmond and Mac 
Ginty, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015; Randazzo, 2016). While some scholars began to advocate 
and prescribe ways in which the local might be better accommodated in internationally led 
peace operations, others were more detached and simply observed how local agency and 
resistance occurred (to both negative and positive effect) irrespective of international actions 
(Chandler, 2010c; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). Ultimately, the local turn, its promise and 
potential, has been hotly contested by scholars and these discussions can be seen to reflect the 
epistemological and ontological approaches of scholars and their own understanding of 
peacebuilding. 
There is no consensus of what peacebuilding is or the objectives and practices it comprises. 
Indeed, how it is defined appears to change according to interests of those invoking it 
(Bercovitch, 2009, p. 171) and a significant amount of literature has sought to typologise and 




what it seeks to achieve (see, for instance, Wiseman, 1987; Segal, 1995; Cappelli, 1998; 
Bellamy, 2004). According to Chetail and Jütersonke (2015, p. 2), scholarship can be broadly 
demarcated between those who feel peacebuilding “involves concrete conciliation efforts in 
situations of conflict” (such as Lederach, 1997), and those who conceive of it as “a specific 
operational mandate” (such as Barnett, Fang and Zürcher, 2014).  
Regardless of how peacebuilding is conceptualised, barring a few exceptions, literature 
typically treats peacebuilding as a net good that despite its problems appears to be either 
necessary or positive. Indeed, even those more critical conceptions that note the emancipatory 
potential of the local require international intervention as a process which can be resisted. For 
example, Richmond’s critical framework of peace-formation (which he juxtaposes with other 
aspects of peace-operations) (Richmond, 2013a, 2014b; Pogodda and Richmond, 2016), 
understands peacebuilding as the international attempt to resolve (rather than manage) failures 
that occur during the process of statebuilding. Where peacebuilding’s adherence to liberal 
dogma obscures and mitigates alternative and local discourses of peace, peace-formation is 
driven by understandings of the local agency and ownership, which if connected to 
international and state level legitimacy have a chance of leading to a more positive and 
emancipatory peace (Maschietto, 2016, p. 144).  
Friction and ‘travelling packages’ 
While this effort by Richmond to clearly segregate various activities which occur under the 
banner of peacebuilding is theoretically useful, his conceptualisation is motivated by the need 
to distinguish indigenous practices of peacebuilding (peace formation) from their international 
and state consolidation counterparts, given his belief that it is only with an emphasis on this 
process that positive peace can be obtained. Given that this thesis seeks to look at the ways in 
which the discourse of peacebuilding has been shaped, contested, and transmitted throughout 
academia, it rejects rigid definitions and typologies such as those noted above to conceive of 
peacebuilding as a flexible, ever changing, social construct. Here, emerging scholarship 
seeking to analyse the interaction between international and local peace processes is pertinent 
in conceptualising peacebuilding as a range of practices.  
This literature has drawn on the notion of “friction”, defined as “the awkward, unequal, 
unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” (Tsing, 2004, p. 4).9 
 
9 See, for instance, work by Shaw, 2007; Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Hellmüller, 2013; Jarstad, 2013; Millar, 




Through this, peacebuilding is understood as a collection of ‘travelling packages’ or “bundles 
of principles and ideas, wrapped up in practices and allegories, transmitting norms of behaviour 
and thought from one place to another” (Millar, 2013). Scholars are interested in the process in 
which international and local norms, values, and practices clash, and the way in which 
“heterogenous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of culture and power” or 
new outcomes (Tsing, 2004, p. 5). As such, peacebuilding flexibly is conceived of as, 
a range of efforts aimed at political, institutional, social, and economic transformations in post-
war societies engaging a variety of actors [where the] overall aim of peacebuilding is to reduce 
the risk of overt violent conflict and to pave the way for a durable peace and development. 
(Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013, p. 291) 
While the focus of this thesis is decidedly normative, seeking to look at the ways in which 
peacebuilding scholarship has shaped and been shaped by relations of power, it seeks to 
understand how critical theorists have attempted to transform peacebuilding’s theory and 
practice. Rejecting notions such as peace formation (Richmond, 2013a, 2013b, 2018a) and 
other emancipatory equivalents in favour of conceptualising peacebuilding holistically as a set 
of norms, practices, ideas, and values should not be seen as an attempt to distance this thesis 
from transformative scholarship, however. Rather, this shift in conceptualisation is seen as a 
necessary undertaking to consider how peacebuilding’s practice and theory has been altered 
across time and in response to its interaction with researchers, policy makers, and practitioners. 
This definition allows for a flexible and fluid understanding of peacebuilding which can more 
easily illuminate the contestations and distortions that occur as scholars interact with it, while 
preferring its normative and aspirational elements. 
2.3: CONTESTING PEACEBUILDING, DEMARCATING CRITICAL APPROACHES 
While peacebuilding has been discussed within an increasingly broad range of disciplines, from 
philosophy, to theology, economics, politics, and international relations, the multidisciplinary 
approach of PACs has provided numerous integral developments which have shaped practice 
and understanding in a variety of significant ways. The following section provides a brief 
outline of the emergence of PACs, positioning it as a discipline founded on resistance and 
transformation before looking at how its scholarship has contested peacebuilding. Though 
these origins have been heavily disputed since its establishment, the continued calls for critical 
approaches to conceptualising peace and power by PACs scholars indicate that irrespective of 




approach (see, for example, Shinko, 2008; Richmond, 2009a; Kappler, 2013; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013; Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Jackson, 
2016b). 
At its core, “Peace Studies is an inherently critical endeavour” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2013, p. 766). Emerging in the 1960s alongside a tide of social movements, PACs contrasts 
traditional or orthodox theories of international relations by placing peace at its centre instead 
of the state (Buhaug, Levy and Urdal, 2014; Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014). Though 
work by conflict resolution’s pioneers, such as Quincy Wright, Lewis Richardson, and Ted 
Lentz, contributed significantly to the discipline’s emergence, it remained conceptually blurry 
and institutionally weak until tensions escalated between the USSR and USA during the Cold 
War. It is here that the heart of PACs was established, alongside the burgeoning anti-nuclear 
movement “practiced by people who are deeply conscious of the pathologies of conflict” and 
who seek alternative conflict resolution methods (Boulding, 1978a, p. 343; Rogers and 
Ramsbotham, 1999).   
Over the next two decades, several academic conferences, a handful of journals and numerous 
research centres were established by hundreds of scholars committed to peace (for an excellent 
overview, see Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014). PACs’ point of departure from 
traditional schools was found in its unified concern to address the root causes of violence, its 
interdisciplinary and multi-levelled approach to analyses “combined with quantitative and 
empirical methodologies, and its normative commitment to the analysis of conditions for non-
violent social and political change” (Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999, p. 742). While 
championing several early successes, including the signing of non-proliferation treaties and 
several peace agreements, dwindling superpower tensions in the 1970s revealed a series of 
ontological cracks in the foundations of PACs which had expanded across the Atlantic divide 
between increasingly pragmatic North American scholarship and their more critical North 
European counterparts (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014; Chandler, 2017a).  
Nowhere were these divergences more apparent than in the attempt to establish the subject of 
their analysis, of peace and conflict itself. Where North American scholars constrained the 
definition of peace to its antonymic roots in war, many European scholars sought to expand the 
definition of violence (and thus peace) to include structural and indirect violence (Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2013; Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014). Here, Galtung (1969, p. 184) 




a research emphasis on the reduction of personal violence at the expense of a tacit or open 
neglect of research on structural violence leads, very easily, to acceptance of 'law and order' 
societies… too much research emphasis on one aspect of peace [structural/personal 
positive/negative] tends to rationalize extremism to the right or extremism to the left, depending 
on whether one sided emphasis is put on 'absence of personal violence' or on 'social justice’. 
And these two types of extremism are of course not only formally, but also socially closely 
related and in a dialectic manner: one is often a reaction to the other.  
This effort was less-than-favourably received by scholars on the other side of the Atlantic, 
despite their physical distance from the perceived Communist threat. An intellectual 
counterpart to Galtung, Kenneth Boulding (1978a, pp. 344–349), retorted that “the European 
peace research movement [had] retreat[ed] from the realities of the international system… 
[into] fantasies of justice… downgrading the study of international peace”. Such sentiments 
were reiterated by more orthodox scholars against PACs writ large and for much of last century 
peace scholars have been dismissed and marginalised within academia (Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013). 
Within academia more broadly, North American scholars have historically been considered 
more conservative than their European counterparts, and it is thus no surprise that these 
scholars argued against broader ‘maximalist’ definitions of peace in favour of a more 
conservative ‘minimalist’ definition (though they were not alone in this endeavour). Such 
conceptions primarily seek to address or reduce the overt causes of war and violence, 
supposedly reflecting the roots of peace studies (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014), 
while only ever being able to produce negative variants of peace (Kester and Cremin, 2017; 
Millar, 2019).10 ‘Maximalists’ on the other hand, sought to create a ‘positive peace’ by 
decreasing barriers to realising human potential. They held that any attempt at peace creation 
needed to address broader issues of structural violence, including concepts such as hegemony 
and the international system itself (see Galtung, 1969). As such, whether a scholar subscribes 
to a minimalist or maximalist definition of peace has significant repercussions for whether they 
critique broader issues of power and hegemony within their analysis, and thus how 
peacebuilding is critiqued. While both approaches have their merits, recent studies have 
suggested that scholarship has overwhelming focused on conflict over peace, and that studies 
 
10 Negative peace is defined as the absence of war and violence, while positive peace as the negation of structural 
violence (in addition to actor-led violence) or violence that emanated from the international order and its social 




of positive variants of peace and structural factors have declined since the Cold War (Gleditsch, 
Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014; Jackson, 2015; Bright and Gledhill, 2018). 
Dividing peace scholarship 
Though the type of peace desired is not automatically linked to the analytic approach of an 
academic, the two are closely aligned and have significant implications for how scholars 
contribute to peacebuilding research. Where more conservative understandings of peace might 
lead to a greater acceptance of the status quo and focus on reducing the immediate violent 
elements, scholars adopting positive interpretations should be as concerned with the social and 
systemic factors that produce inequalities which lead to conflict in the first place. By and large, 
PACs scholarship can be divided along these two approaches, between those which refine the 
current system and those which seek to transform it (Newman, 2009b), though a variety of 
labels have been used to differentiate those more conservative understandings (such as 
minimalist, instrumentalist, integrative or problem-solving approaches) and their more radical 
and progressive counterparts (such as maximalist, structuralist, transformative, paradigm 
critiques and critical approaches).11  
Scholars are not bound to any one category but move amongst them through time, issue, and 
context. The most popular of these categorisations, seen as the problem-solving versus 
foundational or paradigm-critiquing divide, was famously articulated last century by the 
esteemed International Relations scholar and Critical Theorist, Robert Cox. For Cox (1981, p. 
130). critical theories were seen to transcend the international order by offering “normative 
[yet feasible] choice in favour of a social and political order” and must therefore “clarify this 
range of possible alternatives” (ibid). Within peacebuilding scholarship, problem-solving 
scholars are seen to make existing systems work more effectively and improve the practice of 
peacebuilding, while the latter challenge the underlying assumptions that make up the 
peacebuilding discourse (Pugh, 2013, p. 11). Where Cox (1981, p. 128) sees merit in both 
approaches, scholars frequently critique each other for not undertaking their favoured 
approach. Here, problem-solving scholars conceive of critical theorists as being too abstract, 
while critical scholars perceive their counterparts as reifying the systems which produce 
conflict. 
 
11 For the sake of clarity, this thesis typically refers to this division through the problem-solving/critical theorist 
dichotomy, though later chapters delineate between 5 categories of criticality  (see chapter 5) which, while sharing 
many overlaps with existing categorisations, have been relabelled to avoid confusion with existing concepts and 
to focus on the identification of more radical and transformative critiques (termed subversive knowledge, see 




The significance of this debate is immense for studies of peacebuilding and some of the most 
ardent critiques against PACs scholarship have come from paradigm-critics within it (see, for 
example, Chandler, 2017a; Jabri, 2013a; Jackson, 2016a, 2017b; Pugh, 2004a, 2013). These 
scholars feel that their problem-solving counterparts’ concern with “establishing instrumental 
practices to address pre-existing problems” (Bellamy, 2004, p. 19) freezes the status quo, 
preventing struggles for justice while denying the reality of conflict, ignoring the clash of 
interests between groups, and focusing on misperceptions and subjectivity (Banks, Michael 
and Mitchell, 1996). Such arguments, typically considered ‘paradigm critiques’, claim that 
their colleagues who “focus on the normative and technical processes of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, rarely consider the global power structures in which they take place” (Richmond 
and Pogodda, 2016). While attempting to improve peacebuilding techniques and operations is 
undoubtedly a noble endeavour, critical scholars claim that the problem-solvers’ focus and 
quest to be ‘policy relevant’ ignores structural issues that promote conflict, while practitioner’s 
“search for knowledge that reinforces their own practices and experiences” ignores broader 
critiques made against the peacebuilding paradigm (Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012, p. 16).12 This is 
an exceptionally important critique to consider, given shifts such as the ‘local turn’ whereupon 
critical scholars’ advocation for a greater understanding of local societies and resistance to 
peacebuilding could be co-opted by their problem-solving peers to mitigate and pacify these 
same spaces by, for example, generating theories in which local communities are ‘empowered’ 
to own international norms and processes (see, for instance, Campbell, 2011).  
The extent to which these criticisms are warranted has been fervently debated, and some 
problem-solving theorists have lashed back at the lack of alternative solutions made by their 
attackers. Paris (2010) epitomises this view in his article Saving liberal peacebuilding, where 
he argues that critiques against the liberal peace are often exaggerated or misdirected, and have 
failed to produce any viable alternative that is of use to decision makers. While Paris (ibid, p. 
339) claims to agree with the need to reform liberal peacebuilding, he believes that those useful 
alternatives suggested by liberal peace critics, such as the need for local ownership in 
peacebuilding, “are themselves based on liberal principles, [where] it follows that much of the 
 
12 William Easterly and Peter Boone provide an illustration of this phenomenon in the broader humanitarian sector. 
Easterly claims that researchers will publish a piece claiming there is no link between foreign aid and positive 
growth, this claim will be scrutinized by other researchers during which someone will argue that there is a link 
with positive growth. This publication will be picked up by aid agencies and used to justify their work, until 
another academic scrutinizes the claim and finds again that there is no link between foreign aid and positive 




critical literature is actually espousing  variations within, rather than alternatives to, liberal 
peacebuilding”.  
Given this thesis’ aims in identifying and understanding precisely how these more critical 
theorists have contested and challenged the discourse of international peacebuilding, 
delineating between critical and problem-solving scholarship becomes of great significance. 
While categorising scholars by their potential for radical or revolutionary thought is made 
difficult by their inherent fluidity, general divisions can be drawn based on the types of 
questions asked, the methodological approach taken, the conclusions made, the language used 
and the surrounding scholarship cited and critiqued (see the table below in which Bellamy 
(2004), drawing on Cox, usefully summarises these considerations). 
Table 1: Divisions in Scholarly Approach - adapted from Bellamy (2004) 
 Problem-Solving Critical Theory 
Purpose predominantly instrumental and 
predicated on implicit normative 
assumptions 
explicit normative agenda 
Nature of the social world objectivist world-view that treats 
problems as pre-given and 
interventions as discrete acts 
maintain that the social world and 
the problems that peace operations 
address are socially constructed. 
Relationship between theory and 
practice 
do not reflect on this relationship uncover the ideological 
preferences of dominant theories 
and practices, and seek 
alternatives 
Drawing on notions of positive peace and critical theory, we can understand that problem-
solving theorists seek to improve peacebuilding practices (how we do peacebuilding), while 
critical theorists seek to challenge the broader structures and systems that lead to conflict (why 
we do peacebuilding).13 The focus of critical theorist’s stems, perhaps, from the significance 
that assumptions of ‘why we peace build’ have in altering how practitioners respond to 
questions of ‘how we do peacebuilding’. As argued above, it is not enough for critical scholars 
to simply critique these structures however, and Cox has convincingly argued the explicit need 
for critical approaches to contain alternative orders. Unfortunately, recent scholarship has 
suggested that many critical theorists fail to do this and offer only their critique as an alternative 
 
13 While a key component of this thesis lies in exploring how scholars addressed these questions, it must be noted 
that the extent to which critical theorists focus on questions of why is often balanced, to its detriment, by their 




(Visoka, 2018) rather than outlining alternative objectives and social orders to which 
emancipatory endeavours can be directed.  
Other reflective studies have argued that in addition to this failing, many critical critiques fail 
to go far enough in their challenge of structural factors and the status quo, leading to questions 
of precisely how critical peacebuilding theorists have assisted in the emancipation of the 
subjects of intervention. Here, Jackson (2015, 2017b) has noted that most scholarship within 
social sciences is informed by a Popperian and positivist view (which maintains a problem-
solving approach), while critical scholarship frequently fails to adequately acknowledge and 
contest the range of institutions which continually oppress peoples and cause violent conflict 
(from the legitimacy of violence, to the capitalist state). A significant reason for this might be 
seen to stem from how scholars balance their critical aspirations with their normative desire to 
immediately help those in need. Given the foundations of PACs as a critical discipline 
concerned with normative critique, most scholars would likely prefer to be considered 
transformative or critical. While many theorists may seek more maximalist definitions of peace 
in the long term, this thesis seeks to understand how the concern with the immediacy of 
violence encourages a problem-solving approach and minimalist understanding of peace at the 
expense of critiquing  larger structures and positing more radical alternatives. 
It is here that the importance of divisions between conceptions of peace and academic approach 
become most obvious. For, while a scholar may desire to contribute to the establishment of an 
expansive and positive variant of peace, if their critique is focused upon the immediate factors 
of violence rather than larger structural causes of conflict, they potentially contribute to the 
improvement and reification, rather than transformation, of the existing order. As is explored 
within this thesis, it appears as if critical literatures are becoming increasingly descriptive and 
critiquing our understandings, while failing to offer alternatives which either address their 
critiques, or the broader systemic issues. Part of the underlying rationale of this thesis is to 
explore how critical theories may be co-opted or distorted by the very performances and 
institutions of academia. Where chapter three draws on the notion of parrhesia to account for 
a more detailed notion of criticality as it is envisioned within this thesis, the following section 
looks at how academic knowledge has been conceptualised within PACs to understand how 
critical knowledge might contest international peacebuilding, and how the various elements of 




2.4: ON ACADEMIA 
Since international peacebuilding’s inception, there has been a steady and growing volume of 
introspective analysis within the academic literature (see, for example Rogers and 
Ramsbotham, 1999; Buhaug, Levy and Urdal, 2014; Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014; 
Jackson, 2015; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Goetze, 2017; Thiessen and Byrne, 2018). 
Often written to deepen arguments articulated by critical theorists, this arm of enquiry typically 
questions the dominance of the liberal peace as it appears in theory rather than in practice. 
Illustrating the attempts by scholars to evaluate the role of academia in developing and 
progressing peacebuilding practice and theory, this branch of literature is mostly made up of 
more critical scholars articulating their dissatisfaction with theories which they believe to be 
buttressing power. 
The need for introspective analysis was made succinctly by Mac Ginty (2013c) in his edited 
handbook of peacebuilding. Mac Ginty asks readers to consider the assumptions which are held 
by those researching peacebuilding, questioning whether we think some conflicts are worse 
than others, or whether we favour particular methodologies which may lead to ingrained biases 
in results. He points to how problem-solving theorists and the critical theorists often talk past 
each other, preventing the rigorous critique of ideas, often at the expense of work undertaken 
by critical theorists who are less favoured by practitioners due to assumed policy irrelevance.  
The following section analyses these introspective critiques of international peacebuilding 
theorisation to outline how critical approaches might seek to contest and transform the 
peacebuilding paradigm, our understandings of peace, and the international order. To do this, 
it highlights the conventional theory of knowledge transmission between researchers, policy-
makers and practitioners by drawing on Kolb’s (2014) ‘Experiential Learning Cycle’, before 
investigating research by peacebuilding theorists on how this cycle is distorted through a 
variety of institutional factors. These works typically highlight two overarching issues to do 
with the creation of alternative peacebuilding theories and the sharing of knowledge between 
policy-makers and theoreticians, the significance of which is demonstrated by drawing on the 
works of more ‘radical’ critical theorists. Ultimately, while the understanding that is proffered 
here relates to the theory/policy/practitioner divide, this thesis reorients these models to focus 
only on the interactions of theorists (scholars) as it seeks to understand how critical scholars 
have attempted to contest their peers and the wider discourse before such efforts are distorted 




Knowledge Transmission in Theory: The Experiential Learning Cycle 
Understanding how theory, policy and practice interrelate should be of great importance to 
peacebuilding researchers who are interested in transforming or improving how we build peace. 
Despite this, reflexive analysis of how theories are constructed and disseminated has rarely 
been undertaken, with scholars frequently either failing to declare their assumptions, or failing 
to question them. This would be of little significance if academia had no impact, and while 
Avruch (1998, p.4; 1998, p.1) famously claimed that “practice drives theory”, there are many 
instances in which theory, as any academic might hope, has informed practice. Indeed, the 
close personal links between many policy-makers and scholars, and the number of scholars that 
undertake consultancy work for NGOs, suggests that this ability to affect practice may be 
significant (Goetze, 2017). This thesis assumes that the theory (or academia in general) can 
inform policy and practice, but that the relationship between these is heavily contested and 
convoluted.14 
Understandably, given the difficulties inherent in analysing how knowledge is transmitted and 
translated into practice, there are few studies which make this the focus of their enquiry, though 
numerous scholars remark on the phenomenon. For example, in a study of research and policy 
on fragile states, Jones and Elgin-Cossart (2011) argue that while there are issues with 
translating policy into practice, there is also a significant gap between what is known by policy-
makers and what is known by researchers. To them, no framework exists for knowledge 
accumulation, and academia’s lack of focus on policy tools has limited its relevance to 
decision-making circles, while donor research is not rigorous enough to be translated into 
policy (Ibid). While they propose several solutions to bridge this gap, including adopting 
minimum measures in research design, a later study by van der Lijn (2016, p. 168) argues that 
“even if the knowledge gap between practitioners and academics were to be improved 
suboptimal policies would remain” given the way friction occurs when international policies 
are enacted upon simplified local realities that exist only in the minds of policy-makers. These 
latter studies of friction, which analyse the way in which policies are altered as they are 
implemented in practice, provide a useful starting point for this thesis, which assumes these 
same realities occur in the more abstract realm of transmitting theory between academics even 
before they are transmitted into policy.  
 




The relationship between policy and theory is undoubtedly important, not only because theories 
should improve policy and practice, but because theories themselves could not be refined and 
tested if this transmission was never revisited, remaining a purely philosophical and abstract 
pursuit. As Kolb (2014, p. 4) argues, “without theory, reflections may not lead towards insight 
into practice”. Kolb explains the relationship between theoreticians, policy-makers and 
practitioners through a ‘learning cycle’ where reflexive observation leads to abstract 
conceptualisation, before active experimentation (implementation) and concrete experiences 
can occur. Intrinsic in this relationship is the role of academics who are largely involved in the 
first two stages in the cycle (and given the rise in ‘pracademics’ may becoming increasingly 
involved in the latter two as well). 
 
Figure 1: The Experimental Learning Cycle, taken from Kolb 2014  
While this conceptualisation of the interplay between knowledge, policy and practice seems 
self-explanatory, in reality, such a smooth process is rarely found and there are numerous 
imperfections which lead to closed loops where reflective observation does not lead to 
innovation in theory, or theoretical innovations struggle to manifest in policy or practice. Kolb 
offers one explanation for this difficulty by drawing on Luhmann and Foucault. He argues that 




whole more resistant to change” (Kolb, 2014, p. 6). Thus, to Kolb, it is easier to convince an 
individual practitioner of the need for change than it is to change the organisation that he/she 
works for, or humanitarian efforts writ large, given the way in which underlying assumptions 
remain concealed or undeclared (in what he calls the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion).15 Such 
suggestions clearly resonate with this thesis’ focus upon critical innovations in peacebuilding, 
where the difficulty that local-turn advocates have had in having their ideas around local 
ownership implemented clash with peacebuilding’s core assumption of the supremacy of 
Western governance models, knowledge and capacity. 
While this transmission and failure to affect the desired change is important, a prior question 
must be asked regarding what happens to such ideas at the academic level. The following 
section draws on the previously identified notions of criticality to evaluate our understanding 
of barriers to the transformation of international peacebuilding within scholarship. While the 
distortions that occur to theory within the academic realm are undoubtedly somewhat different 
to those between the scholar/policy/practitioner divide, by treating more mainstream and 
orthodox scholars in a similar manner to policymakers and practitioners, the contestation and 
distortion of radical and emancipatory critique can be more easily traced. 
Barriers to critically contesting International Peacebuilding 
As has been noted earlier, one of the greatest ongoing debates within PACs relates to its 
‘transformative’ nature; the willingness of academics to critique not only the practices used to 
obtain peace, but the types of peace sought. From Herman Schmid’s early writings in the 1960s, 
Oliver Richmond’s critiques in the 2000s, and David Chandler’s writing in the 2010s,16 
scholars have continually accused each other of failing to be transformative, to recognise the 
structures of power which they are complicit in, and to propose solutions that are radical enough 
that they can overcome issues of structural power and oppression. Indeed, the critical turn that 
emerged within development studies (Schuurman, 2009), PACs (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2013) terrorism studies (Jackson, Smyth and Gunning, 2009) and many other disciplines at the 
turn of the millennium, while normative, often fails to connect with metanarratives and be truly 
critical. The following section explores several barriers which are seen to impact on the ability 
 
15 Though Autesserre (2014b) provides a compelling argument how the inverse is also true, where individuals can 
be (inadvertently or otherwise) resistant to change and innovation through their ‘everyday’ peacebuilding 
practices. 




for scholars to construct and transmit more radical and emancipatory critiques, focusing 
primarily upon technocratic, structural and epistemic constraints.  
Technocratic Closure 
One of the most consistent critiques against the transformative capacity of PACs scholarship 
and peacebuilding has emerged through studies of technocracy. Here, the professionalisation 
and standardisation of the peace industry has led to an increase in the need for neutral research 
which can be used by those in power (such as policy makers) to increase the efficiency of 
peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 289). Defined as the “systems and behaviours that 
prioritize bureaucratic rationality”, the dominance of the norms, rationales, and practices of 
which it is comprised (including truth, regime and epistemes), are seen to be a product of 
modernity and the neoliberal order embodied by the Global North which preferences Western 
ways of knowing and understanding (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 289).17 
Similar to many interpretations of problems-solving knowledge, technocratic knowledge is 
considered value free and buttresses the status quo by assisting policy makers in their 
endeavours, rather than denigrating and scrutinizing their actions (Chomsky, 2017). Within 
peace research, the technocratic turn has enabled the Global North to better manage and order 
conflict, rather than transform it (Duffield, 2007, 2019), and it has been largely successful in 
shifting the public and political debate away from human solidarity, ethics and morality, 
towards the efficacy of the business imperative (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 295). Its dominance has 
increasingly framed how conflicts are “understood, discussed and responded to” (bid, p. 300) 
and it has become a “major factor in determining the nature of peace-building process, the 
actors involved  in peacebuilding operations, and the type of ‘peace’ that it produces” (bid, p. 
287).  
As such, the preference of technocratic knowledge has been seen to stifle innovation in both 
knowledge creation and transmission. Mac Ginty (2012) and Scholey (2006) have both noted 
how technocracy leads to and compounds the effects of epistemic closure in which 
peacebuilding’s defence and supporting bureaucracy becomes a political project closed to 
outsiders. Here a set of “mutually reinforcing institutions creat[e] an increasingly hegemonic 
system of peace-building that is intolerant of alternatives and creativity”, reducing the ability 
 
17 Modernity is not enough to explain the dominance of technocracy however, and “key institutional and political 
actors had to be in place over a sustained period in order to promulgate the superiority of technocracy. Thus, the 
main international peace-building institutions, as well as the international financial institutions, have been 





to create and find non-conforming innovations to the practice of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty, 
2012, p. 288; Stanton and Kelly, 2015). To Goetze (2017), these issues are compounded by the 
close network of relations between people involved in international peacebuilding (regardless 
of institution), where most people appear to come from similar backgrounds and levels of 
privilege, decreasing the level of diversity in conceptualisations and the possibility of 
alternatives (often referred to as an epistemic community or invisible college).   
Stanton and Kelly (2015) have argued that technocracy has diminished the willingness and 
ability of practitioners to implement as well as critique new methods, while academic or 
dominance of theory and knowledge production has marginalised practice-based knowledge. 
Drawing on Donald Schon’s work on how practitioners think and operate, Stanton and Kelly 
argue that “positivism created a division between those responsible for theory and knowledge 
creation, and those responsible for practice” (ibid, p.43). During this split, scientists and 
scholars became responsible for building and refining theories based on the results of 
practitioners who were tasked with testing them. This division led to a loss of reflexivity 
amongst practitioners whose practical knowledge was continually devalued within academia 
which had increasingly privileged theory over practice in knowledge creation (ibid, p.39). 
Thus, while academia increasingly marginalised the technical knowledge of practitioners, who 
struggled to convey to academics “how they knew what to do” in complex environments (ibid, 
p.43), practitioners struggled to apply the theoretical ideas espoused by academics (Eraut, 
1994). They instead increasingly rely on their own intuition and “tried and true methods” 
(Stanton and Kelly, 2015, p. 45), or the useful policy relevant and value free knowledge of 
orthodox research. 
Other commentators have highlighted issues that compound this tension between practitioners, 
policy makers and academics. Osaghae (2001, p. 25), for instance, argues that there is often a 
disconnect between policy and research agendas unless research is explicitly commissioned by 
policy makers or donors themselves. Here, the focus upon evidenced based case studies and 
theory building by researchers is potentially lost on policy makers who are typically more 
interested in practical responses to domestic politics (Scholey, 2006). Conversely however, 
other scholars have pointed to the high level of influence that donor institutes wield over setting 
research agendas through their control of funding (Bell, 2001; RAWOO, 2001; Olinisakin and 
Scholey, 2005; Bergeron, 2007), which could potentially further delegate the realm of theory 
building to an isolated academia. In addition to this is the added confusion caused by the 




producers of knowledge has challenged the status of expert and the ability for consumers to 
evaluate the merits of particular knowledge which compete with each other for audiences 
(Olssen and Peters, 2005; Barry, 2011). 
Structural Barriers 
The technocratic turn is not something that simply reduces criticality and innovation in 
scholarship, but is a preference actively constructed and maintained within the neoliberal 
academy by its funders who desire this type of knowledge (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 
1975; Schuurman, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2012). The preference for this type of research, perceived 
to be value free insofar as it reflects the values and interests of the status quo (Jackson, 2015; 
Chomsky, 2017), has been reinforced through its reproduction in the metrics used by the 
neoliberal university to monitor and evaluate academic performance and funding decisions 
(such as the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the U.K. and Performance-Based 
Research Fund (PBRF) in New Zealand). This closure of diversity within the neoliberal 
academy is such that the entire research process is affected. De Guevera and Kostic (2017, p. 
7) note, 
In the social sciences, too, engagement with ‘stakeholders’ (such as policymakers) and 
‘beneficiaries’ (such as local Southern communities) is encouraged throughout the whole 
research process from design to dissemination, again ensuring relevance and possibilities for 
direct impact. This influences the design of research projects and also the types of research 
methodologies and contents that are currently favoured. Most importantly in recent years, there 
has been a push towards both evidence-based policymaking and research based on big data, the 
latter playing a major role in attempts to predict social events such as ‘violent conflicts’ in the 
South and ‘riots’ in the North and, ultimately, to prevent them. 
This power is disciplinary, in that scholars who ‘play the game’ and produce policy-oriented 
research are more likely (or able) to receive funding from private and public entities which 
enable greater research undertakings and subsequently more research outputs and, often, job 
security. Scholars who seek to undertake more radical and revolutionary research may be 
unable to find the funding to do so, or will likely produce research that is of little commercial 
or policy benefit leading to departments being viewed poorly by university administrators who 
place them under continual review and restructuring, decreasing their  access to funding and 





Another factor to reduce radical scholarship and innovation within academia is the weight 
afforded to well established academics, who, while potentially having more bureaucratic 
responsibilities, have less pressure to “publish or perish” affording them more time to 
undertake large scale research projects. The academic capital of such scholars might be so great 
that they are seen to stifle innovation, as Galtung and Freire have been seen to do in PACs 
education (Kester and Cremin, 2017). This dominance over a discourse bears many similarities 
to those of large news media outlets noted by Chomsky (2002), which are able to influence the 
news cycle due to their improved access, funding, and readership. One could conceive of 
academics following or engaging more with the writings of influential scholars, both to 
increase their own impact by situating their research within these larger conversations, and 
because their status affords them a more prominent position in search algorithms – which, while 
often sorting by relevance, also take into consideration the number of views or citations an 
article may have had. In addition to this, interpersonal relationships may afford such scholars 
more publishing opportunities (through co-authorship, etc.), while their positions as editors for 
prominent journals may enable them to keep ‘their finger on the pulse’ and predict and shape 
new research ventures.  
More overtly, research and department heads might have a greater say over staff positions, 
research funding, PhD scholarships, etc., all of which have long term repercussions on shaping 
the types of questions that will be produced by those institutions. This is not to question the 
ability of academics to employ a wide range of scholars within their faculties, but merely to 
acknowledge that epistemic communities may inadvertently be produced through these 
processes. One example of this might be seen through ‘embedded experts’, “influential scholars 
[who] have close ties to power holders” and work closely with governments to produce 
knowledge and inform policy, while frequently excluding scholars “with critical or counter-
hegemonic views” (Jackson, 2015, p. 28), a critique frequently made by critical theorists 
(Schuurman, 2009).  
Meanwhile, the “publish or perish” environment of academia also has numerous impacts on 
innovation the quality of research being undertaken by scholars.18 The performances of 
everyday academia, such as staff meetings, teaching and bureaucratic responsibilities all 
encroach on the time scholars have to undertake research, while the institutional need to 
 
18 According to one recent op-ed, this environment can also be a ‘publish and perish’ one, whereupon the costs of 





continue to publish incentivise incremental rather than revolutionary research. Systems such as 
ethics approval (not required by research institutes and think thanks) affect the types of research 
that may be undertaken and how, reducing scholars’ competitiveness within the competitive 
knowledge marketplace for ideas, which alongside time pressures, increases scholarly reliance 
on second hand information collated by third parties to inform their research (de Guevara and 
Kostić, 2017, p. 6,7).  This publish or perish environment may further reduce the quality of 
scholarship by reducing their ability to explore and engage with existing scholarship, and as 
noted earlier, encourage them to undertake more mainstream and iterative work which is more 
likely to be published.  
Epistemic Closure 
Another significant factor which could be seen to reduce the critical potential of peacebuilding 
knowledge is the notion of epistemic closure, whereupon scholars can be seen to rarely engage 
with other disciplines, leading to homogenous research clusters and a reduced potential for 
innovation. In a scoping study of how ideas are transmitted, Millar and Lecy (2016, p.12-13) 
noted that disciplinary divides within PACs are relatively closed, and ideas were often 
transmitted through one or two “bridging publications” which most scholars seemed to rely on 
to inform their grasp of alternative research. The consequence of this phenomenon was that 
academics were less likely to constructively engage with ideas stemming from outside of their 
immediate academic discipline or research community (ibid), potentially diminishing the value 
of their own work by failing to address and consider innovations made in other fields. These 
same divisions can be seen to occur spatially (for example, between research produced within 
North America and Europe; Beriker, 2015) and epistemologically (for example, between 
critical and problem-solving theorists; Schuurman, 2009). 
Adding to those difficulties highlighted in transmitting knowledge within academia and 
between research and policymaking institutions, a number of works point to the dominance of 
Northern scholarship in peacebuilding policy who favour its universal, macro level, non-local 
and non-context specific knowledge (Mac Ginty, 2012, p. 296). In an earlier scoping study on 
the prominence of the Global North in academia, Mac Ginty (ibid) finds that the best-resourced 
peace and conflict research institutes and publishing houses are all located in the Global North 
and are dominated by Global North academics. Subsequently, Mac Ginty argues that the 
creation and exchange of knowledge by professionals is “bounded transnationalism”, where 
“the dominant flow of personnel, ideas, practice and peace-building funding is from the global 




academia are seen to be only further accentuated by the fact that peacebuilding institutions, 
donors, and INGOs typically operate from “New York, Washington, Geneva, Brussels, Paris, 
London, Tokyo etc”, rather than the specific context in which they operate (Richmond and 
Pogodda, 2016). 
Scholey (2006), in her review of research relationships between Global North and South 
institutions argues that the ability of Global South scholars to tap into global discussions is 
limited by insufficient resources and their focus on short term, contextually driven, problem-
solving, which is of little interest to Global North scholarship. Other factors such as peer-
review and publishing processes (dominated by English) further disadvantage non-Global 
North scholars. To Scholey, these difficulties, combined with ongoing conflict, have the 
potential to lead to brain drains within the Global South, further reducing their potential, 
leading her to argue for the deliberate restructuring of administration and research projects to 
undermine the Global North advantage. 
Interestingly, Scholey’s (2006, p.181) analysis of the North/South division is drawn purely on 
spatial terms where “Southern researchers refers to researchers situated in Southern war-torn 
contexts”, regardless of whether they were trained in the North or are recipients of Northern 
funding. Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of ‘habitus’, Scholey (2006, p. 181) argues that 
“the experience of living in a place shapes our behaviour, understanding and analysis” which 
subsequently affects the way in which researchers frame “problems and questions, research 
methodologies, funding and dissemination”. Like Lecy, Millar, Mac Ginty and others, Scholey 
seeks to illustrate the Global North’s dominance of research by highlighting the Global South’s 
lack of funding and research output, which, while illustrative, does not go deep enough. To this 
end, Maclure’s (2006) analysis of the impact of endogenous African educational research 
points to several significant asymmetries in the relationship which reflect the influence of 
governmentality on North/South scholarship – though in the discipline of education rather than 
peacebuilding.  
Maclure argues that institutional funding constraints upon sub-Saharan African scientific 
institutions cause them to prioritise teaching at the expense of research, to the extent that their 
scientific output is estimated to be less than 1 percent of the world’s output. Most of this 
research is “produced by scholars and consultants who are employed in the universities, think 
tanks, and aid agencies of Northern countries” who not only set research agendas and modes 




mindsets to them and whom they have formed relationships with (ibid, p. 81). In addition to 
this are the noted problems in how Western scholars perceive ‘good scholarship’, wherein peer 
review mechanisms frequently filter out scholarship from the Global South which fails to 
comply with their expectations (by, for example, failing to offer a significant theoretical 
contribution). All of these issues severely limit the potential for African research to reflect 
African concerns, and while the dominance of the Global North is certainly illustrated through 
their numerical supremacy in both research output and funding, deeper analysis is required to 
trace the extent to which Global South scholarship reflects Southern rather than Northern 
concerns. 
This is not to say that Global North Academics are all complicit in the deliberate subjugation 
of Global South scholarship, as they too are bounded by the neoliberal institutions in which 
they work which are also worsened by technocratic elements. For example, and to add to 
Maclure’s argument, Global North researchers face funding constraints which prevent them 
from having collaborative relationships and face to face discussions with their Global South 
counterparts, or building new networks within the Global South, while mechanisms such as 
tenure and peer review incentivise research that is more theoretical in nature, at the expense of 
work with a more practical bent (Scholey, 2006). Ultimately, what should be taken away from 
this discussion is the need to critically assess the extent to which Global North academics are 
complicit in the continual marginalisation of Global South scholarship and transformative 
theories. As Dowding (2006), in his analysis of power and dominance argues, watching 
someone being bullied is not the same moral wrong as being the bully. However, once we 
become aware of how institutions affect the interests of ourselves and others, “anyone who 
does not act to change those institutions for the better is part of the structure of domination” 
(ibid, p. 142). 
These discussions on the dominance of the Global North in peacebuilding literature suffer, like 
so many studies of peacebuilding, from oversimplified binaries. Actors from within the Global 
North are not a homogenous entity (as seen by our divisions of problem-solving, critical, and 
radical scholarship), and differences exist between these groups on how they feel we can best 
achieve peace. The assertion that ideas are marginalised along a Global North/South divide 
cannot account for this phenomenon entirely and drawing conclusions simply by undertaking 
an analysis of the number of academics from the Global South who have been published in 
northern journals would presuppose, incorrectly, that academics from the north are incapable 





While critical scholars have critiqued top-down approaches in favour of emphasising local 
agency, which they believe to be emancipatory and might transform the international system 
rather than integrate post-conflict states within it, their ability to offer truly radical critiques is 
not a given. Here, more ‘radical’ scholars have challenged the ability for critical theorists to 
critique the liberal peace paradigm. Chandler for instance, has long argued that liberal peace 
critiques were unable “to go beyond the binaries of liberal universalism and cultural relativism” 
(2017b, p. 20), and that their (mis)conceptualisation of power led to an inability to overcome 
it (2010a).19  
Other scholars have argued that efforts to move beyond the liberal peace (such as hybrid and 
post-liberal peace) do not go far enough given their refusal to critique particular institutions or 
suggest radical alternatives. Unlike Paris (and perhaps Chandler) however, these critiques are 
more vehement, and they call on scholars to denounce many of the foundational liberal 
assumptions inherent in their writing. Jackson (2017b), for example, critiques critical theorists 
such as Richmond and Mac Ginty for continuing to consider state-centric solutions of 
peacebuilding which are built around notions of ‘legitimate’ uses of violence, the acceptance 
of which, is itself “an essential cause of war and violence”. Jackson’s argument here becomes 
similar to Schmid’s (1968), where the failure to radically rethink concepts, such as the 
Westphalian state and the international system, amounts to integrative rather than 
transformative problem-solving.  
Similarly, Rubenstein (1999), draws on Marxian and Foucauldian scholarship to argue that 
conflict resolution (and subsequently peacebuilding) has been created by global elites to more 
efficiently and acceptably manage social conflicts. Similar arguments have been made by 
scholars such as Dillon and Reid (2009) and Duffield (2019). To Rubenstein (1999, p.127), 
peacebuilding efforts cannot resolve conflict, as radical structural changes do not serve the 
interests of elites in maintaining their hegemony. Putting questions of whether a coherent (and 
potentially malicious) global elite exists aside, Foucault’s notion of governmentality provides 
a more nuanced reading of Rubenstein’s work, which could explain how our social systems 
structure peacebuilding practices and theories to be integrative and to reify hegemony. While 
this is explored throughout the thesis, it is worth briefly highlighting Foucault’s work on 
 
19 Though these critiques appear to have been raised due to Chandler’s (2017b, p. 166) view that elements of post-
liberal peace and the local turn could amount to ‘cultural relativism’ and the undermining of democracy and 




‘discourse’ which deepens the eminence of divisions between problem-solving and paradigm-
critiquing theorists. Jabri (2013a, p. 94,95) eloquently explains Foucault’s concept of a 
discourse as: 
social relations represented in texts where the language contained within these texts is used to 
construct meaning and representation… The underlying assumption of discourse analysis is 
that social texts do not merely reflect or mirror objectives, events and categories pre-existing 
in the social and natural world. Rather, they actively construct a version of those things… they 
do things. 
To Foucault, discourses can be considered “a violence which we do to things” (Foucault, 1984); 
they play a role in legitimizing and recruiting violence, by making violence conceivable 
(Demmers, 2012). Such sentiments deepen the importance of the critiques made by Jackson 
(2017b) and others, by suggesting that paradigm-critiques which fail to adequately critique 
oppressive structures are potentially integrative and validate rather than transform bad practice, 
given the ways in which language or writing on peace influences how we conceive of reality 
and the range of imagined futures (or alternative orders). The following section explores the 
most recent ‘post-liberal’ turn in academia which is increasing in popularity amongst critical 
scholars, to situate why now, more than ever, we need to understand precisely how critical 
theorists critique the discourse of peacebuilding and the limits and challenges of academia that 
must be overcome if their emancipatory intent is to be realised. 
2.5: THE POST-LIBERAL TURN  
Peacebuilding, in both theory and practice, is fundamentally contested. Although questions of 
what peacebuilding is, and the type of peace being sought have been fervently debated since 
the term’s popularisation, the issues that they attempt to resolve are much older, drawing on 
problems of power and politics, dominance and subjugation, and transformation and 
integration. Over the past two decades, scholars have made considerable inroads in challenging 
the top-down liberal paradigm of peacebuilding with the bottom-up local and contextual 
understandings of the post-liberal peace.20 Indeed, as is explored within this thesis, the critical 
and local turns within peacebuilding scholarship (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; 
 
20 As explored throughout this thesis, there is not clear alternative paradigm to the liberal peace which has instead 
been contested through a variety of critical labels (such as emancipatory, everyday, local, bottom up, etc.). While 
there are nuances between each of these conceptualisations which are explored in more detail throughout this 
thesis, the conception of the post-liberal developed by Richmond (2011a) offers perhaps the most coherent and 




Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015) have heralded an ever-growing number of 
works which draw on critical approaches and sensitivities during analysis (chapter 5). 
Despite the popularity of these approaches however, it is unclear to what extent they have been 
emancipatory rather than merely rhetorical or pragmatic (Chandler, 2017b). While many 
scholars have positively noted the emancipatory processes of local resistance to the hegemonic 
norms of liberalism, they have, rather confusingly, also pointed to how resistance against the 
‘liberal peace’ has always occurred (Canclini, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2011), raising questions about 
how exactly the last decade of critical scholarship has benefitted the oppressed. Perhaps the 
merits of the post-liberal shift lie simply in the recognition of liberalism’s localness coupled 
with the hope that this acknowledgement may lead to its refinement. As noted earlier in the 
chapter, others have argued that this shift has not gone far enough and that we need to replace 
many more of our foundational assumptions to truly undertake emancipatory peacebuilding by 
transforming the international system writ large (see for instance, Jackson, 2017b). 
Considering these innovations, some reflective analysis has demonstrated a struggle to 
comprehend what peacebuilding is if it is no longer liberal. Chandler has argued that 
peacebuilding’s advocation for local empowerment and capacity building are becoming 
indistinguishable from other fields of development and risk reduction, and that peacebuilding 
as a distinct policy field no longer exists. He argues that:  
if the goal is no longer peace and if there is no structure of goals and developments from which 
success and failure can be judged, then peacebuilding certainly does not seem a particularly 
fitting description for the forms of international intervention still discussed and pursued under 
this rubric. (2016, p. 52) 
To Chandler (2017b, p. 192), the influence of postmodern thinking and the rejection of meta-
narratives and universals has seen peacebuilding shift from a policy field concerned with 
human and sovereign rights under international law, “to concerns of knowledge claims of cause 
and effect, highlighted through the problematization of peacebuilding policy interventions’ 
unintended consequences”. Policy-makers, attempting to overcome the unintended 
consequences of peacebuilding, have shifted their focus to “the pragmatic governance of 
effects”, focusing on fluid and contextual issues at the expense of addressing the root causes 
of conflict (ibid, p.193). 
While this shift is the precise reason why critical scholars believe root causes of violent conflict 




hegemonic meta-narratives, Chandler’s concern that peacebuilding’s ‘twenty year crises’ has 
ended with its destruction has some merit, at least to those wishing to conceive of peacebuilding 
as a concrete set of policies which attempt to get post-conflict states from A to B. Though 
observations of peacebuilding’s death may be somewhat overstated, especially if peacebuilding 
is understood as a continually changing bundle of norms, understandings and practices, the 
critical turn’s rejection of universal truths and knowledge appears to have coincided with a 
reduction in the ability for scholars to critique ‘universal’ systemic causes of violence. While 
notions of emancipatory peace and resistance suggest that these structures might still be 
contested and transformed, the extent to which more relativist and contextualised critiques 
contribute to this task is unclear.  
While most European PACs scholars appear to have taken up post-liberal critiques and research 
agendas enthusiastically, it is worth remembering the critical scholarship that emerged 
alongside the ‘hybrid peace’ (approx. 2006-2015). Here scholars problematized the conception 
of local ownership by arguing that it had been implemented rhetorically (or only in name) by 
practitioners, and noted that local actors might struggle to resist co-option by exogenous forces 
or truly own their processes (Donais, 2009a; Richmond, 2012b; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2013). While Richmond and others sought to overcome this problem of co-option by 
highlighting how emancipatory resistance occurs in the ‘everyday’ practices of local groups, 
making the resistance to hybridity a terminological fallacy (chapter 8), it is conceivable that 
such resistance may not always be successful (producing negative outcomes and variants of 
peace). In addition to this, it is entirely unclear how critical scholarship helps subalterns in 
these emancipatory processes, given it typically targets other scholars or international actors. 
Furthermore, this new era of the post-liberal peace does not mean that the project of liberal 
peacebuilding is over in anything but name. Emancipatory peace, as conceptualised by 
Richmond, still requires intervention as it is created through resistance to external norms. Even 
as Chandler (2016) writes about the end of peacebuilding, he admits that there is little to suggest 
peacebuilding practices will cease to exist, or that bottom-up solutions will completely replace 
top-down planning. 
2.6: CHAPTER CONCLUSION - THE SUBJUGATION OF CRITICAL THEORY 
What the post-liberal phenomenon of peacebuilding suggests is that the relationship between 
policy and theory is more mutual than Avruch argued at the turn of the century. Indeed, the rise 




producing practices of peacebuilding occurred alongside a steady policy shift where the 
championing of liberal solutions to conflict reached their zenith a decade ago, before being 
consistently contested and diminished by hybrid, then ultimately post-liberal challenges. This 
phenomenon, or the rise of post-liberal peacebuilding theory, has occurred alongside seismic 
shifts in the structure of the international system which have led some commentators to call for 
a return to macro level analysis of how peacebuilding is being transformed in both practice and 
theory. Roland Paris (2014, p. 502), for example, has argued that  
peace operations have always reflected the prevailing material and ideational conditions of 
international politics, and if we are now witnessing a shift in these conditions – including the 
rise of actors who have different strategic interests and ideas about what types of international 
interventions and domestic governance structures are legitimate or desirable – what, then, are 
the implications of these structural changes for the conception and execution of peace 
operations? 
To Paris, new scholarship should focus on geopolitics to see how shifts in power within the 
international system could challenge norms and universals such as liberalism and their 
corresponding peacebuilding practices. With the growing involvement of non-traditional 
peacekeeping countries (such as Brazil, China, India and Russia), such calls are undoubtedly 
warranted. However, they tend to assume rather than problematise the relationship between 
theory and practice. Paris is asking how developing countries or emerging powers are altering 
peacebuilding practices without first considering how these practices are altered more 
generally. Even before such questions can be asked however, a prior problem exists relating to 
how our understandings (in the form of scholarship) are constructed, transmitted and distorted 
within academia. 
To this end, a host of sub-questions relating to peacebuilding can be raised.  How do 
peacebuilding practices change and transform? Who changes them? Does practice inform 
theory or does theory inform practice? Do academics matter, and how are research and policy 
agendas shaped through power? How are ideas contested, and how do epistemological and 
ontological differences amongst peacebuilding scholars affect wider understandings and 
perceptions of the phenomena? In a sense, how does academia contest and contribute to the 
discourse of peacebuilding? Significant scholarship exists which assesses the practitioner (or 
policy) and theory divide (for example, Lowenthal and Bertucci, 2014; Varisco, 2014), yet 




and relatively shallow. It seems that by virtue of being academics, we assume to understand 
how academia works.  
While scholars such as Millar, Mac Ginty, and Scholey have all critiqued the dominance of 
Global North scholarship in theorising peacebuilding, or the institutional blockages that 
prevent constructive interdisciplinary engagement, none of them have fully considered the 
ways in which ideas are accepted, reshaped or rejected throughout this process. Precisely how 
do interactions between academics and their attempts to produce and transmit knowledge affect 
how peacebuilding is understood and practiced? This question is far more complex than what 
technocracy’s North/South divide can account for, given additional biases within scholarship 
across race, gender, location and academic discipline, etc., yet, these issues remain only 
tangentially explored within the field of peacebuilding. At the very least, there is a need to 
repeat Mac Ginty’s preliminary work which analysed the Global South’s influence in 
scholarship and Lecy and Millar’s analysis of theory transmission through a more critical and 
normative lens which accounts for the difference between iterative and transformative 
theorists. Such a study would only scratch the surface of the above questions however, as 
merely assessing the volume of outputs by academics does little to account for how ideas 
become fragmented as they are transmitted, or indeed why some ideas fail to have any influence 
at all. 
Thus, this thesis takes a different tact to Paris’ suggestion. It seeks to undertake a macro level 
analysis of shifts in peacebuilding theory without dismissing the critical and local level insights 
that have contributed so significantly to the field in recent years. Implicit in this critique is the 
question as to what extent the local turn has allowed scholars to consciously and unconsciously 
exonerate themselves from the role they play in perpetuating conflict promoting structures and 
practices of intervention, by leaving the resistance of oppressive orders, actions, and actors in 
the hands of those most likely to benefit from their transformation. Thus, this thesis aims to 
understand how critical scholars contested and resisted the discourse of international 
peacebuilding and investigates the radical, transformative, and emancipatory merit of their 
critiques. The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework employed by this thesis, 
termed ‘subaltern knowledge’, and establishes how the micro-level framework of compound 
friction is inversed to analyse the interplay of scholars by reconceptualising the local or 





CHAPTER 3: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The potential subjugation of emancipatory theory gives rise to a series of questions or problems 
which inform the research aims of this thesis: 
• How do critical theorists believe their knowledge may affect discourses of 
peacebuilding? 
• How do critical theorists attempt to influence discourses of peacebuilding? 
• How do critical critiques and emancipatory theories of international peacebuilding 
influence the wider discourse? 
These questions reflect broader calls in peacebuilding literature, PACs and IR to revaluate the 
role of peacebuilding writ large, given shifts within the international system (Paris, 2014), and 
changes to the types of peace being sought (Chandler, 2016, 2017b; Paris, 1997). Taking these 
calls as a starting point, this thesis does not assume to ‘know’ how the discourse of international 
peacebuilding is constructed. Choosing theorists utilizing critical approaches to study 
peacebuilding as its starting point, it investigates how they have attempted to disrupt and 
challenge mainstream narratives of international peacebuilding by exploring the ways in which 
their critical insights and innovations have been transmitted within and between academics and 
the broader peacebuilding community. To undertake this analysis, the thesis focuses on a 
particular discourse (international peacebuilding), as it has been constructed by a particular set 
of actors (critical scholars), within a specific time period (between 2005, around when the 
critical turn in scholarship began (Schuurman, 2009; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013), and 
2017, when data was collected). This chapter outlines the rationale for the analytical 
framework, before the research design is explained in chapter 4. It first reaffirms the 
assumption that academics have a responsibility to critique power and identifies the types of 
knowledge or data analysed within this thesis. Following this, it constructs an analytical 
framework by adapting the notion of friction to apply to knowledge production and 
transmission.  
3.1: Parrhesia and The Responsibility to Critique 
The analytical and methodological approach of this thesis owes much to the myriad of post-
structuralist, post-colonial and critical scholars whose works are referenced throughout its 
pages. As it is primarily a qualitative endeavour, which seeks to understand how scholars have 




structuralist sensitivity, reversing many of the methods and theories that emerged from the 
critical turn upon themselves to offer a reflexive critique of the discourse. Like similar efforts 
to evaluate discourse (see, for instance, Keller, 2011; Randazzo, 2015; Chandler, 2017a; 
Goetze, 2017), this thesis rejects positivist epistemologies which reduce complexity through 
grandiose generalisations and simplifications in favour of embracing complexity and 
sensitivity, shifting the focus away from providing solutions and answers to the questions and 
processes of knowing themselves.  
This thesis combines the conception of truth provided by parrhesia with the rationale of critical 
theories and PACs to clearly demarcate the type of knowledge analysed within it – which I 
term ‘subversive knowledge’. The need for this new conceptualisation of knowledge emerges 
from the need to more clearly categorise and evaluate how scholars have critiqued the discourse 
of peacebuilding. Drawing on the works of Cox, Duffield, Foucault, Gramsci, Habermas, Jabri, 
Kincheloe, Mclaren, Pugh, Schwarzmantel, Jackson and others, this thesis seeks to radicalise 
the ontological foundations of PACs, explicitly seeking theories of emancipatory peace that are 
cognisant of the need to critique and transform the exogenous (international and structural) 
factors which produce conflict, in order for acts of ‘post-conflict transformation’ to succeed.  
The argument that emerges throughout this thesis is that where problem solving theorists have 
yielded important practical lessons by appraising the methods used to build peace, critical 
theorists have critiqued the orthodox rationale behind those practices, primarily by criticizing 
their top-down implementation. While the latter critiques construct a space for alternative 
variations of peace to arise, they rarely explore this space themselves and their arguments seem 
to be bounded by ‘reality’, shying away from normative arguments or explicit attacks on the 
broader factors that promote conflict. 
I draw heavily on Foucault’s (1980, 2012; Foucault and Ewald, 2003; Foucault, Davidson and 
Burchell, 2008) work deconstructing metanarratives and eschew the tendency of utilizing a 
single ‘correct’ methodology in favour of experimenting with a range of methods to capture 
and analyse the numerous viewpoints, experiences, and beliefs underlying critiques of 
peacebuilding. At the heart of this effort is the Greek notion of parrhesia which is used to 
demarcate the type of knowledge analysed within the thesis and tie together the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions which drive its methodological and analytical approach. 
Used by Foucault in his exploration of the relationship between philosophy and politics, 




through its rejection of a ‘real’ or ‘objective’ truth and its sensitivity to both the productive and 
oppressive influences of power in shaping knowledge. By grounding the epistemological 
framework upon parrhesia I seek to accomplish three things. First, I seek to more clearly define 
the types of knowledge that this thesis examines - what I call ‘subversive knowledge’. Second, 
I seek to make clear the normative assumption at the heart of this thesis, that academics have a 
moral responsibility to produce and transmit this type of knowledge – which is not only an 
impetus for this thesis, but a bias reflected in my examination of the discourse. Third, I seek to 
emphasize the social construction of knowledge and truth to better rationalise the analytical 
framework laid out in the next section. 
Parrhesia can be translated as free or fearless speech and it conceptualises the act of ‘speaking 
truth to power’ (Foucault, 2001, p. 12). To Foucault (ibid, p.19-20), 
parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through 
frankness, … to his own life through danger, … to himself or other people through criticism 
(self-criticism or criticism of other people), and … to moral law through freedom and duty. 
More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal 
relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve 
or help other people (as well as himself). 
Parrhesia, as Foucault conceived it, reflects the post-structuralist concern with modern 
epistemologies’ projection of evidence (or truth) as being disinterested and value free 
(Foucault, 2001, p. 14; Papadimos and Murray, 2008). To post-structuralists, there is no 
objective reality and truth “is not out there waiting to be discovered, it is created in the interest 
of those who exert the most power” (Foucault, 2012). Rejecting modern epistemologies’ belief 
“that what gives access to the truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone”, 
parrhesia “allow[s] us to adopt and adapt an ancient Greek wisdom that points to the ethical 
and spiritual dimensions of the pursuit of knowledge” (Papadimos and Murray, 2008). Truth 
becomes value laden, and a scholars’ task becomes one of exposing or ‘unconcealing’ regimes 
of truth. 21 
In a similar vein to critical traditions, ‘subversive knowledge’ should be considered flexible in 
the extremes of its critique. Its unifying characteristic is not its radicalness, but its focus on 
disrupting and challenging the broader structural factors that promote conflict. As such, 
 
21 It is important to note the work of Michelle Dean (1994, 2010) who clarifies this conceptualisation by exploring 




subversive knowledge is often (but not exclusively) found within critical theory. It is a category 
of knowledge that becomes distinct primarily through its integration of parrhesia, which fills 
the void created by post-structuralism’s rejection of objectivity by viewing truth as a belief 
used to critique power. Thus, subjugated knowledge is a critique which, following parrhesia, 
is a moral and political endeavour that reflects PACs' and critical theory’s interest in both 
exposing regimes of truth and in making normative claims against those in power on behalf of 
the oppressed. At its extreme, subversive peacebuilding knowledge reflects theorists who 
consider orthodox peacebuilding practices to serve the purpose of the existing order by 
‘managing’ conflict within the constraints of the wider, conflict promoting, international 
system. Building on critical theories’ conceptualisations of ‘local peace’ (Richmond, 2014a; 
Pogodda, Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015), subversive knowledge refers to attempts to 
understand how groups resist those peacebuilding practices which replicate oppressive systems 
of governance and management, not only within post-conflict states, but across the entire 
international system. Chapters 5 and 6 explore these continuums in more depth to identify a 
broader typology of critical peacebuilding theories in which these and other characteristics 
were understood. 
In addition to developing ‘what truth is’, beyond elitist conceptions of knowledge and evidence, 
an epistemological framework of parrhesia expands ‘who can know truth’. In fact, Foucault’s 
(2001, p.170) main interest in parrhesia was in the truth-tellers themselves, as he sought to 
understand who was able to tell the truth and why. In this conceptualisation, truth-tellers are 
the powerless who, through a sense of duty, courageously criticise those in power by sharing 
their beliefs with those who do not want to hear them (Foucault, 2001, p. 12; Papadimos and 
Murray, 2008; Tamboukou, 2012, p. 854).  
While few would consider academics and intellectuals in much of Western society today to be 
‘powerless’, parhessia does not mitigate their role in critiquing power. Indeed, it can be seen 
to provide both an avenue for them to offer a more emancipatory critique, as well as an 
argument for why they should ‘speak truth to power’. Through its contestation of the notion of 
truth, parrhesia empowers academics by allowing them to rely on intuition (as those in power 
often do (Barakat and Waldman, 2016, p. 17)) while simultaneously increasing their 
responsibility to declare and account for their personal biases. While not solely constrained to 
the intelligentsia (Chomsky, 1967), Tamboukou (2012, p. 862) argues that given their roles as 




sustaining the web of human relations and opening up potential sites where students can be 
educated in telling the truth as they see it, but also in listening to others".  
To Tamboukou (2012, p. 861), parrhesia is deeply entangled in networks of power relations 
where the ability to speak truth, or listen to truth as the case may be for many within the West 
(see, Spivak 1994), is heavily interwoven with “the risk of being exposed ‘to the powerful 
other’”. In the face of increasing neoliberal rationales within the academy, the ‘parhesiastic 
pact’, in which truth-tellers speak the truth without concealment and ‘the prince’ (or 
practitioners) listen without punishing the truth teller, is being challenged and risks to 
parrhesiastes are increasing (Tamboukou, 2012). In such times, acts of parrhesia become more 
important and academics must avoid the urge to ‘resist’ these challenges by withdrawing from 
“public academic spaces into archives, libraries and private studies” (ibid, p.861).  
That academics should act as ‘truth-tellers’ is not exclusive to the concept of parrhesia, and 
numerous calls have been made for all academics to critique power given their privileged and 
protected position in societies, their role as educators, and their specialist training (see, for 
example, Chomsky, 1967; Weiss, 1991; Whitehead, 2014). These factors can be seen to endow, 
or amplify, the responsibility of academics “to expose the lies of governments, to analyse 
actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions” (Chomsky, 1967). 
Parrhesia can assist in this task by filling the void left by the rejection of modern 
epistemological frameworks and their comforting notions of objectivity and truth, forcing 
academics to ‘acknowledge power’ and ‘wrestle with it’ – to “challenge those who wield such 
power, expose corruption, and to speak out” against it (Papadimos and Murray, 2008, p. 4).  
A distinction must briefly be made here on how the act of speaking truth to power is interpreted. 
Those seeking to help emancipate subaltern populations can either produce knowledge that 
empowers and aids the oppressed, or they can critique those that are in power who are directly 
or indirectly oppressing them. The emancipatory potential for this latter type of knowledge is 
constrained by the fact that the act of “speaking truth to power is confirmatory rather than 
transformatory” (Richmond and Graef, 2012, p. 64). To a certain extent, by challenging power, 
we are at the whim of power to change, which may diminish the potential of such knowledge. 
Despite this, given the privilege required to both access and interpret scholarly knowledge, 
critiques of international peacebuilding typically (and perhaps understandably) appear to target 
those in power (academics, practitioners, policy makers, etc.), rather than to empower the local 




interpret ‘speaking truth to power’ in a literal sense. Consequently, the question of for whom 
knowledge is produced is continually asked throughout this thesis (notably in chapter 8) to 
problematise how critical knowledge might accomplish its normative ambitions.  
SUMMARY 
This thesis holds that academics have a social responsibility to be the conscience of society and 
undertake acts of parrhesia – to challenge and disrupt power, to speak truth to it, and to look 
for transformative innovations that will encourage better notions of peace within all societies. 
While advocating this stance however, the thesis recognises the constraints highlighted in 
chapter 2 which impede the production, transmission and utilization of radical critiques, and it 
is sceptical of the ability of academics to propel an emancipatory peace through these 
institutions.  Indeed, academics have their own norms and values which shape their behaviour 
and influence the types of knowledge they produce. While many academics make a significant 
effort to be impartial in analysing and producing knowledge, a parrhesian epistemology might 
suggest that these pains may in fact reduce their ability to ‘speak the truth’ if they obscure their 
values in the pursuit of ‘objective’ and ‘evidence’ based research. In the field of international 
peacebuilding, exploration of these tensions becomes pertinent, given the self-prophesied 
desire by many critical theorists to encourage emancipatory practices that challenge hegemony, 
who must at the same time resist the influences and conforming nature of that very same 
hegemon. As succinctly stated by Tamboukou (2012, p. 861), 
the politics of truth is not about establishing valid knowledges, but rather about understanding 
complex configurations and truth games through which practices and discourses are 
scientifically validated and become dominant. The quest for meaning and understanding is 
therefore a process of uncovering the veil that both covers and hides the material conditions 
and fierce power relations at play through which 'dominant truths' and master narratives' are 
constituted and established.  
Here, the Foucauldian or parrhiasian inspired analysis of academia, which pays attention to 
the effects of self and institutional regulation (governmentality), would do much to uncover the 
extent to which academics might consciously or unconsciously tailor their research by 
promoting, reframing, dismissing, or ignoring particular elements. To undertake such an 
analysis, this thesis employs a modified framework of friction which is sensitive to the 
circulation of power within and throughout academic and policymaking circles and which, it 





3.2: Modifying Friction 
It is precisely because knowledge can be distorted as it is produced, transmitted, and utilized 
that this thesis considers existing models of knowledge production and transmission 
inappropriate for the task of analysing critiques of peacebuilding. Given that constraints to 
knowledge production exist, it is important to assess their impact alongside the transmission 
and utilization of knowledge rather than in isolation, as existing models tend to do. These 
models focus on how knowledge is produced or transmitted with little consideration as to why, 
trivialising the role of academics and treating them as impartial static entities who have no 
stake in how their knowledge is received. Furthermore, they do not seek to normatively assess 
the impact that distortions to the original intent of the knowledge have on peacebuilding, nor 
the ways in which actors explicitly transform knowledge to achieve their own aims, or indeed, 
how other actors may contest these reinterpretations. In a sense, theories of knowledge 
production, transmission and utilization as they have been applied to the discourse of 
peacebuilding, while aware of power, reduce the agency of academics in the same way that 
early theories of peacebuilding ignored the agency of post-conflict societies, overlooking the 
ways in which academics actively attempt to promote their ideas and avoid their co-option. 
To better understand this process, I modify the conceptual framework of friction to analyse the 
interplay between knowledge producers and consumers. The concept of friction is widely 
attributed to Tsing’s (2004) analysis of ‘universals’ which offer two significant theoretical 
contributions to the studies of peacebuilding: the reimagining of ‘universal’ norms and 
practices as ‘ethnographic objects’, which is applied to peacebuilding and ‘knowledge’ (or 
research) in this thesis, and the analytical framework of friction, which I augment with models 
of knowledge transmission. 
SIMPLIFYING KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION 
Unlike many studies of peace operations which focus on the way policies are reinterpreted and 
altered as they are implemented (the policy-practice divide), this thesis seeks to explore the 
ways in which theories and ideas of peacebuilding are reinterpreted and altered as they are 
transmitted within academia. To do this, peacebuilding is conceptualised as an ethnographic 
object and insights from the knowledge transmission process are used to focus on interactions 
rather than outcomes. While such an endeavour can easily be expanded beyond the immediate 




model has been undertaken here primarily in reference to the transmission and utilization of 
knowledge as it applies to academics. 
Building on the post-structuralist conceptualisation of truth provided in the previous section, 
an analytical lens of friction allows for multiple interpretations and experiences of norms and 
practices traditionally considered universal. Drawing on previous studies of friction, this thesis 
reconceptualises peacebuilding as an ethnographic object or travelling package of ideas, norms, 
theories, values and practices (Millar, 2013) that continually change through interaction and 
experience. While the focus remains on critical theories of peacebuilding, it is important to 
note that these theories are part of a wider discourse which they are both influenced by and 
influence. This conceptualisation allows for an analysis of continual change (figure 2) where 
an actor’s interaction with the package of peacebuilding alters it, producing new realities which 
emerge and create ‘feedback loops’ that, in turn, produce new interactions again. For example, 
an academic might produce a research output (such as a journal publication) which is 
transmitted either directly or indirectly by way of transmission belts (for example, a 
conference) to other audiences who in turn interact with it.  
 
Figure 2: Simplified knowledge transmission - the hermeneutic cycle 
To explore how knowledge is utilized, this thesis implements a modified framework of friction 
(table 2 below), instead of traditional models of knowledge utilization, to focus explicitly on 
how research outputs are altered through interactions. As recipients of knowledge consciously 
or unconsciously accept, reject, or modify ideas, a new output is produced which continues the 
cycle. For example, a practitioner may produce a new policy which reflects a shift in thinking 
towards a new idea, or an academic may publish a new article which references or builds on 
the original work in response to its reception. It must be noted that how an idea has been 





such, it is only possible to ascertain the frictional encounter in hindsight, or after a secondary 
point of transmission. 
FRICTION IN KNOWLEDGE TRANSMISSION 
Traditional models of knowledge utilization are often intrinsically linked to understandings of 
policy and decision making. Concerned with ‘outputs’, these models are hindered by 
disagreement as to precisely what ‘utilization’ entails (Neilson, 2001). In contrast, utilizing a 
framework of friction shifts the focus from interpreting outcomes to exploring how knowledge 
is interacted with instead. Table 2 below outlines a modified framework of friction which 
applies to the knowledge transmission process. 
Table 2: Friction in Knowledge Transmission 
Sub-processes Primary actors Combinations 
What kind of process is 
observed? 
Who are the primary actors 
involved? 
Are multiple sub-processes 
occurring? 
Acceptance Single Subversive Compliance and adaption? 
Adaption Single Orthodox 
Adoption Various Subversive Co-option and resistance?  
Co-option Various Orthodox 
Resistance Combination of orthodox and 
subversive 
Adoption and rejection? 
Rejection 
One significant modification made by this thesis to the conceptual framework originally 
provided by Björkdahl et al (2016, p. 6) relates to the actor being analysed. Where the 
framework of friction has often been used to understand the influence of power in the 
interactions between local and global actors in studies of peacebuilding, this distinction was 
less suited to an analysis of academics. Where the original framework of friction sought to 
focus on how local actors interacted with ‘universal’ or ‘global norms’, the modified 
framework inverts this relationship to place critical actors in the local space. Thus, categories 
of actors were reconceptualised to consider how critical theories, produced by ‘subversive 
scholars’, interacted with more mainstream or orthodox theories and scholars. This is done to 
emphasize both how subversive ideas are changed through interaction with the wider 
peacebuilding community, and how subversive scholars resist orthodox ideas.  
The framework above is not an alternative to existing models of knowledge transmission or 




the conscious and unconscious efforts to create, modify, and transmit knowledge. The 
framework allows for a broader analysis of the transmission process to better understand the 
frictions that emerge through interaction, and which often produce unintended and unexpected 
interpretations and utilizations. This allows for a deeper understanding of the ways in which 
scholars influence the process of knowledge production and transmission, by exploring and 
uncovering the unconscious and conscious efforts of researchers to shape and frame knowledge 
in response to practitioner and peer response. It envisions academia as a competitive 
marketplace for new knowledge where ideas are not necessarily equal or judged on their own 
merit but are instead influenced by the ability of actors to promote them (Olssen and Peters, 
2005; Barry, 2011). 
Given the manner in which the theoretical framework above has simplified (at least 
illustratively) the knowledge transmission and policy process, an initial reading could suggest 
that it is unable to account for indirect methods of transmission, or the more slow and gradual 
process of ‘enlightenment’, recognised by policy theorists as the most influential type of 
knowledge. Given that this thesis seeks to understand critiques of peacebuilding as they have 
been made over nearly two decades of theory, policy and practice, this is not seen to be a 
significant issue, as theorists will have had time to reflect on how the discourse of 
peacebuilding has been changed within their writing (see, for example, Kappler, 2013; 
Paffenholz, 2013; Randazzo, 2015; Chandler, 2017a; Thiessen and Byrne, 2018). Instead, this 
approach will likely make it difficult to discern whether subversive research directly or 
indirectly influenced change, which is beyond the focus of this study. Likewise, it will be 
difficult to account for an idea that has been rejected if recipients have ignored it completely 
which would reduce its paper trail, providing no further observable output. Again, this is not 
considered a significant issue as wholesale rejection of a subversive research output leaves it 
intact and unchanged unless its creator decides to revisit it, which would be indicated by a 
further output, which could be analysed to see how it was modified. 
Ultimately, I seek to normatively evaluate scholarship based off the framework of parrhesia 
and subversive knowledge outlined in the previous section (chapters 5\6\7). Chapter 8 then 
uses this modified framework of friction to understand how knowledge transmission and 
contestation between scholars has transformed and distorted critiques, before reassessing how 





CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
To explore the ways in which critical theories sought to challenge and contribute to the broader 
discourses of international peacebuilding, this thesis relied on observations made through a 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), nuanced by insights gleaned from a Citation Network 
Analysis (CNA) and over 40 interviews with key peacebuilding theorists. While there is no 
‘correct’ way to analyse a discourse, this three tiered approach was seen to offer the most 
nuanced way to both qualitatively and quantitatively explore its make-up, and investigate the 
patterns of critique that emerged. In a sense, the research design can be seen to loosely reflect 
the hermeneutic cycle, in its desire to understand authors’ episteme and ontologies, while 
forcing a recognition of the cultural, historical and social contexts in which research has been 
produced (Mantzavinos, 2009). In line with the CDA approach, this researcher sought to 
understand all levels of the discourse, paying attention to phonology, syntax and semantics and 
how scholars and their works manipulated, legitimated, and manufactured consent or 
hegemonic understandings of peacebuilding. The questions and problems explored within this 
thesis are not isolated to the field of PACs or international peacebuilding. However, given the 
often-normative intent of its scholars, and the perceived emancipatory significance of the local 
turn, the ways in which academics have contested and sought to transform both the practices 
and objectives of peacebuilding are immensely significant. 
Given the extent of data collected and the numerous trials and errors involved in these 
exploratory methods, only the primary rationales and key examples have been included within 
the body of this thesis, while supplementary material (including examples, lists of scholars and 
works coded, etc.) can be found in both the appendix and online dataset (available on request). 
The chapter begins by briefly outlining the precise research design and the ways in which the 
various methods were drawn on to test and deepen observations made throughout. It first 
elaborates on how the dataset (which reflects the discourse of critical peacebuilding) was 
constructed. Following this, it explains how critical discourse analysis and grounded theory 
were used to code and interpret articles. The remaining sections then outline how interviews 
and citation network analysis were drawn on to better inform and verify observations 






While undertaking the literature review for this thesis, a range of prominent scholars were 
identified who had contributed significantly and critically to international peacebuilding 
studies. A series of formal and informal scoping interviews were conducted with these 
academics and various policymakers to receive input on potential avenues of exploration and 
to garner preliminary understandings of academia’s role in peacebuilding. While the original 
intent of this research project had been to understand how academics contested policymakers 
and practitioners, both the literature review and interviews revealed substantial problems with 
understanding how knowledge was produced and transmitted within academia itself – a 
significant lacuna in the field of peacebuilding where many scholars were still contesting 
whether or not academia impacted policy at all. Given this, and the various opinions that 
interviewees had presented about academia’s role in contesting peacebuilding, it was decided 
to restrict the focus solely to the interplay between scholars, and try to understand how their 
ideas were contested and distorted from within the Ivory Tower. 
Figure 3 below visualises the various research steps. Given the largely exploratory nature of 
this thesis, several significant ‘feedback loops’ were constructed which continually required 
recoding and further analysis to be undertaken in reflection of new or contradictory insights. 
From a high level of abstraction, this consisted of 6 overlapping steps. Step one constructed 
the representative dataset of critical peacebuilding through bibliometric techniques and key 
word searches identified from both the literature review and scoping interviews. Step two used 
these same bibliometric techniques and preliminary coding to verify the integrity of the dataset 
and identify preliminary patterns to focus on during discourse analysis. Step three involved the 
discourse analysis in which over half the dataset was read and coded, while using bibliometric 
techniques to deepen understandings and trace the transmission of ideas. Step four involved 
the coding of articles and more in-depth citation analysis to identify further patterns and trends, 
and understand how outputs and authors had interacted and contested one another. Step five 
involved exploring these preliminary findings and patterns through a series of interviews with 
key scholars writing within the field, to test theories, expand insights, and obtain alternative 
explanations and understandings. Step six utilized these nuanced understandings to recode and 





Figure 3 Research Design 
4.1: Data Collection and dataset construction 
To explore critiques of peacebuilding, it was necessary to first identify those scholars most 
engaged with critical theories of peacebuilding and prominent works, both critics and 




and their assumed difference to mainstream or problem-solving knowledge could be 
understood, before assessing how critiques were transmitted and contested. As the sheer 
number of diverse contributors to the field made traditional methods to identify a ‘core’ 
problematic, the thesis constructed a method comprised of both quantitative (bibliometric) and 
qualitative techniques. The following section outlines the creation of dataset containing critical 
peacebuilding scholarship which was analysed within this thesis. 
There is a general consensus that peacebuilding as a distinct set of theories and practices 
emerged following the end of the Cold War (chapter 1 and 2). Since then, a plethora of journals 
have been set up explicitly devoted to the topic, while numerous others have included it within 
their mandates. Despite this increase in peacebuilding infrastructure, the concept remains 
conveniently malleable with poorly defined boundaries regarding precisely what it entails, its 
objectives, and who it concerns. As chapter 2 argued, this disagreement is reflexive of divisions 
within the wider PACs community and manifests across its burgeoning scholarship. 
Unsurprisingly, this poor conceptualisation is more evident within the realm of critical 
peacebuilding scholarship, which remains splintered after several discursive attempts to define 
it (i.e. local, hybrid, post-liberal peacebuilding). Given this ambiguity, and the relatively 
marginalised nature of critical theory (R. Jackson, 2009), this thesis sought to define critical 
peacebuilding as it emerged from the scholarship of those most engaged with it. Rejecting an 
a priori definition in favour of a Kuhnian (2012) approach to understanding disciplinary fields, 
where they are continually being revised and reshaped, a longitudinal study of the discourse 
was undertaken using an adapted grounded theory approach to capture how it has been 
conceived by those studying it (see, for instance, Pouliot and Cornut, 2015; Jackson, 2017a). 
Similar to other studies of the discipline, a series of keyword searches were used to retrieve 
relevant articles which were then analysed to construct a nucleus of critical peacebuilding 
theorists. In contrast to these previous studies however, the method for obtaining and analysing 
texts needed to be nuanced enough that it would identify less mainstream and obscure 
contributions. Thus, while studies such as Sillanpaa and Koivula (2010), Millar and Lecy 
(2016), and Bright and Gledhill (2018), employ citation thresholds and journal index rankings 
to construct their datasets, this thesis eschewed these informetric tools on the basis that they 
would have led to a list of scholars and texts ranked by academic popularity rather than 
criticality. Instead, the researcher selected scholars based on their research contribution to 
topics associated with more ‘critical’ variants of peacebuilding scholarship. These variants 




(for example, Barnett, Fang, & Zürcher, 2014; Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017; Chandler, 2017b; 
Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Hughes, Öjendal, & Schierenbeck, 2015; Jabri, 2013a; Paffenholz, 
2015; Randazzo, 2016; Richmond, 2011), supplemented by suggestions by critical scholars 
during a series of scoping interviews carried out in 2017.  
Harzing’s Publish or Perish (PoP) software was then used to implement a series of keyword 
searches within Google Scholar.22 The keyword search was favoured over retrieving references 
by disciplinary or subject tags given the subjective manner in which articles are often 
categorized (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018) and the difficulties of assigning disciplinary tags 
to such an interdisciplinary topic. Each term was searched individually by year, from 2005-
2015. This exercise was then repeated on the Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) databases (see 
appendix 4.1). The table below lists the terms identified in the literature review as most 
reflective of critical peacebuilding scholarship. 
Table 3: Key search terms used to identify critical peacebuilding scholarship  
“Hybrid Peace” Hybrid Peacebuilding 
“Liberal Peace” Liberal Peacebuilding 
“Local Peace” Local Peacebuilding 
“Post-liberal Peace” Post-liberal peacebuilding 
“Postliberal Peace” Postliberal Peacebuilding 
“Peacebuilding resistance” Critical Peacebuilding 
“Emancipatory Peace” Emancipatory Peacebuilding 
The time period (2005-2017) was chosen in consideration of patterns that emerged within the 
literature review (Chapter 2), as it was seen to reflect the ‘heyday’ of critical peacebuilding 
scholarship (Chandler 2017) proffering numerous revolutionary conceptualizations of peace 
(i.e. liberal (2000) -> local –> hybrid -> everyday -> emancipatory -> postliberal (2017)). It 
has also been noted by experts within the field of bibliometrics that a significant amount of 
time (five years or more) is needed to adequately construct citation datasets required for the 
CNA, and for online publishing and search databases to correctly index publications (Sugimoto 
and Larivière, 2018, p. 91). In recognition of this, data was only stored if it was published 
between January 1, 2005 and December 31st, 2017, when the data was collected.  
Results were then cleaned, first by importing them into the referencing manager Endnote 
(produced by Clarivate Analytics) before exporting them into Excel to manually check and 
verify bibliometric information (author, year, title, journal), as well as manage those references 
 
22 Publish or Perish is a piece of software that allows for more nuanced Google Scholar searches, as well as the 




not contained within Endnote’s database. By design, this amounted to a considerable overlap 
in articles, and duplicates and non-journal texts (such as PhD manuscripts, unpublished works, 
books and other reference material) were removed.23 While Google Scholar provided the 
highest number of results from these searches, it also returned the highest number of false 
positives. Subsequently the above process was repeated over a series of months and replicated 
on competitor databases (Scopus and Web of Science) in order to ensure accuracy and best 
results. For a more detailed breakdown of this process and the findings relating to the methods 
utilized to obtain research outputs, please see appendix 4.1. 
Three datasets were compiled during this process (see chapter conclusion). The original 
‘extended dataset’, which contained all cleaned articles retrieved from the data 
collection/keyword search phase, comprised 2967 articles and was used to identify trends in 
research outputs over time and identify the primary dataset. The ‘primary dataset’ comprised 
605 articles authored (or co-authored) by the 105 authors who were selected to reflect ‘core 
critical peacebuilding scholars’, having published 4 or more articles on critical peacebuilding 
between 2005-2017 (for rationale, see Appendix 4.1.3). This was the primary resource upon 
which the CDA and CNA were conducted. The ‘hybrid dataset’ contained 250 of the 605 
articles which mentioned hybrid (or its affixes) in the body of their text which received 
additional coding steps in relation to the themes of hybridity (chapter 8). 
Bibliometric analysis undertaken using Google Scholar is relatively rare because of the 
opaqueness of its search algorithm, which retrieves anything that “bears the trappings of an 
academic document” after scouring institutional repositories, and academic and publisher 
websites (among others) for articles, op-eds, book chapters, PowerPoint slides, conference 
minutes etc. (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018, p. 32). Furthermore, its retrieval process is 
undertaken dynamically which means search results may fluctuate on a day to day basis 
depending on the availability of data at the time (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018, p. 33). Despite 
these limitations, and in contrast to previous attempts to map the wider PACs field (with the 
notable exception of Millar & Lecy, 2016), Scholar was picked as the initial database for 
information retrieval due to the noted restrictive and limited number of Arts and Humanities 
publications indexed by its alternatives such as Scopus and WoS (Sugimoto and Larivière, 
 
23 Given the technical limitations of bibliometric analysis, only research articles were collected and analysed 
within this thesis, which have been proven to be more accurate when attempting to understand the nature, scope 




2018, p. 31).24 To overcome these limitations, the search process was repeated using a variety 
of search terms over the course of several months (January-June 2018) to triangulate results. 
As a final measure, searches were also carried out using WoS and Scopus, and results were 
compared and merged into the Scholar dataset if they were missing. 
One notable barrier to the sample list identified in this thesis is caused by the choice to use total 
research production as an indicator of engagement with or contribution to theories of critical 
peacebuilding. To do this, the thesis utilized a full counting method,25 recording all returned 
authored works as 1, irrespective of the amount of actual work an academic contributed to the 
article. This decision was made, in recognition of Bourdieu’s writings on academic capital and 
Foucault’s writing on discourses which consider how power creates and shapes hierarchies of 
knowledge within academia. Bibliometric studies have shown how academic capital 
(resources, position, and fame) correlate to cumulative advantages for established researchers 
at the expense of other researchers, such as new entrants, women, and those with less resources 
or opportunity to research and publish (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018, p. 53).26 By adopting a 
full counting method it was hoped that this would create a more reflective data sample and 
include more minor or emerging scholars. 
A final point to note about generating a data set from the numbers of published works is that 
output is not an indicator of quality (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018, p. 53). Citation counts and 
other metrics are often used in addition or in contrast to total output as they represent the impact 
that an academic or article has had upon a community, and thus, are seen to indicate how or 
why a particular field has changed. In contrast, this thesis is interested in the changes or 
revolutions that may not have occurred, and thus seeks to identify a range of critical 
peacebuilding theories before assessing how they were transmitted, and resulting frictional 
encounters. Thus, while this thesis does not seek to prize output above quality, impact was 
considered less important for selecting those scholars most engaged with the field, and was 
 
24 For example, the journal Peacebuilding, explicitly set up in 2013 for the publication of critical materials, was 
only indexed by Web of Science since 2015 capturing 86 of its 153 articles (retrieved December 2017), while 
Scopus does not index the journal at all.  
25 While other counting methods could have been used, such as harmonic counting which weights authors 
according their listed position in co-authored texts, given the volume of inconsistencies across the range of 
reviewed journals, it was decided that this would offer little further insight into the range of authors selected. 
While it is likely that some authors may have contributed much less to the articles they appeared in, given the 
relatively low threshold used to select authors, it is unlikely that this would have had a significant effect on 
selection as even scaling down the top contributors substantially would not see them removed from the list. 
26 This is through things such as ghost and honorific research, where well established academics are given 
honouree authorship within articles they contributed very little too (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018). This is 
evidenced by the spread of articles amongst authors within the dataset, where the most prominent scholars 




instead drawn on during the qualitative stage of the thesis to assess how critical theories of 
peacebuilding were received by mainstream scholars. 
LIMITATIONS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Pains were taken to ensure as many voices as possible would be captured through the data 
gathering process, and the scope of collection and analysis was extended beyond ‘substantial 
research’ to include and account for most published material in academic journals (review 
articles, open letters, opinion pieces, and forewords) to better capture the engagement of 
emerging critical peacebuilding scholars. However, several sources needed to be excluded due 
to restrictions on accessing and easily analysing material. These include non-English articles 
(given translation issues), sources not published online, book reviews (which often offer little 
additional analysis), unpublished works (due to copyright issues), book chapters and books. It 
is difficult to predict the consequences that these exclusions may have had on the thesis, but it 
is hoped that this is relatively minor given that these sources could have still been drawn on in 
reviewed material and that scholarly works appearing in journals are often seen to represent 
the most important academic outputs (Bright and Gledhill, 2018, p. 5). It is widely 
acknowledged that the peer review mechanism of journals plays a central role in the 
construction and limitation of academic fields (Kochen, Crickman and Blaivas, 1982). 
Perhaps the most significant exclusion in this dataset is that of non-English speakers as this 
could significantly reduce the input of scholars from the Global South who are of particular 
importance to a study such as this. Unfortunately, due to the limitations of this researcher, non-
English material was beyond the scope of this study. It was hoped instead that scholars within 
the dataset might refer to these texts, theories, and scholars within their own works – as critical 
scholars could be expected to do – and their works and contributions would be identified in 
this manner through the CNA. In a similar fashion, the CDA and CNA methodologies 
employed to analyse materials were thought to supplement and identify any significant 
contributions that might have been missed by the data collection and database construction 
methods which, though they would be omitted from quantitative analysis, could still be (and 
were) included during the qualitative analysis (discussed further in chapter 5.1).    
4.2: Methods - Citation Network Analysis 
Citation network analysis (CNA), like discourse and content analysis, “allows researchers to 
examine the characteristics, structures, and evolution of research fields and scholarly 




referenced within texts, it can be used to assess the coherence and boundaries of a particular 
academic field, how knowledge is being used and by whom, and to trace the flow of 
information within and beyond research communities. While CNA is a component of 
bibliometric analysis, it is often used in shorthand to describe a plethora of overlapping 
techniques which analyse bibliometric data to understand different relationships (for example, 
between authors, research institutions, theories, or disciplines). This thesis drew on several 
elements of CNA to verify the coherence of the primary dataset and to deepen insights drawn 
from the discourse analysis. CNA is an increasingly common research tool which follows a 
specific set of methodological steps, as such, the following chapter briefly explores the 
philosophical underpinnings of CNA before briefly outlining these steps.   
There are significant technical and philosophical issues within CNA which require careful 
consideration and navigation by researchers (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015).27 For example, the 
data sample used and the thresholds set to exclude and include particular research outputs can 
all have significant repercussions on what sort of patterns emerge, and how results may be 
interpreted. In line with Garfield (1979), this thesis attempted to offset these issues by 
combining the CNA with a critical discourse analysis, and with insights drawn from interviews, 
to both test the validity of findings and to better interpret results. It also followed the research 
design steps laid out by Zhao and Strotmann (2015) and utilized the most common settings for 
analysis and mapping provided by van Eck and Waltman (2010).  
THEORY - WHY WE CITE 
CNA is informed by a normative view of science which, in line with Merton (1942), considers 
research a social activity governed by a set of norms, including: universalism (the 
impersonality of science; communism (knowledge is a common good to be communicated and 
distributed freely); disinterestedness and organized scepticism (where new knowledge claims 
are evaluated critically and objectively) (see also, Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). The 
foundational assumption of CNA is that a citation indicates some type of relationship between 
the cited and the citing text, whether a similarity in findings, methodological approach, or area 
of enquiry (ibid). Citations can be considered as both “tokens of recognition” which provide 
an indication of an idea’s merit (Peritz, 1992, p. 448), or “concept symbols” which link ideas 
or concepts within a text to its source (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). The more references two 
publications share and the more both publications are cited together by other texts, the stronger 
 




the relationship between the two, and the more likely they are to have things in common. 
Likewise, the more a text is cited, the more influential it is seen to be. While CNA can be used 
in a temporal manner and consider how research fields might develop, analysis can only be 
undertaken “after the knowledge and ideas have been integrated into larger contexts” and 
cannot provide immediate understandings on research fields (ibid, p.6).  
CNA is different to evaluative network analysis which seeks to rank scholars, publications and 
institutions against one another (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). Indeed, this thesis employs a 
sceptical understanding of research metrics such as impact factor and h-Index. Instead of using 
such tools to identify the dominant scholars and theories, it considers what these dominant  
ideas and scholars might obscure, as well as how academic structures and performances might 
subsume or degrade the possibility of alternative thinking and emancipatory innovation. 
Egotistical and normative citations, for example, while not frequent enough to invalidate CNA 
approaches, highlight the diversity of reasons in which scholars may cite particular works 
which might exclude their academic merit (Borgman and Furner, 2002). Drawing on Bourdieu 
(1977), the thesis repurposes the notion of social capital to understand ‘academic capital’ and 
how many of the norms governing citation behaviours may negatively impact on peacebuilding 
studies by compelling scholars to cite prominent authors, not because they wish to credit that 
authors work, but because they wish their study to be considered alongside these more 
foundational texts.  
The act of citing another author is understood, by those within bibliometrics at least, to be 
governed by a set of norms and values which “require authors to cite the works that have 
influenced them in the development of current papers in order to give credit where credit is 
due” (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). Differences in citing style and failure to abide by these 
norms does not mean that the norm has been violated writ large (ibid). Despite a few rule 
breakers, the underlying norms which reflect the collective perceptions of citing authors 
continue to exist and be adhered to by the majority of scholars (Small, 1976)  and numerous 
studies have found high correlations between citation count and the standing of a publication 
within the academic community, to show that results from CNA are statistically valid (see, for 
instance, Bayer and Folger, 1966, and Virgo, 1977). 
There are three main types of CNA which essentially draw on the same data: inter-citation (the 
number of times two publications cite each other); co-citation (the number of documents that 




two publications have in common) (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). Each technique can be used 
to map out dominant publications and authors, and the relationships between them, however a 
significant amount of interpretation (or a more qualitative analysis) is often required to generate 
anything more than a superficial understanding. For example, without qualitatively exploring 
results, CNA is unable to tell scholars whether a research output was agreed with or disagreed 
with, or whether the output was popular because of its empirical findings or its theoretical 
development. The following section will outline the standard research method for undertaking 
CNA which was employed within this thesis before elaborating on how analysis was carried 
out – the results of which can be found in chapter 5. 
CNA METHOD 
The methodological approach employed by this thesis to undertake the CNA draws heavily on 
the design, steps and rational outlined by Zhao and Strotmann (2015), while using the software 
VOSviewer created by van Eck and Waltman (2010) to undertake analysis and mapping. A set 
of fairly consistent steps are typically followed to undertake a CNA, which Zhao and Strotmann 
(2015) clarify as: 
1. Delineation of the research field being studied: collecting a complete and clean set of 
scholarly publications produced in this field, 
2. Selection of core sets of objects representing this research community, 
3. Measures of connectedness between objects in the core sets,  
4. Multivariate statistical analysis, 
5. Network analysis and visualization, and 
6. Interpretation of results and validation 
Perhaps one of the largest limitations on studies employing CNA are the constraints on 
delineating and collecting the initial data set, a process often reliant on the large publishing 
houses that own and govern the dissemination of most academic knowledge (such as 
Routledge, Elsevier, etc.). While the information age of technology, which coincided with the 
rise of these publishing houses, has undoubtedly been beneficial in digitizing research outputs 
and allowing for more widespread and cost effective dissemination, the attempts by these 
companies to assert control over their intellectual copyrights brings a host of problems which 
reduce many of the benefits this shift might have entailed. Thus, while the increase in studies 
employing CNA tools reflects an increase in accessibility to the information required to 




publishing houses have also artificially constructed epistemic communities by limiting who 
can access their information, and by competing rather than collaborating with other houses.  
As explored at the beginning of this chapter, given the differences in data and formatting, 
scholars are typically forced to rely on the use of only one publisher, omitting results from 
other sources to avoid the technical difficulties that drawing on multiple sources lead to. This 
has been the case for existing CNA within PACs which have tended to rely on one data base 
for data collection (for example, Bright and Gledhill (2018) confine their analysis to articles 
within the Scopus database), which, as noted in in the beginning of this chapter, have 
significant repercussions the delineation of the research field. Those studies which have used 
PDF scrappers to parse references from texts manually (rather than by retrieving them from 
publishing houses) have also faced limitations in the ability of tools to accurately parse 
references (which are complicated by older publications which often have illegible typesets) 
and may also be compounded by their initial database choice to delineate articles (see, for 
example, Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014).  
While the triangulated method of field delineation undertaken within this thesis (section 1) 
overcame many of the copyright limitations which emerge from relying on one specific search 
engine, this led to several issues when seeking to obtain the bibliometric information of these 
texts. Scholars utilizing either Scopus or WoS to delineate their research field benefit from 
being able to directly export bibliometric data alongside results from search engines. Given 
this thesis utilized data from WoS and Scopus (which format this data in different ways) and 
Google Scholar (which does not provide cited reference information) triangulation was used to 
construct the cited reference data set. This essentially required the use of the programming 
language Python to run each of the 605 articles within the dataset through the Scopus, WoS, 
and CrossRef28 search engines to scrape bibliometric data for each article. The results from all 
three searches were then merged, duplicates were removed, and references were cleaned 
through the fuzzy compare function of Excel and Open Refine (GitHub, 2015). Where articles 
had received no bibliographic information from this process, they were manually checked, and 
where possible, references were manually entered. Due to the variety of article types captured 
within the primary dataset, bibliometric information was only able to be compiled for 577 
 
28 As Google Scholar does not contain bibliographic information for documents, CrossRef was seen as a viable 




articles. This, however, was still seen to be representative and statistically significant, and those 
577 articles cited 27,362 research outputs comprised of 18,325 unique texts.29 
ANALYSIS 
Once the field has been delineated, and research outputs and their bibliometric data have been 
obtained and cleaned (steps 1 and 2 above), researchers undertaking CNA measure the 
connectedness between outputs and calculate their similarities (steps 3 and 4), before clustering 
and mapping them (step 5) for analysis and verification (step 6). As noted by van Eck and 
Waltman (2017), bibliometricians do not usually develop their own clustering techniques, but 
instead draw on existing methods from other fields. While there are many nuances and 
technicalities to the clustering references for analysis (see Zhao and Strotmann, 2015), this 
thesis relied on the method and computation within the programme VOSviewer, which is seen 
by many to be sufficient for the type of analysis undertaken within this study and allows for 
easier interpretation of results, given its particular mapping algorithms (van Eck and Waltman, 
2010, 2017).  
Though a variety of tools were initially explored to undertake the analysis and visualisation for 
the CNA component of this thesis, VOSviewer was seen to offer the cleanest and most straight 
forward interface for the types of analysis desired. VOSviewer is a free programme developed 
for the use of large-scale bibliometric analysis and visualisation. It is exceptionally useful for 
analysing and clustering patterns at an aggregate level, and while more nuanced tools exist for 
exploring individual relationships (such as CitNetExplorer), given the small size of the dataset, 
VOSviewer was seen to perform this task well and allow for easier data handling and 
verification, given its acceptance of a wider array of bibliometric formats.  
Clustering is an exceptionally important component of CNA, given its outputs provide the 
nodes and relationships that will be analysed by researchers. While larger datasets pose 
numerous problems for researchers given the level of detail and effort that is required to 
accurately analyse and interpret them, the data sample analysed within this thesis was not seen 
to cause any significant difficulties (computational or otherwise) given its smaller size. After 
inputting data into VOSviewer and selecting the elements of data to be analysed, VOSviewer 
calculates the co-occurrence of documents and plots these points on a similarity matrix before 
 
29 Some of these references (such as chapters within larger texts) were occasionally too long for VOSviewer to 
read, leading to the software only being able to map 18187 references. These isolated instances primarily related 





producing a visual map which can then be explored and analysed by the researcher (for more 
on the techniques and calculations employed by VOSviewer, see van Eck and Waltman, 2010). 
At all stages of this process, VOSviewer allows results to be exported into a plain text file that 
can be examined and checked for inconsistencies in data input and calculation. Finally, 
VOSviewer compiles co-occurrence matrices to compile maps through a ‘Visualisation of 
Similarities’ mapping technique (as opposed to multidimensional scaling, see Borg and 
Groenen, 2005). This technique is seen to more clearly display structured maps for 
interpretation than other techniques, where the distance between nodes represents the 
relationship between them (the smaller the distance, the greater the similarity) (van Eck and 
Waltman, 2010).  
Researchers must decide what bibliometric elements will be clustered, and thus what type of 
analysis will be undertaken. Within the course of this thesis a wide range of analysis were 
undertaken, though interpretation relied primarily on two techniques which were seen to 
produce the most reliable and illustrative results (bibliographic and co-citation). Co-citation 
analysis is useful for understanding the extended network and surrounding fields of a data set, 
and was employed to cluster cited references together based on the frequency in which they 
occurred together within source document bibliographies. Bibliographic coupling, on the other 
hand, was used to explore the relatedness of source articles within the dataset by clustering 
texts based on the number of references they shared – which is useful for determining the 
interconnectedness of a research sample. Though these particular types of analysis can become 
problematic with larger datasets by causing computational problems, given the number of links 
between articles which are generated between nodes, this did not appear to be an issue for this 
study, given the relatively small dataset being analysed. Where direct (or intercitation) analysis 
does not suffer from this limitation, it is less useful in analysing data sets published within a 
relatively short time frame (as many of the publications within this dataset were), something 
that bibliographic coupling and co-citation analysis techniques do not necessarily suffer from 
(van Eck and Waltman, 2017). Despite this, an inter-citation analysis of source documents was 
undertaken which largely confirmed the findings drawn through the previous analysis (see 
appendix 5.4), though these relationships were less refined given the small time frame of the 
study. Together, these analyses were seen to reveal a more comprehensive understanding of a 






The limitations of CNA have been extensively discussed in literature and include problems of 
data collation (including decisions around delineation and thresholds), dependence on experts 
and formal structures of scholarship (published works) and the accuracy of citation counts and 
bibliographic information (for an excellent overview of these issues, see Zhao and Strotmann, 
2015). Ultimately, it is an “imperfect yet very useful method for studying knowledge flows, 
the diffusion of ideas, social and intellectual structures of science, information resources, and 
research evaluation” (ibid, p. 11). Many of these factors have been discussed already in the 
limitations of constructing the dataset, while the limitations within the CDA (of interpreting 
published works to understand discourse) are equally applicable for CNA, in that the 
conclusions drawn and extrapolated from this analysis are based off only a fraction of informal 
and formal relationships that exist between scholars.  
Ultimately, the thesis attempted to mitigate many of the limitations that result from the choices 
made by researchers (such as citation thresholds which are used to include and exclude works 
for analysis) by relying on established techniques and commonly applied settings, such as that 
laid out by van Eck and Waltman (2010). Despite this, many issues are likely to have persisted 
and impacted on this analysis. As noted by Garfield and Merton (1979), CNA is of most use 
when supplemented with other methodological and more qualitative approaches. It was hoped 
that some of the short comings that may have resulted from this approach may have been 
overcome through careful use of interviews to deepen and test observations and theories 
throughout the course of the thesis. 
4.3: Methods - Critical Discourse Analysis 
Numerous authors have constructed typologies or genealogies of peacebuilding critiques and 
this thesis does not seek to reinvent the wheel for these categorisations which usefully highlight 
ontological and epistemological differences amongst researchers. The critical discourse 
analysis utilized within this thesis sought to understand the general (rather than specific) limits 
of peacebuilding critiques as they emerged from the articles within the data set. The purpose 
was to uncover and identify the areas of popular enquiry and tacit marginalisation, to outline 
the range of transformative and emancipatory critique, their potentials and limitations, and to 
lay the foundations for a more in depth exploration of how social and institutional structures 
may have affected peace research agendas and outputs. This section lays out the method used 




To do this, elements of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and grounded theory (GT) were 
utilized to analyse the works of academics within the dataset. CDA is a socially oriented 
approach to linguistic analysis which views texts in relation to ideologies and power. It 
considers language to be dialectally related to social events, practices, institutions and the 
material world, and explores the relationship between these elements to consider how 
discourses may lead to social and organisational transformation (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and 
Futing Liao, 2004). As such, CDA is well placed to analyse the works of critical peacebuilding 
theorists, given the assumption held by this thesis that academia contributes to the overall 
discourse of peacebuilding. CDA is critical in that it explicitly seeks to understand social 
emancipation. Drawing heavily on the works of Bourdieu, Foucault, Gramsci, and Habermas 
it unpacks the relationship between language and social life and considers how language 
constitutes and reproduces relations of power, domination and exploitation (Ibid).  
The CDA approach used by this thesis was merged with elements of grounded theory to limit 
the scale and scope of its analytical focus. Grounded theory is a methodological approach that 
became popular in disciplines dominated by positivistic and post-positivist cultures, as it was 
seen as a more objective way of approaching qualitative studies (Matteucci and Gnoth, 2017). 
Since the publication of its seminal text in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss, GT has been, somewhat 
ironically, heavily criticised for its modernist and positivistic approach (Charmaz, 2008). Over 
the past several decades, attempts by scholars to rework the theory have seen three distinct 
strands emerge which reflect objectivist, post-positivist and constructivist ontologies and 
epistemologies (ibid). Ultimately, a deeper discussion of GT’s philosophical and 
methodological pitfalls is not necessary here, as the approach was only loosely applied to the 
analysis to complement the CDA. The basis for drawing on GT was to benefit from its focus 
on generating new theories, allowing for categories and understandings to emerge, rather than 
be reified, during the coding process (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). At the heart of GT is its 
cyclical nature of analysis, which requires researchers to constantly compare data, returning to 
and altering already coded pieces and nodes, as new patterns emerge to change prior 
observations (Matteucci and Gnoth, 2017). To construct these categories in the most objective 
way, GT encourages researchers to make these emerging nodes and construction of themes 
explicit as substantive and theoretical codes, and undertake analysis with as few preconceived 
notions of any given research area as possible. Due to the data collection method employed for 





By blending these two methodological approaches, this thesis analysed the writings of critical 
peacebuilding authors with an explicit focus on emancipatory and transformative critique 
(chapter 3). This allowed for an analysis that was cognisant of the socio-historic context in 
which research is produced, the limitations on authors by structural and self-governing factors, 
and the way language can be used to promote and subvert new ideas and hegemonic processes. 
Articles were read chronologically and by author and geographic region in an attempt to give 
greater weight to scholars within the Global South (with those regions with fewer articles being 
read first). Initially, two or three pieces of work from an author’s collection in the data set were 
coded to build up a general idea of their career contributions and areas of focus (one early, one 
middle, and one late). After this, the author’s additional works within the dataset were scanned 
for significant points of difference in terms of approach, conclusion, or contribution 
(categorisations that emerged and were altered throughout the analysis). One of the benefits of 
the GT approach utilized was that only new information needed to be coded to understand the 
boundaries of peacebuilding critique. While this reduces the number of points that needed to 
be recorded into a more manageable amount this comes at the expense of potential areas for 
further quantitative analysis in terms of identifying the dominance of particular arguments. If 
there were any transformative points of difference from the works already coded (beyond 
empirical and context specific observations), these were also noted. In general, this led to 
approximately half of an author’s output being coded during this phase, or 330 articles from 
the total dataset.30 
CODING 
Articles were coded using the programme NVIVO, initially to highlight the problematique31 
they were addressing and the contribution they sought to make (for instance, a new framework, 
understanding, or a practical improvement). Given the focus of the thesis on transformative 
 
30 Though the listed coded dataset only comprises 310 articles, as 20 of these were considered ‘technical 
documents’ (introductory chapters, review articles etc.) whereupon the ideas and arguments within them were not 
seen to fairly reflect those of the authors who were, for example, summarising another scholars work.  
31 The concept of problematique, as laid out by Bachelard, is intrinsically linked to several other overlapping 
themes within this thesis, including Foucault’s (1980) notion of episteme and Deleuze’s (1994) conception of the 
‘problem idea’. The problematique refers not just to the questions being asked, but the surrounding structures that 
make up the problem, treating knowledge not as something that can easily be identified but something that is 
influenced by and transforms ordinary life (2012). With these overlaps in mind, problematique, as it is employed 
within this thesis, refers not only to the primary question employed by researchers, but their surrounding 
epistemological (and corresponding methodological) approaches (ibid). Thus, it is used to identify not just the 
level to which researchers address their question and analysis, but to what level their methodological approach 
directs their attention, allowing this thesis to delineate between a researcher’s stated problems (for example, issues 
relating to the objective of a ‘liberal peace’) whilst simultaneously recognising that the core problematique 




and radical critiques, notes were made in relation to an author’s ‘criticality’, which was most 
often seen to emanate in their writing through particular terminologies (such as subaltern, 
emancipation, or liberal peace) and their reflection on structural constraints or hegemonic 
processes (see chapter 3). These categorisations changed continually throughout the process of 
coding which led to a significant amount of reworking and recategorizing articles in relation to 
new ideas and patterns that emerged, as each article was compared to the existing coded data 
set and to how the academics themselves perceived and developed critical approaches to 
peacebuilding (insights informed by interviews). Given the nature of coding, a short summary 
and explanation was written for each article so that they could be revisited and altered more 
easily without the need to adjust and recode each sub-node within NVIVO later (this was also 
seen as a way to overcome some of the technical constraints of the software noted in the 
limitations).   
Again, it must be highlighted that the purpose of this undertaking was not to categorise and 
evaluate every argument and finding of critical peacebuilding studies; rather, it was to identify 
the general limits of critique - the areas of popular contestation and implicit or explicit 
marginalisation. Despite the quantitative or empiricist findings that emerge from this approach, 
the focus remains squarely upon the normative and qualitative dimensions of its critique. 
Nevertheless, efforts were made to ensure consistency while interpreting and coding the data 
from which these observations were drawn, with two independent coders blind testing 10% of 
the coded data set to assess consistency amongst core node coding, and by presenting many of 
the observations and coding decisions to academics themselves during interviews to test their 
validity and to receive feedback which could then be used to rework coding decisions. The 
following sections lay out the different nodes used to capture ideas and themes, the process of 
coding, and its limitations.  
NODES 
Though numerous nodes were used to categorize and highlight ideas throughout the analysis, 
with many more being created, merged and deleted along the way, these typically fell into three 
categories: technical information, analysis, and points of reference. Technical information 
contained nodes which represented mostly impartial evidence (for example, the countries an 
article might focus on or an author’s institutional affiliation) which were used to identify 
broader trends and patterns over time. Conversely, the latter two categories contained more 
interpretive evidence, used to explore and assess the range of critiques within the data set. For 




whereas ‘points of reference’ included examples of lip service paid to particular ideas by 
academics, or reflections on the contribution of academia to the dispossessed, which were used 
as reference points for coding reassessments and to organise evidence for analysis. The general 
themes of these nodes are explored below, while a more detail is available in appendix 4.2. 
Node Area: Technical Information 
Technical nodes included information about the author, such as their gender and institutional 
affiliation, as well as information about the article itself, such as the countries or actors it 
focused on, and whether it was primarily a conceptual/theoretical or empirical article. This was 
useful to understand broad patterns in the literature (for example, were works on hybridity 
focused more on empirical case studies, or conceptual and normative arguments about ideal 
outcomes?).  
Node Area: Points of Reference 
This category contained over fifty different nodes which were used to remind the coder of 
similar theories and approaches in the texts, and to provide a more systematic way to review, 
identify and compare new ideas. These nodes included things such as the various areas an 
article might seek to contribute to (as noted in its abstract, introduction or keywords), examples 
of the particular critiques raised by the author, suggestions to improve or reform problems, 
pertinent reflections on structural barriers or on other academics, or other attempts to categorize 
or typologise peace. In line with the GT approach utilized and limitations of the software, 
coding to these nodes was not done in a systematic fashion, and the number of articles that 
were assigned to nodes declined throughout the process as the frequency of new and original 
ideas and themes became sparser. As such, these nodes should be considered reference points 
for the coder which were used to signpost new ideas, theories or particular points of interest 
that grabbed their mind and informed both the coding and node categories – rather than a 
comprehensive set of every academic and contribution to each sub-node in question. 
ANALYSIS CODES 
The last, most subjective, and perhaps most interesting nodes were, aptly named, analysis nodes 
and reflected the final analysis of the coder. Here, two core categories emerged; ‘primary 
contribution area’ (PCA), and ‘criticality’. The former sought to identify the phenomenon to 
which an article ‘spoke’ most, and was split into ‘objectives’, ‘practices’, ‘conceptions’ 
(including frameworks and theories) and ‘understandings’. Objectives were understood to be 
the objectives of peacebuilding writ large rather than the objectives of a particular peace-




peacebuilders. Practices, on the other hand, included critiques of particular methods, cases, 
operations and their short-term objectives, while ‘conceptions’ contained those more abstract 
critiques which challenged existing or posited new frameworks, theories, explanations or 
conceptualisations. Similar to this was the category of ‘understanding’ which, while initially 
coded alongside concepts, was separated later to demarcate those articles that challenged the 
explanation of non-theoretical phenomena (for example, the actual events that took place rather 
than why they occurred).   
While PCA was originally geared towards identifying an article’s ‘target of critique’ or its core 
problematique, this was expanded into three categories during coding to better reflect the 
indirect ways in which numerous works contributed to the issues they identified. Consequently, 
PCA was divided into three areas: primary problematique (the stated foci of the article); 
primary conclusion area (where its final discussion and conclusion were directed); and primary 
contribution area (this researcher’s understanding of the primary area targeted by the article). 
These categories were used to indicate how the balance between the target of critique and 
overall contribution of an article emerged and was managed by authors within each text, as 
well as in comparison to the other articles. For example, an article might identify its primary 
problematique as the type of peace being implemented within a post-conflict state (objective), 
but suggest a host of methodological improvements which would affect the practice of 
peacebuilding in the hopes of altering the type of peace achieved but not necessarily sought 
(practice). Such a case would be weighted to understand where the primary contribution of an 
article lay, which was coded accordingly. Notably, the conclusion and discussion sections of 
articles indicated the relevance and utility that authors understood their work to have and in 
line with the broader aims of this thesis, these sections were weighted more heavily during the 
coding of this particular node, as it provided a better indication of what the academic sought to 
accomplish, their wider concerns, and the potential output of their writing (at least as presented 
to readers).  
Table 4: Primary Contribution Area 
Code Primary Contribution Area 
Practice  Targeted the practices and methods of intervention 
Objectives Targeted the objectives of peacebuilding writ large 
Frameworks, Theories, Conceptualisation Targeted the conceptual, frameworks, definitions, or other 
scholarly work 
Understanding Targeted an explanation or account of a particular 
phenomenon. Overlaps with theories, but is less abstract – for 




objectives, and only interested in explaining what occurred in 
one particular context. 
Finally, articles were also coded in relation to their ‘criticality’, which was based on the 
reviewer’s subjective opinion of how the ideas and arguments within the text contributed to the 
larger body of work being analysed. This node underwent continual revisions in response to 
conceptual and empirical developments in the literature, as it sought to most aptly capture what 
innovative and transformative critiques were, in relation to, rather than in isolation from, other 
articles. This led to some potentially controversial coding decisions, as articles were 
occasionally marked less critically if they simply replicated the works of their peers. While 
several articles reaching the same conclusion theoretically speaks to the validity of their 
findings and arguments (or, to the capital afforded to particular buzzwords), in line with the 
broader aims of this thesis, the decision was made to reduce the associated criticality of articles 
which continually approached the same problematic without providing significantly new 
insights beyond what had already been highlighted by other authors. Notably, this had a 
significant impact on those works concerning ‘local ownership’ which appear to have an almost 
tautologic (in the manner of Wittgenstein) relationship with criticality in the minds of 
academics (discussed in chapter 6), despite much of the work being highly repetitive and often 
producing compounding rather than radically new insights.32 
The GT approach utilized by this analysis encouraged new nodes of criticality to emerge from 
the themes and discussions appearing within the texts themselves, rather than reify existing 
popular, but potentially less suitable, categories of criticality. This process enabled the author 
to overcome issues of trying to fit square pegs into round holes, pursuing areas of interest as 
they emerged by creating as many nodes as were needed, which were later merged into other 
nodes in response to newer and more exciting revelations, only to reappear as the nuances 
between ideas became more distinct and less congruent. Once coding had been completed the 
rationales and functions of these nodes were reassessed alongside their corresponding works. 
Five nodes of criticality (status-quo, improvement, critical improvement, transformation and 
radical transformation) were seen to best reflect the dispersion of articles and their overlapping 
ideas, themes and contributions, and all articles were eventually recoded and merged into these 
more reflective groups. Though distinct, these categories can be seen to share many features 
with existing typologies, notably the divisions in Critical Theory (Cox, 1981; Brown, 2013) 
 
32 This is also considered to be an outcome of the underlying structures inherent in academia which encourage 
authors to publish or perish – meaning the continued application of a particular framework or methodological 
approach in new (but often comparable) environments is tacitly encouraged. There are merits and pitfalls to these 




and Visoka’s (2018) recent work which delineates approaches to alternativity by critical 
scholars. While the differences between these existing typologies and those put forward here 
might appear rather subtle at first, they are designed to better reflect the aims of this thesis, 
drawing on post-colonial and emancipatory epistemologies to acknowledge the different 
approaches to alternativity and criticality, whilst endowing them with a particular, and at times 
perhaps unwanted, explicit normative purpose.  
Table 5 Criticality Codes 
Code Description 
Status-Quo Typically undertook large quantitative analysis to test theories (such as the 
relationship between trade or democracy and peace) over large periods of 
time. They often utilized neutral language, expressed limited normative intent 
and typically ignored significant critical endeavors such as the local turn 
while offering no solutions 
Improvement Typically targeted a particular process or outcome, these articles contained 
little substantial consideration of long-term transformation and critique of the 
status quo. 
Critical Improvement Might consider broader structural issues that lead to conflict, but nevertheless 
produce outputs for short term improvement or process and practice oriented 
transformation. 
Transformation Analysis considers structural and wider factors significant and pays greater 
attention to relations of power and notions of transformation or emancipation 
Radical Transformation Analysis pays significant attention to broader structural issues, power 
relations, and constraints. Seeks radical and transformative change, and 
engages in alternative conceptions of peace which are explicitly 
emancipatory.  
In general, these nodes comprise an ordinal scale of criticality, with ‘improvement’ reflecting 
the least transformative or radical ideas, and ‘radical transformation’ reflecting the opposite. 
While the scale is ordered, numerous articles straddled two nodes, containing, for example, 
emancipatory intent with orthodox solutions. Such overlaps were not seen to be an issue with 
the particular nodes; rather, they reflected the depth and complexity contained within each 
article and the interrelatedness of problems addressed. Thus, while the divisions contained 
within the table above are relatively concise, these distinctions blur as they are applied to the 
articles which they organise, urging both coder and reader to see nodes as malleable containers, 
between which, the distance is continually changing in response to new understandings and 
problematics as well as the socio-historic context in which they are encountered. For more 
details on the coding process, see appendix 4.2. 
LIMITATIONS OF CDA 
Like all research, this thesis suffers from numerous limitations which must be acknowledged 




information is available in appendix 4.2. First, numerous technical limitations may have 
adversely impacted results. For example, the software utilized to record observations (NVIVO) 
occasionally struggled to interpret texts during keyword searches, reducing the accuracy of the 
large-scale patterns that were drawn on to initially guide analysis. It also occasionally failed to 
update new coding decisions (for minor reference point nodes) given the size of the project and 
computational limitations. While both problems were addressed to a certain extent, the first by 
redoing analysis manually using PDF readers, and the second by limiting the extent to which 
reference nodes affected coding justifications, these may have still had some minimal impact 
to individual examples (rather than the broader patterns in which observations made within this 
thesis were based).  
Second, while the method of identification, triangulation and collation to construct the dataset 
analysed within this thesis sought to overcome many of the limitations in reviewing the 
contributions of so many scholars to such an interdisciplinary discourse, these terms and 
methods would have invariably reflected the biases of this researcher and their effects would 
have been compounded during coding and analysis. Though the integrity of the dataset (both 
scholars and articles) and general findings from the coding were tested through the CNA and 
interviews, with additional works and areas occasionally being suggested by participants, a 
qualitative reading on this scale undoubtedly has many limitations. The two blind tests sought 
to verify coding, though this could only test the codes of criticality and contribution area and 
the more inductive components of analysis may have invariably overlooked some ideas, 
misinterpreted particular notions or phrasings, or failed to pick up on the subtle nuances 
contained and hidden within the more obtuse conclusions in which radical critiques might be 
located. Thus, the criticality of these articles must be read in relation to the context in which 
this thesis was written, providing a snapshot of criticality as it is read now, rather than 
historically. This will likely lead veterans of the field to disagree (somewhat) to individual 
coding justifications, given the context in which they encountered a publication may have been 
different to my own. 
Again, I must stress that while these limitations are important, and a more in-depth reading and 
discussion with every author about every piece of work would have invariably produced deeper 
and more nuanced understandings, it was beyond the scope, funding, and time constraints of 
this thesis to explore and understand the tacit implications of every piece of work. Instead, the 
explicit and overt arguments and solutions were identified in the hope of understanding the 




The goal was to identify the core radical and transformative contributions of text, the acts of 
parrhesia, rather than academics’ tangential and tacit resistance to power. The justification for 
this position was based on the understanding that, if academia has little impact on policy (as 
some contend), or the institutions of academia have little impact on their writing (as many 
interviewees contend), why not be radical? 
4.3: Methods - Interviews 
Two rounds of interviews were undertaken to deepen and test insights made during research. 
The first round of interviews was conducted in 2017 and served as a scoping exercise to identify 
potential areas of exploration and receive feedback on early observations. The second round of 
interviews was undertaken upon completion of the CDA and CNA, though before results were 
finalised, to test findings, receive alternative explanations or personal accounts, and collate a 
variety of views on the state of PACs scholarship. In total, 47 interviews were conducted 
throughout this project with 43 individual scholars (some interviews contained two scholars, 
and some scholars were interviewed in both rounds). 36 scholars went on record for interviews, 
though I have sought to minimise individual sentiments and quotes throughout the writing of 
this thesis to avoid critiquing individual and emerging scholars in favour of critiquing the 
discourse as a whole. 
Given research funding limitations, and the desire to undertake interviews in person to allow 
for more free and frank discussions, scholars within Northern Europe and the U.K. were 
contacted by email and asked whether they would like to participate in the research. Though 
most scholars appeared within the dataset, several scholars were also interviewed given their 
noted importance in the field of peacebuilding.  
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner where a series of questions were asked 
in relation to individual aspects of participants works (to seek clarification on particular points, 
or to test coding decisions for example) and on their understandings of the role of academics 
and PACs writ large. Most interviews took around two hours, and participants were able to 
direct discussion to areas they felt were important or pertinent to my understanding, and to go 
on and off record where they felt uncomfortable discussing sensitive issues more openly. For 




4.4: Chapter Conclusion 
The results of the data collection and dataset construction are laid out in the table below. The 
extended cleaned dataset shows results returned from the initial data collection, the primary 
dataset contains the number or articles and authors which were analysed within this dataset, 
and the hybridity dataset refers to those works that were analysed again in relation to hybridity 
(chapter 8). It must be noted that due to publishing restrictions and software limitations 2% of 
articles (15) were unable to be accessed by this researcher.33 Subsequently, only 590 articles 
could be analysed in a systematic fashion within the CDA. Given the statistical insignificance 
of these articles, the dataset was still listed as containing 605 articles, as the authors and years 
of these texts were still factored into larger analysis. Furthermore, only 577 articles within the 
dataset contained bibliographic information which could be used during the CNA. This 
discrepancy was primarily caused by, for example, opinion pieces, review, and introductory 
articles, which often contained no references. As this was not an error in dataset collection or 
collation, this was not considered a limitation, and articles without references could still be 
utilized within the CNA given other articles cited them.  
Table 6: Break down of data collection 
Dataset Articles Authors 
Extended Cleaned Dataset 2967 3109 (approximate) 
Primary Dataset 605 Articles 111 authors (+ unlisted co-authors) 
CDA Coded Dataset 330 coded articles 111 authors (+ unlisted co-authors) 
CNA Dataset 605 (577 with references)  111 authors (+ unlisted co-authors) 
Hybridity dataset 250 articles  
Utilizing three distinct techniques generates numerous issues that need to be considered by 
researchers. While each method’s individual limitations have been elaborated on above and 
within the appendix, it is important to note that these issues may have been compounded 
throughout the research project. For example, the manual construction of the dataset and 
triangulation process could have omitted several pertinent texts and scholars, which could have 
negatively impacted on analysis. Through the CNA and CDA it was hoped that any such works 
and insights may still have been accounted for (even if they could not be quantitatively 
 
33 Where some articles were unable to be retrieved due to access restrictions and other various copyright issues, 
several articles (primarily those published on Hein Online) had outdated typeset interfaces on their PDFs and were 
unable to be edited or coded using the NVIVO software. While these items may have been able to be coded 
manually, given the number of automated scripts that were run on initial articles to identify patterns and trends, it 




measured alongside the rest of the dataset), though personal bias may have led this researcher 





CHAPTER 5: THE LIMITS OF CRITIQUE - FINDINGS 
To understand how critical scholars have contested the discourse of international 
peacebuilding, we must understand what their critiques were, their limitations, as well as how 
these were interpreted and transmitted – the barriers to both knowledge production and 
transmission. Where chapter 8 explores this transmission in the context of hybridity, chapters 
5, 6, and 7 lay the foundations for understanding the popular and marginalised areas of 
criticality which emerged from the inductive analysis laid out in chapter 4. This was guided by 
three open ended themes which asked: how is the field of critical peacebuilding comprised 
(current chapter), how academics emulated criticality (chapter 6), and what critiques and 
alternatives to dominant and orthodox theories of peace have been posited (chapter 7). 
This chapter begins by outlining the scholars and their publications analysed within this thesis, 
before unpacking the high-level results from the critical discourse and citation network 
analysis. The CDA identified several pertinent trends in scholarship which problematize the 
extent to which academics have offered radical and transformative critiques of international 
peacebuilding. It finds that the vast amount of scholarship draws on critical approaches to 
analyse the practices and methods of peacebuilding rather than its objectives and wider 
systems. Furthermore, where scholarship does focus on these broader dynamics, it often seeks 
to contest our frameworks of understanding, and critiques objectives by offering new ways of 
conceptualising peacebuilding. The CNA shows that despite the interdisciplinary nature of 
PACs, the dominance of particular academics and their theories suggest that scholars, in 
addition to not challenging and transforming these wider issues of conflict promotion 
themselves, are not drawing on significant literature from outside the field of international 
peacebuilding to make up for this lacuna. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the 
scholarship within the dataset provides limited possibility for radical transformation, given 
most appear to be following a critical problem solving approach, cognisant of the need to 
critique systemic issues, but content to focus on challenging practice. 
5.1: Results - Constructing Critical Peacebuilding 
The following section outlines the high-level features of this dataset and their authors before 
their coding and relationships are more closely explored.  
While PACs has had a rather tumultuous history since its establishment last century, with new 




IR and Political Sciences, related literature has seen steady growth. Indeed, the increasing array 
of reflexive critiques, dedicated journals, disciplinary conferences and workshops which seek 
to understand and define the core of PACs shows that this is a discipline that is undergoing 
extensive introspection as its members seek to revise and potentially reinvigorate its normative 
foundations. Given this trend, it seems unsurprising that the number of publications on 
peacebuilding captured within the data set has grown substantially over time. Figure 4 below 
shows the increase in critical peacebuilding related literature since 2005. A spike in 
publications can be seen around 2012 and 2013 as heated discussions surrounding the concept 
of hybridity take place, as well as a sharp increase beginning in 2016/2017 (which continues 
on beyond December 2017 when the dataset ends) which appear to be caused by an increase in 
reflexive pieces problematising PACs and its relationship to peacebuilding (see, for instance, 




Figure 4: Primary dataset publications by year 
The process of triangulation outlined in Chapter 4 (and Appendix 4.1) identified 111 core 
peacebuilding scholars.  While numerous other disciplines engage with peacebuilding related 
topics, the authors captured within this dataset have primarily been trained or currently reside 
within PACs (or closely related) departments. In total, the dataset consists of 71 men and 40 
 
34 This trend slightly contrasts the extended dataset which escalates substantially in 2016-2017 (and beyond). This 
is most likely caused by the mainstreaming of critical terms where scholars drew on critical approaches to generate 

























women, 103 of whom resided within the Global North at the time of writing (see figure 5 
below). Though this includes several scholars who had undergraduate degrees from within the 
Global South who appear to have relocated to the North (primarily Canada) during their post-
graduate studies and either stayed at these institutions or claimed this to be their affiliation. 
Scholars noted as being within the Global South reside in Brazil, Ecuador, Kenya, Nigeria, 
South Africa (2), and South Korea (2). 
 
Figure 5: Number of scholars by region 
While the unequal gender and geographic diversity is not unsurprising, it is useful to bear in 
mind when considering other trends which emerge within the dataset. While the search terms 
employed to identify scholarship could have been less representative of female and Global 
South scholars, the CNA verified the robustness of the dataset and did not show any significant 
outlying groups of scholars who may have been missed during data collection. It is more likely 
that these figures reflect who is shaping (or recognised as shaping) critical peacebuilding 
scholarship. For example, European peacebuilding scholars have typically been perceived as 
more critical than their North American counterparts (Beriker, 2015). As such, we would 
expect and find more scholars to be located within Northern European institutions (60% 
including the U.K.) than in North American ones (22%). This division is even larger when 
looking at the number of publications per region, with Northern European institutions 
(including the U.K.) tripling that of their North American colleagues (see figure below). Closer 
inspection of this breakdown shows that only 9 of the North American scholars are from the 
USA (the rest are from Canada), and that while they are engaging with critical literature, they 




















structural factors within their analysis of peacebuilding practice and theory (see appendix 5.2 
for more a more detailed breakdown).  
 
 
Figure 6: Number of Articles published by region 35 
While many authors that one might expect to be found in such a study were included for 
analysis within the extended works of the dataset through co-authored pieces etc., as noted in 
the previous chapter, numerous scholars were excluded through the criteria used to construct 
the dataset and limit the scale of analysis. 
5.2: Results - Critical Discourse Analysis 
The following section outlines the limits of critique as they emerged through manual coding of 
the primary dataset and text mining. While over 330 articles were manually coded during this 
process, the results provided below and the observations and arguments made later are 
primarily drawn from 310 articles, as repetitive writings and technical texts were omitted from 
the more in-depth analysis (in line with the Grounded Theory approach taken) - as they either 
provided no new arguments or could not be seen to fairly reflect the views of authors (see 
chapter 4).  
 
35 Please note, these figures were derived by attributing one point per author, rather than per region. As such the 
total number of articles indicated (733) is significantly higher than the number of articles in the dataset, as articles 
that had co-authors were counted multiple times. This was considered to be more illustrative of the ways in which 



















It identifies the foci of critical peacebuilding articles, the types of problems they addressed and 
broad patterns in theory and arguments that emerged within the dataset. The primary finding 
put forward here and explored throughout the thesis is that contra to what one might expect 
from critical approaches, most works within the dataset addressed specific operational and 
methodological problems rather than the broader objectives of peacebuilding or the type of 
peace being sought. 
CRITICALITY CODING 
Central to the analysis conducted within this thesis is the notion of criticality outlined in 
Chapter 3. The understanding developed by this author sought to emphasize the transformative 
and imaginative theory to argue that it is not enough for scholars to simply identify spaces for 
emancipation through their critique, but that these spaces needed to be filled with ideas and 
challenges themselves. Criticality, as it was measured in an article’s focus, semantics, critique, 
and solutions identified consistent patterns within the dataset, where most scholars drew on 
critical approaches but were generally more conservative in their advocation for alternative 
objectives or critique of more systemic factors.36 
Table 7: Article Criticality 
Recorded Criticality Number of Articles 
Status Quo 9 
Improvement 85 
Critical Improvement 123 
Transformation 58 
Radical Transformation 35 
Total 310 
Perhaps in testament to the methodology used to construct the initial dataset, status quo texts 
were few and far between, and were most noticeable for their neutral terminology and intent. 
They were often large quantitative studies testing particular theories, where, for instance 
scholars used sizable datasets to compare the correlates of conflict with freedom house indexes 
 
36 It must be noted that results of criticality shown below are from a skewed dataset, the construction of 
which was designed to capture the most critical works on international peacebuilding. Thus, the fact that 
only 9 articles were coded as ‘status quo’ enforcing should be seen as unsurprising, given that only articles 
using critical approaches were captured and analysed within the dataset. These nine articles would most 
likely still appear somewhat critical in comparison to articles outside of the dataset. As such, the table and 





on democracy to highlight a specific relationship in dyadic and democratic peace theory (see 
appendix 4.2 for more). 
Improvement texts also contained more neutral terminology in their writing but expressed a 
muted desire to ‘transform’ peacebuilding methods or were more critical in the focus of their 
analysis. Suggestions made by these pieces would typically be provided to improve methods 
of peacebuilding rather than transform the types of peace or objectives sought (see appendix 
4.2 for more). 
Critical improvement texts comprised the largest body of works and bore a close resemblance 
to the notion of ‘critical problem-solving’ theory outlined by Brown (2013), which approaches 
the real-world problems of peacebuilding from the position of the marginalised and oppressed, 
but provides suggestions and solutions that would lead to immediate improvement rather than 
long term transformation. Many of these writings explicitly signified their normative intent in 
constructing an alternative or better peace. However, they failed to adequately elaborate on 
what such a peace would look like and generally appeared to conceptualise it as a peace only 
for post-conflict states – failing to critique the broader international system and constructs of 
peace, for example. While many of these works attempted to lay out some indication of what 
a desirable alternate end result might entail, either through the focus of their analysis or by the 
solutions and suggestions they posed, the methods or practices of peacebuilding were typically 
the primary target of their critique (see appendix 4.2 for more). 
Transformative texts presented yet another step towards criticality and would be seen by most 
scholars to represent texts pertaining to Critical Theory. They were more often focused on the 
objectives or types of peace or gave a significantly greater review of such aspects. They would 
indicate awareness of broader structural and systemic issues that would need to be addressed 
and would include more emancipatory and emotive language on behalf of the subaltern and 
oppressed. Though these texts were less likely to provide solutions that targeted specific 
peacebuilding methods, they were not necessarily more likely to provide solutions and 
suggestions directed at objectives or types of peace either – and instead would typically critique 
particular frameworks of understanding. Like much of Critical Theory, these works were often 
more committed to scholarly debate than producing immediate results, and while they would 
conventionally be seen as more critical than critical-improvement texts, it is this author’s view 
that they occupied a similar position to these texts despite being more abstract and not explicitly 




Radical transformative texts were considered to be the most critical texts within the dataset. 
They utilized critical approaches, critiqued objectives and types of peace, were notably more 
radical or emotive in their rhetoric, and indicated a strong focus on social justice and 
emancipation. Their suggestions were typically considered to be revolutionary in comparison 
to other texts and generally expanded on issues beyond the immediate operationalisation of 
peacebuilding because of their abstraction or description and lack of prescription (see appendix 
4.2 for more). 
As sceptics of the field might have suspected, the majority of texts utilizing critical approaches 
to study peacebuilding (as captured within the dataset) were more concerned with practices and 
methods than objectives. Similar to observations made by Schuurman (2009) regarding 
development studies, scholars expressed a normative concern for improving the subjects of 
peace interventions but failed to link these to larger metanarratives. Scholars rarely considered 
what the objectives of interventions were (beyond rhetorical critiques of the liberal peace – see 
chapter 7) and how efforts to achieve them would integrate states within the current order, 
rather than transform it. Drawing on Visoka (2018), the coding shows that most articles either 
provided alternative methods and practices (which were iterative and untransformative of 
objectives), or provided alterity as critique, rather than sketching out actual alternatives 
themselves. As discussed in chapter 6, these critiques were often limited and failed to radically 
consider factors beyond the post-conflict state. As such, barring most radical transformative 
(and some transformative) articles, critical peacebuilding scholarship should not be considered 
‘subversive knowledge’, given it failed to live up to normative intent of PACs and the 
emancipatory intent of Critical Theory. where more critical pieces provided new frameworks 
of analysis rather than alternative orders, and those more prescriptive texts offered practice 
oriented solutions without considering structural and systemic causes of oppression and 
conflict promotion (and thus were critical problem-solving texts, à la Brown, 2013).  
Applying a temporal analysis to the coding of these articles shows that the increase in 
publications (and scholars) drawing on critical approaches to peacebuilding was mostly met by 
an increase in critical improvement texts (figure 7 below). This suggests that the success of 
critical scholars in challenging and transforming how peacebuilding is understood 
corresponded with an uptake of these terminologies and methods which did not necessarily 
match their critical intent, producing policy oriented improvements rather than radical 




suggested that an increase in less critical scholars or a shift in how these conceptualisations 
were used (to generate empirical findings) led to a decline in criticality.37  
 
Figure 7: Criticality of articles per year 
FOCUS OF CRITIQUE 
Coding also sought to identify the various foci of articles - what they were critiquing and what 
their findings sought to add to (practices, objectives, or scholarship). As noted in chapter 2, a 
key point of contention amongst critical theorists is that problem-solving scholars continually 
improve and reify the status quo by challenging the practices and methods of peacebuilding 
rather than objectives. The following section outlines the various analysis that were undertaken 
on the dataset to understand the merits of these claims, and the endeavours to which scholars 
here contributed.  
The coding found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the majority of articles (185) could be 
considered ‘case studies’, focusing on particular post-conflict countries or peoples, or less 
frequently, on a particular international actor undertaking acts of peacebuilding. The lines 
between case studies and their more conceptual or theoretical counterparts can be tricky to 
draw, given that many articles which undertook a case study approach did so to contribute to 
broader conceptual discussions. Indeed, the majority of articles coded (254) maintained some 
focus on a post-conflict region or actor during their analysis. In total, 137 articles were 
considered primarily theoretical or conceptual contributions and focused on the phenomenon 
of international peacebuilding, types and conceptions of peace, or more frequently, critiques of 
other academics and research agendas.  
 
37 Here, it was noted that empirical works created through field research often produced policy recommendations 
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Table 8: Article Type 
Type of Article Number of Articles 
Case Study 185 
Conceptual or Theoretical Study 137 
Technical Article 20 
Total  330  
Articles were further coded according to the area in which they identified their primary 
problematique, addressed their conclusions or suggestions, and the coder’s interpretation of the 
primary area to which their article contributed. It was considered important to differentiate 
between these three levels, as scholars frequently addressed their overarching problem in a 
roundabout manner (for instance, noting the problem to be one of objectives, then identifying 
practice-based solutions to address it). A reason for this could be seen to stem from the 
versatility of concepts such as the ‘liberal peace’, which, though occasionally considered an 
objective (a Kantian or Democratic peace for instance), were more often critiqued for the 
particular practices and methods used by peacebuilders to achieve them (liberal peacebuilding).  
The table below shows the primary area of focus for each of the coded articles. It shows that 
studies overwhelmingly focused on methods and practices of peacebuilding (typically through 
case study) or how peacebuilding as a phenomenon should be understood or reframed. While 
numerous theories, concepts and frameworks were developed or expanded through studies 
within the coded dataset, only 52 articles explicitly addressed the objectives of peacebuilding 
as the central component of their analysis – critiquing or reimagining the outcomes that 
international peacebuilding leads to. 
Table 9: Primary Contribution Area38 
Contribution area 
Concepts, Theories and 
Frameworks Understandings Practice Objectives 
Problematique 34 80 156 40 
Conclusion 35 114 70 13 
Contribution 51 132 105 22 
The understanding of critical theory and approaches that emerged within articles in the dataset 
can be seen to align closely with more orthodox or traditional approaches, in that scholars often 
expressed a desire to be transformative and obtain some better version of peace for post-conflict 
subjects, while focusing their critiques on the more short-term and achievable aims of 
transforming peacebuilding practices rather than objectives. Table 10 below shows that as 
 
38 Note, not all articles had easily identifiable suggestions/take-aways within their conclusion and thus some were 




articles were considered more critical, they were more likely to address theoretical or 
conceptual issues than types of peace or peacebuilding practices.39 




Objective Practice Understanding 
Radical 
Transformation 
12 5 5 13 
Transformation 15 8 13 21 
Critical 
Improvement 
22 5 41 56 
Improvement 1 4 41 39 
Status Quo 1 0 5 3 
As argued in chapters 2\3 and 6, a key component of criticality envisioned within this thesis is 
the extent to which larger objectives of peace or the international system (including 
understandings of state, governance, economics, etc.) were challenged. Such works were 
exceedingly rare, and most radical or transformative critiques culminated in offering, for 
example, a new research agenda or conceptualisation of a phenomena rather than a new practice 
of peacebuilding that would fundamentally challenge the type of peace sought, or an 
understanding of peace that required Western countries to alter their own domestic conceptions 
and practices. The table below clearly shows this relationship, in that scholars who identified 
the primary problematique as the objectives of peacebuilding (most commonly the type of 
peace sought or the objective of a ’liberal peace’) were far more likely to conclude with 
critiques of, or suggestions to improve practical measures or our understandings of particular 
phenomena than they were of objectives.  




Objectives Practice Understanding 
Concepts, Theories 
and Frameworks 
15 0 0 6 
Objective 4 5 11 11 
Practice 11 7 54 57 
Understanding 4 1 5 40 
As the table below shows, it is only when the article as a whole is taken into consideration that 
such critiques of peacebuilding’s objectives could be seen to advocate for some broader form 
 
39 A significant limitation that must be restated here is that when suggestions and improvements are provided that 
are applicable to the policy world, the perceived level of criticality typically reduces given the difficulty in 
transferring criticality to the practical realm. Such observations would suggest that the more instrumental an article 
the less critical their work might be perceived to be. This thesis sought to overcome this bias by explicitly 
positioning alterity as a component of criticality, where prescriptions were delineated between those that targeted 
operational or practice measures (problem-solving) and those that sought to transform the objectives of 




of transformation. For instance, where an article’s discussion and conclusion chapters (the 
‘takeaways’) could be targeted more towards providing or challenging peacebuilding methods, 
when read alongside their identified problem and broader discussions, they potentially and 
tacitly advocated a wider transformation or challenge to the phenomena of peacebuilding. 
Ultimately, only 14 articles identified the objectives of peacebuilding as their problematique 
and maintained a focus on these objectives throughout the text. 





Objective Practice Understanding 
Concepts, Theories 
and Frameworks 
22 0 2 9 
Objective 6 14 11 9 
Practice 12 6 85 52 
Understanding 10 2 6 62 
TOPICS OF CRITIQUE 
While this study did not seek to replicate existing meta-analyses of PACs beyond 
peacebuilding, being more concerned with the normative and critical focus of articles than the 
large scale quantitative trends, its use of NVIVO provided an opportunity to explore some of 
the more abstract patterns within the dataset through the programmes’ text mining tools.   Using 
NVIVO’s word frequency algorithm on articles within the dataset (excluding technical text40) 
offered the first indication of the common areas of focus. While such observations are perhaps 
less nuanced than manually reading and coding articles based on their title words and abstracts 
(see, for instance, Bright and Gledhill, 2018),41 they nevertheless provide an indication of the 
semantic patterns across articles. For example, despite the observation by Richmond (2007d) 
and others  noting the plethora of words for conflict and the singular word for peace, ‘peace’ 
was the most frequent word to appear within the data set overall (23617 times with a further 
350 mentions of nonviolence and pacifism) which when combined, nearly eclipsed the 
overlapping terminologies of conflict  (8203 times), war (7788 times) and violence (5988 
 
40 Technical text, which included titles, abstracts, figures, graphs, footnotes, references, editorial notes, etc. were 
omitted from analysis given the way that such text would distort results. 
41 Indeed, it was this author’s intent to replicate their coding on the NVIVO dataset, however neither their article 
nor their online reference material contained the specific coding sheet that was used to determine whether an 
article was focused on conflict or peace. Ultimately, even the methodology employed by these researchers relied 
on an automatic element where, after a set of coding criteria had been produced, a python script applied that 




times). 42 Though peace can (and should be) considered many things beyond the absence of 
violence, it is refreshing to note that literature on peacebuilding does, from this abstract 
semantic level at least, appear to be focused on building peace as much as it is on conflict 
reduction.43  
The high frequency of invocations of peace is unsurprising given its utilization as an adjective, 
verb and noun. Indeed, as is discussed in Chapter 6 and 7, the number of articles that were 
concerned with the types of peace being sought or built (objectives) is significantly less 
impressive, and many of the references to peace were in relation to things such as peace 
education, processes, and agreements – the construction of peace rather than discussions of 
what peace is. Such findings echo earlier arguments made by Richmond (2007a) against IR  
that peace is an often assumed rather than questioned concept, a charge which is significantly 
more problematic when levelled against scholars within PACs itself and against those 
critiquing peacebuilding.  
Using NVIVO’s automated insights tool on the text of articles within the dataset, the following 
high-level ‘themes’ were generated which were used to explore groups of articles and identify 
common patterns amongst text (see figure below). This depicts themes according to their 
frequency, which provides a broad picture of the various themes and nodes that were then 
replicated to capture and cluster data. 
 
 
42The second most utilized word was ‘international’ (16089) and the third ‘local’ (15853) – which is also rather 
unsurprising given the significant focus of authors on international and local actors, peacebuilding processes, and 
understandings – especially through the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding literature which sought to challenge or resist 
the international through conceptions and understandings of the local. For a list of the top 50 words, see appendix 
5.1. 
43 For a more detailed exploration on the normative differences between these two themes, see Bright & Gledhill 





Figure 8: Word cloud of terms by usage in dataset  
Further searches were conducted to explore the changes in terminology over time to understand 
when new concepts emerged and were popularised or replaced. The ability to identify semantic 
patterns in the dataset allowed for a variety of nuances to emerge which helped this researcher 
explore and identify relationships and trends in both theoretical concepts and analytical 
enquiries. For example, where Chandler (2017b, p. 193) has recently noted that over the last 
two decades, approaches to peacebuilding have shifted from attempts to transform conflict to 
simply managing it (indicating a lowering of expectations related to the ‘end of the liberal 
episteme’), this claim could be empirically verified within the dataset by assessing how usage 
of these terms had changed over time. The figure below charts these semantic patterns to 
suggest that over the course of the dataset, scholarship has increasingly oriented towards 
‘conflict resolution’ (resolving or ending a particular conflict) or ‘managing’ conflicts rather 
than ‘transforming’ them. The significance of this terminological and analytical shift, 
according to Chandler, is that it reflects a reduction in the expectations of what peacebuilders 
and academics believe international operations can feasibly achieve. While some critical 
scholarship has noted this as a positive trend in which the hubristic mindset of Western 
policymakers is finally being acknowledged (Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović, 2016), it may 
also reflect a diminishment of both the aspiration and optimism in our ability to build peace – 
resonating with arguments made over a decade ago by Duffield (2007) and Pugh (2004a, 2016) 
concerning the ways in which peacebuilding only manages and contains violent conflict in a 





Figure 9: Articles mentioning approaches to conflict  
The potential diminishment in the aspirations of peacebuilding correlates with an overall 
increase in more critical terminologies in peacebuilding literature (figure 10 below), where 
invocations of emancipation, everyday and resistance can be seen to increase as inferences of 
conflict transformation have decreased. Thus, while the aspirations of peacebuilding missions 
may have been reduced, there has been an increase in critical and relativist terms which  does 
not correlate with an overall increase in criticality within the dataset (figure 9 above).  
Instead, these three features point to the popularisation of critical terms (whereupon more 
scholars used these analytical concepts and frameworks but in potentially less critical ways), 
as well as the relativism of these terms, whereby scholars who drew upon them were often 
reluctant to ‘problem-solve’ and suggest radical alternative practices and objectives, favouring 
analytical studies which ‘described’ rather than transformed.44  
 
44 While there are a host of critical terminologies within peacebuilding literature, these terms often appeared in 
more critical texts and align in various ways with the objectives of subversive knowledge (chapter 3). See, for 
example, Richmond (2011b, 2011a) for discussions on everyday, resistance and local aspects of peace. At the 
same time, these terms often appear to have been co-opted, or utilized in less critical ways over time (or as they 
were popularised). See, for example, Joseph (2013) and Chandler (2015, 2017a) for how resilience was co-opted 
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Figure 10: Temporal indication of critical terminology 
COUNTRIES OF CRITIQUE 
While the majority of articles focused on peacebuilding within the Global South, many of these 
studies included critiques of the actions undertaken by international peacebuilders (critiques of 
their practices, methods and operations). In line with arguments that emerged through the ‘local 
turn’, most studies appear to have been more critical towards international actors than local 
ones, or at least tended to view the problems to have been caused by this international/local 
dichotomy which required international actors to improve their own understandings and 
methods, rather than to increase/upscale their efforts, or conversely for local actors to better 
accommodate international norms and actions. Of note is that despite the intensity and 
continuation of numerous conflicts worldwide, the top three countries analysed within the 
coded dataset were Bosnia and Herzegovina (22 articles), Kosovo (18), and Northern Ireland 
(18).45 Looking at this distribution via region however, demonstrates that conflicts within 
Africa received the most attention followed by those in Eastern Europe and South and 
Southeast Asia (figure below). 
 
45 Another method which was initially tested to identify the main countries of analysis within the dataset was by 
using the text search feature to quantitatively understand how often particular countries and regions were 
mentioned. While this produced somewhat different numbers to those provided through the qualitative coding 
above, these were seen to be less accurate and reflective of case focus given articles would often mention 
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Figure 11: Article focus by region 
While this case study focus might suggest that scholars are just as interested in peacebuilding 
processes at home as they are overseas, there is a distinct difference in analysis between these 
regions. Here, literature on European countries (primarily Northern Ireland and the Balkans) 
focused predominantly on intercommunal/religious/ethnic violence or, more specifically, on 
economic aspects of aid programmes (as was the case in Northern Ireland) and governance (as 
was the case in the Balkans). Interestingly, neither of these regions elicited significant 
discussions of hybridity,46 presumably given their cultural norms and practices were seen to 
more closely align to those of the ‘international’ actors and scholars active in those areas, in 
stark contrast to studies of other ‘exotic’ regions such as Asia and the Pacific. 
5.3: Results - Citation Network Analysis 
The CNA was used to verify the dataset constructed in the initial phases of the study, by testing 
the interrelatedness of scholars and articles, and to ensure that prominent works and scholars 
 
46 With the exception of those slightly more theoretical articles which offered findings based on multiple case 
studies in which hybridity was not clearly linked or used to understand instances within Northern countries. For 
example, the two texts coded to Northern Europe and which had the highest references of hybridity were by 
Richmond and Mitchell, 2011c and Richmond and Tellidis, 2012. However, these articles drew their insights from 
a plethora of countries, with Richmond and Tellidis focusing more on terrorism than peacebuilding within Israel, 
Kashmir, Nepal, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Sri Lanka, utilizing the term 54 times, and the Richmond & Mitchell  
article invoking hybrid terms 20 times and focusing on Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Bosnia, Mozambique, Namibia, 
and Liberia. This is not to say that discussions of hybridity were not relevant to Northern contexts, but these 
themes were explored more through the overlapping notions of everyday and resistance to show, for example, 
how local groups and communities would resist and redirect economic aid (see Skarlato et al., 2013) rather than 
‘hybridity’ as it was invoked in other contexts such as the Pacific where it related more to overarching state 
institutions than aid practices (for example, Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009). 
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had not been missed.47 It was also used to understand how different groups of scholars might 
privilege certain theories and ideas above others, and to explore how ideas were transmitted 
and utilized within the dataset. While the information captured in these processes provided 
numerous insights, given space constraints within this thesis, this section will unpack these 
findings primarily in relation to the notion of epistemic closure. The findings from this analysis 
are primarily drawn on to understand the transmission and contestation of hybridity in chapter 
8, however it is important to highlight them here to identify the various networks and groupings 
of scholars within the dataset. 
The next section first compares the theoretical influences upon the dataset with that of IR, to 
claim that its scholars draw heavily on critical theorists within their discipline. It then unpacks 
the top 100 cited references within the dataset to identify several distinct clusters of scholars 
and research types, as well as their contributions and interactions with each other. Results from 
a co-citation analysis and bibliographic analysis are then explored in relation to this narrative, 
to visually demonstrate these networks and deepen our understanding of scholarly interactions.  
The results from the network analysis suggest that the dataset contains a coherent and relatively 
close community of scholars which can be divided into smaller clusters containing several 
significant ‘academic hegemons’. The dominance of these scholars combined with the 
performances of academia are seen to increase epistemic closure within studies of 
peacebuilding. Though these features are not unusual for research communities, they may 
diminish the prospects for innovation and transformation – an argument which will be explored 
throughout the remainder of the thesis.  
COMPARING INFLUENCES (THEORIES) 
While there are numerous ways to understand the broad features of the dataset (including the 
CDA below), technological advances and the digitizing of research outputs have opened up a 
host of new avenues in exploring the relations between articles through analysis of their 
references. While several methods were tested throughout the duration of this thesis, a rare 
point of comparison can be made by analysing the influence of key texts within the broader or 
adjacent discipline of International Relations (IR). The following section provides a blunt 
outline of these theories within the data sample, to offer readers familiar with the field of PACs, 
but not of citation analysis, a chance to get accustomed with these techniques. 
 
47 It must be noted that this thesis uses the term cite and reference indiscriminately to break up repetition of terms 




Richmond and Graef (2012) undertook a seminal analysis of the prevalence of ‘core theories’ 
within International Relations by counting the number of times key texts within each theory 
were cited in Google Scholar. While there are several limitations to their approach (see 
Richmond and Graef, 2012, pp. 63–64), they compellingly suggest that since the invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, IR has shifted away from its core theories of realism and liberalism to 
embrace more critical and post-colonial discussions. Reproducing this study provides a broad 
and comparative understanding of the prevalence of these theories within critical peacebuilding 
scholarship. As Richmond and Graef had no way to delineate between research communities, 
in this particular instance, the data sample of the thesis should be seen to form a microcosm of 
their study (and thus IR). It must also be noted that since their study was carried out in 2010-
2011, it is possible that some of the dynamics presented below are caused by previous ‘core’ 
texts being surpassed by newer ideas and theories – as such, this is only an illustrative test to 
understand key theoretical influences. 
Richmond and Graef identify 13 theoretical strands within the field of IR, which are 
represented by between 4 and 7 texts (see the appendix 5.3 for a full break down of these texts 
and citation numbers). By calculating the number of citations within each of these strands, they 
determine the ‘influence’ of that particular theory. Figure 12 below shows the results of 
reproducing their study upon the dataset within this thesis, while figure 13 shows the results of 
the original study undertaken by Richmond and Graef.  
 
Figure 12: Citations per theory (as defined by Richmond and Graef , 2012) 
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Figure 13: Citations per theory of IR (reproduced from Richmond and Graef, 2012) 
While the number of citations is astronomically different given the size of data samples, we 
can see distinct differences between these communities. Namely, critical peacebuilding 
scholars appear to be overwhelmingly focused on PACs theories and draw heavily on 
surrounding critical theories, such as post-structuralism and post-colonialism. While a 
significant variation of these PACs figures is due to the influence of Paris’ At War’s End (2004) 
(136 citations), even accounting for this we can see the clear preference of scholars within the 
dataset for more critical approaches.  
The dearth of realist literature is expected, given the more optimistic mindset that scholars 
studying peacebuilding might have about the ‘state of nature’ and possibility for peace. 
However, the minimal engagement with other theories, such as feminist literatures is somewhat 
alarming. Though this could be due to the texts selected by Richmond and Graef to represent 
feminist literature, this finding suggests the need for peacebuilding theorists to engage with a 
broader range of more critical theories. Ultimately, it is somewhat unsurprising that scholars 
within the dataset drew mostly on critical and PACs theories, given authors were primarily 
from PACs and utilized critical approaches to study peacebuilding. On the other hand, scholars 
must be careful to engage with a range of literatures and theories to counter epistemic closure 
and continue challenging hegemonic views. These figures, though in no way conclusive, 
indicate that scholars within the dataset may be relatively isolated from other communities and 
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may fail to engage in, and draw on, these wider discussions to the detriment of producing more 
radical understandings and solutions. 
COMPARING INFLUENCERS (SCHOLARS) 
Before continuing, it is useful to provide a snapshot of the top cited authors within the data set 
to better understand who might be considered the ‘dominant’ authors, alongside its dominant 
theories. The table below lays out the top 20 cited authors by works within the dataset.48 As 
readers familiar with critical approaches to international peacebuilding might assume, the most 
prominently cited scholars within the dataset were Richmond, Mac Ginty, Chandler, Millar and 
Paris. Given many of these authors are also widely published, their increase in citations is 
hardly surprising – however scholars such as Paris, Lederach, and Collier can be seen to have 
been cited at a significantly higher rate when weighted against the number of publications they 
were being cited for. Despite this, most articles within the dataset remained relatively under-
referenced, showing the dominance of these scholars within the field and the potential to 
subsume and overshadow more critical works. 
Table 13: Top cited authors by texts within the dataset  
Author Dataset citations Author Dataset Citations 
Oliver Richmond 690 Paul Collier 99 
Roger Mac Ginty 411 Johan Galtung 90 
David Chander 320 Gearoid Millar 89 
Roland Paris 294 Edward Newman 76 
Mark Duffield 193 James C Scott 72 
Volker Boege 168 Timothy Donais 71 
Michel Foucault 157 Jonathan Goodhand 66 
Michael Pugh 151 John Heathershaw 64 
John Paul Lederach 123 David Roberts 59 
Michael Barnett 107 Nicholas Lemay-Hébert 58 
IDENTIFYING INFLUENCES ON CRITICAL PEACEBUILDING STUDIES 
Given the number of cited references, it is difficult to clearly illustrate the various patterns and 
communities that emerged through coding without resorting to an abundance of extensive and 
mind-numbing lists. Thus, while the analysis was carried out on the full dataset (605 articles; 
tables and results are available on request), the following section explores these findings in 
 
48 According to Bradford’s law of scattering, moving beyond the top 20% of works and authors reduces the 





relation to the 100 most popularly cited references for indicative purposes, before stepping 
back to unpack the results of the larger bibliometric analysis and their consequences.  
Scrutinizing the top 100 cited references provides the first indication of the coherence of the 
critical peacebuilding community, and the comprehensiveness of the method used to construct 
the dataset (see chapter 4). These references were authored by 57 scholars, 19 of whom were 
tracked within the primary dataset (demarcated with an * in the table below).49 8 scholars 
(shaded in the table below) were considered outside the immediate field of peacebuilding and 
had typically been cited for their theoretical innovations (Foucault for governmentality, Scott 
for resistance, Acharya for norm transmission, Bhabha for hybridity, Cox for critical theory, 
De Certeau for the everyday, Tilly for state formation, and Tsing for the notion of Friction).  In 
addition to this, several post-colonial/development studies’ authors featured prominently 
within the cited references but could also be considered ‘outside’ the immediate field of 
peacebuilding. These include Bhabha, Escobar, Jabri and Spivak. Though they had frequently 
written on related topics, their writings typically focus on broader notions of development, 
rather than peacebuilding exclusively. While the rest of the authors were frequent contributors 
to peacebuilding studies, their absence from the dataset can be explained by their more 
‘mainstream’ views and approaches to studying peacebuilding (post-2005). Thus, this snapshot 
of the top cited references tends to confirm the methodology used to identify authors and key 
texts in that no significant authors appear to have been missed without due cause.50 
Table 14: Top 100 cited references by primary author  
Author # top 100 publications Author # top 100 publications 
Richmond OP* 14 Escobar A 1 
Mac Ginty R* 8 Fanthorpe R 1 
Paris R* 5 Fukuyama F 1 
Chandler D* 4 Gartzke E* 1 
Foucault M 4 Ghani A 1 
Lederach JP 3 Gleditsch Ks* 1 
Pugh M* 3 Hegre H* 1 
Barnett M* 2 Jabri V 1 
Collier P 2 Jarstad Ak* 1 
Donais T* 2 Kaldor M 1 
Doyle M 2 Keck M 1 
Duffield M 2 Krasner Sd 1 
Fearon J 2 Lemay-Hѐbert N* 1 
Galtung J 2 Marshall Mg 1 
 
49 Given the limitations of bibliometric software, only first authors were identified for this calculation. 




Pouligny B 2 Menkhaus K 1 
Scott JC 2 Millar G* 1 
Acharya A 1 Newman E* 1 
Autessere S* 1 Oneal Jr 1 
Bhabha H 1 Ramsbotham O 1 
Björkdahl A* 1 Richards P 1 
Boege V* 1 Roberts D* 1 
Campbell S 1 Russett B 1 
Caplan R 1 Snyder J 1 
Chesterman S 1 Spivak Gc 1 
Chopra J 1 Stedman Sj 1 
Cooper N* 1 Tilly C 1 
Cox R 1 Tsing A 1 
Cramer C 1 Zaum D 1 
De Certeau M 1   
ANALYSIS OF WORKS 
Unpacking these works in more detail leads to several overlapping yet relatively coherent 
clusters of scholarship. For simplicity’s sake these have been delineated here as external 
scholars (Theory Creators, and Post-Colonial scholars), and internal scholars (Critical 
Hegemons, Mainstream Hegemons, North American Scholars, and Theory Testers). These 
clusters will be briefly explored before accounting for the relationships between them. The aim 
here is not to unpack each contribution or author; rather, it is to show the broad and overlapping 
patterns of behaviour and interaction that can be extrapolated from these works which can then 
be visually charted within the CNA.  
Theory Creators 
These scholars (highlighted in yellow in the table above) can be considered mostly outside the 
field of peacebuilding and its immediate surrounds - though their writings have informed 
numerous critical revelations within the dataset. For example, Tsing’s (2004) understanding of 
friction (cited 22 times), was invoked heavily by North European scholars (see, for example, 
Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Hellmüller, 2013; Schia and Karlsrud, 2013). Here, they sought 
to outline an alternative conception to that of hybridity (Mac Ginty, 2011), which showed how 
external and internal norms, processes and ideas interacted and transformed each other (for the 
most comprehensive work to this effect, see Björkdahl et al., 2016). Their effort could also be 
seen to theoretically deepen and expand on the concept of constitutive norm localisation 
explored by Acharya (2004) (cited 14 times). Similarly, De Certeau (1984) was referenced 29 
times for his conceptualisation of the ‘everyday’ which provided significant theoretical 




peacebuilding, as well as how their daily practices could be seen to resist and transform 
interventions and governance (see, for example, Richmond 2009a, 2010, 2012a). While 
numerous scholars have discussed the ‘everyday’ in relation to De Certeau, within the dataset, 
it appears that much of this influence can be attributed to Richmond (who first cited the author 
in 2008), and whose development of the term surpassed that of other scholars. 
Post-Colonials 
While many post-colonial scholars wrote on closely related topics to that of international 
peacebuilding, most were considered to come from outside of the field of international 
peacebuilding or PACs (with the possible exclusion of Jabri).51 These works tended to impact 
critical studies of peacebuilding through their contestation of the post-conflict or post-colonial 
other. For example, Escobar (2012) (13 times) and Jabri (2007) (22 times) provide a more 
pessimistic understanding of intervention and its links to imperialism, while Spivak (1994) (22 
times) challenges the ability of the West to ‘know’ the post-colonial other. Notable in these 
works is that of Bhabha (1994) (21 times), who’s understanding of the interface between the 
colonizer and colonized played an instrumental role to the development of more critical 
understandings of hybridity, primarily proffered by theorists in the U.K. (see chapter 8). 
Critical Hegemons 
More critical and Marxist understandings of peacebuilding and transformation can be seen to 
stem from the works of Mark Duffield (2001, 2007) and Michael Pugh (2004b, 2016; 2008), 
who were drawn on in conjunction with understandings of governmentality and biopolitics 
produced by Foucault (1980, 1991; Foucault, Davidson and Burchell, 2008), prevalent in the 
works of critical hegemon’s such as Richmond and Chandler (see, for example, Richmond, 
2007c; Chandler, 2010c, 2010a; Chandler and Richmond, 2015; Pogodda and Richmond, 
2016). Sharing many overlaps with these critical works, though often from a slightly more 
instrumental and locally focused perspective, are the numerous works of Mac Ginty, who like 
Richmond, often appeared to act as an early bridge for much of post-colonial scholarship’s 
nuancing of hybrid, everyday, indigenous and local peace and peace processes (see, for 
instance, Mac Ginty, 2008, 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). 
 
51 Jabri has published several articles in what would be considered ‘critical peacebuilding’ (see, for instance, 1996, 
2013a) though her work is more generally targeted towards broader and overlapping themes – typically within IR 





Another prominent cluster of scholars to emerge within these 100 texts are those often found 
within the curriculum of taught courses in PACs. The works of Galtung (1969, 1996), for 
instance, are intrinsic to the formulation of PACs pedagogy and understandings of peace 
outside of North America (where Boulding (1978a) and others tend to dominate). The 
preeminent text of Lederach (1997) (62 times) on the other hand, is widely recognised as a 
staple amongst peacebuilding policymakers and practitioners, and is frequently drawn on by 
scholars assessing the ‘local turn’ or ‘bottom up’ peacebuilding ventures (for a good critique 
of this trend, see Paffenholz, 2013, 2015). Meanwhile, Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 
(2011) offer a broad overview of the contemporary (and often less critical) PACs scholarship, 
which newcomers (this author included), often use as a first point of reference to ground 
themselves within the discipline. While many of these scholars’ works were critical at their 
time of publication, since 2005 and the increased influence of more post-colonial, feminist and 
post-structuralist theories (the Theory Creators grouping above), this thesis considered them to 
be more of the problem solving variety (coded as improvement or critical improvement during 
the content analysis).  
North American Scholars 
While the above clusters are typically more related to research areas than geographic region, 
both the manual coding and CNA of texts and scholars within this cluster appeared to be unified 
less by analytical approach than by spatial delineation. While these scholars typically shared 
an interest in testing elements of the democratic peace thesis, and undertook large scale 
quantitative analysis, they have been labelled North American Scholars on the basis that 
geography, more than anything else, appears to unify these works and their approach. Despite 
the relatively small number of North American scholars captured within the primary dataset, 
their publications make up a surprisingly sizable number of the top 100 publications.52 The 
published works of Roland Paris are obviously a significant boon to this theme given they are 
so frequently cited. While many scholars might consider Paris (and perhaps Paul Collier and 
Mary Kaldor from the U.K.) critical theorists, given the conceptual revolutions they posited 
around the turn of the century (see, for example, Kaldor, 1999; Collier, 2003; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004), as with the Mainstream cluster above, their work appears less critical in 
comparison to more recent works. While scholars such as Michael Doyle and Timothy Donais 
 
52 If works from other categories are included in this portfolio (such as scholars who reside(d) in North America 




received relatively positive engagement by scholars within the dataset, Francis Fukuyama and 
Paris often appear to be referenced, not because of the value of their argument, but as strawmen 
to attack (such as the ‘liberal peace’ explored in chapter 7). This is most notable with the 
exceptionally high number of references of At War’s End, which famously argued for 
‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’, and in much the same way as Fukuyama’s (1992) 
thesis regarding the ‘End of History’, is often invoked so that it can be admonished. 
Theory Testers 
The remaining texts in the top 100 cited publications of this thesis are more difficult to place 
in rigid categories as they come from a diverse range of scholars and research areas. In 
comparison to other texts however, these tended to be more quantitatively53 or empirically 
oriented,54 testing the explanatory utility of theories. As such, this last category is significantly 
more fuzzy, and while more nuanced divisions could be drawn (for example, based on the 
geography or methodological approach of the scholars), this is not necessary for the purposes 
of this thesis. It is however worth noting that within the dataset, these large-scale quantitative 
studies (often coded less critically within the CDA) are rather prominent research endeavours 
within North American and Norwegian scholarship. 
Interactions of Theories 
Limiting our understanding of these relationships to the 100 top cited texts, we can understand 
how these rather fuzzy groups of scholars interact with one another. Post-colonial theorists and 
Theory Creators, for example, can often be seen to construct and produce theories and 
conceptualisations which are drawn on by others to inform understandings and theoretical 
advancements. Where the former often produce work that challenges hegemonic 
understandings and framings, the latter can be seen to build (or deconstruct) larger/grand 
theories which are used to understand broader phenomena – though with significant overlaps 
and nuances. Critical hegemons such as Richmond and Mac Ginty then draw on these scholars 
to develop new understandings and insights, which are often critiqued by others, who offer 
different and typically more critical and cynical interpretations (such as Chandler, 2010c, 
2010a, 2017a). Duffield and Pugh tend to inform many of these framings but could be 
considered more as ‘grand theorists’ than their peers, and often sit in opposition to the works 
of Paris and other prominent yet more status-quo or quantitatively oriented theorists (such as 
Timothy Donais or Michael Barnett).  
 
53 See, for example, Oneal and Russett, 1997; Gleditsch, 2002; Gartzke, 2007; Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2009. 




Mainstream hegemons, on the other hand, often work in a different space to their critical 
counterparts, discussing and producing concepts which inform the wider discipline – they also 
tend to be more instrumentalist, and do not appear to engage in any consistent manner with 
their more critical counterparts noted above. Meanwhile, North American scholarship can often 
be seen to be relatively removed from these discussions, with the exclusion of Donais and 
Doyle (and potentially Barnett). Finally, theory testers, who are in no way the last rung on the 
food chain, tend to draw on a variety of works and conduct more empirical research to test 
theories and explanations in post-conflict contexts – while also producing their own insights.  
This is not to suggest that only some of the groups above produce and innovate knowledge 
while others simply test it. All scholars are part of an immense and intricate process of 
interaction, which involves numerous feedback loops whereupon they draw on each other’s 
work to critique it and inform their own theories and understandings, often whilst positing 
solutions. The sections below explore this process of interaction in reference to the CNA 
undertaken on the dataset as a whole – where the understanding of the above relationships can 
be seen to occur on a larger scale. 
CO-CITATION ANALYSIS 
Co-citation analysis is generally accredited to the pioneering work of Small (1973) and 
Marshakova (1973) and is the most commonly used CNA technique (Zhao and Strotmann, 
2015). This form of network analysis shows the relationship between cited references within 
source articles and is useful for exploring research which have informed the scholars and 
theories analysed throughout this thesis. It does not show the relatedness of the articles in the 
data sample itself (which is shown through a bibliographic coupling analysis) or the direct 
connections between the articles in the data sample (shown through a intercitation network 
analysis) (see appendix 5.4). Two texts “are considered co-cited when they appear in the same 
reference list” (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). This section begins by outlining the technical 
information of this analysis, before reinterpreting the last sections findings within the broader 
dataset to suggest that texts outside of this data sample are likely to be less critical – and that 
as scholarship becomes more popular, it may become less critical (explored in detail in Chapter 
8).  
In order to comprehend the large number of cited references contained within the dataset, and 
in line with common bibliometric studies practice, a minimum citation count was set in order 




Such thresholds are typically arbitrarily assigned, and literature does not appear to offer any 
significant insights into how to best set these measures (Sillanpaa and Koivula, 2010).55 To be 
included in the analysis, cited works needed to have been cited 13 times within the dataset, 
which provided 105 cited references for analysis, similar to the section above (14 would have 
been 92, 12 would have been 112). While reducing the threshold expands the points of analysis 
and ultimately shows these relationships in more diverse and expansive ways, due to the 
medium in which this thesis is being presented, it was decided that a sampling of 105 cited 
references is both indicative of the wider dataset and more comprehensible for readers. Please 
note, a more expansive analysis was also undertaken to assess variances, the map of which is 
available online (see Appendix 5.4 for information). Despite this effort, the scale and scope of 
the map is still extensive and individual nodes are often illegible unless scrutinized on a 
computer. To assist readers in understanding how texts are weighted, the top 25 cited references 
have been listed in the table below, alongside the number of times each text was cited within 
the dataset, and its co-citation value (weighted by Total Link Strength).56  
As with the results explored in the previous section, Paris’ text is cited most often within the 
dataset and thus is more likely to share connections with other cited works (hence its high total 
link strength). Because of this, we would expect this work to be a central text, which less cited 
works are situated around and connected to.  
Table 15: Top 25 Cited References in the dataset  
Reference # Citations 
Total Link 
Strength 
Paris R, At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 136 1126 
Richmond Op, The Transformation Of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005) 85 771 
Duffield M, Global Governance And The New Wars: The Merging Of 
Development And Security (London: Zed Books, 2001) 82 684 
Richmond Op, A Post-Liberal Peace: The Infrapolitics Of Peacebuilding 
(London: Routledge, 2011). 66 568 
Duffield M (2007) Development, Security And Unending War - Governing The 
World Of Peoples. Cambridge: Polity Press. 64 554 
Lederach JP (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided 
Societies, Washington, Dc: United States Institute Of Peace 62 445 
Chandler D (2006) Empire In Denial. The Politics Of State-Building (London: 
Pluto Press, 2006). 58 522 
Mac Ginty R (2011) International Peacebuilding And Local Resistance, 
Rethinking Peace And Conflict, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 58 560 
 
55 See Zhao and Strottmann 2015 for some useful guidelines, however. 
56 Total Link Strength is the co-citation value generated by VOSViewer and is dependent on how many 
connections a text has to others within the dataset – the higher the link, the more influential or interrelated the 




Mac Ginty R, Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down And Bottom 
up Peace (2010) 41(4), Security Dialogue, 391-412. 49 422 
Mac Ginty R, Indigenous Peace-Making Versus The Liberal Peace, Cooperation 
And Conflict 43, No. 2 (2008): 139–63 49 521 
Kaldor M (1999) New & Old Wars – Organised Violence In A Global Era, 
Cambridge: Polity Press 44 339 
Richmond Op, Resistance And The Post-Liberal Peace (2010) Millennium - 
Journal Of International Studies, 38 42 376 
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VOSviewer clusters closely related texts together to more easily identify various research 
communities. Within the data sample provided, it identified four overlapping clusters which 
are laid out in the table below. These roughly conform to the groupings identified manually 
through the CDA which were explored in the previous section. 
Table 16: VOSviewer Clusters of prominent cited references 
Cluster # # Articles Colour Primary Theme 
Cluster 1 35 Red The Local Turn 
Cluster 2 30 Green Critical Critiques & Theory 
Cluster 3 29 Blue Mainstream and Grand Theory 
Cluster 4 11 Yellow Economic and Quantitative Studies 
The figure below displays the results from this co-citation network analysis. In addition to the 
clusters identified by VOSviewer, circles have been manually drawn to roughly indicate the 
various groups of scholarship explored in the previous section and facilitate easier 
interpretation of the offline map. The size of the nodes (cited references) within the map are 




location on the map is determined by their interconnectedness to other references (co-citation 









In the top left-hand corner of the map one can see the prevalence of the ‘Theory Creators’ in 
the dataset – primarily through the works of Foucault. Moving towards the centre the influence 
of the Critical Hegemons becomes apparent. These works permeate the spaces within and 
around the Theory Creators, extending down towards the scholarship on the local turn, and 
above the Mainstream Hegemons. Within this map, this circle primarily contains the work of 
critical theorists such as Chandler and Richmond and consists of what were typically coded as 
‘conceptual articles’ or ‘academic critiques’ within the CDA. In general, as one moves from 
the left hand side towards the centre of the map, and works become more closely related, the 
number of abstract transformative (Critical Theory) texts are overtaken by critical improvement 
(critical problem-solving) texts (see the following CDA section for details on these values). 
These texts can thus be seen to act as a buffer between more critical contributions and the less 
critical and more mainstream texts at the centre of the map. Mainstream Hegemons and 
American Scholars increase in frequency and size (influence) as one moves horizontally from 
left to right.  
The Local Turn cluster comprises many different types of scholarship, including the seminal 
works of Autessere (2014b, 2014a) and the anthropologist James Scott (1985). A closer look 
at this body of literature shows that it is in fact more closely aligned with the Critical Hegemons 
and Theory Creators on the left-hand side of the map. It is connected to the more mainstream 
scholarship by numerous smaller critical improvement/critical problem-solving or ‘general 
theory testers’ texts, which appear to mediate between both those more radical calls for local 
ownership and more orthodox texts which seek to utilize these findings to inform and improve 
peacebuilding. Finally, on the far-right hand side of the map are the economic and quantitative 
texts (which in this map and others are often made up of Norwegian and North American 
scholarship. When the data sample is expanded, these works can be seen to connect to the main 
corpus of texts through the works of classical theorists (for example, Wendt (1992) Anarchy is 
What States Make of it; Carr (2001) The Twenty Years Crisis; Kant (1932) Perpetual Peace) 
and scholars testing elements of the democratic peace thesis, indicating that these scholars are 
potentially more aligned with classical IR theory than PACs. 
As can be seen several significant relationships emerge through this mapping and the previous 
section, most notable is the prominence of academic hegemons within the dataset. That some 
scholars produce and are cited more than others is uninteresting on its own, however the 
dominance of these scholars and their impact on the field must be considered in relation to their 




co-citation network analysis (as well as their positioning in the following section), these 
scholars often appear to act as bridges between more critical and non-peacebuilding specific 
theorists (such as Foucault), bringing in new ideas and reflections to contest understandings 
and conceptualisations of peacebuilding. Less prolific scholars can then be seen to reinterpret 
these works, often drawing on their discipline’s hegemons rather than the original theorists, to 
empirically test the understandings posited, slowly diminishing the criticality of ideas as they 
become more mainstream (explored more in chapter 8). The sheer scale of these hegemons is 
such that it could reduce new and innovative theories by overshadowing other efforts, 
victoriously championing particular interpretations, or more slowly shifting research foci, as 
lesser known scholars are forced to situate their research within the agendas set by these larger 
scholars (explored more in chapter 10). 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC COUPLING ANALYSIS 
A bibliographic coupling analysis was undertaken to assess the interrelatedness of authors.57 
This analysis connects scholars within the dataset based on the number of cited references their 
articles’ share (Zhao and Strotmann, 2014). This type of analysis can be seen to uncover 
relationships between scholars, or their epistemic communities, by positioning them together 
based on the literature they jointly draw on. This does not necessarily mean that two adjoining 
scholars will have a personal connection, have co-authored papers, or will be working in close 
physical proximity to one another. However, it can suggest that these features might exist, 
which can be further explored qualitatively (Chapter 8 is very much a product of this deeper 
style of investigation).  
The figure below displays the interrelatedness of 110 authors (plus 6 co-authorship groups). 
This threshold was set for simplicity’s sake, to allow some of those scholars who had only co-
authored documents within the dataset to be displayed. Where Zhao and Strotmann (2015) 
suggest omitting co-authored documents given they may alter results by being accredited to 
multiple authors, given the way in which the data sample was constructed it was held such 
works would not negatively affect analysis as co-authored texts would remain as independent 
nodes rather than being merged into their primary authors’ results. Authors were separated into 
8 clusters by VOSviewer and are connected by 4618 links (with a total link strength of 57267). 
 
57 Several bibliographic coupling analyses were undertaken to ascertain the interrelatedness of source documents 
within the dataset as well as their authors. Due to space constraints however, only the relationships between 
authors are presented here, given that the relationships between source documents largely confirm the 




The size of each node on the map is dependent on the link strength of that author (the 
interrelatedness rather than number of citations received by that author). As one can clearly 
see, Oliver Richmond eclipses the rest of the dataset given that his extensive volume of 











From this map, it is possible to identify particular research communities. While Richmond, 
Mac Ginty and Chandler remain dominant, this form of analysis shows how they represent 
relatively diverse research strands. For example, Chandler is more closely affiliated with the 
works of Neil Cooper, Nicholas Lemay-Hérbert, Michael Barnett, etc., while Richmond can be 
seen to work closely with Sandra Pogodda, Audra Mitchell, and Stefanie Kappler. Mac Ginty 
shares strong links with a variety of scholars, including Richmond and Chandler, but also Joshi 
(potentially to the extensive research undertaken by Mac Ginty, Joshi and Lee on the correlates 
of war, for more see chapter 7), and a host of other critical UK scholars. Millar, on the other 
hand, appears to be more closely linked to the Green communities near the top of the map, 
which mostly comprise the works of Verkoren, Van Leeuwen, Albrecht, Höglund, and other 
scholars who have all been part of similar working groups during their past research on Hybrid 
Peace Governance and Friction.58 As with other maps, Gartzke, Goldsmith and Hegre appear 
relatively far removed – given the differences in both their methodological approach and 
research focus.  
These relationships, further confirmed by a bibliographic coupling analysis of source 
documents and the citation network analysis (appendix 5.4), suggest that while scholars are 
often closely related to those with similar research agendas and methods, they also appear to 
be loosely clustered geographically. While this could be due to their shared research focus as 
much as anything else, this fuzzy correlation between scholars and space appears rather 
consistently across all maps (with the exception of academic hegemons). For example, in the 
figure above, there are two distinct groupings of North American scholars. Where Byrne, 
Skarlato, and Karari form one cluster (and were at times all part of the same institution), 
scholars within the U.S.A are equally grouped on the other side (evident in all maps). Similarly, 
the green clustering shows the close ties between Northern European scholars (such as 
Björkdahl, Höglund, Millar, Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, etc., mentioned above). This is not 
to suggest that a host of ‘citation cartels’ exist, whereupon scholars are referencing their 
institutional peers to increase their academic capital (though this could be the case), but that, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, scholars are likely to work more closely with their immediate peers or 
are perhaps more familiar with their work (increasing their tendency to draw on it).  
 
58 Millar is also potentially the most isolated of these critical U.K. scholars, working from Aberdeen university in 




While this correlation is not conclusive, it suggests that scholars form relatively restrictive 
epistemic communities, where strong research ties have been established according to physical 
space (exceptions such as SungYong Lee, who resides in New Zealand yet is closely linked to 
scholars in the U.K., can be somewhat explained by his close professional ties to Richmond 
and Mac Ginty who were his supervisors). Due to the constraints upon this thesis, these 
relationships are only tentatively explored throughout the following chapters, but it conforms 
with observations made during the CDA, that different regions appear to have different 
research communities and agendas. It adds to this observation by quantitatively suggesting that 
research communities within countries express greater research interpolation than those 
between countries. While this correlation is rather tentative and a larger and more extensive 
analysis is needed to confirm it, this could account for the historical divisions between North 
American and European scholarship (noted in Chapter 2), by suggesting that scholars are less 
likely to engage in literatures with lesser known scholars from outside their region than they 
would with their ‘local’ colleagues. In addition to suggesting the importance of interpersonal 
connections within academia, this poses significant problems for scholars further away (such 
as in Australia or New Zealand), and to an even greater extent, for scholars within the Global 
South. This finding is explored in more detail in Chapter 8 through the notion of hybridity 
which shows how three competing conceptualisations emerged which were spatially 
constrained, contested and conflated. 
Summary 
While the statistical tools used to calculate and understand the relationships between texts and 
authors may suggest rigid and faultless empiricism (numbers do not lie), the field of CNA is 
only able to suggest tentative conclusions at best, especially given the extensive limitations in 
collecting and constructing data samples, and the numerous decisions that researchers must 
make in carrying out the analysis and interpreting results. Despite this, it is believed that the 
method undertaken to construct the dataset and compile bibliometric data (Chapter 4) provided 
more comprehensive and statistically relevant results than previous studies in the field relying 
on singular databases. Furthermore, while the analysis and mapping undertaken through 
VOSviewer may be less configurable than the types of manual analysis undertaken by data 
scientists within the fields of Information Science, by compiling a variety of analyses to 
understand the patterns across them, it is believed that the observations made are relatively 
robust. As an additional measure, the findings from this analysis and the interpretation of these 




theories of interpersonal networks and research patterns. Though a more detailed exploration 
of these findings in reference to the interviews provide a plethora of additional insights, given 
size constraints, within this thesis these findings are primarily used to deepen insights from the 
CDA.  
One notable difference between the two figures presented above is the prominence of 
mainstream and less critical theorists in cited references. Here, these theorists appear to be 
more ‘central’, indicating their greater influence within the wider discourse. When the analysis 
is reversed to show similarities between the documents within the primary dataset 
(bibliographic coupling analysis, appendix 5.4), the relationship is also switched, placing 
Critical Hegemons in a more central and interconnected role. From this we can discern that 
despite the strong interrelatedness of critical scholars within the dataset, they continue to 
actively engage with more mainstream works – though this relationship may not be mutual 
(further research would need to be undertaken on those less critical scholars to understand the 
extent to which scholars within this dataset appear in their works).  
While bibliometric analysis is typically used to understand the structure and make up of a 
research field, the clustering of scholars presented here suggests that research communities are 
fairly representative of scholars’ geographical clustering. While it could be the case that 
scholars move to particular institutions because of their research agenda (to be with close 
minded scholars), this appears to coincide with a relatively low transmission and utilization of 
knowledge between regional groupings – as per the economic notion of specialisation, 
particular regions may be better at producing particular types of knowledge. The question is, 
what happens when some regions (and thus types of knowledge) are ignored?  
5.4: Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has presented the high-level results that emerged through the coding and analysis 
of the dataset. The primary finding put forward and elaborated on throughout this thesis is that, 
contrary to what one might expect, most scholars utilizing critical approaches to critique 
international peacebuilding targeted the methods and practices of operations while leaving the 
legitimacy of peacebuilding and its objectives intact. As such, most articles within the dataset 
could be considered ‘critical problem-solving’ (Brown, 2013), given their targeting of practice 




A second theme to emerge from this coding suggests a correlation between criticality and 
instrumentality, where the more radically a critique was coded (in that it deliberately contested 
systemic issues and wider conflict promoting elements, or indicated an awareness of them), the 
less likely it was to prescribe solutions, favouring the creation or refinement of conceptual 
frameworks and research agendas instead (explored more in chapter 8). Drawing on Visoka’s 
(2018) understanding of criticality, this shows critical scholars’ tendency to offer critique as or 
without alternatives, while less critical work is more likely to offer alternative practices and 
methods, leaving objectives and systemic factors under-conceptualised, critiqued or developed 
(explored more in chapter 7). These findings also reflected observations made by Schuurman 
(2009) regarding developmental studies scholarship, wherein critical studies tend to be 
normative but fail to engage with underlying historical meta-narratives other than rhetorically. 
Charting these trends over time indicates that while the number of publications within the 
dataset increased year on year, suggesting an increase in the numbers of scholars drawing on 
critical framings, this did not correspond with an increase in overall radicalness. In a sense, 
critical theory and its approaches were gentrified or deradicalized and though an increasing 
number of scholars utilized these terminologies and methods, they did not reproduce or 
maintain the same critical intent. Instead, these critical revelations were increasingly utilized 
to test theories empirically, challenging and seeking to improve the practices and methods of 
peacebuilding rather than critique and seek transformative challenges to the objectives and 
international order. This trend also coincides with the increase in relativist and pragmatic 
conceptions of peace noted by Chandler (2015, 2017b) which are explored in more detail in 
chapters 7\8. 
As one might expect, the focus of international peacebuilding critique is decidedly upon post-
conflict environments located within the Global South (with a few exceptions in Eastern 
Europe and Northern Ireland). This focus, along with the lack of critique of international and 
structural factors contributing to conflict suggests that international peacebuilding is primarily 
a discipline focused on reducing violent conflict through analysis of those affected by violent 
conflict, rather than those undertaking it. International peacebuilding was not something that 
needed to be considered or studied in the contexts of aggressive or powerful countries such as 
the USA, China, or Russia for instance, and where their actions were critiqued in relation to 
the invasion of Afghanistan, this was done so in their capacity as peacebuilders, rather than 
illegal occupiers (see, for instance, Goodhand and Sedra, 2013; Jarstad, 2013; van der Lijn, 




actors suffered significant critiques, but only in relation to peacebuilding operations in post-
conflict states, not in relation to their support and management of the broader systems that 
contributed to, and enabled conflict throughout the wider world (explored more in chapter 6).  
The bibliographic coupling and co-citation analysis verify the integrity of the tools used to 
construct the dataset, wherein there are strong links between researchers and publications, 
suggesting a relatively vigorous and coherent research group. Despite the interdisciplinary 
nature of the field, scholars appear relatively homogenous with critical approaches dominated 
by scholars within the Global North (and the U.K. in particular - section 1 of this chapter). 
While the strong interconnectedness of these works shows a robust and active community of 
scholars both critiquing and seeking to improve peacebuilding practices and understandings, it 
also shows that this community might be too close – forming small subsets of epistemic 
communities which are relatively isolated from other disciplines and rarely draw on outside 
works (explored more in chapter 8). The dominance of particular academics and their theories 
(academic hegemons) suggest that many scholars, in addition to not challenging and 
transforming systemic issues themselves, are not drawing on significant literature from outside 
the field of international peacebuilding to make up for this pitfall. Similar to findings made by 
Millar & Lecy (2016), this suggests that scholars draw on knowledge primarily produced by 
those within their research areas while only a few scholars/publications ‘bridge’ between 
disciplines which lead to infrequent ruptures and innovation (as can be seen through the 
transmissions of friction, hybridity, everyday, etc.) 
While perhaps limited by the tools used to construct it, the dataset itself confirms widely 
acknowledged observations regarding the lack of women and Global South scholars in the field 
(Scholey, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2012). While numerous scholars within the Global North may  
consider themselves to be Global South scholars, the understanding of habitus suggests that 
scholars will be shaped by the institutions that surround them, potentially limiting their ability 
to offer radically different scholarship to that which is produced by their immediate peers 
(Scholey, 2006). This thesis does not take a stance on this matter itself, given how such 
accusations seem to infer that scholars are colonised by Global North institutions, as well as 
the impossibility of investigating such claims within the limits of this thesis. However, it is 
worth noting how this cultural context may affect research agendas. Indeed, it appears from the 
coding that scholars located within the Global South were no less or more critical than their 
Global North peers (though given the small number of South scholars within the dataset, this 




South scholars such as Franz Fanon, Homi K. Bhabha, and Mahatma Ghandi were rarely drawn 
upon. 
Ultimately, it appears as if scholarship within the dataset provides a limited possibility for 
radical transformation, with many scholars remaining cognisant of the need to critique systemic 
issues, but content to critique practices and methods, or epistemes and understandings, instead. 
The following chapters (6-8) explore these findings in more detail. Chapter 6 unpacks how 
scholars engaged with criticality within the dataset. It focuses on systemic issues, such as the 
state, violence, and reflexivity, to argue that criticality appears to have been somewhat 
marginalised, receiving sparse and often limited attention by scholars. Chapter 7 explores 
scholarly engagement with the objectives of peacebuilding – envisioned as peace – and the 
imagination of alternative orders. It echoes other scholars who note how rarely peace is 
conceptualised within studies of peacebuilding (Richmond, 2007d; Davenport, Melander and 
Regan, 2018; Millar, 2019), despite its central focus, before exploring how efforts to construct 
and imagine an alternative peace are undertaken by only a few scholars and these are, as of yet, 
limited in scope, bounded by what is deemed practical, and appear to be envisioned solely for 
the global south. Chapter 8 explores how competing ideas are conflated and compounded, 
diminishing critical intent, and potentially obfuscating the need to address those systemic issues 





CHAPTER 6: THE LIMITS OF CRITICALITY 
This chapter draws on observations made during the manual coding of articles within the data 
set and is synthesised by results generated through NVIVO’s text mining features, the Citation 
Network Analysis, and to a lesser extent interviews with authors themselves.59 Specifically, it 
evaluates how criticality has been conceptualised and utilized to understand the extent to which 
the radical and transformative aims laid out in chapter 3 have been understood and emulated 
by scholars within the dataset.  
As coding was undertaken, several prominent and thematic nodes emerged which appeared to 
best capture critiques of criticality, calls for criticality, reflexive academic critiques, as well as 
specific phenomena related to criticality identified in chapter 2 and 3. These each form a section 
within this chapter, and were drawn on in the hope of isolating the strengths and limits of 
critical critiques and exploring how studies were contested and constituted the epistemic, 
discursive and institutional structures of international peacebuilding.  
It is important to note that the areas of focus used to explore criticality below were generated 
whilst reading articles within the dataset, rather than by assessing articles against a 
predetermined criterion. Within the primary dataset, there were 3819 invocations of ‘critical’ 
spread over 531 articles. While there were a variety of ways in which terms of criticality were 
used, they were most often seen to be drawn on by scholars attempting to situate their study 
alongside other critical works, to highlight contributions made by existing critical studies, to 
critique critical approaches, or to advocate critical approaches (with the first and last categories 
being the most common). 
Understandings of criticality varied throughout the dataset, though generally conformed with 
the broad trends laid out in chapter 2. For example, Goodhand and Walton (2009, p.319), claim 
critical peacebuilding scholars advance “alternative models of engagement” which focus on 
building consent through provisions of social welfare and legitimate state institutions. 
Richmond similarly argues that critical theory and post-modernism/structuralism depict an 
emancipatory peace which is linked to “social and economic justice, identity, and 
representation”, and allows for marginalised actors, as well as factors such as the environment, 
 
59 While the original intent was to use article keywords to provide a large scale overview of the themes covered 
by articles, given a third of the data set did not contain keywords and the realisation that keywords did not always 
accurately reflect the contributions of an article (as they are author generated and did not always reflect the 
discussion to which the article actually contributed, rather, the discussion to which the author hoped it did), the 




to be considered through reflective emancipation. Without directly critiquing the international 
order, these two approaches reflect a structural sensitivity and search (though not necessarily 
production) of alterity. By far the most dominant conceptualisation of criticality however, 
could be seen through the conflation of criticality with locality, evidenced through the 
substantial efforts to understand the ‘local’ and the ‘everyday’ (this trend has been expertly 
scrutinized by Randazzo, see 2015, 2016). For example, Björkdahl and Selimovic (2015, p. 
168) note that “[s]cholars advancing the critical peacebuilding agenda have been able to map 
various local agents that operate at different scales and make competing claims about peace 
and justice”, and note further work by Kappler, Richmond, and Mac Ginty as evidence of this.  
This chapter finds that critiques of the broader international system and the legitimacy of 
violence are largely absent in discussion, while attempts to radically contest post-Westphalian 
understandings of the state and norms of private property (and its corresponding capital) are 
typically contested only in relation to the post-conflict other. This lack of reflection and 
willingness to critique structural barriers within academia and the Global North suggests that 
even within more critical scholarship, fundamental challenges to peace remain unquestioned 
and most studies contribute to incremental improvements rather than radical challenges. It 
argues that these findings show the limits of criticality within peacebuilding studies, which 
contribute to a form of epistemic closure that greatly diminishes the discipline’s ability to meet 
its own normative and aspirational goals.  
6.1 Critiquing the International Order and Peacebuilding 
Objectives 
Where PACs seeks to be transformative in general, a more critical approach to PACs must seek 
to be transformative of the international order. The rationale for this need is twofold: first, 
without transforming the underlying factors of conflict and inequality, the more immediate 
conditions that lead to it will inevitably be reproduced; second, and related, the practices and 
methods of peacebuilding cannot be transformed unless the overarching paradigm upon which 
they are constituted and reliant is also challenged (Pugh, 2013, p. 21).  
Critiques of the international order were observed in two ways within the dataset: direct critique 
of the international order or system; and critique of the type of peace sought by challenging the 
‘objectives’ of peacebuilding (beyond critiques of the ‘liberal peace’), rather than its practices 




rarely discussed– and whether or not peace or the management of instability is the overarching 
objective of peacebuilding is also contentious (Duffield, 2007, 2019).60  
As noted in Chapter 5, the CDA shows articles coded within the dataset overwhelmingly 
focused on methodological, practical or heuristic issues rather than the ‘objectives’ of 
peacebuilding.61 This focus meant that much of the dataset was coded as ‘critical 
improvement’, not because it failed to be transformative, but because its transformative 
aspirations were focused on the methods, practices, or understanding of peacebuilding without 
critiquing the international order or wider objectives. While numerous articles of this ilk noted 
their explicit intention of achieving a more sustainable or durable peace in the long term (see 
chapter 7), this intent often appeared to be an afterthought or an underlying rational, and the 
bridge between their research output and these broader aims still needed to be built. 
Thus, despite the noted importance of addressing the “underlying structural obstacles to 
sustainable peace” (Donais, 2009b), fewer than 50 articles paid more than mere lip service to 
such discussions (including structural factors). Of these, 34 articles were coded as having made 
concerted efforts to identify and critique structural elements of power and explicitly recognise 
how such issues could curtail efforts to build long term peace if they remained unchecked. Such 
works however, were still studies focused on international peacebuilding, and their critiques 
were often levelled at more localised and contextual elements within post-conflict societies, 
while critique of the international order was generally something mentioned in passing by 
referencing broader discussions outside of the discipline, while, perhaps due to the difficulties 
in dealing with such complexity, maintaining focus on an individual case. For example, 
Aggestam and Strömbom (2013, p. 111) rightly note the tendency for scholars to “overlook the 
relationship between local agencies and wider societal structures” but are themselves forced to 
maintain a focus on interactions within Israel and Palestine rather than grapple with these 
factors directly. This is not to say that their analysis does not contribute to such issues, but 
 
60 While both the state and peace appear to be intrinsically linked in political theory, peacebuilding ventures, and 
their critiques, I have separated out challenges to the state, the legitimacy of violence, and critiques of peace to 
better understand how each component has been addressed in isolation. 
61 Challenges to objectives were coded as follows: problematiques (40), conclusions/suggestions (13), and 
primary contribution (22). As noted in chapter 5, objectives of peacebuilding were considered to be types of state, 





research that reverses this relationship to focus on such matters as a primary point of analysis 
is relatively scarce.62 
SUMMARY 
A reminder must be made here about the difference between paradigm critiques, and critiques 
of the international order. This thesis draws on Kuhn’s original conceptualisation of a paradigm 
to link it intrinsically to the boundaries of thought and questioning within academia. A critique 
of a paradigm opens up spaces for emancipatory research and reflection, but it is not a de facto 
challenge to the international order – it just allows for this to occur. As is explored within this 
chapter, while a significant part of this distinction may appear only semantic, it is based on the 
observation that many of these paradigm critiques challenge only the post-conflict reality or 
the ‘paradigm’ of peacebuilding, rather than the international order writ large. To clarify, a 
claim that free market capitalism and neoliberal economics is ill-suited to a country is only a 
critique of the international order if the argument is extended to be one. Otherwise, it remains 
a critique of the ill-suitability of a particular component of the international system within this 
specific post-conflict space. The main issue that becomes clear throughout readings is that 
where critiques of the liberal peace opened up space in which liberal elements could be 
questioned and challenged, this did not amount to the critique of their suitability within the 
Global North or a production of alternative objectives, but simply a critique of methods and 
practices. 
6.2 Critiquing the State 
Critiques of the state are important to critical approaches of peacebuilding given the links 
between the international system (comprised of states) and their monopoly claim to the use of 
violence, seen to establish peace on an individual/domestic level (Jackson, 2017b). At a surface 
level, understanding and challenging the role and conception of the state emerged as a 
prominent discussion within the dataset. This is understandable given peacebuilding’s close 
(yet unwanted) ties to the bemoaned practice of statebuilding, the state’s central role in both 
the functioning of the international system and the oft critiqued liberal peace, and discussions 
on hybridity which attempted to reconceptualise state legitimacy (see chapter 8). Indeed, 
conceptions of the state (as a political entity) were invoked 5483 times over 523 articles. 
 
62 For works that undertake more of a concerted effort in this endeavour see, for example, Michael Dillon 
and Julian Reid (2009), as well as works by Mark Duffield, Julian Graef, Michael Pugh, Elisa Randazzo, 




Discussions included the ways in which states were constructed or built (for example, 
discussions on statebuilding versus state and peace formation), and their different 
characteristics and attributes (for example, legitimacy, weakness, or peacefulness). To a much 
lesser extent, there were also conceptions of the different types of state that exist (or could and 
should exist) which drew on a spectrum of disciplines such as a political theory (Marxist, 
Pluralist, Institutionalist), colonial studies (postcolonial state), security studies (failed and 
failing states), and other critical fields to develop notions of hybrid and post-liberal or post-
Westphalian states. 
A closer look at these discussions show that while the unsuitability of the ‘liberal state’ for 
post-conflict environments has been well established by scholars, coherent alternatives (rather 
than minor modifications) are scarce. From NVIVO’s datamining tools, the five most frequent 
conceptualisations of state across all articles were discussions on weak, failed or fragile states 
(492 occurrences over 159 articles), specific states/countries (218 times in 104 articles, caused 
by authors either focusing on the country of analysis or providing empirical evidence for their 
claims), 63 state institutions (179 times across 113 articles), the liberal state (161 times across 
79 articles) and ‘democratic states’ (145 times across 73 articles), while mentions of actual 
alternative state types occurred significantly less (with ‘post-liberal’, ‘hybrid’, ‘post-
Westphalian’, and ‘alternative’ state discussions identified 49 times in 31 articles 
collectively64). 
Though discussions regarding orthodox conceptions of the state tended to highlight its 
unsuitability, numerous articles still invoked the term positively, either explicitly or implicitly. 
For example, Donais (2013, p. 195), writing on the peace processes in Bosnia, positively noted 
how “much progress has been made in transforming the empty shell of the Bosnian state that 
remained after Dayton… into something resembling a contemporary, even Westphalian state”. 
Others, such as Dinnen and Allen (2016, p. 79) point to how orthodox conceptions of the 
modern state may even be sought by post-conflict peoples, observing how in the Solomon 
Islands “Rural communities are conscious of the growing limitations of their local (non-state) 
 
63 These were mentioned some 210 times across 101 articles with ‘African states’ being referred to 54 times over 
33 articles, ‘European states’ 36 times over 20 articles and ‘Afghanistan state’ 28 times in 11 articles) which 
roughly correlate with the 111 case studies identified under ‘technical nodes’. 
64 This number excludes discussions which only implied rather than specified a new state type. For example, texts 
often talked about ‘hybrid peace’ which may have implied an alternative state type (such as a hybrid political 
order), however at seemingly equal times it did not (see chapter 8 for more). As such, only texts that explicitly 




institutions in light of new types of conflict stresses; they see a legitimate and singular role for 
aspects of what might be characterized as a Weberian state”.  
Such open support for orthodox conceptions of the state hint at both the preference for its 
construction, as well as the prevalence of problem-solving approaches within international 
peacebuilding literature – where the immediate stability and systems that are seen to be 
reflected in familiar state types are considered desirable or forms of progress out of the post-
conflict quagmire. Though it is likely that similar writings are significantly more prolific within 
texts outside of the dataset, it is worth recognising the lack of diversity in scholarly critique 
and preference within the dataset. Indeed, it is entirely unclear how dissatisfied scholars are 
with the liberal state and whether their critique is mostly rhetorical, or if they seek radical 
transformation of more than just the post-conflict other. 
Some progress has been made in sketching out what a desirable or alternative state is (see, for 
example, Mac Ginty, 2010b and Zanker, 2017), though it remains unclear who these works are 
written for and how they should be implemented. Where earlier critiques that lamented 
peacebuilding’s adherence to traditional conceptions of statehood called for more sensitivity 
(Richmond, 2001a) or critical approaches to peace-operations (Bellamy, 2004) without 
necessarily positing any radical alternatives themselves, the rise of hybrid, local and post-
liberal frameworks popularised after 2007 showed an increasing willingness by some scholars 
to address these agendas – or at least to allow for difference (such as is the case with much 
literature on Hybrid Political Orders (HPOs), see chapter 8). These alternatives to orthodox 
conceptions of statehood remain underdeveloped however and designed for the post-conflict 
other, indicating the continued preference by critical peacebuilding scholars to adjust and 
contest the international order insofar as it applies only to the post-conflict state and subject.  
Beyond these critiques of the liberal state, the most significant discussion of statehood within 
the dataset related to the notion of ‘failed states’. As noted by Newman, the concept of ‘failed 
states’ reflects Western anxieties within a post-9/11 world, the purpose of which was to 
delineate between states that posed a threat to global security, and those that did not (Newman, 
2009a). Failed states were identified based on the extent to which the state and its government 
were recognised and seen as legitimate by external actors, which following classical theories 
of IR (and the then emerging norm of R2P) allowed the international community (or Global 
North as it was exercised in practice) to strip a state of its Westphalian claim to sovereignty, 




intervention in Libya in 2011). Perhaps not unsurprisingly, this conceptualisation was not 
advanced by authors within the dataset enthusiastically; rather, it was drawn on to be contested 
and led to several counter discursive framings, most notably hybrid political orders and hybrid 
forms of governance (chapter 8).   
The discourse on failed states drew heavily on classical IR theory to posit an understanding of 
regions, not as they should be, but as they (supposedly) were. Its conceptualisation was a 
description, rather than a type of state, and while it could be seen to challenge the “idealized 
Westphalian normative system of Weberian states” (Newman, 2009a, p. 421), this challenge 
was primarily as a direct security threat to other states, rather than a critique of statehood. 
Perhaps because of this, notions of HPOs make little sense when considered as alternatives to 
the orthodox and liberal conception of states, rather than as an alternative discursive framing 
to the ‘failed states’ which they immediately challenged. As is discussed in chapter 8, HPOs’ 
production of alternativity was primarily a discursive one which called for the acceptance or 
understanding (rather than promotion) of alternative arrangements of state institutions. 
Discussions on hybrid states within the dataset typically used the term to denote ‘not quite 
liberal’, highlighting a mix of recognisable liberal institutions and the ways in which these had 
been adapted (hybridized), before outlining methods of improving the congruence of 
international peacebuilder’s aims with local customs, practices, and realities. As such, much of 
the writing on hybrid states employs the concept descriptively, while articles’ prescriptive 
elements are geared towards managing this alternativity, suggesting eventual integration rather 
than transformation of the state (see chapter 8).  
Further attempts offered only minor suggestions of where theorists could begin to develop new 
alternatives. For example, Pugh, drawing on Cox, goes some way to outline an alternative 
conceptualisation of statehood calling for a range of systems from “global socio-economic 
networks to world cities and mini-states” (2004a, p. 53). While such understandings might be 
more reflective of their inhabitants by being smaller and more adaptable, Pugh’s critique is still 
primarily concerned with the capitalist state, and his neo-Marxist approach problematically 
leaves the supremacy of the state intact. While such approaches are not as damaging as classical 
theories which “often culminate in the protection of the concept and framework of the 
Westphalian state, rather than the populations they house” (Richmond, 2007c, p. 464), more 
recent critical approaches that build on understandings of human security have perhaps had the 
greatest success by reconceiving of the state as a threat rather than facilitator of peace (Martin 




One of the most coherent efforts to this end has been undertaken by Oliver Richmond, where 
his attempts to outline a post-liberal peace agenda naturally lead him to contest the liberal state 
as well. Where liberal peacebuilding considers statebuilding to be the antidote to the violent 
process of state formation (Richmond, 2013a, p. 319), Richmond (2013c) pursues an agenda 
of peace formation that places peace, rather than the state, at the centre of peacebuilding efforts. 
Though this effort is relatively sparse, given his primary focus on a post-liberal peace (see 
chapter 7), he nevertheless claims that a more radical post-liberal peace would be post-
Westphalian, as the "interdisciplinary agenda implied by a contextualised and ethical critique 
of the liberal peace probably cannot develop while clinging to notions of a territorially 
bounded, sovereign and state-centric international space" (Richmond, 2011a, p. 103). Though 
he argues that new political arrangements could eschew “modernist conceptions of territorial 
sovereignty” and perhaps be “deeply decentralized and reflect alternative lifeworlds or forms 
of political actions whether ‘post-Westphalia’ or federal, confederal, and overlapping” 
(Richmond, 2012a, p. 127), such arguments still appear exceptionally light on content, and 
much more work is needed to develop these theories. 
The extent to which critiques of the state actually seek to overthrow or directly transform its 
conception is highly questionable. More likely, these critiques of the state were laid out simply 
to acknowledge it as a factor contributing to conflict in which the distribution of its power 
needed to be refined or dulled, or as noted by Jackson, to build a strawman and heighten the 
rhetoric of their critique (Zaum, 2012). While it may be the case that attempts to challenge the 
Liberal state were insincere, it is also evident that scholars were bounded by their own 
rationality (à la Chandler, chapter 2). For example, Richmond shows his unwillingness to 
jettison the notion of statehood entirely, claiming that while the everyday provides a way 
around the centralisation of the state and its power and “does not confirm the state in its formal 
positivist, territorial form. Some form of state and of institutions which represents the interests 
of political subjects is necessary" (Richmond, 2011a, p. 122). Problematically, Richmond’s 
writings on what this post-Westphalian or Weberian state might look like are still attached to 
political institutions where the makeup and aspects that he outlines could be radical but could 
also be implemented by a liberal state, allowing for refinement rather than transformation in a 
similar manner to his development of a post-liberal peace (see chapter 7). 
The problem here is not necessarily that academics are unaware of the conflict promoting 
elements that the Westphalian state system produces, but that their critiques, rather than directly 




This problem, of addressing the methods and practices rather than the objectives of 
peacebuilding, continually re-emerges in critical approaches to peacebuilding, but it is more 
disappointing here given how this issue has been evident in the earliest discussions of peace 
and state making in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, at the turn of the millennium, Richmond 
wrote how the shift from first generation peace-making, which largely sought to reproduce a 
Westphalian society of states, to second generation peace-making, which focused on 
individuals to emphasise subjectivity and human-needs (following Galtung and Burton), was  
hindered by the “overwhelming weight of Westphalian discourse” (Richmond, 2001a, p. 327). 
While Richmond went on to provide a compelling argument for the need for greater discussions 
on what constitute peace and for more ‘sensitive’ approaches that did not explicitly reproduce 
the Westphalian order, his argument could be seen to do exactly that which Galtung and 
Burton’s shift to the individual did in the 1970s. Both arguments attempt to overcome issues 
of state-centricity, not by challenging the supremacy of the state, but by focusing on different 
entities or subjects instead, in the hope that such a focus might eventually eclipse the power of 
the state. While both of these phenomena are outside of the scope of the dataset analysed within 
this thesis, they bear a striking resemblance to the post-liberal and local shifts that emerged 
within it, whereby no coherent alternative order has yet been formulated. 
A more radical conception that might overcome these ontological limitations has been more 
recently outlined by Richard Jackson drawing on notions of agonism and anarchism. Jackson, 
noting previous efforts to challenge conceptualisations of the state claims, in a similar vein but 
for different reasons to Pugh, that such critiques do not go far enough. To Jackson (2017b), at 
the heart of the Western conception of statehood is its monopoly of violence, which remains 
legitimate and unquestioned by scholars. To counter this, Jackson suggests the notion of a 
‘post-liberal plus’ peace, an emancipatory peace which eschews modernist and modernizing 
understandings of sovereignty and territory to become a “post-state - or, an anarchist – peace, 
the kind which Gandhi, Tolstoy and others gestured towards in advocating for principled 
nonviolence as the foundational basis for political community” (Jackson, 2017b, p. 10). Such 
a project progresses significantly further to other discussions of statehood which fail to critique 
the role of violence. However, it remains to be seen how much traction such attempts will have 




to political organisation (discussed below).65 Furthermore, there is a danger that by 
piggybacking off an already well known yet significantly less radical conceptualisation, 
scholars will be able to claim a contribution to the post-liberal plus, which beyond expressing 
dissatisfaction with the Westphalian or Liberal state system offers little transformative 
engagement and quickly allows for its co-option and deradicalization.  
SUMMARY 
Given the general focus of articles within the dataset upon the practices and methods of 
peacebuilding, much of the literature which questions the validity of the liberal state in post-
conflict situations appears more closely related to problem-solving theory than its critical 
counterpart. This approach is evident in the overwhelming focus on reforming state institutions, 
which, as noted by Jackson (2017b, p. 4), Mac Ginty (2008, p. 146) and others, emerge from 
liberal peacebuilding’s misdiagnosis over the causes of conflict which fail to address broader 
systemic issues. Where critiques do appear, they challenge the discursive framing or the 
process of state creation, rather than the international conception and system of states. Success 
in these endeavours could allow for a plurality of states, which would continue to reside in the 
unchanged and unchallenged international system. Given the liberal state is not a coherent 
enterprise either,66 it is unclear how varieties of a post-liberal state will necessarily offer a better 
alternative if the foundational or underlying aspects of authority, governance, domination, and 
monopolies of violence are not also called into question on a more global scale. Ultimately, 
what is clear from these alternative approaches is the reliance on the informal state or 
institutions as an emancipatory, if not somewhat obvious, alternative to the formal state and 
institutions posed by orthodox conceptions. Where Jackson (2017b) has noted that similar 
reconceptualization’s of peace appear to be ‘post-hoc’, describing rather than prescribing 
alternative types of peace, the same could be said about these conceptualisations of state, which 
contain a wish list of endearing terms which are used to challenge only the post-conflict state, 
rather than the states of the researchers describing them. 
 
65 Likewise, anarchism is a much-ignored discussion in peacebuilding literature, mentioned 69 times within 41 
references. Beyond Coetzee & Hudson (2012) it was not discussed as a viable political theory or alternative, and 
most references were made in relation to liberal institutionalist literature, citing prominent IR scholars such as 
Bain (2003), Bull (1977), or Wendt (1992). A similar trend was noted with theories on political agonism (see 
works by Chantal Mouffe) within the dataset, yet due to word limitations has not been expanded on within this 
thesis.  
66 Beyond its government, the state is more appropriately conceived of as a “mythical abstraction” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 103) than a clear and coherent entity. Krasner (1995) has noted how the ideal Westphalian state type 




6.3 Critiquing Land and Property Rights 
A further significant factor seen to contribute to conflict was tied to understandings of land 
access and use (mentioned in 76 articles, and focused on by 14). Despite this wide spread 
acknowledgement, most discussions within the dataset focused on the operationalisation of 
land access and private property, rather than seeing them as an intrinsic part of the liberal and 
capitalist order which produces inequalities and conflict worldwide. Where more significant 
critiques were posed, these appear to have had limited impact on other works within the dataset, 
perhaps due to their ability to raise numerous questions but provide only limited answers (see 
in particular, Nagle, 2010; Richmond, 2014e, and to a lesser extent, Pogodda & Huber, 2014, 
and Richmond, 2012b, 2014c). 
Lee (2015, p. 1441), for example, attributes the resistance by Cambodians which resulted from 
these practices to the exploitative actions of elites rather than the underlying principles of 
property which enabled such acts and notes that: 
the problems caused by such poor management of land ownership in the early period 
of post-war reconstruction have become a ‘critical issue’ in contemporary Cambodia, 
‘a primary source of collective disputes’, and ‘one of the most prominent and significant 
forms of human rights abuse throughout Cambodia’.  
In a similar vein, Roberts (2008) notes how privatisation and commodification of land rights 
in Cambodia were a significant cause of conflict, yet argues that the underlying problem was 
with elites and how such matters were implemented, rather than the liberal and capitalist 
understandings that required and allowed for such practices to occur. While such conclusions 
are understandable, this tendency to blame the operationalisation or specific actors for land 
related conflict rather than (or in addition to) the systems that allow for them to occur appears 
to be endemic in peacebuilding literature, and similar conclusions were again made in the 
context of Cambodia by Ngin and Verkoren (2015), in Tibet by Joshi and Mason (2007, 2008, 
2011), and in Kenya by Orjuela (2014) who shows how elites rewarded and punished subjects 




their analysis, just that such work can only ever be seen as a ‘stop gap’ measure designed to 
immediately reduce the possibility of violent conflict.67 
Even when problems of land ownership are not explicitly tied to post-conflict elite corruption, 
underlying discussions (let alone challenges) of property rights appear to be largely absent – 
either because scholars feel they have been made before (though there is little citation evidence 
to suggest this), or because they reduce the complexity of their analysis by focusing on micro 
and endogenous factors of conflict promotion.  For instance, Van Leeuwen has explored how 
international actors contribute to land issues in a variety of African contexts (see van Leeuwen, 
2008). Yet he tends to focus on operational matters, rather than condemning international actors 
and systems more broadly. It is individual international companies buying or leasing large 
tracts of land for resource extraction that cause environmental and social damage to 
surrounding populations, not the international system which is reproduced through 
international peacebuilding and promotes the free flow of capital and private property rights 
that benefit international and commercial, rather than societal interests. While van Leeuwen 
recognises local land disputes are more to do with people’s deep dissatisfaction with the way 
access to land and land ownership rights are organised, and has in the past argued for a 
historical understanding of these issues (van Leeuwen, 2010), his focus on these issues was to 
understand how these factors were experienced by locals on the ground (something that was 
not being looked at during this time), leaving others to connect the global dimensions to these 
empirical works which fell beyond his area of expertise [van Leeuwen, Interview 19.30-
23.00].68 More recently, van Leeuwen and Verkoren (2016, p. 113) have noted how 
international actors in Guatemala “did not consider opening up debate about the legitimacy of 
the neoliberal character of the land reform programme to be their responsibility”. This begs the 
question; whose job is it to challenge these structures and to make the connections between 
these micro and macro level critiques if not the scholars making such observations?  
Another rather critical take by Le Billon and Levin (2009, p. 699) aligns problems of property 
and land usage alongside the state, arguing that even in cases where property rights are well 
 
67 It is worth noting the universality of problems caused by property ownership, land access, and rising inequalities 
which even those in more liberal societies in the West have been unsuccessful in managing (or transforming), and 
which are increasingly creating class divisions based off those with property and those without. This is not to 
suggest that these issues are experienced in the same way by those within post-conflict countries as they are within 
societies in the Global North, but to note how in both contexts adequate solutions have not yet been found.   
68 Verkoren has noted during the same interview that she has attempted to connect these micro empirical studies 
with broader systemic critiques in the past. However, these were published in Dutch publications rather than 
English and have had limited impact on the wider field, attracting few citations beyond her own within the dataset 




established, it is the social contract between users and the state that is often problematic – 
whereby the state seeks to criminalize local communities in order to establish large scale 
industrial property rights. Noting the way in which INGOs and others advocated for such 
programmes, these authors argue that while the industrialisation by Sierra Leone is needed, the 
way in which these programmes have been implemented has been state led and to the detriment 
of local communities. Thus, while noting the problematic nature of the social contract between 
the state and its peoples, their arguments and suggestions are geared towards managing these 
processes better, which, if implemented, have the potential to mitigate such issues from 
becoming violent. However, the possibility of alternative customs and rights being established 
which diverge from the liberal paradigm seem slim under such conditions despite their 
understanding of the links to these broader issues. While immediate conflict stemming from 
access to resources may be mitigated through such solutions, the role of international 
investment and trade deals tends to complicate the social contract between the state and its 
subjects in ways that are typically (and increasingly) unfavourable to local communities to the 
extent that short term effects could be managed, but long term transformation is unlikely to 
occur.  
That’s not to say that larger critiques of land reform do not exist in peacebuilding literature, 
and recent work which has looked at the links between economic development and 
environmental issues in post-conflict settings often takes a more social welfare-oriented 
approach to land issues. Wolff (2015, p. 291), for example, notes the positive effects of some 
land redistribution programmes in Bolivia which informs his conclusions around some of the 
positive prospects for post-liberal peacebuilding. But these conclusions and his analysis focus 
on redistribution and alterity only as it applies to the post-conflict state – the other – and he 
fails to search for processes beyond the post-conflict state or question the viability of only 
pursuing land redistribution after violent conflict has already occurred. 
SUMMARY  
While discussions on land disputes and reformation are increasing in studies of peacebuilding, 
PACs authors appear to have been slow in drawing on many of these same debates that occurred 
in development studies several decades earlier. Within the dataset, property rights and land 
access has primarily been contextualised through empirical and case based work which looks 
at how land access has propelled inequality and conflict, while the few studies that have drawn 
conclusions beyond specific contexts have offered little in the way of alternative 




discussions is the expansion of studies which have looked at how small scale and community 
led projects which work around and resist these norms have been applied and can be extended 
to assist peoples beyond the post-conflict state - to not only assist similar efforts but to ensure 
that if these efforts are successful in bringing economic prosperity to these communities, local 
and indigenous practices and understandings of land aren’t simply subsumed into international 
and liberal state framings once a certain level of development has been achieved. 
6.4 Critiquing the Legitimacy of Violence 
To those less versed in such discussions it might seem curious that despite the orthodox 
tendency to conceptualise peace through the absence of violence, the legitimacy of violence is 
rarely questioned in studies of peacebuilding. While some have noted that pacifism and its 
surrounds are a ‘subjugated’ knowledge (Jackson, 2017a), discussions on peacebuilding (and 
the wider PACs discipline) have the desire to reduce and minimise violent conflict at their core. 
Despite this, ‘pacifism’ and its immediate extensions were mentioned in only 11 articles within 
the primary dataset – and though they appeared over 203 times within these texts, this was 
primarily thanks to the works of Jackson, Scott and Megoran.69 Expanding the search to include 
terms such as ‘nonviolence’ and ‘the legitimacy/monopoly of violence’ saw 76 articles invoke 
the terms 389 times – again, these results were heavily skewed by several articles, as most texts 
(50) contained only a singular use of a term. 
Arguments regarding the marginalisation and lack of discussion surrounding the assumed 
legitimacy of violence have been made saliently by numerous authors, including within the 
dataset (see, for instance, Jackson, 2017a, 2017b and to a lesser extent Megoran, 2011a) and 
will not be readdressed in significant detail here. However, it must be briefly noted how the 
dataset contributed to claims of pacifism’s subjugation, as it is important to understand how 
such discussions have failed to manifest in more critical studies of peacebuilding.  
Though articles that mentioned these terms tended to be more critical and theoretical than the 
overall dataset (see appendix 6.1), those engaged more substantially with such concepts were 
not necessarily as radical as some might have hoped. Three types of engagement were 
identified here: broader theoretical discussions about the status and role of violence in 
peacebuilding (for example, Jackson, 2017b, and to a much lesser extent Richmond, 2007a); 
 
69 With Scott and Megoran’s (2017) piece on ‘The Newcastle Upon Tyne Peace Society (1817-50)’ invoking it 
30 times, as the society’s stance was compared to others within its ilk, and, somewhat ironically, Jackson’s (2017a) 
piece on how pacifism is a suppressed term within IR and its surrounding disciplines, which invoked it 165 times 




tangential but nevertheless transformative discussions of peace education in which principles 
of nonviolence were considered an important aspect (see in particular, Megoran, 2011a; Kester, 
2017c, 2017b, 2017a); and those more case based studies in which nonviolence was discussed 
within the context of specific operations. 
While the manner in which nonviolence and pacifism were drawn on by scholars was rather 
erratic, only the first category of engagement offered any long-term normative support or 
questioning of the rationales of violence and its position in peacebuilding. Discussions over the 
importance of including nonviolence in peace education, though significant, were not nuanced 
enough to be directed towards broader understandings of the acceptance or rejection of violence 
within the state or international system, merely stressing the need for nonviolence to be 
included in pedagogy. This tendency to engage more abstractly with such principles was also 
reflected in those more case based approaches where non-violence was discussed not as a moral 
behaviour or objective, but in relation to stages of peacebuilding interventions - such as 
disarmament and securitisation (see, for instance, Agbiboa, 2015; Idler, Belén Garrido and 
Mouly, 2015). 
This shallow engagement with concepts of nonviolence in critical peacebuilding literatures 
appears to corroborate claims of their subjugation (see Jackson, (2017a), given the manner in 
which authors stopped short of condemning violence outright or more critically assessing their 
own findings. Mouly, Garrido, and Idler, (2016), for example, drew on the seminal works of 
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) to note how civil resistance movements in Samaniego, 
Columbia distanced themselves from warring parties and adhered to policies of impartiality 
and nonviolence, which were seen as a ‘key to their success’. Despite this importance, the 
authors conclude by calling for “a better understanding of all of these factors [both nonviolent 
and other] and their interactions” (ibid. , p. 157) within civil resistance movements (emphasis 
added)  – seemingly unwilling to ‘bite the bullet’ and stand behind their findings which 
corroborate the already extensive work undertaken by political theorists in this field.  
While it could be unfair to criticise these authors for failing to make a point that they perhaps 
do not agree with based on their own evidence, it is difficult to shy away from such 
inflammatory remarks, given how scholars so often leave themselves closed to such broader 
assessments or critiques. For example, Höglund and Kovacs (2010), in their article arguing for 
understandings of peace that move beyond the absence of war, fail to consider how a broader 




despite arguing that one reason for criminal violence becoming an “integral feature of many 
post-war societies” is through its normalisation and legitimisation through prior armed 
conflicts which lead to its acceptance later (Höglund and Söderberg, 2010, p. 381) . Such a 
critique somehow manages to pull the thread without unravelling the dress, exposing the links 
between violence and acceptance, whilst simultaneously failing to unclothe the monstrosity of 
legitimate state and international backed violence standing behind it. Do Höglund and Kovacs 
condemn the legitimacy of violence, or just the legitimacy of criminal violence? While it would 
be disingenuous (and, given conversations with Höglund, outright wrong) to claim that these 
authors were not concerned with all types of violence, their argument, either consciously or 
unconsciously, does not extend to critique post-Westphalian and liberal understandings of 
violence, leaving the false dichotomies between legitimate and illegitimate types of violence 
untouched, which could be reused by states seeking to supress dissent. 
While reducing the immediacy of actor led or direct violence was a reoccurring concern for 
many scholars, structural violence (caused by socio/political/institutional structures) should be 
of equal concern for those hoping to improve or transform the long term potential of 
peacebuilding efforts. ‘Structural violence’ was mentioned 178 times within 81 articles and 
coding of these factors were mostly combined with critiques of the international order or 
system (to understand challenges to exogenous rather than post-conflict state structures). 
Invocations were often made when defining or referring to positive variants of peace, typically 
within the literature review of an article (see, for instance Peou, 2014; Sriram, 2017; and Diaz 
and Murshed, 2013), though a handful of scholars engaged more deeply with these matters. 
For example, Maddison and Shepard (2014) link structural violence to the colonial and 
everyday lived experiences of indigenous populations while Kester and Cremin (2017) 
convincingly argue the need for a post-structural understanding of violence which reflects on 
how scholars and their research may exacerbate and obfuscate structural systems which 
produce conflict.  
Despite these innovative efforts, fewer than 15 articles could be seen to directly (no pun 
intended) and substantially critique issues of structural violence, and an even smaller number 
seemed to unpack these in such a manner as to locate micro systems within their macro 
counterparts. For example, the wealth of studies produced by scholars within Canada 
surrounding the impacts of economic development aid in Northern Ireland (see, for example, 
Karari et al., 2012, 2013), whilst continuingly noting the inability of these measures to address 




Northern Ireland. They find that post-conflict subjects feel peacebuilding measures have failed 
to address underlying structural violence which has been intensified by the global economic 
crisis, but do not then take the opportunity to critique larger economic systems, and instead call 
for a host of improvements to peacebuilding measures that better target local wants and needs 
(Karari et al., 2013, p. 600). While social and economic structures within Northern Ireland 
undoubtedly exacerbate the effects of global capitalism, short term measures to improve their 
efficiency and dampen inequality cannot possibly hope to redress the larger impacts of this 
system. This micro focus is further seen by their failure to critically evaluate the “miniscule” 
(Ibid, p. 600) British funding for reconciliation efforts to address this conflict “rooted in 
colonial history” (Ibid, p.588) through the ongoing lens of colonialism, despite the ongoing 
detrimental effects of British policies and systems in this locale. 
SUMMARY 
As noted by Jackson (2017b, p. 4), 
The crucial point here is that the (frequently) self-defeating nature of liberal peacebuilding is 
that it attempts to construct a peaceful, nonviolent ‘post-conflict’ society while asserting and 
holding onto the doctrine and practice of ‘legitimate’ forms of political violence which enabled 
and precipitated the violence in the first place.  
Both the state and the role of violence need to be considered simultaneously as the creation of 
an order that eschews violence can only be established within a system where the state’s ability 
to exercise force is itself challenged (Bloom, 2017). If the role and legitimacy of violence is 
critiqued in isolation to broader structures of direct violence and the institutions which are set 
up to support them (such as the military industrial complex), then advocation for nonviolence 
or pacifist approaches to peacebuilding will only ever result in transforming attitudes and roles 
at the societal level – which are theoretically (but not in reality) already non-violent given 
liberal understandings of the social contract between a state and its peoples. 
From discussions with scholars, it seems that the unwillingness to consider nonviolent and 
pacifist approaches at the centre of peacebuilding (and the political orders they seek to create) 
is a response to our need to constrain our ambitions to what we believe is realisable rather than 
imaginable. As noted by Albrecht “politically, that’s not going to fly is it? I mean, I don’t think 
the world will buy into pacifism because it sounds like you’re not reacting to the world as well 
right?” [Albrecht, P. Interview. 56:40].While the focus of international peacebuilding on post-




systemic violence only as they apply to these areas (rather than the inverse focus of how these 
factors cause violence across the system), the dearth of engagement with nonviolent and 
pacifist understandings is deafening within a discipline so concerned with building peace.  
6.5 Un-reflexive of academia and home 
Reflexivity within critical approaches is both an ontological and epistemological issue. 
Ontologically, it is the understanding that there is no external or value-free way of perceiving 
the world, and thus no independent criteria through which to judge it.70 This leads to the 
epistemological task of exposing how the world is socially constructed, to challenge the 
frameworks and relationships which are produced to both understand and order it. Within the 
dataset, reflexivity manifested in a variety of ways, with academics occasionally critiquing 
larger structural constraints and paradigms (as was shown above), but also, and to a lesser 
extent, through introspection and self-reflection of both the way in which academia is 
constituted and constitutes the discursive structures and frameworks that support these systems. 
Understandably, works that critiqued such matters were often theoretical/conceptual/normative 
articles, rather than empirical or case-based ones – and most of these (18 of 38) were critiques 
of the discourse or a particular research paradigm which challenged the analytical lenses and 
heuristic devices used by scholars, as well as the foci of their studies. These challenges have 
undoubtedly resonated and transformed the study of peacebuilding in a multitude of ways, as 
evidenced by the discursive shifts between liberal, hybrid, everyday and post-liberal 
peacebuilding. Excellent summations of these epistemological shifts within academia often 
emerge in genealogies of peacebuilding,71 and though this contestation is explored in more 
depth in the chapter 8, a more pertinent yet less explored angle of reflexivity to emerge in the 
dataset related to understanding not how academics view the world, but how they exist within 
it.  Here, I refer to the awareness of both the structures within academia which shape and govern 
the production and transmission of knowledge, as well as the awareness of being part of an 
institution (and often a country) that both exists within and benefits from the current 
international order (noting that most academics within the dataset reside within Northern 
institutions). 
 
70 According to Nietzsche “There is no perspective-free, global viewpoint, no ‘god’s eye’ view, only this or that 
particular perspective ... there is no external comparison or correspondence to be made between what we believe 
and truth ‘in itself’ but only the comparison, competition and differences in quality within and between the 
perspectives themselves” (cited in Solomon 1996, p. 185). 




REFLECTION OF SELF 
Those scholars that reflected on academic constraints sought to account for factors that limited 
the potential for transformative scholarly knowledge while maintaining their focus on 
international peacebuilding. Where some of these studies addressed academia tangentially 
within broader critiques of how the discourse of international peacebuilding and the liberal 
peace is constituted and supported (see, for example, (Lewis, 2017) and (Lidén, 2013), others 
looked at the inherent problems in transmitting knowledge to policymakers (see for instance, 
Visoka, 2016),72 or more specifically how academia was constituted and implicated in 
supporting this order, noting, for example the dominance of Global Northern academics within 
the field (discussed in the CNA, but see also Mac Ginty 2012, pp. 296–297).   
While critical peacebuilding scholars appear relatively cognisant and concerned with the 
ontological and epistemological barriers or limits to knowledge production (as evidenced by 
scholars drawing on postcolonial authors such as Spivak (1994) and the rise in ethnographic 
studies that coincided with the local turn (Millar, 2018)), institutional and structural barriers to 
knowledge production have garnered much less attention. Though related discussions have 
appeared occasionally (especially by scholars drawing on Foucault, such as Chandler, 
Randazzo, and Richmond) ‘knowledge production’ is mentioned only 85 times within 26 
articles of the dataset, and while significant efforts seeking to understand how knowledge is 
shaped and utilized by peacebuilding organisations exist (Autesserre, 2011a; Goodhand and 
Sedra, 2013; Bliesemann de Guevara, 2014; Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn, 2014; Kostić, 
2014; Millar, 2016), reflection on how these same structures might impact on academics 
producing peacebuilding knowledge remains largely ignored beyond the notable yet sporadic 
exceptions of scholars such as Richard Jackson, Roland Kostic, Bliessman de Gueverra, Roger 
Mac Ginty, Oliver Richmond, and Gezim Visoka.73 These discussions, which note the ways in 
which the increasingly neoliberal academy shapes and constrains radical knowledge 
 
72 This was a rather less focused on aspect to emerge within the dataset. Though literature on this field is 
significant, writings on ‘policy transmission’, though critical, were not often captured in the dataset given their 
attempt to influence policy, a feature typically associated with problem-solving theory. 
73 Such as Jackson, 2015; Richmond, Kappler and Björkdahl, 2015; Shepherd, 2016; de Guevara and Kostić, 2017; 
Kostić, 2017; Lemay-Hébert and Visoka, 2017; and Wallis and Richmond, 2017 - though this was also a notable 




production, appear to have been brought over from, or at the very least influenced by, similar 
discussions within critical terrorism studies. 74  
While reflexive studies on PACs indicate an awareness of such discussions, these articles, 
which assess pedagogy around peacebuilding, tend to alter the focus of their works from 
objectives to practices, causing this line of critique to become much more muted (see, for 
example, the difference in writing between Kevin Kester and Rhys Kelly). Meanwhile, the 
significant increase in ethnographic studies of peacebuilding suggests that scholars, aware of 
the limitations and biases produced by institutional factors, have sought to overcome these 
issues by moving beyond them, rather than confronting them directly. For example, Björkdahl 
and Gusic (2015) argue that their engagement with peacebuilding processes in Kosovar has 
been built over time giving them a deeper understanding of contextual dynamics. They argue 
their research approach has emerged from experimentation in “conducting fieldwork in a self-
reflexive manner drawing on ethnographic methodologies” which enables them “to transcend 
the object/subject dichotomy and reflect upon the power relations that are inherent in 
knowledge production” (ibid, p. 267). This awareness is positive, and while their works 
explicitly seek to understand the interplay of global and local actors and the resulting power 
dynamics that emerge, such an awareness only appears to addresses personal and 
methodological barriers, rather than the institutional barriers that have been consciously and 
unconsciously constructed and maintained by scholars within academia. Where a significant 
number of ethnographic work appears to only have a rudimentary understanding of 
ethnography (Millar, 2018), the actual make up of academics, as well as the associated 
constraints of funding, ethics approval, and publishing (to name a few), establish a much more 
subtle constraint on research that no amount of ethnographic research can counteract, unless 
we as researchers reflect more freely on the barriers that we agree to through our membership 
within the neoliberal and publication/metric obsessed system of academia.   
We have begun to understand the ways in which the field of peacebuilding is constituted 
through its practitioners and policy-makers (see, for instance, Goetze and De Guevara, 2013; 
Lidén, 2013), but few scholars have devoted explicit effort to uncovering how we as 
researchers are part of this phenomena (though such discussions occur in intersecting fields). 
One notable and recent exception to this trend is by Catherine Goetze who draws on Bourdieu 
 
74 While the first such mention appeared in Richmond (2007b), this discussion was on the different approaches 
that a discipline could undertake to knowledge production rather than the barriers to its creation which appeared 
more prominently in two studies of terrorism; the first where it was discussed (though not by name) by Richmond 




to undertake a social/network analysis of the field of peacebuilding.75 While academics are a 
relatively minor component of this study, the conclusions she draws based on observations 
about practitioners and policy makers are equally applicable. Goetze notes that peacebuilding 
is “entirely political in the way it is made possible socially, by the way it is done practically, 
and by the way it is understood and justified by its actors’ discourse” (2017, p. 220). She argues 
that, 
It is a global socio-professional field in which global power relations are enacted and 
reproduced in multiple ways: in professional practices and values, in political struggles and 
discourses, and in the everyday lives and professional careers of peacebuilders. Peacebuilding 
continues because it has become for a large range of people and organizations, at many different 
social levels, a way of earning a life and leading a professional career. (Goetze, 2017, p. 218) 
The multitude of scholars, practitioners, policy makers, companies and NGOs that make up the 
field of peacebuilding are reliant on the continuation of conflict and inequality that requires 
peacebuilding in much the same way as the Military Industrial Complex requires the continual 
threat of external state-based violence, or the Prison Industrial Complex requires the social 
environments and legal frameworks that ensure continued patronage (such sentiment can be 
found in Duffield, 2007, 2019; Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo, 2018). Peacebuilders, whether 
policymakers, practitioners, or researchers, are bound by the rules of the game and “orient their 
visions toward the dominant one”, adapting and moderating their behaviours to conform with 
those with more social (or academic) capital, preventing radical contestation and difference 
(Goetze, 2017, p. 9). These issues are dealt with in greater detail during the final discussion of 
this thesis. However, it is worth noting the active and passive ways in which researchers are 
complicit in many of these practices of peacebuilding. Not only do numerous academics within 
this field act as ‘pracademics’, shifting between academia and practice throughout their 
professional careers, but many scholars also actively seek to find audiences within the policy 
realm where their research can be utilized. This is increasingly the case within academia where 
neoliberal reforms seek to gauge academic performance through mechanisms which often 
include ‘policy relevance’ – such as is the case in the U.K. with REF, the PBRF in New 
Zealand, etc. Such efforts undeniably affect the types of questions posed by academics who 
alter the framing of their research or attempt to provide policy relevant conclusions at the 
expense of addressing and asking larger and less immediate questions (as has been seen in the 
 
75 Another notable effort has been undertaken by Richmond (2018b), though this is less of a normative endeavour 




majority of studies within this dataset), while even critical undertakings impact the discourse 
by challenging orthodox scholars and understandings.  
Given the pervasiveness of these barriers and constraints, it is unlikely that any mere 
methodological shift (however well-intentioned) can truly expose and account for the ways in 
which we as researchers reflect the sociological, economic, and cultural barriers that shape our 
thinking and actions.76 Even when confronted directly with such matters, scholars are reluctant 
to accept that such institutional constraints greatly influence their research agendas and 
conclusions. A common question asked by this researcher during interviews was the extent to 
which scholars had ever felt their academic freedom had been limited to the extent that they 
could not argue or publish what they wanted. Despite the understanding that within the 
neoliberal academy scholars have to ‘play the game’ to some extent, no scholars felt that these 
factors had ever altered their work – though this did not mean that their work was always 
engaged with or well received. If true, this would suggest that the limits of imagination and 
criticality identified within this thesis might be more to do with our preference and biases as 
academics (which must then favour the liberal episteme in which many of us reside), than with 
a cabal of editors refusing to publish critical and revolutionary work. If these biases were less 
potent than suggested here, we might expect to see a significant body of work within 
peacebuilding studies that either condemns peacebuilding or accounts for how the international 
order and countries within the Global North continue to maintain and facilitate conflict 
promoting practices and institutions. As discussed below, this does not appear to be the case. 
REFLECTION OF COUNTRY 
While studies that were reflective of international actors and peacebuilding countries appeared 
relatively frequently within the dataset, these often focused on how an international actor 
carried out a particular peace operation – restraining the critique to a singular or small series of 
operations.77 Though such studies take a critical approach (by definition), assessing how 
international actors’ actions have been ‘top down’ and problematic, this focus generally led to 
 
76 Though a notable effort has been undertaken by Shepherd (2016) in her self-reflexive piece exploring the 
relationship between self and research. Though it is likely that other scholars have undertaken similar explorations 
in more informal spaces (such as blogs), not only is Shepherd’s piece refreshingly open and honest, but it is 
published in a journal (though admittedly not within a mainstream peacebuilding journal). Other endeavours are 
often undertaken by heavy weights such as Johan Galtung and Kevin Avruch.  
77 See, for instance, Piiparinen, 2007, 2008, 2015; Chandler, 2008, 2010b; Richmond and Franks, 2009a; 
Belloni, 2009; Allen and Dinnen, 2010; Ellis, Mitchell and Prins, 2010; Kappler and Richmond, 2011; Zürcher, 
2011; Baranyi and Salahub, 2011; Richmond and Tellidis, 2012; Stokke, 2012; Visoka, 2012a; Gartzke, 2012; 
Kostić, 2014; Pogodda et al., 2014; Baranyi, 2014; Wallis, 2015; Visoka and Doyle, 2016; Corbett and Dinnen, 




a critique of the liberal peace and several suggestions of how international peacebuilders could 
be more cognisant of local voices in the future. Such discussions made up a sizeable portion of 
the dataset (coded as ‘case studies’ with a focus on international actors), and rarely expanded 
their critique beyond the particular operation or post-conflict region.  
Of more interest to this study were those scholars that reflected on international actors and 
peacebuilding countries, not only for their problematic peacebuilding techniques, but for their 
membership and role in shaping the international order and broader structures that lead to 
inequality and conflict. These discussions drew on those issues mentioned earlier in this chapter 
(such as the international economic system and private property) to note the ways in which 
existing systems were shaped and upheld by the very countries undertaking international 
peacebuilding operations. This type of critique was seen to be important as it connected local 
conflict dynamics and peacebuilding processes to the larger systems which would continue to 
impede efforts if they remained unaddressed. Thus, while most of the literature within the 
dataset took stringent efforts to constrain the lessons learnt and suggestions to the post-conflict 
locale from whence they were derived, as an understandable reaction to the top-down and 
template based approaches which they sought to counter, more universally applicable findings 
could be made if they were linked to the broader structures of power that more generally favour 
the North without repeating the mistakes of the liberal peace. 
Although more critical scholars often hinted at such issues, this type of reflective critique was 
most (and by no means exclusively) evident in the works of Richard Jackson, Michael Pugh, 
John Heathershaw and Camilla Orjuela (and Mark Duffield and Vivienne Jabri from outside 
the dataset). These latter authors provided perhaps the most explicit critique of international 
actors and the specific problematic elements of systems they believed needed transforming. 
For example, where Pugh’s critiques’ were often levelled at capitalist and neoliberal systems 
(critiquing the entire paradigm), Khamidov, Megoran and Heathershaw (2017) narrowed down 
the focus of this critique to acknowledge the damaging effects of the international financial 
system.78 While in contrast to Pugh, this refinement could appear to be a problem-solving one 
in that it no longer critiques the economic system writ large, there is a noticeable difference to 
other critical improvement work within the dataset in that their challenge was geared not 
towards post-conflict systems, but those upheld by Western states.  
 
78 Admittedly this effort was relatively muted, but it nevertheless indicates one effort by a researcher to link 




Similarly, Lindberg and Orjuela (2011) note how corruption is exacerbated by the global arms 
trade. Their work, which explores conflict in Sri Lanka, often notes the international dynamics 
that contributed to conflict and highlights how “the corruption suspected to have occurred in 
Sri Lankan arms procurements was made possible by global actors like arms producing 
companies (and indirectly the foreign governments that support the arms industry)”, which are 
credited to the UK, US, Russia, Ukraine, Israel and China (p. 266). While such critiques 
certainly implicate countries within the Global North for their role in the international arms 
trade, they seem rather muted given the amount of data available by neighbouring academic 
institutions such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute which could be used 
to generate stronger critiques. Indeed, while Sweden’s share of the global arms exports has 
decreased proportionally since 2014, in 2011 Sweden was still one of the top ten weapons 
exporters, trading predominantly to South Africa, Hungary, and Pakistan (SIPRI, 2019, p. 2).79 
Though a report published outside of the dataset by Orjuela and her colleagues at the Swedish 
Peace and Arbitration Society takes a much more critical and in-depth stance at the role of 
international arms transfers in Sri Lankan conflict, it is notable that this was an independent 
report and not an academic publication (Lindberg et al., 2011).  
The observation here is not that academics studying international peacebuilding are unaware 
of these matters, simply that for some reason or another, they do not consider these to be 
significant factors to address in their academic writings on peacebuilding. One potential 
explanation for this, which is addressed in more detail later in this thesis, is that academic 
articles do not appear to be a place for ‘advocacy’ but objective, scientific debate.80 These 
barriers of moderation are particularly noticeable when it comes to outright condemnation of 
practices such as arms exports, which are problematic given how long it takes to challenge and 
stop such phenomena.81 Indeed within the dataset, ‘arms trade’ was mentioned only 33 times 
within 12 articles, and while these were mostly infrequent references to it being a problem, 
 
79 See also the SIPRI report for 2011 – available alongside the 2019 report. 
80 Numerous scholars pointed to non-academic work (including blogs and personal website) as places in which 
their views might be noted. While this is certainly the case, such works have little academic value or merit 
(excluding alt-metrics) and their lack of citation in the dataset shows how problematic it is to assume that such 
mediums will be drawn on, credited, or even discovered by other scholars, policymakers and practitioners. 
81 Indeed, a Guardian report back in 2013 noted that the United Kingdom exported 2 million pounds worth of 
military equipment to Sri Lanka in 2012 despite their governments continued human rights violations (Quinn, 
2013). Only now, six years on, has a motion entered the British parliament calling for an immediate end to all 




there were no real attempts to address or unpack these issues.82 From this, it appears that the 
international arms trade is beyond the remit of critical peacebuilding studies – and while this 
might be understandable given the limited space within academic publications which  cannot 
possibly address every problem relevant to peacebuilding, the lack of analysis around 
nonviolence and pacifism, as well as the destructive effects of the international arms trade (for 
example), seem to be a particularly problematic omission. Scholars could have easily worked 
findings from surrounding fields such as critical security studies into their work, to suggest 
ways in which international and local actors could better address these factors.  
The local turn and its focus on elements such as the everyday which has occurred alongside or 
due to critical theories of peacebuilding has continually narrowed the scope of analysis for 
academics, encouraging micro-level case based studies which reflect on one particular 
community during one period of time. While the justifications for this turn appear altruistic and 
logical, they also appear to have dissuaded scholars from attempting to construct more 
universal theories, and from critiquing problematic factors affecting peacebuilding beyond the 
post-conflict state, primarily and problematically defined as the Global South. Thus, critiques 
of state or elite corruption were not meaningfully linked to the broader financial systems that 
allowed for them to operate and function, nor did they reflect on the ways in which these 
practices are in no way confined to post-conflict states within the Global South (as leaks such 
as the Panama Papers have increasingly made clear) and which are enabled through the foreign 
aid practices of the global North.83  
6.6 Conclusion: The Marginalisation of Criticality 
The limits of peacebuilding research appear to be, rather worryingly, great. While influential 
debates on many of the broader issues considered here to be important to peacebuilding can be 
found in other disciplines and topic areas, it appears that they have yet to permeate this field 
directly. As such, both critical critiques of, and problem-solving approaches to peacebuilding 
either seek to improve its methods or the understanding of it, rather than challenge and 
reimagine its objectives. Radical critiques of international peacebuilding are both rare and often 
co-opted, as seen by the overwhelming focus on specific geographic regions (chapter 5) and 
 
82 The most significant text, Bromley, Cooper, and Holtom (2012, p. 1029) looks at this from an entirely 
uncritical/un-normative perspective, even going so far as to note the discriminatory nature of restrictions which 
“potentially deny another state access to the weapons it wants”. 
83 A report by UK and African-based NGOs concluded in 2014 that upwards of 60 billion dollars a year is stolen 
from African countries through Western practices of tax evasion, climate change denial, and illegal exploitation 




conflicts at the expense of equally important cases - as well as the lack of critique concerning 
international order/systemic/ and structural issues, liberal notions of state,  private property and 
land ownership rights, the legitimacy of violence and nonviolent or pacifist approaches, as well 
as the Global North.84 The failure to address larger systemic discussions only compounds the 
other negative patterns identified in this analysis, whereupon academics focus more on 
critiquing practices than challenging objectives (chapter 5), where theories and alternative 
suggestions are sparse and un-aspirational or unimaginative (chapter 7), and where the structure 
of academia dilutes and conflates criticality as ideas are mainstreamed (chapter 8).  
While reflexivity from an ontological and epistemological standpoint exists, the broader aims 
and coupling of critiques of the international order to such approaches has been left behind. 
While it is unsurprising that scholars of international peacebuilding focus more on the post-
conflict state or the exact practices and methods used during operations, it is worrying how 
dominant this strand of research is, leading to a dearth of reflection into wider structures that 
are undeniably related to the practices of peacebuilding and our conceptions of peace. To only 
critique endogenous dynamics within post-conflict spaces which lead to conflict seems 
woefully naive when we consider how these problems manifest in all societies and are often 
compounded by actions undertaken by the Global North. While critical approaches focusing 
on local agency have shown how the practices of international peacebuilders often had the 
opposite effect to that which they sought, their critique did not extend to understand more 
broadly how international actors, rules and systems compounded such issues and critiques of 
the international were constrained to their actions in the post-conflict environment rather than 
the international system writ large. It is possible that much of this focus is caused by scholars 
attempting to balance their critical interests of systemic critique with their normative interest 
in reducing the immediacy of violence, as the targeting of more addressable issues such as the 
elite exploitation of land ownership (for example) might suggest. The following chapter seeks 
to understand how scholars have posited and discussed alternative orders within peacebuilding 
 
84 While there are numerous other indicators that are relevant to understanding criticality and larger paradigm 
critiques, this thesis did not have the space to thoroughly examine each one and there was often not enough 
material within the dataset on a particular subject to provide an apt illustration of discussions or lack thereof. Two 
such notable omissions within this chapter are discussions of the international economic system and environmental 
factors, where their explicit consideration by scholars was too rare to allow for a thorough examination of how it 
had been discussed or considered. Environmental/ecological factors, for example, were only mentioned in 35 
articles, despite the increasing wealth of information drawing direct links between how humans and their 
relationship with their natural environment is fundamental to understanding the causes of conflict and peace 




scholarship, by unpacking how they have sought to transform the objectives of peacebuilding, 




CHAPTER 7: THE LIMITS OF IMAGINATION - PEACE AND THE 
LOCAL TURN 
As noted by Boulding (1978b, p. 3), “[p]eace is a word of so many meanings that one hesitates 
to use it for fear of being misunderstood”. Academics within the dataset have engaged with 
‘peace’ in a multitude of ways which fundamentally alter how their work contributes to the 
field of peacebuilding. Peace has been invoked as an abstraction, a tangible reality, an 
objective, and a process. It has been used as a slur to indicate an unsatisfactory or fragile reality, 
and as a mandate or a quest towards utopia. Its many usages are varied and overlapping, and 
the ways in which academics draw on these different conceptualisations can be seen to reflect 
the often implicit assumptions and motivations that guide their work, as well their theoretical 
and conceptual developments of what ‘peace’ is or ought to be.  
Existing quantitative studies that have mapped the PACs discipline have confirmed biases 
within academia that show studies of peace receive fewer citations than studies of conflict, and 
that many studies of peace are more focused on war (Sillanpaa and Koivula, 2010; Gleditsch, 
Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014; Bright and Gledhill, 2018).85 While this focus on conflict and 
war at the expense of developing our understandings of peace is undoubtedly compounded by 
structural constraints such as research funding, it is also related to the inherent difficulty in 
studying peace, given the lack of readily identified outcomes of what peace is, or an agreed 
criteria to indicate whether a people or country is ‘peaceful’ (Davenport, Melander and Regan, 
2018). When scholars do engage with the concept of peace, they rarely extend beyond a 
negative conceptualisation, given the difficulty in operationalising the more robust or positive 
elements of peace laid out by scholars such as Galtung (1969). This allows scholars to avoid 
the complicated task of theorizing peace to focus on more than simply understanding the 
duration of nonviolent periods or particular dynamics such as intensity and scope (Davenport, 
Melander and Regan, 2018). 
Operationally, peacebuilding has often been envisioned to take place once a negative peace has 
been achieved; where peacekeeping or peace-making prevents continued direct violent conflict, 
 
85 This situation is potentially worse than has been noted by these studies, given that the large scale meta-
analysis used to identify biases do not appear to be nuanced enough to uncover why specific invocations or 
citations were made. Because of this, these studies did not capture instances in which scholars are cited for 
a rejection of their ideas, or when peace was referred to in a more negative sense (such as the liberal peace, 




peacebuilding seeks to transform this minimalist peace into something more robust and 
potentially ‘positive’. Given the focus of this thesis on understanding the limitations of 
peacebuilding research, this chapter concerns peace as an objective – what peacebuilding seeks 
to achieve or become – rather than the different actions and methods undertaken to achieve it 
(which would shift the focus to a more problem-solving rather than critical critique). Peace 
does not exist as an existential condition; it is both temporally and spatially bounded 
(Richmond, 2007d, pp. 6–16) and while an increasing amount of literature seeks to understand 
the spatial dynamics of what peace is (whose peace?), there is a lacuna of research which 
investigates or imagines peace as an objective – what peace ought to be. 
Understanding peace as a reality or as an objective is made difficult given that it is often poorly 
conceived and, as will be argued, the many adjectives used to describe different types of peace 
often convolute and confuse understandings about what is actually meant. Indeed, significant 
theoretical developments of peace by PACs stalwarts such as Kenneth Boulding, Adam Curl, 
Karl Deutsch, Johan Galtung, and Quincy Wright appear to be an exception rather than the 
norm, and this chapter supports prior observations that historically the term is “rarely 
conceptualised, even by those who often allude to it” (Richmond, 2007a, p. 249) and is poorly 
imagined within PACs and its surrounding disciplines (Gittings, 2016, pp. 27–28). More 
recently, Davenport et al. (2018) have noted how PACs scholars continually recreated this 
deficiency in theorising and conceptualising peace by extending or reproducing work that 
cemented the disciplinary divisions that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s between stalwarts 
such as Kenneth Boulding and Johan Galtung.86 They note that scholars have favoured an 
approach that allows for the continual generation of testable models which explain political 
violence, while failing to undertake similar efforts towards new understandings of peace.  
Indeed, peace continues to be defined in opposition to war by scholars, and is seen as an ideal 
form, more aspirational than achievable (Richmond, 2007a, p. 263). When peace does 
encounter a deeper analysis, these have tended to focus on peace between states and empires, 
overlooking the role of individual and societal agency (Richmond, 2007a; Davenport, 
Melander and Regan, 2018), potentially due to the dominance of both quantitative 
 
86 Their argument traces the divergence between the two tracts of peace studies embodied by scholars such as 
Galtung in Norway and the North American trend headed by Boulding. They claim that over time these have both 
merged into a focus more on conflict, potentially due to the threat of nuclear Armageddon. It is this authors’ 
contention that another likely influence of this trend’s extension past the immediate threat of nuclear annihilation 
posed during the Cold War came from the increase in funding available to PACs at the end of the Cold War, as 
peacebuilding was formally established and linked to development studies, and securitised by the USA’s efforts 




methodologies, and liberal and IR framings of the state. Beyond such disciplines however, 
peace appears to have attracted more attention, and other fields within the Arts have 
experimented with different forms of expression and literature to develop new themes. These 
efforts appear to have had some impact on PACs scholars, and new critical versions of peace 
research have begun to emerge which hold “emancipation as a prerequisite for peace” 
(Richmond, 2007a, p. 250). This chapter outlines how academics within the data set have 
interacted with the concept of peace in their writing, before assessing its emancipatory and 
transformative potential by discerning how academics have imagined the many possible futures 
of peace. 
Noting the socially constructed nature of peace,87 the aim here is not to independently evaluate 
each conceptualisation but to explore the patterns and calls for peace as they have been 
developed and critiqued by the scholars using them – to understand how scholars have engaged 
with peace. Implicit in this evaluation is the understanding that theories of peace, like theory 
in general, are made to fulfil particular agendas, and that we must pay attention for whom and 
to what end these constructions of peace serve (Cox, 1986; Richmond, 2006b). In a sense, this 
effort is undertaken with the desire to understand whether the claim by academics that 
practitioners only rhetorically engage with emancipatory and critical theories of peacebuilding 
might in effect be turned upon themselves, to ask to what extent critical conceptions of peace 
are only rhetorically engaged with by those scholars invoking them. As such, this chapter 
contributes to the thesis by understanding the aspirational and imaginative aims of 
peacebuilding literature (or lack thereof) and those significantly deeper (if somewhat erratic) 
studies which critique this limited engagement (see, for instance, Richmond, 2007d; 
Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović, 2016).  
It argues that engagement with peace remains relatively poor by critical scholars within the 
dataset, and despite increasing invocations of more critical types of peace, both orthodox and 
contemporary concepts remain largely unquestioned, static and dominant (as noted by 
Richmond (2006b) over a decade ago). From the dataset it appears that efforts to further 
substantively develop peace have been undertaken by only a handful of academics whose work 
is then unceremoniously cited to justify new research agendas that contribute little to the 
 
87 Richmond (2007d, p. 6,7) argues that “Peace does not exist outside of thought, interest and resultant 
policymaking, but is actually a result of them… [Peace] has no inherent meaning, but must be qualified as a 
specific type among many. One must take note of who describes peace, and how, as well as who constructs it, and 
why”. As such, this thesis’ overarching methodologies provide a good framework from which to extract an 




conceptions they draw on. It is argued that articles within the database express a large number 
of ‘peace platitudes’, where terms are invoked to ground studies within a normative framework 
that seems both empty and static, increasingly focused on what is, rather than what ought to 
be. While the critical turn in peace studies has provided new insights and new agendas for 
constructing peace, this remains awkward and disjointed, subjected to a variety of research 
agendas which lack imagination and do not adequately reflect the aspirational elements of 
critical theory. Indeed, beyond the increased understanding of complexity (reflected in a turn 
to relativistic understandings of peace), these critical conceptualisations of peace are 
increasingly descriptive rather than prescriptive, and even when they are negotiated with more 
aspirational aims, these are envisioned for post-conflict contexts within the Global South, 
leaving understandings of peace within the Global North unproblematised despite their 
universal implications.88 
7.1: Conceiving Peace 
To better understand how peace had been conceptualised in the dataset, all invocations of the 
term ‘peace’ were captured alongside corresponding sentiments (4 words to either side) using 
NVIVO’s data mining tools, which were then ranked in order of frequency and content to 
identify trends in usage and type. This produced an overwhelming number of results which, 
upon further investigation, often referred to specific characteristics of peace, rather than a 
coherent and distinct conceptualisation of peace itself. ‘Peace’ was invoked in reference to 
spatial dynamics (domestic, regional, national, Western, etc.), temporal dynamics (future, 
permanent, modern), for specific characteristics (sustainable, durable, economic, unequal, 
fragile, limited, sophisticated) and for its specific types (liberal, democratic, positive, negative, 
etc.). Excluding peace actions or verbs (such as peace education, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding), over 100 types or descriptors of peace were identified (for a list of the top 50 
types, see appendix 7.1).  
This versatility made understanding its use an exceptionally drawn out process, given the 
myriad ways in which it could be invoked. For example, it is possible to describe things as 
being peaceful, to describe actions and policies as creating or building peace, and to describe 
 
88 Drawing on  Davenport et al (2018), it is this author’s belief that few states within the Global North should be 
considered ‘post-conflict’ given their continual acts of direct and indirect violence against peoples within the 
Global South (the ongoing invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance). Despite this and as noted in 
chapters 5\6, literature on peacebuilding and peacemaking focuses primarily upon the Global South rather than 




different types of peace which exist or ought to exist. These various uses were rarely distinct, 
and what were once characteristics or adjectives attributed to peace often became ‘types’ of 
peace themselves. A ‘quality peace’, for example, can refer both to a peace that is of better or 
worse quality (adjective), or to Wallensteen’s (2015) conception of a Quality Peace. While 
quality peace was invoked 38 times across 30 articles within the dataset, a close inspection 
shows that scholars were simply using the term as an adjective rather than Wallensteen’s 
conception, which appears to have been ignored completely by works within the dataset and 
(to date) has had a limited impact outside of it.89  
Table 17 below shows the top 11 peace types invoked within the dataset, explanations of which 
can be found within appendix 7.2. As scholars of international peacebuilding might assume, 
the most highly invoked term related to the liberal peace, which was often positioned as a 
strawman through which peacebuilding could be critiqued. Thus the sheer number of times that 
this peace type was invoked compared to critical types can be explained by understanding that 
both criticisms of peacebuilding’s methods and practices (liberal peacebuilding) and what they 
sought to accomplish (liberal peace) were often levied against this one particular peace type. 
On the other hand, while a plethora of alternative and critical peace types exist (such as the 
local peace, hybrid peace, and everyday peace) these often refer to particular characteristics of 
peace which scholars feel should be prioritised (see Appendix 7.2).  
Table 17: Top mentions of peace in NVIVO Dataset  
Top mentions of peace in Primary Dataset Files References 
Liberal Peace 294 3223 
Democratic Peace 76 524 
Sustainable Peace 151 379 
International Peace 142 355 
Hybrid Peace 51 258 
Everyday Peace 38 243 
Local Peace 72 219 
Positive Peace 72 140 
 
89 Results from the CNA show that none of Wallensteen’s work on quality peace were cited within the dataset and 
that the author was drawn on primarily for his works Understanding Conflict Resolution (2012) and Environment, 
Conflict and Cooperation (1997). This is most likely due to data collection culminating at the end of 2017, only 
two years since the publication of the book Quality Peace, where scholarly works typically require around three 
years to become popularly circulated. It could also be due to Wallensteen being more closely aligned to a problem-
solving approach. A citation search conducted using Google Scholar on the 5 th of April 2019 shows that the 
majority of works that have cited Quality Peace were authored by North American and Scandinavian academics, 




Negative Peace 63 106 
Emancipatory Peace 31 105 
Postliberal Peace 30 103 
Looking at patterns in how these peace types were invoked over time shows that despite the 
dominance of the liberal peace, there appears to be an increasing willingness by critical scholars 
to consider alternative peace types, or at the very least, produce research they hope might 
contribute to this endeavour (see appendix 7.3). However, much of this engagement is shallow 
and offers limited theoretical or conceptual development of what a desirable type of peace 
might be. Indeed, the utility of critical conceptualisations themselves are questionable, given 
the amount of confusion and conflation between concepts that appear to exist (see appendix 
7.2). All critical conceptualisations of peace found within the dataset emphasize particular 
elements, institutions and mechanisms which are seen to make up peace but are themselves the 
mechanisms needed to construct and achieve that peace. For example, a local peace (which can 
itself be seen as part of other peace types) takes the views of local peoples into account and 
contextualises institutions upon their own understandings, cultures, and values. To achieve 
such a peace, peacebuilders must engage with the views and voices of local peoples to ground 
their efforts upon local understandings, causing the methods being used to achieve peace to be 
the same as objectives or the type of peace sought. 
While such a statement might appear entirely understandable and simply semantic, where the 
name of a peace type is determined by its primary characteristic, this practice obfuscates several 
issues. For example, the conflation of characteristics, methods, and objectives obscures the 
overwhelming focus of academics on the practice and methods of peacebuilding at the expense 
of critiquing objectives. As noted by Visoka (2011, p. 105), peacebuilding’s “critical 
approaches [primarily] attempt to provide alternative solutions to the shortcomings of 
externally imposed democratisation”. By treating the characteristics of peace as types of peace, 
its aspirations are conflated with the methods used to construct it, and scholars are able to focus 
on the ‘methods’ of peacebuilding without appearing to neglect its objectives. The issue here 
is that critical approaches to peacebuilding should be concerned with more than operational 
shortcomings caused by interveners methods. Continually critiquing the practices and methods 
used to build peace merely produces more salient ways to ‘get to Denmark’, and it is only when 
scholars move beyond this effort that new understandings of international order, state and 




Again using the example of scholarship on local ownership and a local peace, the focus is on 
creating a peace process built on local desires, which focuses scholarly enquiry on enabling 
this process and away from discussions of what the actual peace will be beyond being ‘locally 
owned’. The question that remains unanswered in these debates is, what happens once these 
objectives have been obtained? Hypothetically, if international peacebuilding efforts 
successfully draw on local conceptualisations and assist in establishing contextualised and 
reflective institutions within a post-conflict society, has peace been achieved and where do we 
go from there? The failure to ask and answer such questions stems, in part, from the fact that 
critiques of international peacebuilding are not necessarily critiques of peace. Yet they often 
attempt to be both - critiquing the methods and practices of peacebuilding while claiming their 
suggestions will achieve a better variant of peace without  explaining how this might occur and 
what this might look like.  
Many critical theorists in this field, Visoka included, attempt to do more than simply critique 
methods but significant efforts are still needed to outline the characteristics of what more 
critical variations of peace might look like. The post-liberal peace, advocated and explored by 
Oliver Richmond is one such peace type, which attempts to position varieties of critical peace 
under its mantle in the same manner that the liberal peace contains various liberal peace types 
(democratic peace, institutional peace, etc. – see appendix 7.2). As such, the post-liberal peace 
provides an excellent place through which to explore the arguments above, by critiquing the 
largest and most robust alternative notion of peace to understand its emancipatory potential and 
shortcomings. The following section briefly explores how scholars have critiqued the liberal 
peace within the dataset to understand why an alternative type of peace is desirable, before 
exploring the post-liberal peace and arguing that it, alongside the increasingly relativistic and 
pragmatic characteristics of peace being identified by critical scholars come at the expense of 
aspirational and imaginative discussions about a desirable rather than already existing peace. 
7.3: Reifying Negative Peace 
As has already been noted within this chapter, meta studies of the PACs discipline have often 
led commentators to argue that studies of peace are often and unfortunately studies of conflict 
(Gleditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014). More recent works have shown how peace is often 
conceived of within a war/no-war binary,90 focusing exclusively on states that have recently 
emerged from conflict to produce a conceptualisation of peace “anchored in a prior condition 
 




of armed combat” (Davenport, Melander and Regan, 2018 p. 19). This trend was evident 
throughout the dataset, as academics struggled to balance advocation of a more robust 
conceptualisation of peace with their more immediate desire to reduce conflict, all the while 
drawing on empirical information which often limited analysis to minimalist and measurable 
understandings.  
For instance, a substantial body of work has been produced by Mac Ginty, Lee and Joshi (and 
similar works such as Joshi, Quinn, & Regan, 2015) which qualifies the implementation of 
liberal peace provisions within peace accords by drawing on two quantitative datasets (the 
Peace Accords Matrix PAM of which Joshi is the associate director, and the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program UCDP). This is notable not only for unpacking and defining various tenants of 
the liberal peace,91 but for doing so with no significant articulation as to what ‘peace’ might be 
beyond this liberal framing. The liberal peace, as laid out by these authors, is not a ‘state of 
being’, but a set of norms and processes which are advocated for by primarily Northern actors. 
It is, as they have argued more recently, 
the dominant form of peace-making and peacebuilding that is supported by leading states, 
international organizations and international financial institutions. It justifies itself using liberal 
rhetoric and is associated with practices and institutions that are regarded as liberal ... It is a 
system of peace-building, -keeping, enforcement and maintenance that has a sustained, if not 
always coherent, ideological heritage and is linked to material power [colonialism] in the sense 
of particular states and institutions and the incentives and coercion that they can offer. (Mac 
Ginty, Joshi and Lee, 2019, p. 3) 
Using the same datasets these authors have investigated how safeguards (temporary 
institutional mechanisms which facilitate the implementation and protection of peace accords; 
2017, p. 995) and social and security provisions (2016) are included and implemented within 
peace agreements. While the latter article explicitly includes social provisions in recognition 
of critical studies, to stress the dangers of overlooking the quality of peace when using 
quantitative methods, none of these works (including their articles from 2014 and 2019) offer 
any qualifier of what peace is beyond the authors’ interest in identifying factors that support a 
durable or sustainable peace.  Their focus in these articles is thus on the top-down or formalised 
implementation of liberal peace provisions, which discount the role of informal liberal reforms 
 
91 By comparatively analysing peacebuilding operations, they argue the liberal peace commonly emphasises the 
promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and security sector and governance reform  (Joshi, Lee 




(which they cannot capture)92 and informal levels of violence and conflict (which the datasets 
they draw on do not capture), starkly contrasting much of their other work which focuses more 
critically on local agency and everyday indicators of peace (with the possible exclusion of 
Joshi’s work).  
Thus, while the dataset offers no definition or explanation of peace,93 these scholars,  in the 
explicit process of identifying the liberal peace, can only be seen to conceptualise ‘peace’ along 
the dialectical lines of opposition to war or violence. This makes their advocation for a more 
durable or sustainable peace based off these indicators appear interested in little more than 
understanding which provisions are most likely to retard the resumption of violent conflict. 
Furthermore, while their inclusion of social provisions (such as economic development) takes 
steps towards assessing the quality of peace, these provisions are referred to more for their 
ability to increase the duration of non-violence than as an integral component of what peace is. 
Alongside similar works by these authors (such as Joshi, 2013), one can identify a significant 
corpus of research that postulates discussions of ‘peace’ which, beyond arguing for its 
elongation, are fixated purely on a limited and negative conceptualisation of peace. 
These authors are not alone in this endeavour, and it is not my intent to single them out for 
what is a relatively common occurrence within studies of peacebuilding (especially when much 
of their other work goes beyond such narrow definitions). Indeed, those more explicit 
condemnations of the liberal peace are often noticeable not for their arguments against 
international peacebuilding methods, but for their absence of alternative objectives and 
conceptualisations. It is hoped that readers will understand that the above case illustrates how 
scholars may routinely overlook such matters, especially when deliberately contributing to a 
specific empirical objective, reproducing methodological steps to make new observations, 
without challenging their own ontological assumptions and seeking explicit transformation and 
aspirational understandings of peace. The failings of the liberal peace are well documented, but 
there seems to be a reluctance by scholars to postulate or advocate alternatives. 
 
92 The authors note that “While liberal peace reforms outside the CPA remain a theoretical possibility, the 
implementation rate variable needs to be contextualized with the scope of liberal peace reforms negotiated in the 
accord. For example, when focusing entirely on the implementation rate, a peace process with three liberal peace 
provisions (all of which present a high implementation rate) is considered more liberal than a process with 20 
provisions (which present moderate implementation). At the same time, a focus only on the number of liberal 
peace reforms cannot be a sufficient indicator to identify the liberal nature of a peace process” (Mac Ginty, Joshi 
and Lee, 2019, p. 8). 
93 The Uppsala dataset does however offer definitions and indicators for how they measure armed conflict, inter 




Scholars within PACs are well aware of the need to conceptualise peace beyond its proximity 
to conflict, and while most articles within the dataset articulate a desire to contribute to more 
critical conceptions of peace, their engagement with such terms often appears shallow and 
tangential. For example, both empirical and theoretical studies often announced their intention 
to ‘contribute’ to some variant of peace using a variety of platitudes, yet the connection between 
their study and constructing some better quality or more positive peace remained undisclosed 
and unquestioned. Similar arguments have been noted by others before (see, for instance, 
Richmond, 2007a, p. 249; Davenport, Melander and Regan, 2018), and while one might accept 
that all works within the dataset contribute to our understanding of peace in one way or another, 
questions of what peace is, and which peace is desirable, remain secondary to the focus of 
many studies which seek instead to uncover or problematise some dynamic of international 
intervention or the various governance mechanisms being constructed under its rubric. 
It is worth reminding readers that most studies of international peacebuilding are not in fact 
studies of peace. Most studies of international peacebuilding are not even necessarily studies 
on how to build peace, but are instead directed towards critiquing the act of peacebuilding – a 
set of tasks and processes carried out by exogenous actors which we assume seek to build peace 
(though it could also convincingly be argued that this is to pacify populations and order or 
manage conflicts). While the observation made in previous chapters that the objectives of 
peacebuilding are rarely critiqued, one obfuscating factor which has allowed for this to occur 
so prolifically appears to be the sheer number of adjectives that can be used to describe peace 
which allow authors to supplement the assumed transformative capacity of their study by 
finessing it with various terms of endearment, as if these were fully theoretically developed 
and operationalizable types of peace. 
To this end, scholars have noted the intent of their work to contribute to  a more emancipatory, 
everyday, local, hybrid, post-liberal, durable, sustainable, effective, far reaching, gendered, 
long term, and comprehensive peace (to name a few), but have rarely indicated precisely what 
is meant by these terms, which in turn gives the collective appearance that these are simply 
synonyms for a better peace or are self evident. Furthermore, many scholars failed to indicate 
the inspiration for their critical variants of peace by referencing its origins, a practice potentially 
justified by scholars using these adjectives in their definitional rather than conceptual sense, or 
mistakenly believing these conceptualisations of peace to be not only theoretically developed, 
but mainstream enough that they did not require further explanation. Where orthodox 




variants are even more problematic and there is a significant need to more firmly develop and 
articulate precisely how these alternatives are shaped and for whom they might be suited. The 
next section looks at one of the most significant alternatives to the liberal peace by exploring 
the writings of Oliver Richmond on the post-liberal peace to argue that even when scholars 
sketch alternatives to dominant conceptions, these should be considered more as extensions 
and recalibrations than radical alternatives. 
7.4: Alternatives to Peace: The Post Liberal Peace? 
One of the most significant critical variants to emerge within the dataset has been the notion of 
post-liberal peace (and its surrounding terms, peacebuilding, governance, etc.). Like many 
critical variants of peace, the post-liberal peace merges numerous types of peace together to 
reorient and emphasise particular elements that are considered pertinent, while offering little 
in the way of easily identifiable objectives. The following section unpacks this variant of peace 
as it has emerged by critical peacebuilding scholars (notably Oliver Richmond) to show how it 
appears more as a research agenda than a specific or alternative understanding of ‘peace’. 
Following this, the post-liberal peace is assessed alongside recent noted trends in scholarship 
to argue that attempts to define peace are becoming increasingly pragmatic and relativist, 
eschewing universalist assumptions while at the same time avoiding a larger reflective critique 
of international dynamics and the conflict promoting elements of the peace lived by those 
within the Global North. 
Oliver Richmond, one of the most ardent commentators on ‘peace’ (within and beyond the 
dataset), has contributed significantly to theorizing the post-liberal through his evolving 
critiques and conceptualisation of the liberal peace. Here, he has sought to challenge and 
demarcate a new ‘post-liberal’ episteme, drawing on notions of the everyday (De Certeau), 
hybridity (Bhabha), infrapolitics (Scott), resistance, and emancipation.  He has published an 
extensive volume of work which link these various concepts together, though for readers, the 
sheer number of publications and the way that Richmond writes – both as if one is fluent in his 
work and aware of the occasional contradictions that occur as his own understanding of terms 
and concepts change – makes it difficult to clearly understand what the post-liberal is. Indeed, 




to the liberal peace, it appears that this was never really Richmond’s intent and this task remains 
in need of urgent attention. 94  
Richmond’s interest in the post-liberal stems from a dissatisfaction or rejection of the liberal 
peace, whose interventions in the local sphere are primarily designed to establish and maintain 
international order and stability between sovereign states through the creation of liberal social 
contracts (Richmond, 2011a, p. 8). Built on a liberal episteme, the liberal peace connects these 
various elements through a social contract to produce varieties of colonial peace (victor’s 
peace, institutional peace, constitutional peace and civil peace) – though in post-conflict 
environments these often lead to a ‘virtual peace’, an empty shell of a state which bears little 
relevance to the everyday lives of its inhabitants.  
This mismatch between the small set of (primarily Northern) actors’ interests, institutions, and 
epistemes and their local counterparts, leads to local subjects resisting and fragmenting the 
hegemony of the liberal peace and establishing hybrid and potentially emancipatory 
alternatives (Richmond, 2011a, p. 3). In line with critical approaches, Richmond’s work on the 
post-liberal peace (and corresponding notions of peacebuilding, governance, and order) are not 
so much new constructions as they are an uncovering and identifying of already existing 
elements that occur and emerge from the practices and performances of the everyday. This 
notion of the everyday, alongside understandings of the local and resistance, are central to the 
post-liberal peace as Richmond (2011a, p. 105) feels they: 
enable political, social and economic organisations and institutions to represent and respect the 
communities with which they are effectively in a contractual relationship. As a consequence, 
international forms of peacebuilding would be more likely to be participatory, empathetic, 
locally owned and self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically and environmentally 
speaking. They would be enabled to provide a via media between different identities and 
interests. They would also be adaptable to changing circumstances and needs. As far as 
possible, these interlocking and interrelated versions of peace would also provide justice and 
equity, and avoid violence both direct and structural. This would either counter-balance or 
 
94 Several scholars commented that they believed Richmond had been producing an alternative peace but that they 
had not understood it. This was also the experience of this author where reading work on the post-liberal, I often 
felt that somewhere, somehow, I had missed an integral text which laid out precisely what the post-liberal was 
and to what it was directed. Nevertheless, I assumed it existed somewhere and could continue with my research 
believing, quite contently, that other works were drawing on and contributing to this same conceptualisation. After 
many conversations with my peers, interview participants, and colleagues around Europe however, I came to 
realise that I was not alone in this feeling. In discussions with Richmond, it appears that many scholars (myself 
included) have misunderstood the notion of post-liberalism. Richmond had not provided a clear and coherent 
alternative to the liberal peace  and was not seeking to do so; rather, his efforts were simply to critique the liberal 




supplant the liberal peace’s obsession with hard security, territorial sovereignty and statehood, 
and institution-building over the everyday. 
Richmond’s understanding of post-liberalism draws heavily on the philosophy of John Gray, 
and is linked to an explicit awareness that any contestation to it as a whole or in part will have 
little immediate impact given how long it took the liberal order (as it exists today) to develop 
and establish itself [Richmond, OP. Interview. 1.07.00 -1.09.00]. Given this understanding, it 
becomes clear that Richmond’s post-liberal peace is not an alternative to the liberal order but 
a critique of its elements and perhaps more importantly, its episteme. The post-liberal peace 
does not contradict or supplant liberal values directly, but refines or reorients them in an attempt 
to connect its various elements more directly to post-conflict subjects encapsulated by notions 
of the local or everyday. 
In such a reading, the radical and transformative potential of the post-liberal peace becomes 
less immediate (or potentially irrelevant) in comparison to its ability to challenge and reform 
liberal elements and their emphases, given the length of time required to overthrow or 
transform such phenomena. Richmond (2011a, p. 10) clarifies this ambition, arguing 
[that from] the perspective of attempting to reform the liberal peace model, what needs to be 
considered is how to identify the rights, resources, identity, welfare, cultural disposition, and 
ontological hybridity, that would make liberal states, institutionalism, and governance viable in 
everyday contexts where others reside. This requires an engagement with not just the currently 
fashionable and controversial issues of local ownership or local participation, but the far deeper 
‘local-local’ (i.e. what lies beneath the veneer of internationally sponsored local actors and 
NGOs constituting a ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘uncivil’ society), which allows for genuine self-
government, self-determination, democracy and human rights. 
This point is made more evident from the very wording of the term ‘post-liberal’, where its 
prefix indicates the audience of such theories as those who currently reside within the liberal 




most of whom reside within the Global North).95 Thus, calls by academics for post-liberal 
peacebuilding cannot be seen as calls for local subjects to undertake post-liberal peacebuilding 
(as they are not yet within the liberal order and do not reside in a liberal state), but for 
international peacebuilders to reform and reprioritise the various elements of the existing 
liberal peace as it is implemented through peacebuilding.96 
In the same way that the liberal peace is comprised of various elements and an emphasis on 
particular institutions (capitalist economies, democratization, etc.), so too is the post-liberal 
peace, which reorients and emphasises particular points which are seen to lead to a better peace. 
This effort is most clearly laid out in Richmond’s book, A Post-Liberal Peace, where he 
establishes the ordering of liberal peacebuilding mechanisms (p. 137), before reorienting them 
and including some additional provisions from the ‘everyday’ to sketch a more critical 
approach (pp. 138-147). 
Thus, the relationship between post-liberal and liberal peace appears to be more murky than its 
prefix would suggest, and it is not entirely clear how far removed from the liberal episteme 
peacebuilding and understandings of peace need to be before they can be considered ‘post’ (or 
to what extent such labels matter outside of academia). Indeed, Richmond’s own push for 
transformation appears to fluctuate based on how well local and emancipatory elements are 
seen to be able to resist the liberal episteme, and he notes that while a post-liberal peace may 
produce new dynamics it could also simply ‘save’ liberal peacebuilding.97 Ultimately what can 
be seen in this conceptualisation of the post-liberal peace is a desire to challenge and transform 
the liberal peace without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead of a radical or post-
 
95 A point of difference may be raised here regarding the use of ‘post-ism’ in scholarship, whereby scholars may 
use it to denote alternative ideas when they are unable or do not wish to  articulate an alternative model. In such 
usage, ‘post-’ can be used as a heuristic container to link a variety of themes and observations without binding 
scholars to a formalised model or overarching theory, enabling flexibility and more contextual interpretations to 
develop (as has been the case with theories of post-modernism/structuralism, etc.). This author understands that 
many theorists eschew laying out an alternative set of standards from fears that these might be co-opted or 
implemented in a blueprint fashion irrespective of context (Visoka, 2018). While this is a valid concern, the 
converse is equally problematic, and such matters may be addressed by either formulating more radically 
transformative and emancipatory ideas, or (as discussed in chapter 6) by targeting the Global North rather than 
post-conflict societies. 
96 Writing that is potentially more relevant to local subjects is encapsulated in understandings of the everyday and 
resistance. However, this literature (within studies of international peacebuilding at least) often appears more 
targeted towards policymakers and practitioners, seeking to make them aware of these subversive elements and 
accommodate them in their planning (either to encourage and allow, or mitigate and co-opt). This sentiment is 
discussed in further detail during chapters 8 and 9.  
97 Richmond (2011a, p. 18) writes that a post-liberal peace “may rescue and reunite both the liberal and the local 
rather than encouraging them to reject each other (as is the case with the current liberal peace paradigm). This 
would entail the recognition that liberalism is actually a form of customary political community, derived from the 




colonial critique to the liberal peace, the post-liberal peace is a critique which reorients the 
ordering of characteristics while cautiously noting how better conceptualisations of peace 
would ultimately need to overcome many of the central tenants of the liberal peace (by 
embracing a Post-Westphalian state for example). While Richmond has argued that more 
radical endeavours may ultimately be required, his conclusions are often tentative and allow 
his critique to reform rather than transform dominant conceptions of peace and governance 
when they are picked up by others. 
While many of Richmond’s arguments and conceptualisations of a post-liberal peace have been 
drawn on by academics within the dataset, actual use of the term remained relatively scarce 
(eliciting 103 mentions within 30 articles by 18 authors). This is despite the fact that 
Richmond’s book A Post-Liberal Peace, was cited 74 times within the dataset, while his earlier 
outline on the same topic, A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism and the Everyday (2009a), was cited 
43 times, showing a relatively substantial impact within the dataset. Post-liberal by itself was 
however, invoked more within the dataset (315 times within 62 articles), and unpacking these 
inferences shows that while the overarching variant of ‘post-liberal peace’ may have had only 
limited success (to date) within the discipline, the numerous critical components that Richmond 
situates under its rubric have been drawn on significantly more often by scholars.  
That these surrounding terms are picked up more often than their corresponding peace types 
by scholars is hardly surprising, given the relatively minimal engagement or conceptualisation 
of peace by authors within the dataset. Indeed, this trend indicates how authors are able to draw 
on critical variants and conceptualisations of peace to justify new research agendas and studies 
which, though they can be seen to contribute to these understandings of peace, more often 
utilize these critical terminologies to further critique the practices and methods of international 
peacebuilding98 – identifying new sights of enquiry such as the local and everyday without 
 
98 Attempting to discern whether authors have drawn on newer critical terms to reinvigorate and repackage old 
research agendas falls well beyond the scope of this study, and I do not intend to argue here that scholars have 
consciously drawn on new concepts to resell old ideas without updating them in light of new understandings and 
frameworks of analysis. However, the combination of editorial pressures and the increasingly limited amount of 
time that researchers have to undertake original field research in post-conflict societies undoubtedly leads to an 
emphasis on refining rather than creating new and ground breaking research (such sentiments were also held by 




needing to consider (or at least articulate) more radical and reflective critiques which challenge 
the objectives of peacebuilding and our understanding of peace. 99 
Deeper analysis of these post-liberal mechanisms, such as the everyday and resistance, have 
further problematised the aspirational value of a post-liberal peace by pointing to the ways in 
which negative outcomes can emerge from undesirable interactions. Here, Richmond notes the 
possibility of the everyday being socially engineered (Richmond, 2011a, pp. 140–1), an 
outcome that seems inevitable when the local is intervened upon by international actors given 
that even ardent proponents of liberal peacebuilding consider it to be “an enormous experiment 
in social engineering” (Paris, 1997, p. 56). Indeed, research has already identified such 
instances by, for example, pointing towards how civil society groups have been co-opted to act 
as democratic watchdogs for international actors (Campbell, 2011; Norman, 2014), while 
others have noted how negative forms of hybrid peace can emerge when the wrong elements 
of the liberal peace are resisted or co-opted by corrupt local elites (Richmond, 2015; Visoka 
and Richmond, 2016). 
It is unclear just how much local and everyday resistance is desirable or required by its 
advocates, who have argued that these negative outcomes may arise through “the tensions 
between local legitimacy and long-standing power structures, international norms and rights, 
and capitalism, rendering the interventionary project ineffective and even redundant” 
(Richmond and Pogodda, 2016), without feeling the need to problematise and challenge the 
entire phenomena of international peacebuilding itself. This unwillingness to critically engage 
with wider concepts or more fundamental assumptions underlying peacebuilding could stem 
from the optimism with which commentators often approach ideas relating to local ownership. 
For example, Richmond (2011a, p. 19) has noted: 
[that the hybrid peace may] not necessarily [be] an emancipatory form of peace, as theorised in 
my earlier (2005) work. Sometimes it is a relatively conservative form of peace, but it also may 
carry the seeds of local agency and a future, more contextually legitimate form of 
peacebuilding. A better understanding of this hybridity may enable the emergence with alterity 
rather than marginalise it, and liberate both local and international from conflict. [Emphasis 
added]  
 
99 This trend is relatively common within the dataset, and Richmond himself often seeks to contribute to 
discussions and understandings of the post-liberal peace through his works on hybridity, which becomes a vehicle 
for obtaining a post-liberal peace, where the defined ‘liberal’ peace is hybridised by the undefined and unknown 




This is not to say that I believe these authors to be ‘romanticising the local’; rather, it is to note 
just how speculative critical approaches to peacebuilding appear to be. While the desire to 
approach local conceptualisations tentatively (as evidenced by the demarcation of negative 
variants of hybridity caused by local actors, such as elites) is undoubtedly warranted, it is 
entirely unclear how these localised critical variants might enable alterity at the international 
level, given that scholars themselves only problematise the transformative and emancipatory 
objectives of peacebuilding rather than the act of international intervention and wider systemic 
factors that justify it (Chandler, 2017b, p. 162). As noted in chapter 5\6, critical challenges 
rarely extend to the foundational assumptions at the heart of the discourse, and while Richmond 
has tentatively suggested the importance of non-violence in a post-liberal peace,100 the desire 
to be unprescriptive by critical scholars seems so engrained that critiques of the international 
order and its problematic elements appear to be something that post-conflict societies will have 
to undertake themselves. While critiques of the liberal peace were undoubtedly successful in 
highlighting the agency that local societies and people exhibit in formulating and building 
peace irrespective of international interventions, it is unclear how these same conceptions, such 
as that of the post-liberal peace, have assisted in challenging the dominant and systemic 
structures that contribute to and exacerbate conflict. The following section will expand on these 
issues before contextualising them within wider peacebuilding literature trends. 
PROBLEMATISING THE POST-LIBERAL PEACE 
One of the most prominent charges raised against critiques of the liberal peace and works on 
the post-liberal, is that such explanations assume that the liberal peace is ill-suited or does not 
work in post-conflict spaces because of some characteristic within these societies themselves 
(Chandler, 2010a, 2010c). In a similar vein to criticisms raised in the 2000s which held that 
institutionalisation before liberalisation was embarked on because international interveners 
were ‘too liberal’ and post-conflict societies weren’t ready for such freedoms, the post-liberal 
assumes that the ‘liberal peace’ is ill-suited to post-conflict societies given their own internal 
characteristics, and thus needs to be amended.101 For example, Richmond (2011a, p. 7) has 
 
100 For example, in a comparative study of peace variants, Richmond et al (2016, p. 16) write that “across all of 
the chapters there are hints of an underlying agreement that at least a liberal peace system is the basis for local 
and international peace architecture, non-violence is preferable to violence of a direct or structural sort, and peace 
requires dense sets of institutional, social and political networks and law, which must reflect the societies they 
emanate from as well as global concerns and norms”. 
101 If this were the other way around and the liberal peace couldn’t be applied to post-conflict societies because of 
some failing within the peace itself, we could expect more reflective analysis critiquing the liberal peace not just 




argued that the “highly specialised context” in which post-conflict states find themselves  
undermines the engenderment of autonomy and agency leading, to the inability of the liberal 
peace being implemented “on the ground”. Such arguments, whether made from the less 
favoured position of Paris (2004) who called for institutionalisation before liberalisation, or 
from the more critical position of scholars within this dataset, coincide with the ‘local turn’, 
whereupon both peacebuilding interventions and academic enquiry delved deeper and deeper 
into the private social sphere of post-conflict societies.  
This turn to the local for solutions and ideas has been a bitterly contested debate between  
Chandler and Richmond who sit on opposing sides as to whether deeper intervention (by 
peacebuilders or academics) can produce emergent or contextualised notions of peace.102 
Chandler (2017b, p. 162) argues that  
the non-linear discourses of local 'hidden' agency neither created the basis of any genuine 
understanding of the limits to international peacebuilding nor provided any emancipatory 
alternative… the power/resistance binary…. provided an entirely voluntarist or idealist 
understanding of the limits to peacebuilding… [while the] ontological assumptions of non-
linear framings tended to problematise the transformative and emancipatory objectives behind 
peacebuilding itself rather than the problematic imposition of external projects per se.  
Within the local turn, the notion of infrapolitics and hidden agency (Richmond, 2010, 2012a) 
became an ontological starting point for both researchers and peacebuilders to explain the 
problems and failings of their liberal peace interventions, which were increasingly seen to 
require non-linear (and neoliberal) responses, both in objectives and methods. The limits of 
peacebuilding themselves were seen to stem from the “hubristic linear thinking of Western 
modernity rather than economic and social structural problems” (Chandler, 2017b, p. 160). 
From this perspective, the turn undertaken by academics to scrutinize the local, while premised 
on the emancipatory possibility of local agency, was undertaken at the expense of critiquing 
the systemic and international factors of conflict promotion to instead transform local societies. 
The aspirational promise of peacebuilding was reduced, and local actors were delegated with 
realising its transformative potential. Furthermore, failures to achieve long term peace were no 
longer the fault of international actors who could perceive such outcomes as successes given it 
showed how they had rejected the past hubris of liberal interventionism by allowing local 
agency (Chandler, 2017a, p. 163). 
 




This drilling down into the local is a common occurrence for critical theorists who, struggling 
to deal with the complexity of the international scale, narrow their analysis to focus on 
particular communities. Such an undertaking is seen as necessary given the nuances to each 
community and the attempt to not only distance one’s self from the infamous ‘top down’ 
peacebuilding methods that universalist assumptions of the liberal peace were seen to generate, 
but also due to the myriad differences between post-conflict societies and contexts which were 
seen to require a plurality of peace types and surrounding institutions.103  
While Richmond himself tends to focus on analysis at the more abstract and meta level, this 
line of questioning (undertaken by numerous scholars) has correlated with a plethora of 
researchers undertaking empirical studies into the societal dynamics of post-conflict spaces. 
While these have produced significant findings, notably in confirming the various ways in 
which international peacebuilding should not be undertaken, they have been less successful at 
generating alternative objectives to peacebuilding, or types of peace that should emerge. The 
following section will briefly outline more recent conceptualisations of peace to note how 
academics are increasingly drawing on critical approaches to demand more contextual and 
relativist understandings of peace, avoiding the need to produce alternative orders and 
transform wider international and structural factors of both peace and conflict. 
To nuance the above observations, a point of clarification must be made to contextualise the 
language used within this chapter. While critical theory requires not only the critique of existing 
systems and processes, but the articulation of alternative orders, this chapter has focused on the 
limits of imagination rather than the limits of alternativity. The purpose of this semantic shift 
was to draw attention not only to the difficulties that scholars face in escaping the liberal 
episteme (as Richmond is attempting to do), but in escaping the confines of their perceived 
reality. One of the more subtle yet continual patterns to emerge while undertaking this thesis 
was noting how few scholars took the time to radically envision desirable outcomes and 
objectives – they failed to imagine the impossible. Taking the less illustrious ambition of 
contributing to a more sustainable peace (for instance), scholars limited the scope of their 
analysis and bound the possibilities of transformation to what they thought might be realisable 
or politically viable. Thus, while the critique here is of the inability of scholars to more 
substantially engage with the development of alterity, the underlying argument also attempts 
 





to target the unwillingness of scholars to seriously consider more radical and utopian systems 
of society. 
7.5: The Relativist Peace and the decline of imagination 
More recent literature that was unfortunately outside of coding within the dataset,104 has shown 
a renewed willingness to engage with conceptualisations of peace that have remained largely 
untouched since discussions during the 1960s and 1970s. Here, works such as The 
Transformation of Peace (Richmond, 2007d), Peace: a very short introduction (Richmond, 
2014d) A Post-Liberal Peace (Richmond, 2011a), Quality Peace (Wallensteen, 2015), The 
Puzzle of Peace (Goertz, Diehl and Balas, 2016), The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and 
Regional Approaches to Peace (Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović, 2016), Reclaiming 
Everyday Peace (Firchow, 2018), and The Peace Continuum (Davenport, Melander and Regan, 
2018)105 have set forth new research agendas or problematisations regarding conceptualisations 
of peace. 
These works have produced a variety of outputs, including descriptive work which improve  
understandings of various aspects of peace (see for instance Goertz, Diehl and Balas, 2016; 
Richmond, Pogodda and Ramović, 2016; Firchow, 2018), conceptual work which produce new 
frameworks and suggest how to better conceptualise or identify peace (Richmond, 2011a; 
Davenport, Melander and Regan, 2018), and to a much lesser extent, prescriptive work that 
advocates a particular understanding of peace, though typically from a less critical perspective 
(see Wallensteen, 2015). Of these various conceptualisations, only Wallensteen’s Quality 
Peace and Richmond’s post-liberal peace make significant inroads in attempting to postulate 
an alternative type of peace, though as has been noted above, the post-liberal peace is more of 
a critique than an alternative while the ‘quality peace’ developed by Wallensteen (2015), which 
 
104 This was primarily due to book publications which were outside the scope of the dataset, but also due to 
timeframe applied to capture articles. Many of these works were however either referenced or alluded to in smaller 
more conceptual pieces within the dataset and were traced through the qualitative analysis to better understand 
particular inferences and suggestions.  
105 As well as an extensive array of noteworthy, though less exhaustive efforts such as that by Rapoport (1992); 




emphasises dignity, safety and predictability, should be read as an even greater effort to reform 
the liberal peace rather than an alternative to it.106 
What is notable amongst all of these texts is the difficulty that scholars have in articulating 
what peace is and how it should be conceived. For example, Richmond (2007d, pp. 15–16) lays 
out a definition in the introductory chapter of The Transformation of Peace  which stresses the 
flexibility of the term (or contextual nature) before asking a variety of questions (such as, what 
constitutes conflict and what is the nature of peace?) which provide little in the way of answers 
to readers who are likely to conceptualise a minimalistic version of peace, given his subtle 
framing of it as an antithesis to violence. While the questions Richmond asks are certainly 
designed to get readers thinking more deeply about who defines peace and why, it is in our 
ability or inability to answer such questions that a coherent understanding of what peace is 
might emerge. To this end, there has been exponential growth in recent research which seeks 
to identify indicators of peace (see, in particular, Mac Ginty, 2013b; Mac Ginty and Firchow, 
2014, but also more recent efforts by Firchow, 2017, 2018, and Nepali and Bhandari, 2017 and 
wokrs on the Global Peace Inded). Davenport et al.’s (2018) study is notable for its construction 
of perhaps the most extensive list of indicators which could be quantifiably measured by 
scholars to discover and assess the quality of peace across all manner of states, regardless of 
their relationship to recent violent conflicts. These indicators could easily be merged to create 
an alternative to the Uppsala Conflict Database to focus on peacefulness rather than violence,107 
and while this appears to be an unstated ambition of their work, the mindset that follows 
attempts to create and quantify peace has had a notable impact on some of its more aspirational 
elements. For example, the desire by these authors to operationalise peace appears to tip the 
balance that must be reached between broad and narrow qualifiers of peace in the latter’s 
favour. Where they note the importance of Galtung’s concept of positive peace, they also 
believe that its ambition led to its disregard, given the difficulties in measuring or observing 
 
106 More common are studies that identify particular elements of peace that might be favourable without offering 
a more robust understanding of what peace is. For example, Davenport et al (2018, pp. 185–186) claim that a 
good definition of peace will: (a) go beyond reflecting various academic’s preferences as well as the war/no-war 
dichotomy, (b) it would not “equate peace with stability” and would not consider a society peaceful if it 
“persistently avoids one form of political violence through the application of other forms” such as might be found 
within countries which eschew political freedoms in favour of order (Singapore for instance). Furthermore, they 
argue, (c) peace should be observable within any society, not just in reference to the last outbreak of political 
violence, and finally, (d) a definition must be operationalizable so that it can be measured across “a large number 
of observable units” but conclude that they have ultimately only laid out “a holistic approach that begs for others 
to take up the challenge of defining peace”. 
107 A similar task is currently underway within the PAM dataset, though this effort appears to be much 




‘structural violence’ empirically (Davenport, Melander and Regan, 2018). To these authors, 
there is a need to be “vigilant against conceptual overstretch, fuzziness, and over ambitiousness 
in conceptualizations of peace; otherwise, our efforts will be self-defeating, as peace again 
becomes too impractical to study empirically and many choose to avoid the intellectual 
quagmire” (ibid). This desire however, leads to the exclusion of numerous facets intrinsically 
related to peace, and they appear to reject or avoid more ambitious notions of justice or human 
security, given their unagreed upon conceptualisations and closer links to development rather 
than peace. 
While this narrowed effort is understandable given their desire to empirically ‘capture’ what 
peace is, to reduce the aspirational aspects of peace simply because of the difficulty in 
measuring it seems questionable. Indeed, understanding peace along a continuum (as they 
propose) allows for an understanding of peace and its correlates (such as development, 
wellbeing, and happiness) not just as they are and could realistically be, but what is actually 
desirable and needed.108 
As noted by Richmond and Mitchell (2011a, p. 2), peace “is not a universal concept that can 
be transposed identically between different contexts”, and the research agenda laid out by 
Davenport et al (2018) manifests as a less critical version of the ‘everyday indicators of peace’ 
explored by Mac Ginty (2013b), Firchow (2018) and others, in that the indicators are 
predetermined rather than identified through qualitative and ethnographic analysis of the 
everyday (top down versus bottom up). Where the everyday indicators of peace seek to identify 
locally grounded understandings of peace that can be built into policy frameworks for specific 
contexts, these are non-transferable to other contexts by their very nature. Given the 
overwhelming focus of theorists on post-conflict states, these seem ill-equipped to offer 
transformation of peace at a more systemic level. Understanding that peace means different 
things to different people is only half the battle, and, following from Chandler’s critique of the 
local turn noted earlier, there is a significant cause for concern that such contextualised 
 
108 Similar efforts exist through a variety of terms (see, for example, work on peace heterotopias by van Leeuwen, 




understandings of peace might produce conceptions that are indifferent to aspiration and allow 
for the creation of a rich person/poor person’s peace.109  
Here, the difficulty that researchers have had in moving beyond problem-solving approaches 
which seek to ‘stop the bloodshed’ to critically analyse larger conflict promoting structural 
factors may be reproduced from the bottom-up, leading to a relativist peace that justifies less 
transformational objectives and outcomes. For example, the creation of peace indicators for 
post-conflict regions (such as whether or not dogs are barking, see Mac Ginty and Firchow, 
2014), could reduce aspirational elements of intervention by producing a peace for the post-
conflict other that would be considered insufficient if comparable indicators were used within 
the Global North. Understanding that different cultures and societies have different values and 
expectations over what peace is disguises the fact that these expectations are socially 
constructed and are, in part, derived from individual understandings of what is considered 
achievable. 
Where the desire of Davenport et al (2018) to construct a less nuanced but more universal 
understanding of peace benefits from the equal measurement of indicators across all states 
regardless of their proximity to conflict, this obviously falls into the exact trap that contextual 
and everyday indicators of peace seek to overcome. Ultimately, both approaches are needed 
and worthwhile undertakings, but they are also incompatible with one another, given one seeks 
to make universalist claims about peace, and the other eschews such efforts. Furthermore, the 
critical approach employed within these efforts sees a significant reduction in the aspirational 
aims of peace, as our analytical focus is directed towards describing various elements of 
existing peace with little thought as to imaging unrealised yet more desirable futures.  
In the overarching effort to study peace and conflict, these research agendas could be seen as a 
prior undertaking to establishing what peace is, identifying the various characteristics of peace 
and how they are understood across the world, which may be later fashioned together to create 
a more universalist understanding of peace which could be carefully employed depending on 
contextual constraints. Ignoring questions of how many indicators must be identified and 
measured before such definitions of peace might be established, a significant concern is the 
 
109 Another concern with many such critical efforts which have argued that failures of the liberal peace are actually 
successes of the local (for example, Richmond and Mitchell, 2011a, p. 2) is that scholars have become increasingly 
happy to reinterpret (an admittedly subjective) reality to qualify poor outcomes as critical successes (Chandler, 
2017a). While literature on negative hybrid outcomes (for example) seeks to normatively delineate failures and 
successes, these conclusions continue to be bounded by the liberal episteme and should be applied equally to our 





lack of foundational and reflexive critique in critical peacebuilding studies. In addition to this, 
as identified in previous chapters, as critical approaches have become more mainstream, their 
critiques have become deradicalized alongside a decreased willingness to produce alternative 
orders or objectives, given the fear of advocating for top-down solutions. 
Numerous authors undertaking critical approaches to peacebuilding studies have become 
increasingly worried with being labelled as ‘prescriptive’, or in generating research that could 
potentially be used to justify the external imposition of policies, institutions, or understandings 
onto a post-conflict society (or, more cynically, of creating research that is of some use to 
policymakers). This has been a repeated and significant critique levelled by scholars discussing 
for instance, hybridity (see the following chapter), which, while noble in intent, appears to have 
backed critical theorists into an epistemological corner leading to the continual generation or 
refinement of theories and understandings rather than the formation and realisation of 
alternatives. The quest to identify, uncover, and measure various elements of peace while 
failing to engage in a more radical critique of the international order and the frequently 
unchallenged factors of conflict promotion (chapter 6) has produced a limitless research agenda 
to describe on the ground realities, devoid of creative, imaginative, and aspirational intent, and 
which, based on current research trends and endeavours, is set to continue rather than 
dissipate.110   
7.6: Chapter Conclusion 
Peace, as it has emerged in the dataset, is an extremely difficult concept to grasp. As noted 
earlier, its theorisation and conceptualisation appears to be exceptionally underdeveloped in 
comparison to understandings of conflict and violence, and most scholars seem content to draw 
on the works of others to offer an indication of its intent, even when these works seem to offer 
little in terms of a clear and identifiable conceptualisation of what peace is. 
Instead, numerous types of peace are referenced, which often contain a set of characteristics 
that can be conceived of as types of peace themselves. Thus, the liberal peace is comprised of 
numerous traits (which are also often types of peace, such as the democratic peace), which in 
turn, lead to variations of a liberal peace (such as civil peace), which can be further qualified 
by describing them as a more or less positive variants (for example, a virtual peace). Critical 
variations of peace are equally problematic, in that while they often offer an emphasise on 
 
110 Interviews with various authors alluded to several forthcoming projects within the United Kingdom and 




alternative characteristics, these are overlapping and are not mutually exclusive to any 
particular overarching type. Potentially due to its aspirational character, peace becomes 
endowed with a set of characteristics (the exclusion or inclusion of which often appears 
arbitrary)111 which can be used to indicate the type of peace, the mechanisms used to create 
peace, and the outcomes of peace depending on an author’s preference, leading to a situation 
in which contrasting types of peace assume many of the same characteristics. The flexibility of 
terminology used to describe peace, while beneficial in enabling authors to highlight particular 
elements and components, has led to an analytical quagmire whereupon scholars must decide 
between offering a minimalistic conceptualisation of peace (often by referencing existing work 
without unpacking and critiquing its elements) or must grapple with a host of convoluted terms 
and cyclical debates to produce a conceptualisation which is often misunderstood and which 
most publishing formats do not provide the space for unless that is the very focus of the study, 
which, for studies of international peacebuilding, it often is not.  
Existing alternatives either uncritically build on the liberal peace or fail to offer a compelling 
and useful transformative alternative. Visoka’s (2018, p. 3) recent analysis of alterity within IR  
noted Richmond as providing ‘critique as alternativity’, wherein the critique itself is the 
alternative– a sentiment which Richmond agrees with [Richmond, OP. Interview. 15mins]. 
This effort is evident in the conceptualisation of post-liberal peace as though it includes a 
reorganisation and refinement of some of characteristics within the liberal peace it offers no 
clear conceptualisation or alternative order or notion of peace. It is a challenge towards the 
liberal paradigm of peacebuilding and seeks to reorient problematic tenants within this regime. 
While the intended audience of these critiques are undoubtedly academics, the post-liberal 
peace could be viewed as a critical problem-solving argument which, whilst desiring more 
transformative outcomes, critiques the immediate practices and objectives (or ordering of 
various tenets), rather than an alternative conceptualisation of peace. While Richmond notes 
the possibility of the post-liberal peace to transform the liberal peace, he also claims that it 
might save (or reform) liberal peacebuilding instead (Richmond and Franks, 2008). Indeed, 
Richmond himself does not extend his critique to the liberal peace as it is lived by those within 
the Global North, and the transformational or critical potential appears to be something that 
either post-conflict societies or other scholars will have to produce if we want this challenge to 
 
111 As noted by Davenport et al. (2018, p. 48), the inclusion or exclusion of particular components within 
definitions of peace often appears arbitrary and for purposes of clarity there is a need to avoid conflating the 
defining characteristics of peace (such as nonviolence) with the mechanisms or institutions used  to build a 




target more than the liberal peace as it applies only to international peacebuilding and the post-
conflict other. 
Yet, interviews with scholars suggested that, though many found the post-liberal peace 
unhelpful in its inability to produce tangible characteristics (from a policy perspective), there 
was a general understanding that constituted an ongoing effort to construct an alternative 
peace.112 Not only do current publication trends suggest that this is unlikely to emerge, given 
the scholarly ambition to vehemently eschew any understanding of peace that might become 
standardised and universally applicable, but Richmond and others claim that the creation of an 
alternative conception of peace was never their intent. Here, Richmond (Richmond, OP. 
Interview. 20-25 minutes) has stated that he did not seek to outline an alternative order (as 
critical theorists ought to do) but, more simply, to challenge the current liberal episteme so that 
an emancipatory space might be found through which new and more emancipatory variants of 
peace might emerge.  
This framing of the post-liberal peace is not laid out to condemn one of the few efforts to 
conceptualise an alternative peace or critique of the current order, but to advocate for more 
critical, reflexive and radical thinking by scholars. The variety of critical variations of peace 
that have been posited by academics all draw on the same format, combining a host of 
characteristics that scholars emphasise as being important if that conception of peace is to be 
achieved, all the while failing to challenge broader questions of the legitimacy of violence 
(chapter 6). These characteristics are often overlapping and conflated with one another, and 
there is a real need for scholars to more clearly distinguish between types of peace and their 
characteristics. With recent trends in literature suggesting that more efforts will be undertaken 
to delve into (primarily) post-conflict societies to identify indicators of peace, it is likely that 
we will have an increasing array of such variables to plot, and thus, clearly distinguishing 
between characteristics of peace and types of peace will become ever more important lest we 
become bogged down with a plethora of measurements that, in turn, become defined as 
 
112 This sentiment was expressed by numerous interview participants, for example, in response to the noted dearth 
of radical and transformative alternatives Severine Autesserre [Interview: 43mins] observed that: “We don't have 
an alternative that goes beyond the problem solving or incremental approach... I think that's really interesting, as 
I hadn't really thought about this deficiency before. I mean, I always thought that's what Richmond and Mac Ginty 
were trying to do, and perhaps I wasn't smart enough to get it. But I don't see how they are suggesting an 
alternative. It's too abstract. So the fact that you've been doing all this work and haven't found something either... 
that's our collective failure as a field. Or maybe it's not a failure but simply a gap, and as good academics we 




variations of peace despite their undesirability if they were enacted or sought in isolation of the 
numerous other characteristics of peace.  
This increasing turn to relativist or pragmatic variants of peace also increases the pressure on 
critical theorists to adopt a more imaginative and aspirational approach to conceptualising 
peace in order to avoid producing understandings that are entirely descriptive of only the 
existing reality or feasible reality. Conceiving of peace as a continuum (as suggested by 
Davenport et al., 2018) with negative and positive peace at either end will allow for the 
eschewal of many peace variants, whereupon emancipatory, everyday, local, etc. can become 
characteristics of post-liberal peace+ (for instance).113 Scholars can then contest the positioning 
of these characteristics on the scale (and thus their importance) without resorting to vague 
statements of attempting to create a more ‘emancipatory peace’ or ‘durable’ peace, despite such 
claims often being entirely devoid of context. This will also allow for a better understanding 
of those characteristics that remain unquestioned. Contra Davenport, Melander and Regan, 
(2018), this author believes that understanding peace as a continuum allows us to conceptualise 
a better or more desirable version of peace, and transformative characteristics such as a 
commitment to non-violence and pacifism (for example) should be at the centre of such 
aspirations if we are to imagine a peace that it is desirable for more than those fortunate enough 
to be living in relatively safe environments (such as the majority of scholars within this 
dataset).114 This will be challenging. Gitting’s (2016, p. 29) historical assessment of peace 
concludes that scholars have had more success in studying peace campaigners and advocates 
than “interrogating the dominant narratives of its international relations and presenting 
coherent counter-narratives”, while Kurki (2013, p. 241) and Visoka (2018, p. 1,2) have noted 
 
113 While a variety of more recent peace categorisations can be used here (such as van Leeuwen, Verkoren and 
Boedeltje, 2012; Millar, 2019 and Scholten, no date), I favour the image of peace as a scale given it provides a 
space for both variations of peace as well as utopias, dystopias and the inclusion of ‘realistic’ as well as 
aspirational, imaginative and desirable discussions of peace. 
114 A further note of importance in the conceptualisation of peace relates to the level at which we are discussing 
the concept. While the three individual understandings posited by Davenport et al. (2018) tend to highlight one 
particular strata (though they are applicable to any), a more productive conceptualisation might be to link the 
entire peace continuum to Anderson’s (2009) categorisations of peace – so that whenever scholars ‘assessed’ 
peace, they would specify at which particular level their observations were made – allowing for horizontal and 
vertical studies and critiques of peace to more easily engage with one another. Anderson (2009) highlights several 
layers at which peace can manifest, including the international (interstate), national (domestic), local (community 
or civil) and social (intercultural peace), interpersonal or inter-relational and individual or personal peace, the 
seventh and arguably most absent in literature on international peacebuilding (excluding some more recent studies 
on the Anthropocene) is peace at the ecological/environmental level (what he terms Gaia). The identification of 
these several layers of peace and the noticeable need shows the interconnectedness of peace between individuals. 
In much the same way that health can be impacted by our surrounding environment, so too can our quality of 
peace – given the way restricted access to resources or environmental degradation can quickly lead to resumptions 





how critical scholars resist producing and articulating alternatives from fear that they might be 
co-opted or misused by policy-makers and buttress social orders they find oppressive. Yet 
without articulating alterity, critical scholars will produce a variety of mechanisms that can be 
used by those in power to refine and modify peace interventions anyway, emphasising 
particular elements (such as resilience) when appropriate to their needs (such as during a 
financial crisis). Knowledge is not produced in a vacuum, and a long history of critical theories 
being co-opted suggests that these ideas and indicators will be resisted, co-opted, applied, and 
transformed by others over time and in spite of any original intent. To reduce the likelihood of 
this use contradicting the aims of theorists, it would be better to lock these mechanisms to a 
truly transformative and imaginative social order that indicates the aspirational elements from 
which such efforts are produced. Normatively binding such mechanisms to a desirable future 
would not only make it easier for other scholars to understand the context in which such studies 
and findings were produced, but may make it easier for others to call out misuse and 
misinterpretations of these ideas. 
This author is aware of the limitations involved in the publishing processes of academia 
(chapter 2\9). Indeed, it seems like the most significant theoretical developments to the notion 
of peace could be found in books rather than articles, undoubtedly due to the significant efforts 
and length that any such undertaking requires which are ill-suited to the short space afforded 
by academic journals. However, within neoliberal academia’s hallowed halls, which preference 
article publications over books, there is a need to be extra vigilant of how these gaps manifest 
in conceptualisations of peace across various medias, and to ensure that even within the 
constraints of academic journal articles, adequate conceptualisations of peace and their 
normative intents are clearly laid out. Given the ways in which language is used to construct 
meaning and representation (Jabri, 2013a, p. 94,95), how we discuss and imagine peace may 
be seen to affect its transformational potential by actively constructing a version of the future 
that is limited and bound by our current perceived reality. By participating in the neoliberal 
academy which favours numerous, short, and iterative publications, the emergent and 
transformative possibility of critical theories may be reduced, or never eventuate. This is even 
more problematic given the performances of academia themselves appear to deradicalize and 





CHAPTER 8: THE LIMITS OF ACADEMIA - THE HYBRID 
QUAGMIRE 
Where the previous chapters have explored the potential for academics to critically contest 
international peacebuilding, to understand the focus and marginalised areas of analytical 
enquiry, the following chapter seeks to understand how these ideas interact. There is a clear 
disconnect between PACs and peacebuilding practice, evidenced by over 20 years of consistent 
scholarship calling for bottom-up and locally owned peacebuilding practices which are rarely 
realised by policymakers and practitioners. While a significant cause of this disconnect has 
emerged in studies of how knowledge informs policy and practice, this thesis seeks to expand 
our understanding of how knowledge is itself contested and transformed. The co-optation and 
misinterpretation of transformative ideas and endeavours, from sustainable development to 
human security, is a frequently occurring phenomena, but it is not only policymakers who are 
guilty. Where the previous chapters have shown the limits to radical knowledge production, 
the current chapter draws on the themes that have evolved to understand how the performances 
of academia distort and deradicalize ideas through their transmission by assessing how the 
emancipatory potential of hybridity remained unrealised. 
Hybridity, or the clash between international and local norms, practices and understandings, 
provides an excellent example of how many of the barriers and performances of academia 
prevent radically critical contributions to peacebuilding theory and practice. While much has 
been written about what it is and what it isn’t, the following chapter explores why. It argues 
that the critical and emancipatory potential of hybridity was dulled by scholars themselves, 
when it could have been championed as a tool for establishing local ownership and resistance. 
The argument repeated throughout this thesis, that scholars are not being critical and 
transformative enough, and that critical theories are diluted or co-opted by other scholars as 
they are mainstreamed, is reiterated with empirical evidence from the dataset which shows how 
a form of dissonance prevents transformative theoretical changes from emerging in a non-
iterative manner amongst mainstream audiences. 
It begins by outlining how peacebuilding scholars invoked hybridity since 2005, emerging in 
the nexus of top-down critiques of peacebuilding and the advocation for bottom-up approaches. 
While scholars used hybridity differently - to understand the interactions between local and 




interactions led to - both research agendas invariably produced empirical findings that could 
improve or potentially transform peacebuilding.  
Focusing on three of the most dominant conceptualisations of hybridity,115 section 2 draws on 
arguments raised in previous chapters to challenge the critical and emancipatory potential of 
hybridity. It argues that where less critical scholars focused on hybrid outcomes and provided 
a variety of prescriptive solutions for international peacebuilders, critical scholars, bounded by 
their own epistemological beliefs, retreated from more instrumental critiques to at least 
describe these processes, and at most critique peacebuilding approaches in a paradoxical 
attempt to allow greater local ownership. The final section contends that while the failure to 
use hybridity in more radical and transformative ways can be attributed to the different intents 
held by those scholars who used it (where scholars were not critical enough), institutional 
mechanisms can also be seen to have compounded this lack of criticality.  
As contestation over hybridity’s conceptualisation increased it became more firmly embedded 
in the PACs discipline, losing the critical and emancipatory undertones which had accompanied 
its more critical conceptualisations translated from post-colonial scholarship. The failure to 
popularise surrounding notions such as mimicry alongside hybridity reduced the importance of 
the international/local dichotomy and its potential to garner resistance, an issue that intensified 
as critical scholars became embroiled in a series of debates surrounding its theoretical 
implications and linguistic use. Concerned with the way in which findings had been drawn on 
to improve peacebuilding (or prescribe hybridity) and how this might lead to rhetorical 
engagement with the local or diminish the quality of peacebuilding’s objectives (‘good enough 
governance’), critical scholars fought to constrain the term to its analytical use rather than 
countering its problematic prescriptive utilization by attempting to find ways in which 
hybridity might enable and justify more radically emancipatory forms of peacebuilding. The 
chapter concludes that by refusing to accept that hybridity could be repurposed and prescribed 
by international actors seeking to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up 
peacebuilding methods, and by failing to posit radical and pragmatic alternatives to 
peacebuilding practice, hybridity’s transformational potential remained discursive and could 
only ever yield a more nuanced understanding and refinement of practice. 
 
115 While the following chapter has been written with the expectation that readers are familiar with the various 
discussions surrounding hybridity given space constraints, more detailed information can be found about the 





Given that all conceptualisations of hybridity have been used by a variety of scholars to 
undertake and study different aspects of international peacebuilding over the last decade, it is 
difficult to clearly delineate between conceptualisations today unless we hold their original 
emergence via  publication as some ‘pure form’ which was then altered and changed through 
use. As discussions of hybridity themselves have made clear, to understand phenomena in such 
a way and exclude prior influences would be to commit a conceptual fallacy. Despite this, and 
in much the same way that studies using hybridity needed to pinpoint a specific time from 
which to understand the various interactions between local and international actors, it is also 
analytically necessary to hold three ‘ideal’ conceptualisations or forms from which to trace 
interactions and compare shifts in understanding. Drawing on these three conceptualisations as 
they were defined and laid out in their original publications provides perhaps the simplest and 
most coherent point from which to evaluate their alteration, both deliberate (by theoretical 
innovations) and accidental (by misinterpreting or conflating them).  
8.1: The allure of hybridity 
While the speed and extent to which hybridity was popularised in critical discussions of 
peacebuilding between 2008-2015 (approximately) might be considered alarming (see 
appendix 8.1), studies of peacebuilding were relative latecomers to the term which had already 
acquired a “fashionable status” across several academic fields (Kompridis, 2005, p. 318). Its 
emergence, coinciding with similar terms such as quasi-statehood and institutional bricolage,116 
reflects the state of peacebuilding studies at the time, whereupon scholars attempted to account 
for two decades of mixed results (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 71). Its analytical value appealed to both 
critical and problem solving theorists given its ability to explain why peacebuilding had been 
met with limited success, and to reconcile the increased interest in ‘bottom up’ peacebuilding 
approaches (espoused in the mid-1990s) with the growing body of works critiquing the ‘top-
down’ liberal peace that arose out of this. 
For critical scholars, hybridity’s appeal lay in its ability to articulate the ‘clash’ between local 
and international cultures, focusing on the various dynamics of power (structural, 
governmental, and subaltern) which flittered through and shaped the interactions of 
international and local communities attempting to build a brighter future. These scholars drew 
 




heavily on a conceptualisation of hybridity which had been refined within disciplines of post-
colonial and development studies, where the focus lay not on the outcome of the encounter 
between intervener and intervened – or peacebuilders and their subjects – but on the agency 
exerted by both. This extended the recognition (re)uncovered by critiques of liberal peace, that 
peacebuilding does not occur in a vacuum, led to a focus on post-conflict subjects themselves, 
to uncover the ways in which local communities exerted agency and responded to (or lived 
with) on the ground realities, shaped by the exogenous understandings and practices being 
implemented around, with and upon them. The interaction between the local and the 
international was neither negative nor positive, but the result of difference – of norms, 
understandings, and ways of life interacting with each other, sometimes contrasting, sometimes 
complimentary or co-constitutive.  
These interactions resulted from active and planned encounters – such as local communities 
attempting to resist undesired exogenous reforms – but also passive or unplanned encounters, 
stemming from the experience of being intervened upon or simply differences in understanding 
and doing. As such, this approach drew heavily on notions of the ‘everyday’ (Certeau, 1984; 
Scott, 1985) in both its active and passive understandings, allowing more radical scholars to 
consider how these interactions might contest the dominant or hegemonic understandings of 
what peace was and how to build it. Many scholars drew on notions of resistance, 
transformation, and change, and with somewhat Marxian sensitivities, looked for alternatives 
to the current order. This line of discussion led to hybridity’s inclusion in direct challenges to 
the liberal peace – finding itself not only a component of alternative solutions (such as a post-
liberal peace), but often a peace in and of itself: the hybrid peace. As such, hybridity, to critical 
scholars, was often alluded to with an air of optimism, that the new understandings and avenues 
that it opened through its heuristic sensitivity and explanation of the peacebuilding encounter, 
might enable new forms of peace to develop that were centred upon societies and their people, 
rather than institutions and the elites that ran them.  
For others, the draw of hybridity lay in a focus on the outcomes that emerged from the 
international and local encounter. While recognising the agency of multiple actors in post-
conflict environments, these academics sought to understand peacebuilding’s unintended and 
often undesirable outcomes through the interactions that led to them. Thus, while their critiques 
and analysis are interwoven with those critical conceptions that looked at interactions through 
power differentials and notions of resistance, the analytical intent of these academics broadly 




That is not to say that these academics did not have similarly transformative long term aims as 
their counterparts, simply that their focus on understanding emergent realities, their negative 
outcomes, and which aspects of peacebuilding might lead to these, produced a 
conceptualisation of hybridity that was more iterative than radically transformative. Split 
between the disinterested desire to know how the peacebuilding encounter was experienced 
and a more normative desire to understand how these encounters produced positive and 
negative realities, academics working within this realm reflected a more problem-solving or 
policy oriented approach and often produced works and conclusions, intentionally or 
unintentionally, that could feed into improving the practice of peacebuilding rather than 
transforming it. 
8.2 Conceptualising hybridity  
Early invocations of hybridity within the dataset mostly referred to the less favourable manner 
in which non-Western polities were often made up of liberal and non-liberal elements.117 This 
usage reflected more mainstream scholarship by prominent writers such as Thomas Carothers 
(2007, p. 25) who argued that attempts at statebuilding had often “led to different outcomes, 
including hybrid polities and even outright reversions to autocracy”. This earlier use of 
‘hybrid’, to delineate between desirable and undesirable orders that might require further peace 
or statebuilding efforts, can be conceived of as the more mainstream conception later contested 
by critical scholars, and which was drawn upon by policy makers and intervention enthusiasts 
alike (see, for instance, OECD, 2009, p. 81)   
Contrasting this view was the growing body of more critical scholarship which emerged after 
2007 and called for the acceptance of hybridity (or alterity) rather than its condemnation.118 
What appears to be the earliest concerted effort to engage with a critical conception of hybridity 
stems from a research group within Australia who contested the negative connotations 
associated with hybrid orders in 2006-2007. Seeing overlaps with the failed state discourse 
which had recently justified renewed and contentious military interventions in the Middle East, 
 
117 This is the case for most early invocations of ‘hybrid’ within the dataset with the exception of Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham (2005) who refer to the UN as a constantly evolving and hybrid system. For example, Heathershaw 
(2005, p. 33), argues against labelling Tajikistan with a “hybrid title such as liberal authoritarianism” while Paris 
(2006) discussed ‘hybrid democratic-authoritarian regimes’, and Turner (2006) (quoting Nathan Brown) refers to 
Palestine as “an uncertain political hybrid that falls short of sovereignty”.    
118 Richmond (2006a) for example wrote on how the liberal peace was in fact a hybrid itself which he would later 
use to outline a hybrid and then a post-liberal peace. Though the concept of Hybrid Peace offers another dimension 
of hybridity as a theoretical outcome, combining various tenants of peace, due to space constraints and given it 
was largely subsumed by the notion of the Post-Liberal Peace, this thesis has elected to focus on the more popular 




these scholars argued for an understanding of political hybridity which contested the 
superiority of Weberian models of state and Western institutions which they felt were less 
appropriate to South Pacific cultures (Foley et al., 2007). Through the notion of Hybrid 
Political Orders (HPO), they argued for a greater understanding of difference and applied this 
both normatively and instrumentally to a range of post-conflict contexts. While the 
problematique identified by these scholars was often seen as the particular political order that 
international actors sought to reproduce (objectives), their critiques and findings typically 
focused on the methods or peacebuilding approaches which led to them (practice). Thus, where 
efforts were occasionally made to articulate desirable characteristics of the state, most 
discussion related to the need to transform or change particular practices to somehow make 
institutions more reflective of indigenous norms and understandings. While the intent of these 
scholars was undoubtedly altruistic, the findings and solutions posited by them reflected their 
proximity to peacebuilding institutions and though they can be seen to allow for difference, 
their attempts to shape and constrain it should not be considered enthusiastic acceptance (for 
more detail, see appendix 8.2).  
A more critical understanding of hybridity, which drew on its use in post-colonial literatures 
(notably Bhabha, 1994), began from a similar starting point to HPOs, seeking to understand 
difference. Instead of focusing on the outcomes produced by the peacebuilding encounter 
however, earlier instances of this conceptualisation focused on the interactions between actors. 
Primarily developed by scholars within the United Kingdom (notably Richmond and Mac 
Ginty, but also Roberts, Mitchell and Peterson, etc.), they sought to understand why 
international actors had been unsuccessful at recalibrating their interventions to accommodate 
and draw on the strengths of the local (Mac Ginty 2010, p.408). Much of the work produced 
under this conceptualisation was descriptive and sought to understand the wider phenomenon 
of peacebuilding, while more normative contributions focused on the rhetorical way in which 
international peacebuilders invoked and practiced local ownership/partnership (for more detail, 
see appendix 8.2). 
The last significant iteration of hybridity to emerge within the dataset was that of Hybrid Peace 
Governance (HPG) in 2012. Primarily developed by scholars situated within Northern Europe, 
it sought to improve understandings of how hybridity was governed through “security, legal, 
political, economic and social systems” (Belloni 2012, p.24). While it could be considered a 
critical effort, its understanding of hybridity drew close parallels with mainstream usage of the 




undesirable – versions of hybridity. Discussions of HPG began from the understanding that 
situations of hybrid peace governance exist, and set about attempting to explain how these 
came about through the interactions of local and international actors in a similar manner to 
HPOs. Sharing more conceptually with HPOs than hybridity, the focus of HPGs was on how 
these institutions and practices were governed and it is arguably the most prescriptive and least 
critical conception out of the three (for more detail, see appendix 8.2). 
SUMMARY 
Though in practice all conceptualisations were often conflated and drawn on for a range of 
different purposes, one could delineate between them (in a somewhat over simplified manner) 
by their focus on the encounter between intervener and intervened (hybridity), on the 
institutions and polities that arose through this encounter (HPOs) and how these and the 
encounter were governed (HPG). While the overlaps between these various conceptualisations 
allowed empirical findings to be drawn on by all scholars, these studies shared little beyond 
their focus on peacebuilding and use of the term ‘hybrid’. Indeed, this chapter argues that 
differences in conceptualisation that emerged between the term’s early adopters were only 
compounded as it was popularised. As the number of scholars drawing on hybrid approaches 
increased, so too did the need to contest the perceived location of hybridity (processes or 
outcome), the actors through which it emerged (international/local or some other variant) and 
the purpose of studying it (to merely understand or to improve peacebuilding). While these 
critical arguments were undoubtedly important for scholars, reflecting their epistemological 
and ontological biases and the role they perceived academia to have in peacebuilding, they 
came at the expense of more critical engagement with problems pertinent to the subjects of 
peacebuilding, leaving the emancipatory potential of hybridity largely forgotten.   
The remainder of this chapter seeks to unpack how this contestation between 
conceptualisations and epistemological and ontological biases constrained the emancipatory 
and critical potential of hybridity by simultaneously condemning prescription and provoking 
intense conceptual debate about the analytical capability of the lens, rather than peacebuilding 
writ large. The engagement with hybrid concepts coincided with a significant increase in less 
critical works, from its emergence in 2007, conceptual development and popularisation around 
2012, conflation and utilization in empirical studies 2011-2014, and then re-contestation in 
2015, followed by a ‘maturation’ of the concept in 2017 which mediated conceptual differences 




8.3: Questioning Criticality 
Before exploring the various issues that hindered hybridity’s critical potential, we must first 
outline some of the reasons why hybridity might be considered uncritical as defined within the 
context of this thesis.119 Indeed, to some scholars, hybridity enabled them to study exactly what 
they intended and all the other discussions around it were simply intellectual sparring.120 While 
many of these debates were argued ad nauseum, the extent to which they could be considered 
superfluous or academic pandering is less clear and can be of great significance, depending on 
how one understands the role  of critical scholarship.  
Where hybridity could not be considered to have failed from a less critical standpoint, enabling 
deeper understandings of the peacebuilding encounter and challenging the notion of difference 
as failure, its success is more dubious when looked at from the more radical and normative 
position employed by this thesis. From this perspective, hybridity can primarily be seen to have 
extended critiques of the liberal peace rather than provided radically new understandings and 
arguments - especially given scholars’ overwhelming focus on peacebuilding actors and their 
approaches (as opposed to structures and systems) and their tendency to ‘critically’ describe 
existing orders rather than posit alternative ones. Unlike critiques of the liberal peace however, 
where solutions could be posited by an advocation for bottom-up processes and increased local 
ownership, the problems identified by hybridity, where the interaction between the 
international and local were the problem, could not simply be solved by prescribing more 
bottom heavy approaches (though some tried). Thus, while many scholars have moved on from 
studies of hybridity (both analytically and mentally), a more systematic account of how the 
various conceptualisations were contested and conflated is useful, not only in providing an 
example of arguments established within this thesis earlier, but of how critical and 
transformative intent is diminished through the performances of academia, including the 
conceptualisation, contestation, and transmission of knowledge. 
 
119 Due to word constraints it must be noted that there is not space to fully expand on each area in which hybridity 
could have been more critical. The arguments made in previous chapters are on the whole applicable to this 
chapter, though it must be noted that where hybridity did allow for the imagination of new orders this was 
generally exercised through the conjoining of international and local understandings and institutions to reach a 
mutually accepted middle ground between (generally) the intervener and intervened, rather than a transformation 
of either the intervened state or international order. 




Of the 250 articles noted as mentioning ‘hybrid’ or some variant of the term, 109 of these were 
qualitatively coded for criticality during the earlier phase of research.121 Of these, 0 articles 
were coded as ‘status quo’, with most being either critical improvement or transformative - a 
slight increase in criticality from the dataset writ large. This variance, explored further below, 
can primarily be attributed to the increased acceptance or problematisation of difference, 
largely in relation to Western stylised states and their suitability for the post-conflict other. 
 
Figure 16: Criticality of hybrid articles 
As writing on hybrid peacebuilding increased, so too did attempts to define it (especially given 
several special issues which sought to solidify its conception) – though the term seems to have 
lessened in popularity since 2014.122 While numerous excursions and side ventures were 
undertaken and enabled through the lens of hybridity, taking a step back from individual 
arguments to look at the broader patterns in the literature helps to better understand how 
scholars engaged with the term. Figure 17 below shows how the purpose of employing 
 
121 While only 109 of the 250 articles within the dataset were coded for criticality, the random sampling method 
used to select articles during coding suggests that these are statistically representative of the dataset as a whole. 
122 More recent works which were unfortunately beyond the scope of this dataset indicate a slightly renewed 
interest in critically engagement with hybrid theories. However, these do not seem to offer significant deviations 
from initial critiques. See, for instance, the special issue on ‘Critical hybridity in peacebuilding and development’ 











hybridity changed over time,123 with two special journal editions (one on hybridity and one on 
HPG) in 2012 leading to an increased number of studies seeking to demonstrate its empirical 
utility, followed by an increase in conceptual contestation caused by disagreements in how it 
had been used empirically. This led to a conceptual deepening of the term as critical scholars 
vehemently argued against its prescriptive use and sought to overcome criticisms that the 
dichotomy between local and international actors was either false or ill-conceived, leading to 
a range of theorists augmenting the lens with critical overlays from feminism, to spatial analysis 
and materialism.  
 
123 While articles discussing hybridity featured prominently within the dataset, only 63 studies were seen to 
contribute to understandings of hybridity rather than simply draw on the term to show awareness of it and its 
lessons learnt, or nuance an understanding (see appendix 8.1). To assess contribution, studies that mentioned 
‘hybrid’ or its affixes two or more times were analysed to understand how they engaged with the term. Those that 
invoked it to simply indicate awareness of it and its findings (typically within their literature reviews) but did not 
employ its conception within their analysis or conclusions were seen to have drawn on but not contributed to the 
terms development in any significant manner. While these studies were included in the hybridity dataset and 
analysis given their proximity to topics intrinsic to hybridity, it was deemed useful to differentiate between those 
studies that engaged with the concept in a more rigorous way, either through conceptual or theoretical discussion 
or by expressly using understandings to deepen empirical studies. Where studies would make both conceptual and 
empirical contributions, articles were coded to the contribution to which they devoted the most amount of 
time/length – which typically favoured empirical studies. Nor is it the case that every critical opportunity was 
missed, but by and large, these opportunities were unrealised or muted. 
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Figure 17: Purpose of 'hybridity' within articles 
The different intents to which scholars approached conceptualisations of hybridity led to an 
immense amount of scholarship challenging instrumental and prescriptive uses. While the 
necessity and validity of these critiques is discussed as an explanatory factor for hybridity’s 
failings in the next section, a separate critique can be made here based on what was prescribed. 
As argued in chapter 3, the role of critical theories is not simply to critique the existing order, 
but to explore and outline alternative ones. Thus, while questioning what theorists using 
hybridity prescribed is a secondary (and indeed different) question to whether or not hybridity 
theoretically can be prescribed, it is nevertheless important to understand how hybridity was 
used to generate solutions. Figure 18 below depicts the area to which hybrid articles focused 
their conclusions. It indicates that the increased criticality of the hybrid dataset (figure 19 
below) coincided with a proportional increase in the number of articles providing conceptual 
critiques and solutions. 
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Figure 18: Primary Conclusion Area 
While many studies of hybridity simply described difference without normatively engaging 
with its desirability, those analysing HPOs and HPG (or hybridity as a secondary element in 
an empirical study) were typically more forthcoming in positing solutions. Here, the language 
used by less critical scholars to describe hybridity was considered telling as to whether 
difference was accepted or simply allowed by scholars (see Appendix 8.2, in particular the 
critique of HPG). Terms such as the ‘liberal/illiberal’ divide, or ‘negative hybridity’, provided 
a  more sceptical reading of the extent to which scholars thought hybrid polities might be better 
than Western and Liberal ones and hinted at how the tolerance of difference came with certain 
non-negotiable principles.  
The thesis’ desire for normative critique necessarily dictates the existence of preferred and 




























used by regimes of intolerance, much of the writing on hybridity gave the impression that 
hybridity was a happy intermediary rather than a long-term project. Discussions on negative 
and positive variants of hybridity and illiberal regimes were often followed by assertions on 
how difference that emerged out of the hybrid clash might be managed or improved. Where 
difference was allowed, it was not something to be garnered by encouraging local societies to 
resist international peacebuilding efforts, but something to be managed by encouraging 
international peacebuilders to accommodate local views and preferences – pacifying rather than 
nurturing resistance to incompatible norms, understandings and practices (see, for instance, 
Greener, 2011; Wallis, 2012, 2013). 
Thus, where hybridity was used to generate peacebuilding solutions and improvements, these 
were targeted towards international actors and rarely extended beyond those arguments 
previously made through critiques of the liberal peace and local ownership – such as more 
contextually bound and locally relevant institutions. With the exception of more vibrant 
discussions on political orders or states, many of the patterns identified across the dataset in 
chapter 6 were apparent in writing on hybridity as well, which failed to offer radical critique 
of international systems, posit alternativity, question economics and capitalism, private 
property, violence, etc. In line with arguments made in Chapter 6, studies of hybridity focused 
exclusively on post-conflict contexts, assessing the experience and outcomes of the 
peacebuilding encounter for a variety of actors all located within the post-conflict state. Despite 
the noted potential for hybridity to inform both local and international understandings, even 
those more radical texts only ever espoused discursive transformations, or improvements to 
peacebuilding methods within the post-conflict paradigm.  
A more radical yet less explored path might have been developed through the advocation of 
local resistance to internationally led peacebuilding efforts. Here, the imbalance of power 
between international and local actors uncovered by the lens of hybridity might have been more 
critically addressed by scholars by identifying ways to amplify local voices. Such a suggestion 
presents a significant problem for more critical scholars who avoid such efforts and the 
normative stance this would require when deciding which local norms, processes and actors 
they would attempt to augment, on the basis that they do not wish to speak on behalf of the 
subaltern (a critique levelled against hybridity in spite of this lack of effort). As noted by 
Chandler (2015) however, the emancipatory potential for hybridity to facilitate a mutual 
exchange of information and learning between these actors (noted by critical scholars such as 




Chandler argues that these scholars failed to problematise the necessity of intervention and the 
liberal universalist understandings which underpin it, as well as the ability (and desirability) of 
international actors and systems to ‘learn’ from the illiberal local, and the essentialised 
sociocultural constructions used to produce the dichotomy between international/local actors 
(or their variants) noted by Mitchell (2011, pp. 37–39). 
While such critiques resonate with philosophical conundrums at the heart of Critical Theory 
regarding the ability to critique systems of which one is a part, they are unfortunately beyond 
the scope of this study. A more pertinent question for scholars of peacebuilding can however 
be asked regarding the extent to which scholars can be radical and transformative, given 
hybridity doesn’t reject the liberal peace and appears to create a double standard which allows 
for the (muted) critique of systemic factors but only insofar as they relate to the postconflict 
paradigm. At the very least, these criticisms reinforce the understanding that previous critiques 
of the liberal peace were only made in so far as they related to the postconflict paradigm, 
exposing them as critiques of liberal peacebuilding instead of critiques of peace. The following 
section explores how the emancipatory potential of hybridity was obscured and conflated as 
these various conceptions were transmitted and interacted. 
8.4: The de-radicalisation of hybridity 
It is the contention of this chapter that the failure for critical theorists to realise hybridity’s 
emancipatory potential was caused by the performances and institutions of academia itself. 
Where the epistemological and ontological beliefs of those more critical scholars may have 
negated their ability or desire to produce radical, emancipatory, and instrumental critiques, the 
popularisation of hybridity and its transmission via research outputs potentially obscured this 
lacuna, allowing it to go unnoticed and unaddressed by scholars. 
As noted in the previous section of this chapter, articles discussing hybrid concepts were coded 
as being incrementally more critical and transformative than the dataset writ large. A closer 
and temporal examination of how this criticality manifested suggests that as hybridity was 
popularised, its relatively consistent critical application was overshadowed by a significant 






Figure 19: Criticality of hybrid articles by year  
That the popularisation of hybridity decreased its critical capacity is unsurprising given a shift 
into mainstream literature would tautologically decrease its criticality. As figures 17, 18 and 
19 indicate however, this shift coincided with a change in both how the term was 
conceptualised and utilized by scholars; the decline in criticality was not (only) because the 
theory became more widely accepted but because how scholars utilized it fundamentally 
changed. Thus, understanding how its critical capacity decreased should be of great 
significance to critical scholars. Did less critical scholars deliberately reduce the criticality of 
the term, or was it misinterpreted? While the increase in conceptual discussions indicated in 
the figures above suggest that critical scholars contested less critical usage, there is a need to 





















The following section outlines various observations of how hybridity’s critical potential 
remained concealed through the conflation of concepts and intents, and the increased focus of 
critical scholars on abstract arguments and critical nuances who sought to diminish the 
prescriptive potential of hybridity in favour of its less contentious use as a purely analytical 
tool to describe processes. 
THE ORIGINS OF HYBRIDITY 
One of the strongest correlations to emerge within the dataset to explain why the popularisation 
of hybridity did not maintain its critical approach or intent was identified by looking at where 
scholars located its origins (closely related to their conceptualisation of the term). Here it can 
be seen that many studies of hybridity offered little to no introduction of the term and often 
referenced work for empirical findings rather than conceptual development. The correlation 
here is not that articles were less critical because they failed to reference the origins of the term, 
but that a decreased engagement and shift in the perceived origins of the term over time 
coincided with a decrease in its critical use. As the term was popularised, attempts to establish 
what was meant by hybridity and its origins diminished, suggesting that the more it entered 
common vernacular the less engaged people were with its radical theoretical origins, utilizing 
it simply as a tool to undertake ever more studies understanding peacebuilding operations. 
Discussions by PACS scholars on the origins of hybridity typically began by accounting for 
the wide array of disciplines within which it can be found, before noting similarities in its usage 
with anthropology, post-colonial, and development studies, among others, (see, for instance, 
Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 69; Wallis et al., 2018, ch. 1). As articles on hybridity were coded and its 
utilization changed, it was possible to see how conceptualisations from outside the data set 
influenced those within it, as well as the foundations to which the term was associated. To 
avoid detailing each individual text that was referenced when introducing the concept (as 
opposed to the empirical findings derived from it) these have been grouped by similarity 
(genesis, author, discipline and intent, available in appendix 8.3). This led to 6 origins of 
hybridity laid out in the table below. 124 
Table 18: Invocations of hybrid origins 
 
124 Three points of clarification must briefly be noted here, which are expanded on in appendix 8.2. First, 
Richmond and Mac Ginty’s conceptualisations shared roots in Post-Colonial scholarship, though Richmond 
focused more on hybrid peace than hybridity. Miscellaneous texts were not attributable to any of the previous 
categorisations but were not drawn upon enough to warrant their own category. Lastly, references to hybridity’s 
biological origins were excluded as they were rarely mentioned and even then, only in an illustrative capacity to 




Origin Mentions Articles (78) Mentions (122) 
Hybrid Peace Governance (Northern Europe) 7 7 
Hybrid Political Orders (Australia) 19 21 
Mac Ginty, Roger (United Kingdom) 29 29 
Misc (Primarily United Kingdom) 7 7 
Post-Colonial Literatures (U.K and USA) 17 21 
Richmond, Oliver (United Kingdom) 32 35 
While the popularisation of hybridity afforded scholars a greater selection of potential origins 
to draw on, following 2013, attempts to indicate these origins diminished somewhat, indicating 
that scholars believed hybrid concepts to be more widely understood. Figure 20 shows how 
the number of articles indicating the conceptual origins of hybridity changed over time 
(weighted against the primary dataset). 
 
Figure 20: Percentage of articles indicating origins of hybridity (weighted against all hybrid 
articles) 
As argued earlier, the conception of hybridity which drew on post-colonial scholarship to 
understand hybridity as a state of inbetweeness was perhaps more critical in its intent (though 
less instrumental in its output). This conceptualisation, which focused on the critical agency of 
the intervened subject and the power imbalances with the intervener was developed to 
understand the post-conflict (or colonial) experience alongside the “informal institutions and 
everyday lives of citizens in the global South” (Forsyth et al., 2017, p. 410). As hybridity was 
popularised within less critical studies, its relationship to post-colonial literatures diminished 
















used articles from within PACs (such as work by Mac Ginty) to introduce and contextualise 
the concept. Essentially, the more hybridity’s origins were located within PACs, the further 
removed it became from its radical or post-colonial origins – despite the efforts of bridging 
scholars to keep this origin intact. This is not to say that hybrid studies became less critical 
because this understanding was reduced, but that this reduced understanding may have been 
caused by a shift in utilization and purpose for which the concept was invoked. The bridge built 
between PACs and post-colonial studies over which the more critical and emancipatory intent 
was transmitted became a distant memory as scholars increasingly cited the transmitters for 
their analytical innovations and empirical evidence without drawing on this normative intent.125 
A further point to note regarding the ways in which scholars drew on surrounding discourses 
to deepen their interpretation of hybridity might also be raised regarding the colonial 
experience of the scholars producing each term. There is a precedent to understand differences 
in criticality along cultural lines, as seen through wider divisions argued by Habermas, de 
Toucqueville and Putnam (for example). While a deeper investigation of each scholar and their 
intellectual history would be required to make any substantive claims, it is worth noting the 
prominence of post-colonial scholarship and sensitivities in the writing of scholars within the 
U.K (hybridity), as opposed to those within Australia (HPOs) and Northern Europe (primarily 
Italy and Sweden). While the reduced reflection on the colonial experience of post-conflict 
countries by European and Australian scholars could be caused by many things, including the 
country cases in which they analyse, it is worth noting how colonial legacies may have 
influenced a more sceptical framing of peacebuilding interventions in the minds of individual 
scholars (for example, scholars from the Netherlands were coded more critically than their 
Swedish counterparts). As has been suggested in chapter 5, there appears to be a spatial 
dimension to how critical approaches  were implemented by scholars, and colonial legacies 
could be one element which affects this, alongside the personal networks of individual scholars 
given that both HPOs and HPG emerged from working groups. 
THE MISTRANSMISSION OF HYBRIDITY 
Where the origins attributed to hybrid concepts potentially indicate how individual experiences 
and intents affected or reflected the criticality of hybridity, the failure for more radical and 
 
125 A counter claim may be made here that it was the bridging scholars who diminished the critical intent of the 
term, given they were primarily (with the exception of Mitchell) white male scholars who, while frequently 
drawing on critical approaches to analyse peacebuilding, suggested that their interest in the field was driven by 
their personal desire to understand rather than a normative desire to improve peacebuilding (sentiment raised by 




emancipatory critiques to be produced through the hybrid lens might also be attributed to the 
types of questions scholars explored through this lens. Here, a series of intellectual and 
overwhelmingly theoretical skirmishes relating to the terminological use and overall utility of 
hybridity occupied a significant amount of literature as scholars contested their ontological and 
epistemological differences via the proxy of hybridity. These generated a series of discussions 
which broadly stemmed from disagreements regarding the binaries used to demarcate actors in 
hybrid interactions, and the extent to which hybridity could be used for instrumental purposes.  
The following section will explore these two discussions in the wider context of this thesis to 
understand how these discussions potentially obscured or shifted the focus of hybridity away 
from its more critical and emancipatory framings. First, it argues that disagreements over the 
binaries used by scholars, while offering new and critical avenues for understanding, distorted 
the focus from the power dynamic translated from post-colonial scholarship between the 
intervener and intervened. Second, it argues that terminological disagreements as to whether 
hybridity could be prescribed failed to recognise these efforts as attempts to reconcile top-down 
and bottom-up peacebuilding approaches, and that the demonization of these more instrumental 
approaches coincided with an increase in descriptive analysis and reduction in the potential for 
scholars to use hybridity to more imaginatively explore ways of critiquing these broader 
systems of power or exploring radical alternatives. 
Binary Argument: why we need a critical conceptualisation 
The most contested element of hybridity within the dataset was directed at the homogenising 
effect of hybridity, where its analytical focus on ‘international’ and ‘local’ actors misconstrued 
the relationship between the two and misinterpreted difference. Texts which made such 
critiques held that scholars erase differences between actors for the sake of analytical 
simplicity, conceiving of only two entities - the all-powerful international, and resistant local - 
whose power differentials remained static. 
This argument has been made in numerous ways by a variety of authors over the past decade. 
Albrecht (2017, p. 175), for example, argues that the narrow focus on the liberal peace thesis 
(of which hybridity is a part) reproduces the same binaries that it seeks to overcome by being 
both ahistorical and conceiving of hybridity “as the meeting and merger between the liberal 
democratic state and local orders”. He claims that the very assumed separation and otherness 
that distinguishes hybridity from contemporary peacebuilding literature “runs the risk of 
erasing differences between the elements that constitute the hybrid order, their histories and 




The need to understand hybridity within a longer socio-historical process, or ‘prior hybridity’, 
is an argument made to counter those who see the reproduction of binaries emerging from the 
false assumption (Peterson, 2012) that hybridity entails “the coming together of ‘pure’ or 
‘distinct’ forms of discourse and practice” (Albrecht and Moe, 2014, p. 5) (see also (Mac Ginty, 
2011). While critical conceptions of hybridity deliberately eschewed an understanding of 
‘before’ and ‘after’ through their focus on process,  it is possible that studies seeking to affect 
hybridity and prescribe particular elements (or argue against this) must, by default, assume 
such a position – even if this is just undertaken heuristically.  
Charbonneau (2012, p. 511) too, argues that one of the reasons why hybridity is all too often 
used to reaffirm the international/local binary is because it “needs the distinction to exist as a 
concept”. Thus, the very aspect of hybridity that scholars find useful - its focus on separation 
and otherness which allows for the detailing and uncovering of these processes of interaction - 
become hybridity’s most problematic failing. As noted by Albrecht and Moe (2014, p. 6): 
[it is here that] the persistence of binaries and categories underpinning our language becomes 
evident. Indeed, the limit of what we can achieve with language transpires, as our need to 
clarify, simplify and structure necessarily disfigures the phenomenon or situation that we seek 
to describe and analyse.  
Other framings or consequences of hybridity’s ‘binary problem’ have been levelled against its, 
or perhaps more aptly, academics’, failings to take into account issues of power and politics in 
a serious manner, and for neglecting issues of political economy and the role they play in post-
colonial state formation (Allen and Dinnen, 2017, p. 504). Similarly, Chandler (2013) has 
argued that this binary has led to the marginalisation of the broader structural issues that affect 
state-building. For instance, Millar, van der Lijn, and Verkoren (2013, p. 139), without pointing 
to specific examples, argue in their advocation of friction that “many analyses of hybridity tend 
to oversimplify matters by treating ‘interveners’ and ‘locals’ as singular and static units” who 
attempt to plan or prescribe its outcomes. Richmond himself has been said to reproduce this 
binary in his focus on how local agency may lead to new forms of hybrid or post-liberal peace. 
Mitchell (2011), who had previously written on hybridity with Richmond, argues that it is his 
very emancipatory focus that leads him to reify the local/international binary, as his privileging 
of non-liberal voices “problematically focuses on fixed or essentialised sociocultural 
understandings” (Chandler, 2015, p. 39) which simplistically attribute understandings of the 
everyday and resistance to local actors, and power or control to international ones (Mitchell, 




essentialising nature of hybridity leads to a focus on ideational issues and institutions, 
overlooking “material issues of social welfare and human security” (Wallis, 2013, p. 428). 
Hybridity 2.0 
Such arguments suggest that the fundamental flaw of hybridity may be unavoidable, as it is at 
the very heart of the concept and our being, thereby requiring its abandonment. Though such a 
stance would seem rather extreme, despite it referring to the jettisoning of a heuristic device 
and nothing more, it has rarely been made with any conviction by PACs scholars (see, for 
example, Hameiri and Lee (2017) and their chapter in (Wallis et al., 2018, chap. 6). Instead, 
most authors either attempt to incorporate hybridity into some larger framework (such as 
friction – see Björkdahl et al., 2016), or find ways to overcome the litany of issues associated 
with it, suggesting that the it is not the essentialising nature of hybridity that is problematic, 
but its implementation by academics (noting of course that hybridity as a concept could not 
exist without these academics). 
To this end, numerous works have attempted to redirect the analytical focus on the 
international/local dichotomy. For example, Mitchell’s (2011) solution to her critique of 
Richmond is to draw on resilience based approaches to peacebuilding which, she claims, go 
beyond liberal peace framings by focusing on the effects and practices of peacebuilding rather 
than the liberal/local dichotomy and its concern with culture. Charbonneau (2012, p. 511), on 
the other hand, claims that: 
a focus on agency and the ways in which it is formed, enabled and transformed, moves the 
analysis beyond the ‘local/international’ binary” without “dismissing its political significance, 
and points to how agents conceive, capture, and enable their agency as ‘local’ or ‘international’.  
In a similar vein, Albrecht (2017) proposes a focus on authority, while Allen and Dinnen (2017, 
p. 504) posit a spatial ontology of hybridity to “engage with the hierarchies of power that 
animate the interactions between these, and other, scales”. These analytical overlays have 
already been utilized to uncover more nuanced understandings of peacebuilding. However, it 
is unclear to what extent they ‘miss the point’ of hybridity by shifting the focus from the clash 
between international and local power dynamics (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 180). As 
noted by Peterson (2012, p. 13), any greater clarity achieved from such overlays is “not 
guaranteed as analysts must still make assumptions and judgments on categorisations that could 




A significant issue that these criticisms of hybridity often seem to overlook is the very rational 
for transposing hybridity into PACs and studies of peacebuilding in the first place. Mac Ginty 
and Richmond note that a significant contribution made to these fields through critiques of the 
liberal peace was through “its willingness to examine the simplistic categories that populate 
our interrogations of international intervention” (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 180). 
Similarly to Albrecht and Moe (2014) and Peterson (2012), they note how it is our ability to 
understand that is limited as “the very terms that we require for mutual comprehension bring 
with them explicit and implicit meaning and connotations” (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, 
p. 180). With no sense of humour, and in direct opposition to their critics, these authors point 
to how  
The critique of the liberal peace, and in particular the lenses provided by the concepts of 
hybridity and hybridisation… at least allow us to engage with these dynamics. The non-
acceptance of established political categories allows us to reassess boundaries and identify the 
connections, networks and co-constitutive elements that comprise the context for contemporary 
peace-support intervention. (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015, p. 180) 
Thus the very problems with binaries and categories that concepts like hybridity sought to 
address have been charged as issues that hybridity cannot address, given its reliance on an 
ontology of Otherness based off cultural difference which needs to be identified and accounted 
for (Sabaratnam, 2013, p. 267). These binaries are, however, a natural part of human 
understanding and a problem not restricted to Western academics.126  
These concerns, targeted at the framework or lens of hybridity, are not insignificant, but need 
to be understood in relation to what academics transposing the tool of hybridity were 
attempting to do. While it is certainly the case that researchers must take care in how and who 
they categorise, this process of simplification and abstraction will occur regardless of whether 
we look at countries, groups, individuals, actions, or experiences. While failing to consider the 
consequences of these analytical divisions is undeniably problematic, scholars who conversely 
fail to consider the rational for the divisions produced by others may walk the discourse too far 
down the road of post-structuralism and post-modernism at the expense of normativity and 
both iterative and transformative critique. This is not to say that these categorisations are not 
dangerous, and I do not argue that all studies dividing groups between liberal/international, etc. 
 
126 As Millar’s (2013) analysis of friction in Sierra Leone shows, local individuals and groups conflate 
international actors themselves, leading to misunderstandings and negative experiences with international 
peacebuilding efforts due to local people misconstruing the services of one NGO with another and being 




are desired or indeed helpful. But, if we accept that such divisions will occur and may improve 
our understanding of phenomena, we can ask ourselves the more salient question of why such 
divisions were used. The question then, becomes whether our methodological tools are fit for 
purpose. As noted by Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015, pp. 180–181): 
To avoid a focus on the foundational assumptions of liberal peace power would risk 
overlooking the massive disruptive and exploitative influence of colonialism and global market 
forces. However, the critique has been much more than an echo-box of Eurocentric historicity, 
elitism, neoliberalism or post-Marxism. It has gone far beyond attempting to counterbalance 
‘the West’ with stories of ‘the non-West’ or attempting to confront the West with its failings to 
live up to its own propaganda. Instead, it has sought to delve into these categories and expose 
their limited purchase, as well as to engage with discursive frameworks from within Northern 
academe or elsewhere – and especially from post-conflict zones or from the global South – 
which have also sought to challenge these categories, and the way they naturalise existing 
power relations.  
Such a critique identifies the problematique as the lack of local involvement and understanding 
in peacebuilding and contends that the international/local dichotomy was required to reassert 
and reify the local, to point to them and their voices, and encourage a better understanding of 
their wants and needs. Regardless of whether this was benevolent, malicious, or patronising, 
the division was justified for this purpose, and if we see this writing in the broader context of 
peacebuilding scholarship, where top down critiques led to calls for local ownership with little 
understanding of how, the intent of this focus appears critical.  
What becomes perhaps more apparent is that the issue of reifying binaries through the use of 
hybridity becomes a problem only when it is uncritically applied. Richmond and others have a 
very specific intent when negotiating ‘liberal-local’ divides, which is to include local societies 
and people in the design and development of their state through dialogue (Richmond, 2009a). 
From this, one can see that Richmond’s purpose in homogenising these binaries is undertaken 
for the very specific purpose of pitting these actors against each other, in much the same way 
that Bhabha’s conceptualisation of hybridity pitted the coloniser against the colonised – though 
Bhabha was considerably less optimistic about the ability for subalterns to modify these 
dynamics given structural issues and imbalances of power (Bhabha, 1994). 
Moving deeper into these divisions, while certainly useful for understanding intergroup 
dynamics and the rise and fall of particular norms, outcomes or understandings, must not come 




and their subject, or the intervener and the intervened upon. As more recently noted by Wallis 
et al. (2018 p.7), “if the hybridity concept is used without sufficient attention to the power 
dynamics and conflictual elements in the specific context in question, it can ultimately serve to 
reproduce existing patterns of hierarchy, domination and prevailing relations of power”. 
Regardless of whether one has an optimistic or cynical outlook on peacebuilding, it is important 
to keep this binary and to view peacebuilding from the perspective of the local. Even if just to 
understand their experience and improve international peacebuilding approaches, or perhaps 
more radically, assist in its resistance and transformation, this distinction is important given it 
is the post-conflict society being intervened upon. Nor is it necessary that a focus on, for 
example, gender, should come at the expense of this binary as both can be drawn on 
simultaneously.  
While a significant aspect of Bhabha’s theory on hybridity related to the fact that there were 
no static entities, that both the colonised and the colonizer were changed in their encounter, the 
capacity for the international actors’ norms and rules to be informed by the colonised seem 
somewhat lessened, and the cultural hegemony and moralistic dominance of the intervener 
seems to override and out rule other conceptualisations. By placing hybridity within the post-
colonial framework, we ensure that its benefit is for the oppressed. Placing it within the wider 
needs of PACs and critical theories ensures a duty of care – and it is on that note that binaries 
and distinctions, categories, and simplifications, should be assessed. Who are they benefitting 
and who are they for, are equally important to bear in mind alongside questions of what 
differences they erase.  
The problem of prescription 
A second frequently occurring argument to be voiced in discussions of hybridity was that 
scholars had been using it prescriptively rather than descriptively. As succinctly argued by 
Millar (2014, p. 501), the issue with prescribing hybridity was that it implied that “international 
actors can plan and administer hybridity to foster predictable social experiences in complex 
postconflict states”. This “erroneously assume[d] a direct and predictable relationship between 
the administration of hybrid institutions and experiences of those institutions among local 
people” which failed to recognize how the concepts and beliefs of both peacebuilders and their 
subjects mediate and affect the hybrid encounter (ibid, p.504). In a sense, it assumed that 
international actors could plan the unpredictable.  
The concern that scholars had for hybridity’s apparent instrumental misuse was such that 




being prescriptive to the extent that it became difficult to discern where hybridity had been 
prescribed as opposed to having been used to generate practical suggestions alongside a host 
of similar concepts (see, for instance, Peterson, 2012; Millar et al., 2013; Millar, 2014; 
Chandler, 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016; Visoka, 2017). For example, Millar (2014, 
p. 504) bandied this charge against several prominent scholars, Richmond included, who 
claimed a prescriptive notion of hybridity based off agonism and the everyday and outlined 
practices which while “supposedly serv[ing] local actors”, did little to explain “how to establish 
such a peace without again making hybridity something to be planned and administered ‘by 
us’ and ‘for them’”.  
Two years later, and in response to the conceptual drift that occurred through hybridity’s 
popularisation, Richmond and Mac Ginty (2016) dedicated an entire article to challenging its 
prescriptive usage. Here, they envisioned a hybridity continuum, with its prescriptive and 
simplistic use (the conjoining of two phenomena to produce a third) at one end and literature 
which seeks to “challenge the fixity of boundaries and categories that have been traditionally 
used to interpret the socio-political world” at the other (ibid, p.225). Articulating a clear 
preference for the latter approach, Richmond and Mac Ginty fired back at Millar claiming his 
work lies somewhere between these two extremes and, while offering no examples other than 
Millar’s (2014) text on disaggregating hybridity which had critiqued them, they argued that 
such work required a “sceptical reading as it seems to be based on a limited understanding of 
hybridity as an analytical tool, and [had the] potential to make and remake anarchic and 
informal political institutions” harbouring a “Western liberal righteousness that sits uneasily 
with understandings of local agency” (2016, p. 225).127  
In a similar vein, George and Kent (2013, p. 293) argue that international actors have drawn 
on local institutions and understandings “with the expectation that, by acknowledging local 
systems of value and meaning, the legitimacy and sustainability of the ensuing peace will be 
enhanced”. However, they fail to offer any immediate examples of this, and point instead to a 
page of Björkdahl and Höglund’s (2013, p. 293) article on friction  which equally provides no 
immediate examples of organisations deliberately attempting to plan hybridity (suggesting the 
reference was rather confusingly used for conceptual rather than empirical purposes, see also 
George & Kent, (2017, p. 523).  
 




In the same manner in which scholars critiqued the behemoth of the liberal peace earlier, 
critiques against prescribing hybridity appear to have largely blown culprits’ attempts out of 
proportion. This is not to say that such concerns were entirely unfounded however, and the 
differences between the three hybrid conceptions understandably led many more critical 
scholars to believe their theories had been co-opted by their orthodox peers. Perhaps the most 
illustrative case of this can be found in the development of HPG. Both the language and the 
focus of studies utilizing the term pointed to a normative analysis of the ‘unexpected’ outcomes 
caused by the collision of ‘liberal and illiberal’ norms, practices and customs (Belloni, 2012; 
Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). Here, scholars claimed that the “Western liberal ideas” on which 
peacebuilding was grounded were “often compromised in practice” (Belloni, 2012, p. 22) 
hinting at an understanding where hybridity manifested as a less than desirable accommodation 
of liberal ideas. Regardless of the extent to which scholars of HPG embraced this difference, 
their understanding of hybridity was frequently accused of being prescriptive, and the few 
times in which their works were drawn upon outside of their immediate peer networks within 
the dataset were for their empirical findings. Rather confusingly then, many of these same 
scholars introduced a concerted effort to develop the notion of Friction (modified within this 
thesis) the following year128 partly as an effort to overcome problems emerging out of 
hybridity’s conceptualisation as an outcome – a perception which they contributed to, and 
reasserted within their new framework. 
Summary 
More recently Visoka (2017, p. 308) has pointed out (quite accurately), that criticisms such as 
Millar’s mischaracterise a prescriptive reading of hybridity with a  “normative commitment to 
an emancipatory peace… which is more an aspiration than an empirical certainty”. What is 
actually being prescribed, or sought is not a hybrid outcome or method of peacebuilding, but 
an “emancipatory wing of liberal peace affiliated with civil peace and peaceful civil society, 
which in practice is often disregarded by peacebuilding organisations” (Visoka, 2017, p. 308). 
As scholars have begun moving beyond the concept of hybridity a fragile consensus seems to 
have been achieved. Today there seems to be little contention that HPOs and HPG were, to 
some extents, used instrumentally if not prescriptively (see recent work by (Wallis et al., 2018). 
The ramifications of this use however, may go beyond the immediate debates that appear to 
have settled in the dust, and two further concerns need to be highlighted for the purposes of 
 
128 See, for example, Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013; Hellmüller, 2013; Höglund and Orjuela, 2013; Jarstad, 2013; 




understanding how critical contestation of hybridity manifested and obscured its radical 
potential. 
The first is the extent to which these debates dominated other and more critical avenues for 
discussion that may have been afforded by hybridity. The cyclical argumentation by scholars, 
which often provided minimal evidence of hybridity being prescribed, was evidence of the lack 
of consensus as to what prescriptive writing might look like and whether it needed to be 
differentiated through a problem-solving/critical problem-solving dichotomy. Indeed, while 
Mac Ginty and Richmond’s (2016) notion of a continuum of debate softens the accusatory 
blow of prescription by allowing texts to move up and down an instrumentalist scale, scholars 
seem completely oblivious to the notion that even works which explicitly condemned attempts 
to manufacture hybrid processes or outcomes might nevertheless be used prescriptively by 
policy-makers and practitioners, given they often applied some form of case specific analysis 
which contained empirical observations of this interaction. Conversely, one could feasibly 
prescribe hybrid outcomes and methods without using the terminology of hybridity: would this 
be an attempt to prescribe hybridity or to include local actors and understandings in 
peacebuilding processes, as earlier writings on local ownership initially advocated? This point 
is reified by the claim frequently made (see for instance Peterson, 2012, and Belloni, 2012) that 
the 2011 report by the World Bank, Conflict, Security and Development, prescribed hybridity 
by invoking ideas similar to it. This is despite the fact that the text uses the term only twice and 
in ways more characteristic of understandings of good enough governance and local ownership, 
or earlier invocations of hybridity by Carothers.129  
Second, these critiques could be more useful by doing away with the language of hybridity. 
Similar to the above discussions on binaries, it is not hybridity that is at fault, rather, it is the 
way in which local ownership has been implemented by international actors whereby the usage 
of hybridity simply convolutes and obfuscates their conclusions. The following section seeks 
to conceptualise prescriptive hybridity as an attempt to administer local ownership and good 
enough governance to argue that these prescriptive arguments would be better understood as 
such, suggesting that this usage may have been motivated more by the desire to join a trendy 
conversation than the analytical clarity this lens provided. 
 
129 On page 156 it was stated that “In Timor-Leste after independence, a de facto hybrid system emerged, where 
local justice mechanisms continued to function in parallel to the formal legal system” and on page 337 in reference 
to the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Peacebuilding Operation in Darfur (World Development Report 




Reconceptualising hybrid approaches as instrumentalization of local ownership 
It is the view of this author, and many scholars who have previously written on hybridity, that 
much of the work which has been undertaken through its mantle has been unhelpful and 
superfluous. This section seeks to account for understandings of hybridity more simply to better 
assess the arguments and findings that the concept has enabled. By understanding how hybrid 
approaches were conceived in the minds of scholars, critiques of the concept can be more 
clearly assessed. The overall finding developed here is not that instrumental works using 
hybridity are invalid (though many of them may be unnecessary), but that their use of the word 
‘hybrid’, while analytically correct, is also conceptually unnecessary and confusing when read 
alongside other works using hybridity as a descriptive lens or framework. By removing the 
allure of the term, we can more clearly understand and engage with these as to its 
(un)prescriptiveness. 
For the sake of simplicity, this argument focuses on the most popular notion of hybridity to 
emerge within the dataset which distinguishes between ‘international’ and ‘local’ actors – or 
international peacebuilders and their subjects – though it is equally applicable to those more 
critical categories that emerged later. It also takes for granted the notion of ‘prior hybridity’ 
laid out by Canclini (2005) and assumes that all processes of peacebuilding are hybrid which 
are continually, actively and passively altered by surrounding actors, norms, understandings, 
and practices. 
Three main claims are proffered: 
1) That as all approaches to peacebuilding are hybrid, critiques for and against hybridity 
must be about active or deliberate attempts to manufacture hybridity, rather than the 
unavoidable passive aspects of hybridity that continually occur through all forms of 
interaction – or the simple misuse of the term. 130  
2) That advocates for ‘hybrid approaches’ to peacebuilding are actually advocating for 
‘international actors to take local groups into consideration’ or some variant of this 
practice. 
3) That arguments against ‘hybrid approaches’ to peacebuilding can only be so if they are 
also against (a) incorporating local actors or understandings into peacebuilding 
processes, or, are against (b) ‘good enough’ governance or hybrid outcomes, or, are (c) 
 
130 I hold the conceptualisation of hybridity to be more valuable as a passive or unimagined phenomena, 
but as we are dealing with prescriptive hybridity in this section, I use ‘approach’ to indicate that this type 




arguing against passive and unplanned hybridity (which is tantamount to arguing 
against gravity). 
International peacebuilding approaches can theoretically exist in three forms; those of the 
international, those of the local, and those which are hybridised and draw on both local and 
international approaches to peacebuilding. Excluding the two prior and ‘pure’ forms, in which 
either international or local approaches to peacebuilding are able to be undertaken without 
contamination by the other (due to prior hybridity), we are left with four possible active or 
planned hybrid approaches to peacebuilding wherein: 
(1) an international actor draws on local knowledges, experiences, processes, etc., in 
an attempt to improve their methods and techniques (and ultimately outcomes) of 
building peace, or; 
(2) an international actor involves local actors and incorporates some of their 
peacebuilding techniques and processes in order to improve the outcome and its 
congruence within the existing local system (or contrarily, attempts to mitigate both 
passive and active attempts by the local to affect peacebuilding through resistance, 
etc.); 
(3) a local actor draws on international knowledge, experiences, processes, etc., in an 
attempt to improve their methods and techniques (and ultimately outcomes) of 
building peace, or; 
(4) a local actor involves international actors and incorporates some of their 
peacebuilding techniques and processes in order to improve the outcome and its 
congruence with the international system (or contrarily, attempts to mitigate passive 
and active attempts by the international to affect peacebuilding through resistance 
etc.).  
The essential difference here is that 1 and 3 assert a passive alternate actor, whilst 2 and 4 
ascribe agency to the other and perceive all actors as being active.131 
While an increasing array of studies have focused on how local actors resist and co-opt 
peacebuilding practices, for better or for worse, most critiques of hybrid peacebuilding take the 
international actor or approach to peacebuilding and outcomes as their analytical focus (see 
chapter 5). To this author’s knowledge, and for seemingly obvious reasons, no succinct 
 
131 Similar categorisations have been made by scholars before, see Mac Ginty’s (2013a) four-part model of 




argument has been made (though it may have been implied) that local actors should stop being 
involved in peacebuilding processes or stop resisting aspects of internationally led 
peacebuilding due to their ideas and processes conflicting with international ones, or due to 
their ideas being detrimental to peacebuilding’s outcomes writ large. Indeed, local agency and 
resistance is often encouraged, or, contrarily in those cases in which local elites are seen to 
have ‘co-opted’ peacebuilding processes, considered as something to be managed. It is also 
worth noting that few recommendations in literature on international peacebuilding are directed 
towards the local instead of the international actor. Thus, in line with most critiques of hybrid 
peacebuilding and this thesis’ broader aims, we will hold ‘international actors’ to be the actors 
undertaking hybrid approaches to peacebuilding in this exercise at the temporary risk of 
marginalising local agency. 
With that out of the way we can ignore scenarios (3) and (4) for the time being and focus on 
those that concern the active role of international peacebuilders. The above conceptualisation 
sees scenario (1) as a relatively uncontentious132 approach to peacebuilding in which 
international actors draw on local sources to improve their peacebuilding techniques in the 
same manner that they might draw on other actors within the international community, while 
scenario (2) encourages or incorporates local groups and actors into peacebuilding processes 
in the same way that a Vice Chancellor might involve faculty heads and staff during a period 
of restructuring. 
While both scenarios face problems with legitimacy and authenticity (how do actors know that 
their advice will be considered, interpreted correctly, and implemented honestly – or 
conversely, how does the Vice Chancellor know that the staff selected are truly representative 
of the faculty, are properly informed to make such decisions, and are not malicious and out for 
personal gain?), the logic behind these two approaches seems relatively uncontentious and the 
calls for hybrid approaches (or local inclusion as they are shown to be) become unproblematic. 
Simply put, we should involve those affected by decisions in the decision-making process. 
Ridding ourselves of problematic labels, we can see that these two approaches to policy 
formulation, decision making, and operationalisation are relatively straightforward and can be 
undertaken simultaneously. 
 
132 I am aware of the numerous arguments, especially those stemming from post-colonial discussions, about the 
ability for Western actors to ‘know’ or understand the local. While these concerns are of immense importance, 




While the above problems bear close resemblance to many critiques of hybrid peacebuilding 
approaches and are undeniably important, before we address them we must unpack what these 
academics mean when talking about ‘hybrid peace outcomes’. If we accept that there is always 
going to be some form of prior hybridity, then all peacebuilding outcomes (or processes) must 
by definition be hybrid ones – and the analytical label of ‘hybrid outcomes’ can be reduced 
simply to ‘peacebuilding outcomes’.133 Assuming, however, that what these scholars actually 
mean when they discuss ‘hybrid outcomes’ relates not to the fact that the outcome is hybridised 
(as this is inevitable), but that the peacebuilding approach that generated the outcome was 
deliberately hybridised by international actors, then we move back to our previous point – that 
the label of hybridity is convoluted and awkward and for the purposes of clarity  we can remove 
it. Thus, hybrid outcomes become peacebuilding outcomes, and hybrid peacebuilding 
approaches become either scenario (1) or (2). 
We can now understand the view held by both proponents and critics of hybrid peacebuilding 
approaches to be one where the active attempt to undertake hybrid peacebuilding operations 
utilizes (or considers) either local knowledge or local actors themselves, and hybrid outcomes 
are simply what eventuates. Following this, both advocates and critics of hybrid peacebuilding 
approaches must either contest the premise that all peacebuilding outcomes are hybrid (as not 
doing so would greatly reduce the value of their arguments ), or hold that outcomes derived 
from hybrid peacebuilding approaches are in some way different to other peacebuilding 
approaches and expose the focus of their critique to be a concern with the methods used to 
build peace - scenario (1) or (2), instead.134 
Thus, beyond highlighting the unpredictable, unplanned, and passive processes of hybridity, 
literature which seeks to do anything more than acknowledge its existence (in a descriptive and 
non-normative manner) is much more clearly understood if the notion of hybridity is removed. 
That is not to say that peacebuilding processes and outcomes are always desirable, but simply 
that any contention with hybridity beyond a heuristic device is unhelpful to discussions of 
peacebuilding. Literature which sought to confine hybridity to the analytical realm needed only 
 
133 Though I do not sincerely believe that any readers might contest the notion that some outcomes may not be 
hybrid, and believe that a tabula rasa may exist, I would direct sceptics to both Mac Ginty’s conception of 
hybridity and the notion of friction which view absolute adoption of exogenous norms/practices/ and processes 
as, nevertheless, an element of hybridity in which the indigenous have either accepted outside solutions willingly, 
or offered no resistance. Even in such instances it is unlikely that these could ever be replicated exactly as they 
exist in the mind of the international peacebuilder. 
134 A third possibility would simply be that they feel this terminological usage is wrong, which contributes little 




to ignore those efforts to plan for ‘hybrid peacebuilding’, and critique their intent, methods and 
objectives rather than the particular (and in vogue) language used. The following section will 
briefly unpack how this simplified conceptualisation affects literature on hybridity, before 
noting some further aspects of academia which negatively impacted hybridity’s 
conceptualisation and concluding. 
Reassessing the findings and critiques of hybridity 
Reconceiving instrumental scholarship on hybridity as an attempt to reconcile bottom-up and 
top-down processes of peacebuilding, while potentially oversimplifying many of the nuances 
and complexities for which the term was utilized, provides a significantly clearer understanding 
of its impact on the wider peacebuilding discourse. It also, rather uncomfortably, expands and 
simplifies the normative positions held by scholars critiquing its use, raising questions as to the 
extent to which scholars were able to shelter behind the façade of hybridity and produce 
arguments that had not been taken to their logical conclusion.  
Beyond the understanding that international and local norms, practices and ideas clash in 
awkward and unpredictable ways to generate unexpected and sometimes unwanted outcomes, 
hybridity provided a convoluted way for scholars to extend and remake arguments surrounding 
the necessity and ability for international actors to include and foster local ownership during 
peacebuilding practices. As argued above, the contention that hybrid peacebuilding approaches 
do not work135 must refer to international efforts to either include or engage with local actors, 
positioning them as critiques of how attempts to implement local ownership have been 
orchestrated and carried out.  
This understanding has some potentially awkward and confusing implications for scholarship, 
which this thesis believes are useful in testing the claims of peacebuilding scholars. For 
example, the argument by Millar (2014, p. 506) “that international efforts to administer hybrid 
institutions, such as hybrid courts or hybrid governance, are unlikely to produce predictable 
local experiences, but may have unpredictable and potentially even conflict-promoting effects” 
becomes either, rather uninteresting (as all efforts will inevitably be hybridised and are thus 
unpredictable), or problematic. Does Millar mean to say that international actors should 
disregard the local during operations, or more simply, that they are generally unsuccessful at 
doing so? Millar’s contention is unsurprisingly more clearly seen as an observation that 
peacebuilders failed to control local processes or conversely localize international norms in 
 




Sierra Leone. He argues that the bottom-up processes of hybridity which were unplanned and 
un-administered by international actors were more successful at facilitating positive 
experiences (Ibid, p.511), but like most scholarship which attempts to take a less policy 
oriented approach, leaves conclusions unfinished.  
As noted above, many authors have made similar claims regarding the inability of the 
international to predict the experiences of the local and the outcomes of peacebuilding. How 
this understanding is to be interpreted by more policy-oriented scholars becomes problematic 
however, given their reluctance to argue against the project of international peacebuilding in 
its entirety. Instead of arguing against peacebuilding, or for the need to empower local 
resistance (or, conversely, for the international to resume top-down practices of peacebuilding), 
scholars identify negative and positive hybridities, and either simply describe them, or seek to 
find ways that more desirable versions of these ‘unpredictable’ experiences and outcomes may 
be generated. This is not to say that such studies are unimportant as they undoubtedly increase 
our understanding of the problems inherent in peacebuilding. Instead, it is to show that the 
language of hybridity often seems to obscure the findings made by authors, allowing endless 
claims of whether or not hybridity should be administered at the expense of grappling with the 
more pertinent yet difficult question of precisely how international actors should encounter the 
local, or if they should at all. As scholars do not want to argue that peacebuilders should 
undertake a more top down approach, nor that the project of international peacebuilding should 
be disbanded, the solution to most of the problems caused by hybridity appear to be, rather 
simply, more hybridity. How this should occur however, is unclear, given scholars are unable 
to explore avenues of how international actors might better engage with local actors (as this 
would be prescribing hybridity), nor are they able to explore how local agency might be 
empowered to resist and contest the international (given this would amount to speaking on 
behalf of the local).  
The observations above, like many raised by critical scholars within the dataset, indicated a 
host of larger philosophical problems between critical and problem-solving theorists which 
remain unresolved and problematic. For example, and as noted in chapters 2 and 3, critical 
theorists should do more than simply critique the existing order, yet it was critical scholars who 
most often argued against the prescriptive use of hybridity, seeking to confine it to a descriptive 
realm, cementing their inability to posit any transformative or radical alternative orders beyond 
discursive and analytic framings. If hybridity is unacceptable as a lens through which questions 




should such questions be raised? While a host of further (and potentially endless) concerns can 
be raised regarding the utility of hybridity, due to space limitations, it is important to simply 
note how these various interpretations of the concept enabled a series of cyclical debates 
whereupon scholars, bounded by their liberal epistemes and the unquestioned logic of 
international peacebuilding, sought to contest international peacebuilding in such a way as to 
prevent the production of radically alternative objectives, the disbandment of international 
peacebuilding, or a more reflexive critique of their own societies.   
8.5: Chapter Conclusion 
The lifecycle of hybridity provides a useful illustration of many of this thesis’s central 
arguments. It highlights how, amidst peacebuilding scholars’ relatively muted effort to critique 
and radically oppose systems of conflict promotion, few sought to offer transformative rather 
than iterative alternatives. Continually challenging a selection of hegemonic institutions and 
understandings to identify emancipatory spaces, these were left open for others to sketch out 
and potentially co-opt. Where hybridity could have enabled critical scholars the opportunity to 
imagine new and alternative orders based on social and environmental justice which eschewed 
violence and capitalist economics, few scholars spent the time to actively articulate what such 
systems might look like and how they could stand against the homogenising efforts of 
international peacebuilding and its establishment of order. While many noted how their 
hybridity enabled insights could lead to emancipatory alternatives, this more instrumental 
effort was undertaken by scholars who used the recognition of alterity to improve international 
peacebuilding methods and its external creation of a more localised state instead.  
The three conceptualisations of hybridity unpacked within this chapter speak to the different 
ontological and epistemological positions of the scholars who drew on them. By analysing 
workshop and publication dates, as well as references to notions of hybridity developed outside 
of PACs, a timeline emerged which highlighted the various critical intents and problematiques 
that scholars sought to address. From this we can clearly discern that where HPOs (articulated 
first) and HPG (articulated last) normatively assessed interactions and outcomes to manage and 
order difference, hybridity sought to improve understandings of the peacebuilding encounter 
through its descriptive focus on processes.  
As conceptions were popularised and conflated within PACs scholarship, the critical variant 
espoused by scholars became more removed from its post-colonial origins, and a series of 




unaware of its origins and intent to problematise the balance of power between intervener and 
intervened, scholars began accusing hybridity of reifying the very issue its critical variation 
had sought to address. Subsequently, a host of debates that had already occurred in other 
disciplines, though which to some remained unresolved, were re-contested within 
peacebuilding literature. While these questions critically expanded the conceptualisation of 
hybridity, they also reified its descriptive rather than imaginative potential. Such discussions 
dominated theoretical debates, obfuscating or redirecting more radically transformative 
discussions into abstract arguments and a growing body of descriptive research agendas. 
The critique of instrumental studies overlooked the ways in which all research might invariably 
produce empirical findings which could be used to improve international attempts to engage 
with the local during peacebuilding operations (rhetorically or otherwise).  The larger problem 
lay in the fact that where problem-solving theorists could draw on hybridity to prescribe 
improvements to peacebuilding methods, critical scholars could only target academics to 
improve understandings of peacebuilding or critique international practices for being 
ungenuine or rhetorical. Critical scholars thus sought to enable local actors by paradoxically 
critiquing policymakers and peacebuilders, calling on them to be more sensitive and aware of 
local customs, instead of finding ways to strengthen the locals’ ability to directly resist 
international efforts. The solution to hybridity, was more hybridity. 
It is here that the tacit acceptance of the liberal system and its unchallenged suitability to the 
Global North becomes most obvious and problematic. The desire to critique and transform the 
local or international paradigm only as it relates to the post conflict state is evidenced by how 
critical scholars, not wishing to speak on behalf of the local by prescribing local solutions, did 
not instead redirect their analysis to offer deeper and more radical critiques of the international 
system or their own states. Scholars avoided the need to take a more normative stance in their 
critiques which would undoubtedly be required if radical solutions for increasing local 
resistance to the international were prescribed, noting how this would amount to a hegemonic 
attempt to counter hegemons. This moment of critical reflection was short lived however, and 
unwilling to shift their focus from the exotic post-conflict other, scholars retreated to abstract 
philosophical white noise, rather than expanding their critiques of international peacebuilding 
to the international system upon which peacebuilding was constituted. From the Ivory Tower 
scholars critiqued those who they believed co-opted hybridity, overlooking how the first 




the very real yet instrumental desire to disassociate difference with failure and realise earlier 
calls for local ownership and bottom-up peacebuilding. 
It was this lack of effort, to radically and reflexively explore our understandings of process, 
order or governance beyond the externally defined post-conflict state, that remains hybridity’s 
largest yet most overlooked failing in peacebuilding scholarship. Hybridity enabled scholars to 
maintain their focus on problematic post-conflict societies and the acts of interveners within 
them, providing a plethora of research agendas which avoided reflecting on the international 
sphere beyond ‘the field’. Ultimately, hybridity transformed our understandings of 
peacebuilding processes, and without rejecting the project of internationally orchestrated 
peacebuilding writ large, condemned many efforts trying to improve it.  
While the popularity of hybridity in peacebuilding scholarship appears to have declined 
somewhat in recent years, with many of its most ardent proponents and critics having moved 
on to new concepts, recent iterations of hybridity suggest that there has been a maturation of 
the term. Forsyth et al (2017, p. 408) have noted “how scholars in various disciplines today use 
hybridity as a heuristic device for exploring complex processes of interaction and 
transformation occurring between different institutional and social forms, and normative 
systems, in a wide range of contexts”. Other recent work (Lemay-Hébert and Freedman, 2017; 
Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo, 2018; Wallis et al., 2018) suggests an uneasy compromise has 
been made, whereupon the analytical use of hybridity espoused by those more critical scholars 
has triumphed over the competing terms of HPOs and HPG, while shedding its post-colonial 
and emancipatory origins. Where critical feminist and spatial nuances (for example) are 
undoubtedly beneficial to analysis undertaken through the lens of hybridity, its recognition of 
the post-colonial other and the struggle between intervener and intervened has diminished 
alongside its focus on challenging the liberal paradigm. Subsequently, hybridity has been 
firmly established as one more tool through which academics can analyse conflict and 







CHAPTER 9: REVISITING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CRITIQUE 
This thesis sought to understand how critical scholars contested and contributed to the 
discourse of international peacebuilding. It took for granted that research is produced for 
someone and for some purpose. While the initial aim was to contribute to understandings of 
how research is distorted and transformed as it is transmitted into policy and practice, a prior 
question serendipitously derailed this effort early on. If peacebuilding had been less successful 
than hoped, because of the difficulty in translating theory into policy and practice, what might 
the world look like if this problem did not exist? Retreating into Plato’s cave, the thesis sought 
to scrutinize the ideas of scholars before they became forms, questioning the unbounded 
utopias that research aimed to realise, and how these might be distorted and constrained from 
within the academy itself. This final chapter begins with a brief note on limitations before 
summarising the avenues explored within this thesis and their rationales, after which the areas 
to which this research has contributed are plotted. Following this, the chapter notes the various 
limitations that would have shaped and constrained this research endeavour, before establishing 
why the contributions made here matter, and potentially, how some of the issues identified 
within its pages might be resisted. 
Thesis Summary 
To explore the shifts, transformations and critiques of critical peacebuilding, a representative 
dataset was constructed from publications since 2005, when numerous disciplines within social 
sciences were undergoing a critical turn (Schuurman, 2009; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; 
Chandler, 2017b). The normative and transformative intent of PACs informed much of this 
agenda, while also providing an excellent case study through which questions could be 
explored. If orthodox disciplines were bogged down by scientific objectivity and served the 
interests of the international order, how might a discipline founded against such matters contest 
them? Equally, international peacebuilding seemed an obvious field to interrogate, due to its 
noted transformative potential and the assumption that questions of how to build a more 
peaceful society would likely entail discussions about what such a society might look like. 
Given the scope of such problems, the thesis anchored itself upon two overlapping themes from 
knowledge utilization discourses; barriers to critical knowledge production, and barriers to 
critical knowledge transmission. Simply put, it sought to identify both the limits of critiques 
(the areas of popular and marginalised discussion) and how scholars interacted and contested 




numerous scholars to contest and tout the transformative and critical aims at the heart of the 
discipline, making such ruptures easier to investigate through the joint methods of interviews, 
critical discourse and bibliometric analysis (chapter 4).  
Underpinning this effort was the critical framework coined ‘subversive knowledge’ (chapter 
3). This allowed for a conceptualisation of criticality to emerge from within the dataset itself, 
exploring the various twists and turns produced by scholars contesting what it meant to be 
critical. At the same time, it provided a framework to evaluate articles. Based on feedback from 
a series of scoping interviews and conference presentations, this framework sought to be 
deliberately provocative and radical by marrying the normative and humanist intent of PACs 
with parrhesia’s understanding of truth telling.  Where critical theorists often suggested that 
problem-solving approaches reify the status quo and fail to address systemic issues contributing 
to conflict, this framework sought to understand precisely how critical scholars envisioned 
doing better. Who were critical theorists writing for, and how did they seek to change the 
world?  
Central to this effort was understanding critiques made by problem-solving theorists against 
their critical counterparts for having devalued the utility of their knowledge by being too high 
level and abstract. Parrhesia requires that truth tellers put themselves in danger during their 
act of speaking truth to power, endowing the need for knowledge to not only be critical, but 
useful. Thus, the esoteric pursuit of scientific knowledge for the sake of understanding was 
seen as neither critical, in that its potential for change would require further efforts by others 
to make it so; nor was it parrhesiatic, in that it sought to ‘understand’ rather than directly 
challenge the objectives, practices, and ‘power’ of the status quo. Critical knowledge that 
simply offered a new understanding or uncovered emancipatory spaces without giving 
direction as to how these might be utilized, though often normative, could therefore be critiqued 
for failing to offer alternative orders and buttressing the status quo by allowing these spaces to 
be co-opted (as seen with hybridity in Chapter 8). 
The analysis undertaken of these texts proved exceptionally useful for understanding how 
scholars within PACs operated and engaged in the discourse of peacebuilding. While countless 
conceptual and discursive shifts were produced through these works, the thesis noted that 
despite the increased use in critical approaches to studying peacebuilding, there is a dearth of 
reflexive and critical writing. Chapter 5 laid out the high-level results of the discourse and 




peacebuilding studies formed a relatively rigid and closed epistemic community which may 
stifle innovation and reify technocratic and iterative scholarship. The breadth and depth of 
research was then explored in successive chapters to identify the limits of criticality, and 
tentatively identify ways in which these might be overcome. 
It first noted that, despite the claim of ‘international’ peacebuilding, scholarship 
overwhelmingly focused on post-conflict countries, at the expense of challenging problematic 
systems and processes which continued to oppress others. It expanded on this observation in 
chapter 6, when it evaluated in more detail how fundamental assumptions about the 
international and liberal order remained unchallenged yet immensely problematic. It argued 
that the lack of reflexivity in understanding how our discourses and studies contribute to these 
oppressive structures was staggering, and that peacebuilding scholarship needs to challenge 
these more fundamental problems if it is to be emancipatory. There is little point to writing 
about local empowerment while our countries continue to sell instruments of violence, 
oppression and pacification to the state. 
Chapter 5 suggested that most studies focused on offering new understandings or explanations 
of phenomena, especially as it related to telling the successes and failures of peacebuilding 
operations, while the objectives (what peacebuilding seeks to achieve) often remained 
untouched and unquestioned. Chapter 7 further unpacked this finding by looking at how 
conceptions of peace had been considered and developed by scholars. It argued that few studies 
offer any indication of what type of peace their critiques contribute to bringing about. Though 
an exceptionally limited body of work explored or critiqued dominant understandings of peace, 
these failed in both their challenge of what could be possible and in their ability to overcome 
the hegemonic Western episteme. Instead scholars appear to be retreating into relativistic 
studies which delve ever deeper into local societies to describe existing conceptions of peace, 
while simultaneously advocating new types of peace, but only as they apply to the post-conflict 
paradigm. Such an approach suggests that the oppressive aspects of the liberal peace are only 
problematic for the post-conflict other.  
Lastly, Chapter 5 suggested that as the discourse of critical peacebuilding had grown, it 
appeared to have lost its critical intent and became bogged down in empirical theory testing. 
Scholars overwhelmingly produced solutions targeted at peacebuilding methods and practices, 
while more critical research endeavours only challenged frameworks and theories. This was 




conflated to reduce its critical potential. While the post-colonial and critically informed variant 
of hybridity as a process appears to have triumphed over less critical conceptions, its 
emancipatory intent has been diminished in the face of arguments which problematised its 
focus on the international/local binary and circular arguments surrounding its instrumental use. 
While such concerns were undoubtedly warranted, the conception of hybridity that has 
emerged and much of what was written whilst it was in vogue, have reduced the emancipatory 
potential of the framework to see it as one more analytical lens through which peacebuilding 
operations can be described. 
The tendency for critical approaches to endlessly attempt to understand the world rather than 
change it is well understood by scholars. Indeed, Marx himself, while offering a devastating 
critique of capitalism, had little to say about a post-capitalist world and spent much of his time 
understanding and fetishizing its parts and distortions (Harvey, 2014, p. 4). This penchant is 
understandable, as the imagining and espousing of alternative orders has the potential to be 
disastrous if it is based on a flawed understanding of the world and its problems. Leaving 
philosophical (and colonial) questions of whether one can really ever ‘know’ aside, we must 
consider at what stage do we know enough that alternatives can be proffered? The pursuit of 
critiquing our understandings and epistemes is undoubtedly important, but it seems that as 
successes are had, and these critical ideas become mainstream, policy oriented theorists aren’t 
able to utilize these understandings to generate critical solutions. Whether because of 
differences in intent, or because their solutions target practices rather than objectives, these 
scholars are attacked for all manner of sins, as has been seen by attempts to implement ideas 
stemming from the local turn, while critical theorists struggle to move beyond their role as 
critics (Chapter 8).   
From this it seems that either all problem-solving theorists must become critical theorists, so 
that they can more critically address issues of hegemony in favour of emancipation, or, all 
critical theorists must become problem-solvers, to avoid co-option by identifying tangible 
solutions themselves. The problem for critical theorists, as always it seems, is that their 
epistemological beliefs prevent them from positing universal or local solutions themselves 
given that these may accidentally and hegemonically speak on behalf of the subaltern or fail to 
accommodate contextual dynamics. The question then becomes, who are their ideas being 
produced for, and what impact do they seek? The disinterested pursuit of critical knowledge is 
an intellectually selfish task which if not reflective gives the illusion of speaking with the 




themselves. The very same international order that academics are themselves a part, and which 
facilitates the conditions in which they are able to produce knowledge which may either contest 
or buttress it. 
Research Limitations 
As with any research project, there a variety of limitations which constrain and potentially 
distort the findings of this thesis. Many of these are already noted, such as: key word selection 
for dataset identification; threshold numbers for dataset construction; and the technique used 
to read and interpret texts (see chapter 4 and its corresponding appendix). Others, such as the 
culminative effect of using three different research methods (CNA, CDA, and interviews), each 
with their own limitations (see chapter 4), may have compounded lesser issues by reproducing 
each techniques’ distortions and further skewing analysis. While these issues are important, it 
was hoped that this joint approach may have diminished some of the larger problems associated 
with interpreting texts by strengthening qualitative findings through quantitative analysis 
(CNA), and by checking these findings with researchers themselves (interviews) to reduce 
misinterpretations and misrepresentation (for a comprehensive overview of qualitative 
approaches and their failings, see Silverman, 2016). For example, by focusing solely on journal 
articles, there is likely a host of additional material that went unscrutinised within this thesis. 
It was hoped, however, that the CDA and CNA may illuminate any significant areas of 
unaccounted for knowledge, while interviews with scholars could provide a further fact-
checking measure. 
While interviews sought to counterbalance many of my own personal biases by discussing 
findings and observations with researchers, it was not possible to interview every scholar 
within the dataset due to time and funding constraints. Subsequently, most interviews were 
conducted within Northern Europe and the U.K. to reduce travel costs, and many North 
American and Global South scholars were neglected who may have had differing opinions as 
to what the role of criticality was and should be in peacebuilding. 
Of most importance for readers is acknowledging what these techniques have been unable to 
achieve. This thesis can only have hoped to provide an isolated snapshot of critical thinking as 
it related to international peacebuilding between 2005 and 2017. It sought to understand the 
broad patterns and trends of research, the topics and questions that scholars occupied 
themselves with, and the solutions they posited. This macro overview comes at the expense of 




occasional absent areas of radical scholarship are unimportant, but that they are outside the 
norm because they suffer a lack of readership while being obscured and marginalised beneath 
the weight of more traditional approaches and hegemonic framings. While the initial desire of 
this thesis was to uncover and focus solely on radically critical scholarship, given the lacuna 
of such research, the prior step of understanding the extent to which these works were 
marginalised (and how) was considered necessary. Further research suggestions, elaborated on 
later in this chapter, may help to overcome some of these issues. 
Contextualising Findings 
Despite these limitations, the findings of this thesis contribute to three key areas of scholarship: 
PACs and the discourse of international peacebuilding; understandings of knowledge 
production and transmission; and understandings of critical theory. 
Its primary finding, that the increased uptake of critical approaches to study international 
peacebuilding have failed to draw on its transformative and emancipatory potential, revitalises 
and extends earlier critiques made against PACs which have problematised its critical potential 
(see, for example, Chandler, 2010c). It suggests that while the normative impetus of the 
discipline has been met by numerous scholars, the transformative and critical potential, seen to 
be reinvigorated by critiques of the liberal peace (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013), has been 
overwhelmingly used to contest operational elements of peacebuilding, suggesting an iterative 
rather than critical turn. Furthermore, the citation and discourse analysis suggests that despite 
the interdisciplinary nature of PACs, its scholars are relatively homogenous (Scholey, 2006; 
Mac Ginty, 2012; Goetze, 2017) and its epistemic communities are relatively isolated from 
cross-cutting disciplines. Barring several scholars and theories which dominate the discourse, 
discussions which consider more systemic issues from outside of PACs are rarely drawn on, 
reducing the ability to radically transform and challenge both peacebuilding and peace. As 
such, the thesis adds weight to a variety of claims surrounding the untransformative nature of 
PACs scholarship by reconfirming the lack of works investigating peace (Gleditsch, 
Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014), pacifism (Jackson, 2017a), or even the necessity of international 
peacebuilding, suggesting peacebuilding seeks to more efficiently manage social conflicts 
rather than transform them (see, for example, Rubenstein, 1999; Dillon and Reid, 2009; and 
Duffield, 2019). 
It adds to understandings of knowledge production and transmission through its exploration of 




emancipatory intent, to instead problematize operational elements of peacebuilding and 
transmit realisable empirical findings. It expands on Millar and Lecy’s (2016) observation of 
how bridging publications transmit new ideas within the discourse, suggesting that these 
divides are not just disciplinary but relational (both geographical and interpersonal). It also 
observes in more detail how ideas are distorted, conflated and repurposed as they are 
transmitted within disciplines. The findings of this thesis further problematise the 
transformative potential of scholars by suggesting that as critical theories are used 
instrumentally they appear to be deradicalized – with practical solutions never quite matching 
the emancipatory potential of their identified critique (the liberal peace is at fault, but the 
practice is what needs to be changed). Indeed, even if constraints on knowledge production 
were not an issue, transmission appears to conflate and deradicalize critical intents. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the issue identified was not just that PACs scholars are relatively 
uncritical, but that the institutions and performances of academia are making it so. 
Finally, the thesis builds on understandings of the critical/problem-solving divide, especially 
the works of Brown (2013), by empirically exploring how critical problem-solvers (critical 
improvement scholars within this thesis) may draw on critical approaches to analyse practices 
and methods, rather than the objectives or international order which constitute and are 
constituted by peacebuilding. It also extends the understanding that critical scholars are 
reluctant to posit radical alternatives (Visoka, 2018) by exploring how they attempt to maintain 
their utility through the endless generation of new frameworks through which the concept of 
peacebuilding can be understood and problematised. Such an understanding builds on 
scholarship which contests the ability of critical scholars to move beyond the liberal episteme 
by suggesting that their eschewal of being hegemonic has led them to double down on their 
need to observe and understand the post-conflict other at the expense of grappling with fuzzy 
and desirable alternative orders, or more critically and reflexively critiquing the systems of 
which they were a part and which continue to contribute to inequality and conflict. By viewing 
change only for the post-conflict other, we ensure the maintenance of the current international 
system and are not being critical. 
Reinterpreting Scholarship 
The primary finding made by this thesis is that while there has been an increase in critical 
approaches to studies of international peacebuilding, these works have been limited in their 




approaches did so to critique the methods and practices of peacebuilding operations, leaving 
questions of the legitimacy and the need for peacebuilding largely unchallenged. This is 
understandable, and the normative intent with which many of these scholars analysed post-
conflict environments perhaps left little room for such problematic and condescending 
questions; peacebuilding is a net good, and without it these peoples might be in a far worse 
position. Similar to Jackson (2015, p. 22), I do not blame individual scholars “for deliberately 
choosing a system maintenance orientation, or deliberately adopting a problem-solving, 
pacification, or stabilisation approach”. Peacebuilding will continue to occur regardless of 
criticism and coherence (Chandler, 2017a). I realise knowledge has power, and such arguments 
could (and do) lead to slippery slopes where Western governments withdraw funding during 
times of austerity, while continuing to produce the conditions which give rise to the need for 
peacebuilding in the first place (Duffield, 2016, 2019; Chandler, 2019; Anholt and Wagner, 
2020). Taking away the carrot of peacebuilding is unlikely to do away with the stick of 
intervention, and as we have seen in Cambodia, Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Vietnam, and in a 
myriad more socially oriented regimes in the past, difference is rarely tolerated by those 
capitalist behemoths who rely on the subjugation and exploitation of others (Chomsky, 2002).  
The problem, as it was expanded on in chapter 6, is that the constant focus on micro and 
operational factors of peacebuilding has not been matched by the intent to challenge the 
structural conditions which continue to create, lead to, or exacerbate conflict. Rarely did studies 
critique the effects of the globalised economic system (capitalism), the necessity or legitimacy 
of physical violence, or larger institutions of structural violence. While the makeup and 
legitimacy of the Weberian and Westphalian state were problematised, these challenges were 
more about accommodation of difference than encouragement and transformation of the politic 
writ large, and only ever as they related to the post-conflict other (chapter 8). 
From this analysis, it appears as if there is an inverse relationship between criticality and 
instrumentality, wherein those scholars that were more likely to problematise such issues were 
also much less likely to produce or suggest ways forward. Thus, where critical theorists 
challenged and transformed our understandings (and potentially, epistemes), (critical) 
problem-solvers posited a variety of solutions to transform peacebuilding practices (chapter 8). 
The critical and local turn that occurred throughout these shifts continually deepened the 
analytical focus on local populations (Chandler, 2010a), delving into societal spheres to either 
understand or empower local agency and voices (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Again, 




For less critical theorists, where the problem of peacebuilding lay in its top-down ‘liberal’ 
methods, this turn to the local could resist and transform processes to make them more 
congruent and reflective of their societies (Paffenholz, 2015), reducing the frictions that arose 
and increasing the likelihood of establishing a more ‘positive’ and ‘durable’ peace - or more 
cynically, lubricating the edges of those liberal elements that were harder to swallow. For 
critical theorists, the focus upon local subjects provided an opportunity to renegotiate the local 
state as the contextual dynamics of resistance and custom challenged the liberal peace and its 
privileging of the existing, and global elites (Chandler and Richmond, 2015, p. 4). While 
providing a way to negotiate the objectives of liberal peacebuilding, it reduced the need for 
creative and imaginative exploration through the requirement of understanding context, leading 
to a concerted effort to identify and describe the range of desirable characteristics intrinsic to 
each society without the need for transformative prescriptions  (chapter 7).  
The desire to not impress/oppress new norms and standards upon post-conflict societies in the 
same top-down method as the liberal peace was undoubtedly well intentioned. However, the 
scope of imaginative rather than descriptive alternatives was limited to a few academics who 
in the process of laying out a post-liberal peace, positioned more emancipatory elements within 
the rubric of the post-conflict other (chapter 7). The new types of peace, state, and ways of 
doing were undeniably improvements (if often practically unimplementable, and conceptually 
fraught and undeveloped), but they failed to go far enough, leaving the legitimacy of violence 
and oppression largely intact for the architects and maintainers of international order within 
the Global North (chapter 6). More often, emancipatory spaces were identified and left vacant 
by critical theorists to be later co-opted through the good intent of iterative solutions (chapter 
8). 
To some, this rather bleak reframing of nearly two decades of research is perhaps overly harsh 
given these studies were undertaken with impeccable precision and good intent. However, none 
of its points are exactly new, and are instead woven together out of criticisms that have been 
made by many scholars individually and in isolation from one another over the past two 
decades. Though this reading may seem disingenuous to many authors and their efforts, the 
intent of this narrative is to critique the discourse as a whole – rather than the scholars who 
comprise it. Indeed, one of the reasons this reading might appear so severe is because most of 
the scholars within the dataset are not focused on transforming the international system or 
‘saving the world’. Their interest lies squarely on the post-conflict state and the act of 




I fully accept this mismatch in intent, the critiques here have been raised, not to elicit blame or 
chastise the previous efforts of these scholars, but to make a normative argument about why 
this lacuna is important, and how such issues might be addressed by all scholars in the future. 
While I have spent some time in the academy (and hope to spend much more), I cannot begin 
to fathom the discursive shifts that have occurred, and the efforts required by scholars to 
achieve them. The blossoming of critical theories, of feminism and post-colonial 
understandings (for example), are tremendous improvements on the archaic whitewashed halls 
of academia and have produced incredible insights and nuances across disciplinary divides. 
The reflection of local sensitivity has been an undeniable boon, and while it may have been 
rhetorically implemented or misinterpreted as the state in practice, it has coincided with a 
gradual increase in post-colonial reflection amongst critical scholars. Here, works such as 
Chaterjee (2004), Jabri (2013b) and Mazower (2012) have all outlined the immediate need for 
scholars to reconsider the ongoing legacy of colonialism, post-colonialism, and neo-
colonialism in their understanding of intervention, politics and power, posing significant 
ontological and epistemological challenges for Western academics and their understanding of 
the other. To address these issues, there has been an increase in ethnographic analyses, but the  
question remains: to what extent do these studies and the turn to the local blind scholars to 
wider reflections and enable the endless pursuit of research which fails to properly grapple with 
history and our own proximity to empire and subjugation? The problem is not so much that 
scholars are focusing on other things, but that very few scholars are focusing on this thing, a 
problem compounded by the deradicalization of intent and content as critical ideas are 
transmitted (chapter 8). Three substantive issues can be raised in relation to the above 
observations. 
The first regards the transformative desire of PACs scholars. PACs scholars seek to minimise 
violence by transforming the systems around them. If, as this thesis has argued, much of the 
work undertaken by scholars is instead iterative, then problematic systems will be reproduced 
in post-conflict societies alongside inequalities that lead to conflict. If scholars seek only to 
transform the practices and methods of operations, then they must implicitly agree with the 
objectives of the liberal peacebuilding project, despite the plethora of research highlighting 
how the liberal project is constituted through (and constitutes) a system of violence. If there is 
no explicit intent (and attempt) to critique and transform the objectives of peacebuilding, we 




institutions that exist, or could exist, without their help – reflecting the colonial mentalities and 
White Saviour complex of the Global North. 
I would argue that none of the scholars within this dataset conveyed any such intent or optimism 
for the objectives of the international peacebuilding project, and though most see it as a net 
good for post-conflict societies, they are careful to contextualise understandings and systems 
within local communities. Indeed, the significant shifts in conceptualising and implementing  
peacebuilding that have been afforded by critiques of ‘top-down’ methods and the advocation 
of local ownership clearly show that scholars do not believe their systems to be necessarily 
better than others. Instead, it seems that for reasons of capacity, corruption or whatever else, 
many feel international peacebuilding may be required to give these states a boost in the ‘right’ 
direction. 
This leads to the second point regarding critical approaches and theory. If critical scholarship 
and a focus on systemic factors fail to be accentuated, and are instead diminished/de-
radicalised, or overlooked, then the transformative capacity of international peacebuilding is 
constrained to the post-conflict paradigm. Where arguments by critical theorists relating to the 
need to challenge more systemic factors have been well articulated in the past, the failure to 
draw on these or account for such issues in peacebuilding literature leads to two possible 
problems. The first is that scholars are not cognisant or interested in challenging and 
transforming these larger issues, thereby theoretically binding their critiques to problem-
solving work which can only ever make short term improvements in post-conflict states. If, 
however, and as many scholars within the dataset articulated, their intent to transform processes 
in post-conflict states is to generate a new outcome (as opposed to an objective), then they are 
placing the onus of resisting, challenging and transforming the international order on the post-
conflict other. This task seems an exceptionally unusual one to place on post-conflict societies, 
given that much of what international peacebuilding seeks to address are consequences of, or 
are enabled by the conflict promoting elements of the ongoing colonial system and the 
international order - compounded by the direct and indirect actions of other external actors 
(such as Western states, international corporations, etc.). 
The third and final point here relates to the potential for transformation and alternatives. Here, 
we must consider the extent to which intervention in post-conflict societies may damage the 
ability of locals to achieve peace on their own. The push to delve deeper into local societies, in 




form of unavoidable ‘cultural violence’, whereupon the norms, practices and understandings 
of international actors interact and contrast with local ones. While such processes of hybridity 
are unavoidable, and scholars such as Richmond have noted how subaltern agency and 
resistance can in fact benefit from this act – intervention can be emancipatory - we must 
consider what damage is being done, not just to the other, but to our ability to imagine possible 
and virtual futures. Where Western hubris previously enabled the creation of artificial civil 
societies in post-conflict spaces to then undertake ‘local’ peacebuilding (Campbell, 2011), the 
‘pragmatic turn’ (Chandler, 2017b) has intensified the need for contextual understandings and 
reflected an embracing of relativism that has prevented the imagining of new orders while 
somehow mitigating the need to increase reflexive analysis (chapter 7). 
Where overarching principles of peace are increasingly scrutinized by scholars much of this 
effort focuses on understanding its contextual elements through programmes such as the 
‘everyday peace’ indicators.136 These are driven by two rationales. The first is that by knowing 
how peace is understood locally, we might better produce the conditions which enable it. The 
second is that through a greater understanding of the various characteristics of peace, patterns 
will begin to form through which we can better establish contextualised variants (sentiment 
expressed in interviews). While both efforts are understandably positive, they also 
(conveniently) require a significant amount of new field work by scholars to study and 
interview local subjects and understand ‘what peace means’ in each environ. This will 
undoubtedly lead to a better understanding of peace in various contexts, but it may also 
denigrate the quality of peace; to what extent is contextualised peace simply a reflection of 
differences in what is deemed possible by those communities? And how do we ensure that 
‘good enough’ governance or peacebuilding (Wallis, 2017) is not being replaced by ‘good 
enough’ peace? Furthermore, to what extent are everyday peace indicators going to be applied 
reflexively on societies within the Global North?137 By describing what kinds of peace exist, 
we fail to look at what kinds of peace might, or should exist – we fail to imagine. A better path 
forward may have been to draw on understandings of agonism and anarcho-pacifism to identify 
 
136 See, for example, (Mac Ginty, 2013b; Nepali and Bhandari, 2017; Firchow, 2018). A host of new research 
projects have also begun in Sweden and the U.K. to further identify indicators which contribute to ongoing efforts, 
such as the Everyday Peace Indicator research initiative  headed by Pamina Firchow 
https://everydaypeaceindicators.org/. 
137 Just how hypocritical is the effort of scholars to establish representative and agile governance mechanisms in 
post-conflict societies when their own democracies are not only struggling under the rise of alt-right extremism, 
co-option by corporate lobbying, and mass social engineering projects (Cambridge Analytica’s role in the election 
of Trump and vote for Brexit for example), but they have become increasingly susceptible to external election 
interference (Washington Post, 2019) – something that many within the Global North have been undertaking 




non-negotiable principles of peace such as a commitment to non-violence and the eschewal of 
domination and oppression (see suggestions below). 
In their effort to grapple with complexity, scholars consciously and unconsciously decide 
which factors are significant for their interpretation of the world. That many of the above 
questions remain unaccounted for and overlooked is evidence of the inability of academics to 
understand and articulate every relevant issue in every publication. The point here is not that 
scholars should engage with such discussions in every instance, lest an awareness of systemic 
factors is invoked in the same manner as the lofty desire to contribute to various platitudes of 
peace (Chapter 7), but that, like peace, scholars need to devote more time and energy to grapple 
with these challenges. The point is to highlight why it is necessary for more policy oriented 
scholars to draw on the wider works that do this, and to ensure that we are not arbitrarily 
developing greater and more complex understandings of the post-conflict other which 
contribute little to transformation and emancipation of the subaltern. For those more critically 
oriented scholars, there is a lacuna of questions around systemic issues that appear largely 
untouched, and significant efforts need to be undertaken to recalibrate research agendas away 
from the focus of understanding the post-conflict other (and the fetishization of its parts), as if 
our own societies were faultless and perfect, to bring these discussions into the discourse of 
international peacebuilding and seriously reflect on where we can make the most impact. 
Reality check and barriers to criticality 
There is of course an entirely different and more optimistic way to understand contestation of 
international peacebuilding over the past two decades. There have been undeniable discursive 
shifts in how we understand and explain peacebuilding, and an exceptional challenge has been 
laid down by scholars to better engage with the post-conflict or post-colonial subject. While 
changes in practice have not yet matched these shifts, there appears to be an increasing (and 
less rhetorical) effort amongst smaller agencies and individuals seeking to accommodate and 
empower the local and to contextualise peace in a less hegemonic and top-down manner. While 
‘alternatives’ such as the post-liberal peace do not present the ‘end all’ solution to our liberal 
episteme and paradigm, they have had some positive impact – even if just to provide a heuristic 
container in which more scholars can begin to problematise such issues. Research is a 
collaborative effort, and the understandings and insights about what peace is that have been 
gleaned from the hundreds of empirical studies around the world might eventually merge into 




violence undoubtedly leads some scholars to prioritise policy-relevant research in an attempt 
to improve the lived experiences of post-conflict subjects. Rome did not fall in a day, and the 
long-term effort of dismantling one form of violence will inevitably produce another type that 
needs to be grappled with. From this perspective, it seems logical to try and improve the 
practices and efficiency of peace operations and reduce the oppressive elements of intervention. 
The narrative that academics have positively contributed to the discourse of international 
peacebuilding reflects, to some extent, the Western notion of progress. Without getting into the 
extensive philosophical debates on progress we must contextualise these advancements and 
retrenchments within an understanding of the structural factors that continue to permeate and 
subjugate the everyday lives of all people. Where the ethics, values and norms of societies have 
changed considerably over time, larger systems of inequality continue to demonstrate how 
good intent fails to be met by practice. Biopolitical and governmental forms of power will 
continue to transform and shape the relations and experiences of humanity, and we must 
consider how our critiques of more micro elements are shaped and distorted by these very 
systems we critique (or fail to critique). Progress must be judged alongside these broader 
elements, particularly understandings of social and environmental justice which, if not 
addressed, appear likely to undermine any of the short-term gains made through international 
peacebuilding.  
Critical work has been critical, in so far as it has connected some of these more transformative 
issues with the interests of the scholars studying them. So why do the revelations and insights 
brought forward in this thesis matter? Many of the conclusions drawn above resonate with 
other critical scholarship within the field, and scholars who view the genealogy of 
peacebuilding through more rose-tinted lenses might ask how, yet another study claiming that 
‘scholars have not been critical enough’ contributes anything of value. Surely the questions 
posed here refer simply to the ordering of research priorities in which I have attempted to argue 
that the problematiques of critical theorists are somehow better than everyone else’s, before 
lambasting those same critical theorists for failing to focus on the things that I believe are 
interesting? This is an excellent critique, and I have grappled with it over the course of writing 
this thesis. The problem, to this author, is not simply that scholars have failed to address 
significant areas of research including more radical and potentially transformative issues, but 
that the performances and institutions of academia actively circumvent and deradicalize these 
efforts when they do occur. The analytical framework used within this thesis to evaluate the 




scholars to seek radical transformation of conflict promoting structures, to challenge authority 
and systems of governance, and to make clear their normative values and intents in analysing 
the lives of the post-conflict other. The following section will briefly note some of the barriers 
to such endeavours, before suggesting some potential ways in which these might be resisted. 
BARRIERS TO CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
To Schuurman (2009), the failure of academics to critique the wider structures and systems of 
conflict can, in part, be attributed to differences in how criticality is interpreted. As was noted 
in chapter 2, there are many different types of scholarship that can be considered critical, and 
significant efforts have been undertaken by PACs scholars to maintain this capacity through 
normative critique. However, it appears as if such works have become increasingly decoupled 
from other aspects of criticality, such as broader historical analysis or meta-narratives in a 
similar manner to scholarship within Development Studies (Schuurman, 2009). Differences in 
how criticality is understood and employed by academics cannot account for this lacuna alone 
however, which are influenced and reinforced by the performances and institutions of academia 
itself. Though there is not space to unpack each of the socio-economic and institutional factors 
that affect criticality, it is hoped that by briefly touching on some of these more prominent 
barriers, future research can begin to more seriously identify pathways to overcome them. 
Perhaps most problematic of these limits are the epistemological and ontological biases of 
scholars, the extent to which they themselves are bound by broader structures, and the 
possibility of transformation writ large (theories of change). While these are fundamentally 
problematic issues, due to space constraints these are not explored in any great detail here 
(however, for excellent discussions see, Jabri, 1996, 2013b; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). Instead, 
and however naively, this author assumes that resistance and change are possible, but that 
emancipatory transformation can only occur if we expand the horizons of critical critique and 
more openly call out abuses of privilege. To do this, we must be aware of the numerous other 
barriers that restrict such efforts, so that we might resist against them. 
Capital 
Of great significance here is the ‘agenda setting’ ability and disciplinary power of both 
economic and academic capital, which constrain and reorient research agendas in the interests 
of the status quo. Capitalism co-opts (Bloom, 2017), and while the increase in knowledge and 
its production may fit the liberal narrative of progress, it is beneficial for more than just the 




business, and institutions of security and governance (Chomsky, 1967, 2002). Nearly half a 
century ago, Schmid (1968, p. 221) observed how peace researchers need to ‘ally’ themselves 
“with those who have power in the international structure” in order to have an impact. The 
influence of this relationship and the disciplinary power of funders to shape research agendas 
has had significant repercussions within academia through its preference of particular 
disciplines, methodologies, and research agendas (notably, policy-oriented and technocratic 
scholarship) (Schuurman, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2012; Chomsky, 2017).  
Similarly, dominant and well-established scholars have had significant impacts on shaping and 
framing agendas which potentially obfuscate alternative or more emancipatory avenues. Their 
ability to shape narratives are reinforced by the need for more junior scholars to reference and 
draw on their works in order to link into discussions and be read, while their interpretations of 
narratives can become so hegemonic that alternative framings fail to gain traction. This was 
observed within this thesis by the totalising effect that framings of the post-liberal peace (touted 
by scholars such as Richmond) appeared to have on how alternatives to the liberal peace might 
be considered (chapter 7).The dominance of this narrative was such that many (this author 
included) incorrectly believed that the post-liberal peace was an alternative conception, to 
which smaller incremental studies might contribute and connect. Instead, it appears that no 
grand alternative to the liberal peace are being formulated, and as critical scholars compete 
with one another as to who can be the least prescriptive (chapter 8), aspirational alternatives 
are unlikely to emerge as scholars fervently set out to describe existing localised 
understandings of peace. 
Scholarship 
The ability for more robust and aspirational conceptualisations of peace to emerge are also 
hindered by the very medium in which we publish itself. A significant observation to arise 
during the coding of this dataset (though numbers were not recorded) was the standardised 
formatting of academic knowledge; introduction, literature review, context, method, findings, 
discussion, conclusion. This is logical for a discipline seeking to understand the world, 
whereupon the problem is laid out, investigated, understood, and then finally solutions and 
implications are provided. Indeed, this thesis subscribes to the same format. The problem 
however, is that it seems to necessitate the endless reproduction of problematising and 
understanding the world, rather than imaging and producing alternatives – those areas in which 
suggestions and alternatives are most often found are typically the shortest sections and suffer 




A further concern is that solutions and findings within the dataset were targeted towards 
scholars and (elite) international actors (international peacebuilding organisations). The 
prioritisation of policy-oriented research within academic evaluation mechanisms such as the 
REF and PBRF (chapter 2) compounds this tendency through the weighting of academic and 
policy impact, all of which reinforce a research agenda which, though focused on the local, is 
undertaken for the benefit of the Global North. As noted by Jackson (2015, p. 29), "very little 
research is oriented towards providing advice to local non-state actors, groups and movements 
seeking to resist state oppression or overcome the structural and cultural violence imposed by 
states and international institutions". While new systems (such as alt-metrics) may have moved 
some way towards acknowledging alternative research outputs, these are compounded by the 
problems inherent in assessing impact through citation count and readership (chapter 5\8), and 
while they potentially allow for research to be written for the subaltern, they do not in any way 
encourage or require this. Unfortunately, accounting for such research was beyond the scope 
of this thesis. However, most scholars I spoke to seemed to produce knowledge primarily for 
other academics (in the form of research publications) or for policy makers and practitioners 
(in the form of reports and policy recommendations). As noted in chapter 8, this is problematic 
given it paradoxically attempts to empower the local through internationally led peacebuilding. 
  
Diversity 
As explored in chapter 5, the database on which this thesis was undertaken contained 
significantly less women, and a dire number of scholars from the Global South. While this lack 
of diversity was not unanticipated, tracing references through the CNA and CDA did not 
indicate a significant effort by these scholars to engage with academics within the Global 
South, as one might assume scholars concerned with local voices would do.138 While scholars 
from the Global South within this dataset were not coded more critically than other scholars 
(confirming observations that their studies are often more empirically based and problem-
solving given their proximity to post-conflict environments (Maclure, 2006) and desire to 
 
138 Engage here should be read as cite/reference. There are obvious issues with this reading, in that scholars could 
have engaged with numerous people through other interactions – however given the focus of this thesis on research 





reduce the immediacy of violence),139 numerous ideas are undoubtedly missed given the 
difficulties in subscribing to Western expectations of ‘good scholarship’.    
Publishing 
As noted in chapter 2, the structure of publishing systems and their editorial gatekeepers have 
an obvious and significant role to play in shaping discourses through their ability to accept and 
reject ideas. The most robust, referenced, and nuanced discussions on peace, for example, were 
contained within books rather than journal articles (chapter 7) yet the neoliberal academy (and 
scholars with limited free time) preference journal articles over books, leading to questions of 
what ideas might be lost within these 6-8,000 word limits. Equally, the proliferation in 
publications and knowledge producers (de Guevara and Kostić, 2017) undoubtedly reduce the 
ability of scholars to fully engage with a wide range of discussions, let alone scholarship from 
the Global South as it often fails to  subscribe to the norms of the Global North making it less 
likely to be published.140 This problem has been recently noted by Goetze (2019, p. 1) who 
argues that “local knowledge is disparaged” as “peacebuilding privileges knowledge that has 
been produced and is diffused in OECD-country research and academic institutions and the 
business world”.  
Knowledge transmission and epistemic closure 
How research is transmitted also has significant implications for the criticality of knowledge: 
first, because it can be distorted and have its critical capacity dulled and conflated with less 
critical work (as was the case with hybridity discussed in chapter 8). Second, because scholars 
appear to only infrequently read works outside of their discipline or epistemic communities. 
The barriers between critical and problem-solving theorists are fluid but extensive, and at times 
researchers “seem to belong to different paradigmatic, phenomenological and epistemological 
universes”, preventing the interpolation and fertilization of new ideas (Schuurman, 2009, p. 
833). Recent bibliometric studies have shown how scholars rarely draw on research from across 
disciplinary divides (or epistemic communities) and beyond a limited number of bridging 
publications, this is typically to briefly acknowledge or discredit the research rather than 
 
139 Given these journals are typically edited by scholars within the Global North, it may be the case that more 
critical scholarship was simply not accepted into journals given it failed to subscribe to Western conventions. 
140 Several editors were interviewed to understand how much scholarship was submitted from the Global South 
and why these were not frequently published. A common narrative was simply that it did not conform to our 
standards and would take too much time to edit into an acceptable format (their names have been withheld given 
this trend appears endemic rather than isolated to these individuals). Occasionally such scholarship is 




engage and utilize it  (Millar and Lecy, 2016).141 Institutional understandings of academia as a 
knowledge economy, whereupon disciplines must compete for resources, funding and students, 
suggest that such boundaries may be deliberately constructed as a strategy to maintain 
disciplinary independence (and survival). Similar divides were noted within this thesis to exist 
through physical space, suggesting that scholar’s awareness and engagement with research is 
both an interpersonal and spatial factor. This isolation may greatly reduce the ability for 
scholars to learn from each other’s findings and arguments, reducing alternative perspectives 
and potential innovations. The significant problem noted by Schuurman (2009), whereupon 
problem-solving and critical theorists fail to engage with one another in any significant manner 
because of irreconcilable differences, is potentially compounded across these other divisions 
of space and discipline.  
SUMMARY:  
It is important to understand how knowledge producers “are bound by [the] broader dominant 
structures of their times, both material and ideological” which, while not determining exactly 
what knowledge is created, nevertheless limit the boundaries for critical exploration (de 
Guevara and Kostić, 2017, p. 4). There are numerous performances within the neoliberal 
academy which are both a result of, and contribute to, the maintenance of this bureaucratic, 
‘neutral’, and ‘efficient’ system. Whether by the pressure to publish and be read, or by being 
unable to access and thus interrogate systemic factors of conflict in particular environments, 
every scholar’s imagination and critical capacity are tempered. The ‘technocratic turn’ in 
academia, however, is not an organic and inevitable construct. Mac Ginty (2012, p. 291) has 
noted multiple technocracies which are reproduced by both internal and external actors alike, 
which suggests that the current paradigm within the neoliberal academy is the result of 
victoriously championing against alternative theories, practices and methods. Given the 
significant number of attempts to challenge the resulting top-down practices of the liberal 
peace, scholars must believe that this paradigm can be transformed. 
There is an obvious need to do so. Improving the methods of peacebuilding which seek to 
alleviate the suffering of post-conflict communities is a noble endeavour, but it must be 
matched by an equal effort to transform both the post-conflict and international paradigm. 
 
141 Similar findings have been drawn by numerous scholars. For example, Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik (2016, 
p. 281) argue that the fields of Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding have developed “largely in parallel to each 
other, and often without any significant engagement between fields of inquiry”, despite much peacebuilding 




Critical theorists themselves need to do more than simply critique the practices of 
peacebuilding and transform our epistemes. Saying No is not enough (Klein, 2017) and 
alternatives must be actively constructed. Scholars’ attempts to uncover difference at the local 
level has generated a plethora of research which describe existing realities rather than explore 
new ones. Many critical scholars struggle with this task, fearful of generating research that can 
either be used to buttress the status quo or construct new hegemonic orders (Visoka, 2018), 
they tentatively sketch out desirable characteristics. These efforts are worthwhile, but they do 
not go nearly far enough in countering the fundamental flaws apparent in our own system, and 
given their high levels of abstraction, they, like numerous other critical theories, are open to 
co-option by the current order as other scholars seek to translate them into something that can 
be utilized. The following section suggests several ways in which scholars may begin to 
develop strategies of resistance against the neoliberal academy, and reinforce a more radical, 
transformative, and emancipatory research agenda. 
A Call for Change 
Here is what needs to be understood in our bones: the spell of neoliberalism has been broken, 
crushed under the weight of lived experience and a mountain of evidence. What for decades 
was unsayable is now being said…(Klein, 2017, p. 263)  
The good news is that PACs, and potentially the wider social sciences writ large, appear to be 
undergoing a period of change. No doubt much of this is due to the increasing pressures on the 
neoliberal academy, straining under governments’ increasing attempts to curtail costs by 
cutting public funding instead of fairly taxing businesses and elites (Harvey, 2005; Chomsky, 
2010; Shore, 2010, p. 15). But it could also be due to the dissatisfaction that many scholars 
have voiced in the increasing role that academia has played since the collapse of the Cold War 
- in buttressing power, adhering to market and securitization logics, and fetishizing particular 
parts rather than the system as a whole (Harvey, 2014). Where the 1990s presented the triumph 
of liberalism and the ‘end of history’, the years that followed have left many angry and 
impoverished. For the first time in history, it is projected that younger generations in the North 
will have a worse quality of life than their ancestors – and this has not been due to a global 
redistribution of wealth to the Global South (OECD, 2019). Indeed, socialism lay discredited 
due to its convenient yet false association with the fascist notion of Communism – while the 
(neo)liberal left somehow advocated for the market rationales of business interests, creating a 




(Chomsky, 2002, 2010). The resurgence of a violent and extreme Right has shocked many, but 
societies have mistakenly allocated the task of countering it to the state (see, for example, Ford, 
2019) despite their problematic track record in provoking these same fears and motivations into 
global conflicts throughout the last century (Perkins, 2004; Klein, 2007; Chomsky, 2010; 
Bloom, 2017).  
But right now, today, PACs scholars (and one would assume, many others) are increasingly 
reflecting on their position in this order. Ever more articles and research agendas contest this 
position (Richmond, 2007a; Shinko, 2008; Paris, 2014; Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015; Allen 
and Dinnen, 2017) and a string of introspective conferences on the field of PACs may have 
significant consequences for a critical (re)capture of the Ivory Tower.142 While it is unlikely 
that scholars will be able to resist the bureaucratic elites who have taken over their 
administrative thrones – many such elites being academics themselves – there is still a space 
for scholars to undertake acts of everyday and epistemic resistance and to ensure a more critical 
and emancipatory research agenda. Indeed, bureaucratic and financial pressures are set to 
continue diminishing the role of academia and education (Kelly and Kelly, 2013), potentially 
increasing the need for scholars to exercise their responsibilities from outside the University 
and privileged positions within the Global North.  
Transformation may still be made from within, however. As in the period of decolonisation in 
the 1960s and 1970s, PACs scholars and departments should make concerted efforts to 
radicalise their pedagogy (Freire, 2000; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012; Connell, 2014; de Sousa Santos, 
2018) and side with the millions of voices calling for change. The systems of power and ruling 
elites all over the world are being contested, as daily protests in Hong Kong, Brazil, France and 
the U.S.A, and a host of social and environmental movements  are showing. Nonviolent 
resistance is successfully being used to challenge abuses of power (Vinthagen, 2015), and this 
new world has a role in which both critical scholars and problem solvers may unite in a shared 
agenda for peace. For example, problem solving theorists might look to improve the techniques 
and strategies of such movements, to find ways in which subaltern groups may avoid Big 
Brother’s corporate and state surveillance, and spread awareness of the abuses of power. 
Meanwhile, Critical Theorists can take a more concerted and imaginative effort to question 
what new futures and realities could lie ahead by increasing their focus on those non-state 
 
142 For example, the 2018 Peace Research in Sweden Conference (Lund University) and 2019 Toda Peace Institute 
conference have both sought to take a step back and reassess the impact and direction of PACs, alongside a host 




communities in Mexico, Syria, Bolivia and others who have worked together to not only resist 
power, but redefine the structures and systems of society in more socially and ecologically just 
ways. Such research agendas may be too extreme for some readers, especially those who 
simply ‘came here for the peacebuilding’. However, there are numerous ways in which these 
scholars can push towards a more emancipatory agenda, irrespective of the extent to which 
they are dissatisfied with the current system. The following section outlines possible solutions 
to the problems highlighted in the previous chapters of this thesis, including future research 
that can be undertaken to better understand how criticality is reduced with the explicit intent of 
actively countering this. 
INCREASING REFLEXIVITY 
Of the many issues highlighted in this thesis, it appears there is a significant need for PACs 
scholarship to more thoroughly engage with understandings of reflexivity. This is not to say 
that the plethora of insights gleaned by scrutinizing the local do not have the potential to curtail 
negative effects from top-down peacebuilding, but that such efforts do little to transform the 
larger issues of the international system which must also be addressed. 
Being reflexive does not mean that scholars cannot satisfy their own intellectual curiosities 
(though perhaps such an argument should be made). Instead, it requires them to revisit the 
balance between their focus on the international and local in a more honest and frank way, and 
ensure that the current and overwhelming focus on local actors has not mitigated the 
responsibility of international actors and the Global North. As noted by Jackson (2015), 
external culpability in conflicts within the Global South are frequently downplayed by scholars 
who increasingly seek to find endogenous causes of conflict at the expense of the exogenous 
systems which enable them. This is not to say that endogenous actions are unimportant and that 
we should forget the lessons of the local turn and return to a more systems-oriented gaze 
altogether. Instead, it is to draw attention to how the narratives we construct around these 
conflicts omit external responsibility by looking for local solutions to ‘local problems’. These 
problems are not entirely local however, and we cannot hope to help countries if the largest 
enablers of violence are not held to account. Academics should play a greater role in shedding 
light on those Global North atrocities which remain hidden behind a veneer of secrecy. 
Thus, reflexivity should not only entail more historical analysis or meta-narratives, but an 
active desire to reflect on how current systems and processes are escalating and promoting 




whereupon our effect on the other is acknowledged and critiqued (Archer, 2007). Academia is 
not an independent estate, free from the interferences of business, politics or religion, and 
scholars need to more actively understand the ways in which the knowledge we produce 
continually obscures and reshapes the lived experiences of those around us. This greater 
willingness to be reflexive and engage with meta-narratives need not exclude the gains made 
in understanding the local, but it should question the extent to which scholars have avoided 
looking at the failings of their own states. Indeed, those scholars who are delving deeper into 
local contexts to describe the many varieties of peace need to think long and hard about the 
value that these works add, given they seem unwilling to prescribe alternative orders. While 
such work is undoubtedly useful in increasing our understanding of post-conflict environments, 
surely a more constructive effort would entail more actively resisting and countering those 
systemic factors of which their societies are a part, and which continue to generate the 
environments of conflict which they so closely scrutinize. Perhaps here there is an opportunity 
for academics to work more closely with both whistle blowers and investigative journalists.  
SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 
Knowledge is not produced (or published) in a vacuum and there is a need to engage more 
openly with the notions of criticality discussed within this thesis. Regardless of whether one 
finds critical theory too abstract to be of any tangible benefit, understandings of reflexivity and 
speaking truth to power should be evident in all scholarship to ensure that what is being 
produced subverts rather than maintains oppressive systems. While many similar frameworks 
exist, the contention of parrhesia, that truth tellers place themselves in a position of danger to 
speak the truth, raises serious and significant questions about the perceived impacts and 
audiences of research. Within this thesis, many works appeared listless and undirected, and 
discussions with scholars typically illuminated how infrequently we consider to whom we 
speak and what we desire to achieve. Speaking truth to power could call scholars to more 
actively engage in questions of who they feel might read their research, and to what effect it 
was undertaken. Overwhelmingly, academic knowledge is produced for academics. As such, 
accumulating greater understandings of the local, while appearing genuine and helpful, may be 
simultaneously self-interested and colonial. Though a focus on the local may allow 
international actors to acquire better sensitivities (Chapter 8), a more radical notion of 
responsibility might call on scholars to reorient such research for the local – published in 




there is a need for PACs as a discipline to more radically consider for whom their studies are 
produced.  
SCIENTIFIC AND OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE 
Given their normative and transformative aims, PACs scholars might also consider ‘doing 
away’ with performances which appear to be hangovers from the positivist paradigm. The 
notion that anyone, including scholars, can be truly objective is clearly farcical, and thus the 
academic showmanship of adhering to such dogmatic language appear almost hypocritical or 
misleading. I am not advocating here for an outright adoption of colloquial writing; this would 
obviously lead to significant confusion amongst readers depending on time and context (though 
for anyone who has read Wittgenstein, you may have already suffered this). There are clear 
benefits to the neutral and market-oriented language that we use in publications. It seems more 
professional and thus believable, increasing our status as experts. It also calls on readers to 
weight research on the facts provided, rather than the persuasiveness of the rhetoric used 
(though the extent to which this is true may be debatable). At the same time however, it 
obscures the intent with which scholars undertook their work, and their rationales for the 
solutions and findings posited.  
Thus, we might consider, as a discipline, adapting some of the norms that we have unwittingly 
taken (or had forced upon us) by more scientific departments and neoliberal pressures. For 
example, we could maintain neutral language within the methods and findings of our writings 
so as to not obscure the detail of our studies, while allowing for more emotive language during 
the introductions, discussions and conclusions. I do not mean to say here that we should slide 
into a mass of rhetoric and fail to engage with truth and experience, who knows what would 
happen next? We might end up becoming politicians! Rather, we could more openly advocate 
for why our research was undertaken and to what end. There are three potential benefits to such 
an endeavour.  
First, for critical theorists, so concerned with the co-option of their critiques, the use of more 
subjective language might disincentivise the technocrats from drawing on their work given its 




recognise when works have been taken out of context, or when findings have been adopted to 
a different intent.143  
Second, such language might force those same academics to engage more with the contribution 
their research makes and who it benefits. If a scholar claims their work has a normative interest 
in helping Afghanis who have been subjected to hundreds of years of great power politics, 
invasions and successive failed humanitarian and development interventions, calling for a 
better ‘understanding of the interplay between local and international actors’ seems eerily 
inadequate. While the claim is not unfounded, what use might this better understanding 
provide? How would an Afghani’s life be improved by an academic in the U.K. knowing more 
about matters already evident to them? If the aim is to critique the international, then scholars 
should be more direct and open about this. If the aim is to simply understand the local however, 
we must consider why this is necessary in more detail. Continually contributing to 
understandings, or proving and disproving theoretical frameworks, while intellectually 
invigorating, offers little immediate recourse for those suffering. As was argued in Chapter 8, 
the discussions around hybridity became increasingly esoteric and abstract over time. These 
allowed scholars to make all manner of conclusions which were only philosophically 
interesting while appearing instrumentally pertinent (for example, that you cannot prescribe 
hybridity). Thus, by adopting an emancipatory sensitivity and more clearly articulating our 
intent, academics and readers are forced to engage more with the effects of knowledge. This 
would not, nor should it mitigate the pursuit of critiquing our epistemes and frameworks 
outright, but it may more openly challenge scholars to underpin their research with a greater 
sense of either how it might be utilized, or more clearly indicate the utopias they seek. 
Third, such language may allow us to more openly speak truth to power. The neoliberal 
language of neutral markets impacting the working class needs to be rejected and blame needs 
to be attributed – both to individuals and collectives who construct, regulate and maintain these 
oppressive systems. While much of this thesis has attempted to avoid calling out individual 
scholars, and indeed claimed that it is the systems and structures that have shaped our 
behaviours, we cannot individually or collectively avoid all blame for partaking in this 
spectacle. This would be disingenuous to the subaltern for whom PACs scholars claim to work, 
and who resist and challenge oppression despite the obvious dangers they face for doing so. 
 
143 A similar, and perhaps less drastic solution might eventuate by allowing for the inclusion of a statement of 
intent, whereupon scholars are provided space to spell out the rational and benefits of their research more 




The norm of neutral and unemotive language within academia is the same as that is used to 
describe the increasing constraints upon academia and the neoliberal market rationality that 
enforces it (Olssen and Peters, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2012; Chomsky, 2017). The technocratic turn 
within academia did not materialise from out of thin air, but was deliberately constructed to 
serve the interests of power (Chomsky, 2017).144 There are people who benefit from these acts. 
They have names and addresses. Academia should take the mantle that journalists are 
struggling to hold and more actively and openly point out atrocities and speak truth to power.  
EXPANDING DIVERSITY AND ACCESS 
For all the talk of engaging with the local, attempts to draw on Global South scholarship appear 
minimal, despite the widely acknowledged need to do (chapter 5). There are obvious issues 
(such as language, research style, and access) that may prevent much of this research from 
impacting on the wider discourse. However, this does not mean that these issues cannot be 
overcome. In the same way that a plethora of new institutions have been set up to assist in 
transmitting knowledge to policy and practice, with a host of online databases drawing on 
lessons of science communication,145 such efforts might be undertaken to assist academics 
themselves. Here, a database might be set up to link research themes and findings to potentially 
display results spatially rather than by impact factor or relevance, as current databases are prone 
to do (discussed further below). 
Another option that might assist scholars in breaking out of their epistemic community would 
be to increase awareness and utility of bibliometric tools. This is not to say that scholars within 
PACs are unaware of these methods, but that there are numerous institutional constraints within 
humanities which prevent these from being more readily available and accessible (see chapter 
4). In addition to the prolific and expanding size of the discourse, there is no simple way to 
quickly understand the vast number of interrelated and disparate themes that make up and 
inform international peacebuilding. All tools appear to have a propensity to marginalise less 
read and accessed scholarship, diminishing lesser known work on the basis that it may be less 
relevant or simply unindexed. Tools such as the ISI Database, Scopus and Google Scholar will 
 
144 For example, while the neoliberal pressures of university have been long increasing in my home country of 
New Zealand, the quality evaluation framework of PBRF introduced in 2003 has had significant and damaging 
repercussions for scholars and staff in tertiary institutions and undermined indigenous research (Roa, Beggs, 
Williams and Moller, 2009). While all such measures have benefits and failings (Olssen and Peters, 2005), the 
push under the National Government (2008-2017) clearly envisioned Universities as research factories increasing 
the pressure to publish or perish. These acts, policies, and shifts did not come out of thin air – but were guided 
and directed by politicians such as John Key, Bill English, Steven Joyce and Trevor Mallard. 




likely improve over time, however, it might be worthwhile investigating a central database for 
peacebuilding scholarship for scholars which is unencumbered by copyright restrictions and 
commercial logics. At the very least, scholars should be more aware of the limitations of using 
any one search engine and explore ways to overcome the predilection to engage only with 
literature from the Western academy, most likely published and owned by a handful of 
companies which spoon feed researchers results.  
In addition to this, during data collection it was noted that male and Global North scholars were 
much more likely to have dedicated and curated profiles on online databases (such as Google 
Scholar or the universal ORCID). While such profiles may not immediately lead to greater 
research exposure, for students and researchers, there are numerous benefits to being able to 
access and quickly identify all scholarly publications by an academic, allowing a greater 
understanding of how their research and thinking has developed. Furthermore, while these 
profiles can often be automatically curated, they still require basic maintenance to ensure 
accuracy. At the very least, most require an initial set up and authentication by scholars 
themselves. Ventures such as Researchgate.net and Academia.edu are attracting increasing 
attention by scholars within humanities, and many appear to be listing draft manuscripts as a 
way of opening published yet paywalled material to increase access. While these communities 
provide numerous benefits by allowing all of a scholar’s research to be listed, they function in 
similar ways to LinkedIn and Facebook and have the potential to reify epistemic communities 
rather than expand them. While further research would be required to fully understand the 
impact that these networks are having on the PACs community, the ‘freemium’ service model 
of Academia.edu (for example) has a clear commercial interest in how it displays results, and 
has been condemned for considering preferencing sponsored research in the past. 
ResearchGate, on the other hand, is relatively opaque in how it calculates and presents results 
(such as metrics) and has automatically set up profiles for scholars in the past containing 
incomplete or inaccurate information, problematizing its use in identifying communities of 
scholarship (Jordan, 2015). Ultimately, it seems that through competition, an ever-increasing 
number of similar tools are being produced to connect scholars. While offering different 
features, these may also be dividing communities who may not have time to manage, curate 
and check all their relevant academic social media sites. Which option(s) scholars choose to 
utilize will largely be based on personal preference and what is recommended to them by their 




that most publication outlets will allow you to input this tag when submitting a new research 
paper, allowing for automatic curation (obviously this is my preference!).  
To this end, and in line with what was mentioned above, another way of increasing the 
coherence and accessibility of PACs scholarship would be to compile a more rigorous and 
dynamic database, unbounded by corporate restraints. Information science scholars have a 
single file containing metadata for all articles within their field, and a similar effort within 
PACs could have numerous benefits, especially if it was expanded to include more information. 
This would assist not only in clearly delineating the field and the research within it, but in 
enabling scholars to understand its areas of marginalised and overlapping critiques and of 
consensus and contestation. A post-doctoral student, for example, might gather all related 
research materials (that could then be synthesised by other scholars where gaps were identified) 
by expanding the bibliometric technique used to construct the dataset within this thesis. This 
could potentially draw on open source and not-for-profit programmes such as Zotero and 
Crossref to link materials in a variety of ways. Rather than using key words and in text terms 
to produce results (as search terms do), articles could be linked via problematique and findings 
(in order of priority - primary, secondary, etc.), country, institution, theoretical framework, 
methodology, etc. If the programme were originally undertaken through SQLite or a similar 
database, a comprehensive reference library could also be introduced to improve citation 
network analysis tools rivalling institutions such as Scopus or WoS. These could then be used 
to both increase the accuracy of catalogued works and provide useful ways for research streams 
to be evaluated by PACs scholars. 
The benefits of such an effort would be significant to all within the field, whether they simply 
seek to understand the world or to change it. Being able to quickly identify the variety of ways 
in which practitioners had attempted to foster bottom-up peacebuilding efforts and their effects, 
for instance, might enable researchers greater insights as to what considerations may have been 
overlooked. Currently, any such effort is greatly hindered by the weight that scholars afford 
various theoretical and analytic frameworks (the primary contribution of many articles), which 
tend to obfuscate the empirical findings of research. While the benefits of such an endeavour 
are significant for policy makers, it would (arguably) be of even greater help to critical theorists 
by more clearly highlighting their marginalised areas of critique, compelling them to climb 
down from their lofty towers of abstraction and more openly contest and challenge the 
structures and systems upon which they previously sat. Linking research outputs not through 




understandings of areas of consensus which could then be expertly and succinctly challenged, 
as critical theorists are prone to do. It would also highlight the dearth of systemic factors 
considered in analysis, opening up new areas of critique, and if coupled with more normative 
and emotive (or intentional) language, challenge scholars to undertake more ambitious 
research.  
SIEZE THE MEANS OF PUBLICATION 
The need to play the game in academia is obviously significant. Even within this thesis, my 
own moderation and that of my peers ensured that many of its pages can be read in the same 
dull tone as an annual report on paper sales at a campus shop (though, I could be mistaken, 
having never bothered to read one). These processes of self and peer moderation typically serve 
a positive function in testing and verifying arguments, yet it is entirely possible that scholars 
cannot adopt more emotive and subjective terminologies in their analysis without significant 
detriment to one’s ability to publish. It is of little help to use such emotive language if top 
ranked journals will not publish such works (reducing the number of people that will see them), 
or people do not cite them because of their ‘unprecedented’ subjectivity. Fortunately, most 
journal editors are academics themselves, and the power to change these behaviours lies in our 
collective hands. 
Recapturing the means of publication could have numerous benefits for studies of 
peacebuilding and the wider PACs community in terms of rethinking the format of publications 
and increasing readership outside of academia by reducing access costs. This might enable a 
greater diversity of writing styles as well as reconsideration of how research is formatted and 
used to engage readers. The standardised format of research outputs within the Western 
Academy appears to leave little room for innovation and imagination (or at least may 
unconsciously disincentivise it). Scholars publish papers which identify a gap in the literature, 
investigate a phenomenon, and then explain the phenomenon and offer solutions or new 
research agendas in the conclusion. While there are routine instances in which this format is 
avoided, and larger efforts are undertaken to posit alternatives (especially in books), this is by 
no means the norm. By changing the format, we might allow (or encourage) scholars to 
undertake new research and explore new ways of doing academia. For example, journals’ word 
limits could become more flexible, or articles could reduce the (valid) need to lay out existing 
research by simply referring to other texts which lay out the same problem. Both would allow 




than continually challenging their parts (unfortunately, due to word limitations this cannot be 
explained in any further detail here).  
While international publishing houses have had significant success in their ability to curate and 
offer extensive selections of research to scholars, the costs of accessing these outfits are 
phenomenal – especially for researchers outside of academia or within smaller institutes. There 
is a significant disparity between Humanities and Natural Sciences regarding the amount of 
published open access material, whereupon Humanities research is often hidden behind 
paywalls despite its benefit to broader publics and its lack of direct commercial use (in the form 
of patentable technology for instance). The costs that these outfits charge to have research 
published as open access are (to this author) excessive, and as a discipline we should consider 
whether this is the way forward – or whether we should collectively move to alternative 
channels. While the open access movement is making strides within these endeavours, and 
publishers are currently rethinking their structures, a return to the University Press (for 
example) could present one option that eschewed market capture, which might receive the same 
readership if a centralised database (as discussed above before) was produced for PACs 
scholarship. 
While it is undeniably useful to have material listed with such publishers, given the greater 
impact they provide, we must consider whether these factors really outweigh the costs. Open 
access journals and independent university presses are increasing in response to these outfits 
(or cartels?), and new research tools (such as Crossref and ResearchGate) may provide 
alternative solutions that are just as useful, but less restrained by copyright restrictions. Though 
alternative mediums such as blogs, podcasts, and non-academic journals may provide an 
alternative way to disseminate knowledge, our own institutional structures offer little incentive 
for us to publish in such formats (‘altmetrics’), and we must ensure that we continue to maintain 
some form of peer review system so as not to lose the expertise and legitimacy of academic 
publications in the face of democratising knowledge (de Guevara and Kostić, 2017). Given 
most journals implement some form of peer review mechanism, whereupon scholars read and 
critique submissions for free, it seems that scholars could individually or collectively eschew 
expensive and restrictive publications for more open access ones. This could negatively impact 
scholars career prospects, given open access journals tend to be ranked lower than those in 
large publishing outfits. However, by working together, PACs scholars could undertake such 
an effort and overcome these issues, especially if headed by hegemonic scholars (the 




significant readership and could increase awareness of these journals by publishing in them 
instead of larger and more prestigious outfits. All in all, there are many ways in which collective 
pressures by academics within the discourse could either provide alternatives or transform 
(through resistance) the numerous constraints imposed on knowledge production and 
transmission. 
RESEARCH AGENDAS 
While the ideas above might provide several new research ventures themselves, it will probably 
come as no shock to readers that this author feels there is a need for a more robust, imaginative 
and critical engagement with the topics scrutinized within the field of PACs. Similar arguments 
have been made before, but it is high time that we collectively revitalise the discipline and 
emancipate it from the constraints of the Ivory Tower. We need to de-subjugate the field by 
adopting more radical, critical, and transformative research agendas, methodologies, and 
outputs. Rather than seeking to critique and ‘transform’ the international order by challenging 
practices of peacebuilding, we need to directly challenge the hegemonic systems, actors, and 
processes of which it is comprised. By expanding our reading groups, email lists, and friends 
whom we share after work drinks with, we can break out of the confines of our epistemic 
closure to engage with ideas from all manner of fields and begin to more rigorously question 
all facets of our current system including concepts, language and frameworks.  
We need to begin considering what peace and society should look like beyond what might seem 
practical or realisable from our desks. While this may entail fostering a better understanding of 
how peace has been conceptualised within local communities around the world, it should 
require an equal effort to understand peace within our own communities. More important 
however, is the need to find alternatives to the current systems (ours included), which requires 
moving away from our penchant to merely understand. For this, we need imagination. We need 
to aggressively and actively engage with what might currently be considered impossible, so 
that we can know what is desirable. Few studies within this dataset unpacked what it was that 
peacebuilding sought to produce and relied on a multitude of overlapping and contradictory 
platitudes to obfuscate this lacuna (Chapter 7). Imagining new futures and utopias rather than 
describing current realities and dystopias is undoubtedly difficult. The entire institution of 
academia seems designed to suppress such endeavours, while PhD students hoping to start a 
career might (with good intention) lambast those few efforts that have tried (I am sorry). But it 
must be done. Such efforts need not speak for the subaltern, but they should consider all locals. 




oppressive if they seek to emancipate others by directly encountering our systems, institutions, 
and practices, rather than enforcing our conceptions upon others. It is time we begin compiling 
a host of alternative orders to which societal transformation can be geared towards. 
On a lighter note, and for those wishing to undertake a less ambitious task after suffering 
through the last several hundred pages, this thesis has highlighted the need for a greater 
understanding of how our field operates. For example, we might interrogate in more detail how 
scholars draw on new discussions and literature to find ways of counteracting the negative and 
constraining influences of publishing houses and search engines. The rise in social media 
technologies within academia have obviously opened new ways to share and access research, 
however we need to critically assess their impact in reifying epistemic communities, or 
conversely, overloading us with repetitive and unimaginative research.  
Here, a more nuanced understanding of how research communities interact could illuminate 
how spatial and interpersonal networks (as well as epistemic divisions) might be overcome. 
One might also consider in greater detail the extent to which the increased competition and 
need for scholars to engage with actors outside their hallowed halls might negatively impact 
research agendas on a long-term basis. Untouched by this thesis due to word limitations, but of 
utmost importance, is understanding how the rise of pracademics within PACs, both through 
contracting work, and because of research evaluation mechanisms which encourage policy-
oriented work, de-radicalise and limit the types of questions asked and solutions posited. 
Ultimately, the avenues for future research seem endless, and before any such venture is 
undertaken scholars need to deeply consider precisely who they are writing for, and how they 
might have the most impact. 
Outro 
It would be futile to think that this thesis has been able to offer more than a shallow scraping 
of the depth and breadth of discussion surrounding international peacebuilding, and not 
everyone will be convinced by my call to be more critical. For those readers, I hope the 
understanding of academia presented was useful - of how the practices and institutions of 
scholarly debate deradicalize and distort knowledge before it makes its way out of our hallowed 
halls. For those for whom the more normative intent of this thesis resonated, I hope that a more 
critical and collaborative effort might venture forth. The findings and explanations for this 
thesis were a somewhat collective effort, and I gained immeasurable insights from drawing on 




Ours is a diverse and fascinating field, and the care and empathy embodied by scholars within 
it is remarkable. However, through time and considerable institutional pressure, our ambitions 
have either dwindled or remained unrealised. 
In the last half a century, Academia has undergone significant, but not unprecedented change. 
The rise in technocratic scholarship and dominance of policy-oriented agendas were heralded 
by numerous scholars before. The negative impacts of academia’s neoliberal rise were also 
predicted. Yet somehow, for all our expertise, we were either unable or unwilling to prevent 
these changes from happening. But our discipline and our institutions have not been the only 
ones affected by such changes.  
I began this thesis, however pretentiously, with the poem The Second Coming by William 
Yates. Since 2016 when this thesis began and Donald J. Trump was elected into office, this 
poem’s popularity has increased significantly, as people felt the ground beneath them crumble 
and wondered what new age of terrors we had entered. With increasing climate change, 
inequality, alt-right fascist groups, and authoritarian leaders around the world, what solace can 
PACs seek to offer, especially in the face of our own constraints? 
Our discipline is clearly at a significant fork in the road – or perhaps it is the same one it 
encountered in the 1970s. It could be the case that the centre of our field - its normative, radical 
and transformative intent - may have never been more than a clever marketing ploy to attract 
students away from political studies. Or maybe its centre did exist, but quickly fell apart 
through spatial and epistemological differences. Perhaps cyclical and esoteric debates dulled 
our passions so that we could no longer argue with conviction. Or possibly, our critical and 
emancipatory aims were simply inundated under the weight of theory testing and esoteric 
sparring. Buried, but still burning. This is not a thesis of pessimism and cynicism. We can 
choose optimism over despair (Chomsky, 2017). Following the election of Trump, Naomi 
Klein (2017, p. 262) argued: 
A great many of us are clearly ready for another approach: a captivating “yes” that lays out a 
plan for tangible improvements in daily life, unafraid of powerful words such as redistribution 
and reparation, and intent on challenging Western culture’s equation of a “good life” with ever-
escalating creature comforts inside ever-more-isolated consumer cocoons, never mind what the 
planet can take or what actually leads to our deepest fulfilment.  





Note on Appendix 
Given the three-pronged methodology utilized within this thesis, a significant number of 
additional research and analyses were undertaken to inform findings which have not been 
included within these pages due to word limitations. Some arguments and understandings are 
drawn on which one could reasonably consider to be common knowledge in the field, and thus 
detailed explanation has been omitted from the thesis itself with complimentary material placed 
in the appendix so that readers unfamiliar with terms can glean a rudimentary understanding. 
This is especially the case for chapter 7, which critiques conceptualisations of peace, and 
chapter 8, which critiques conceptualisations of hybridity, where both chapters have been 
written on the assumption that readers are aware of significant debates within these fields. For 
those who are not familiar with these discussions however, and either desire or require further 
information, more detailed break downs of the terms used and patterns identified within the 
thesis have been accounted for within the appendix. As such, while much of the appendix 
simply refers to technical data (such as coding steps), these other parts, clearly highlighted 
within the thesis and the appendix, can be considered supplementary material which readers 
can either draw on or disregard as they like. Given this extends the length of the appendix 
considerably, the referencing format has been aligned alongside the chapters it refers to, to 
increase coherence and comprehension. 
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Chapter 4 Appendix 
APPENDIX 4.1: DEMARCATING CRITICAL PEACEBUILDING 
The bibliometric analysis employed within this thesis was useful not only for constructing and 
verifying the dataset, but also for analysing it. Drawing on recent bibliometric studies (see 
Strotmann and Zhao, 2010), research methods such as co-citation and bibliographic coupling 
analysis could be used to discern and validate the dataset which was then qualitatively explored 
through the CDA, whilst simultaneously contributing to analysis by outlining the structure of 
the field and its various networks (see chapter 4 for research methods). The following appendix 
lays out the methods used to identify and collect results, and to build the primary dataset 
explored throughout the thesis. 
Appendix 4.1.2: Delineating the field of critical peacebuilding studies 
The interdisciplinary and contested nature of international peacebuilding leads to immense 
difficulty in delineating its ‘field’. Where bibliometric studies on more traditional research 
areas might rely on core journals or databases like PubMed, research areas that span multiple 
disciplines require a more nuanced approach to identify their limits. This is especially the case 
within Arts and Humanities subjects, which often appear to be poorly indexed in online 
databases (Moed, 2006). In these cases, fields are more easily identified by reviewing broader 
subject areas (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015), or utilizing inductive approaches to first 
qualitatively ascertain commonalities that can be then used to identify surrounding texts 
(Sillanpaa and Koivula, 2010, p. 150).  
For humanities subjects, the problems with these online databases are many, as the most 
frequently utilized tools such as the ISI Database contain truncated and highly selective or 
constructed datasets (Zhao and Strotmann, 2015), while more coherent databases like Scopus 
are often ‘unharmonized’ and contain significant variances in how much reference material is 
available for each text. These issues are well known within the fields of data science, and it is 
perhaps because of this that so few bibliometric studies appear to exist within PACs research. 
The few studies that have been undertaken (see, for instance, Sillanpaa and Koivula, 2010; 
Millar and Lecy, 2016; Bright and Gledhill, 2018) have all employed different research 
methodologies and utilities to construct and identify their datasets, and as such, repeat and 





To mitigate these issues, data collection was undertaken in a series of repeatable steps so that 
new search terms could be tested and either added or excluded to the dataset depending on the 
relevancy of results. As noted in Chapter 4, a series of keyword searches were undertaken 
following an inductive reading of critical texts and scoping interviews with authors writing on 
related fields. Multiple terms were tested and verified through co-authorship and bibliographic 
coupling analysis to ascertain the most coherent yet relevant dataset. For example, the inclusion 
of new keywords might present new articles/authors/ or journals for consideration, however if 
there was not sufficient overlap with other results it was unlikely these texts contributed to 
critical analysis of international peacebuilding. If they had not been cited by other texts within 
the database (verifiable via the CNA) and appeared to be on an unrelated topic, that keyword 
and its non-duplicate results could be excluded from the dataset and deemed ‘out of scope’. 
Terms were first tested using the Google Scholar Database and repeated in Scopus and Web of 
Science for any article published between 2005-2017. By obtaining search results from a 
number of databases and keywords, data cleaning was considerably easier, as the more an 
article was returned by these searches, the more relevant it was assumed to be. As such, articles 
that were returned multiple times and in multiple databases required sufficiently less correcting, 
while those articles that only occurred once in the dataset were more likely to be disregarded 
after being verified as irrelevant (these were typically false positives from Google Scholar). 
Appendix 4.1.3: Results 
The following tables breakdown the article retrieval rates for each of the three databases used 
to locate research outputs. Results were assigned a unique ID which indicated the database it 
had been retrieved from so that duplicates and results beyond the scope of the dataset (non-
journal articles and false positives) could be more easily removed before reviewing the 
suitability of each search engine. In total some 11,000 results were captured (with significant 
numbers of duplicates). After data cleaning, 2967 unique and in-scope articles were seen to 
have been captured by these searches, with Google Scholar returning the highest number of 
articles not found in other data bases (see the table below). 
Table 19: Retrieved article distribution by database 
 Total Articles Duplicate Articles Unique Articles 
Scholar 2585 (86 Scopus, 89 WoS) 2192 
Scopus 567 (86 Scholar, 133 WoS) 130 
Web of Science 559 (89 Scholar, 133 
Scopus) 
119 




Studies of bibliometrics typically favour WoS and Scopus over Scholar as the databases are 
not dynamic, have better bibliometric tools (such as the ability to download bibliographic 
information) and are generally more accurate in their indexing. The ease of use afforded by 
these databases over Google Scholar is problematic however, and the triangulated method of 
article retrieval utilized within this thesis suggests that this reliance by data scientists on one 
search engine may need to be revisited, at least within PACs. Most problematic is the finding 
that, combined, WoS and Scopus returned only 775 of the 2967 results (or 26%), and only 216 
articles (35%) of the primary dataset. Scholar, on the other hand, returned 74% of the full 
dataset, and 89% of the core dataset – though considerable manual cleaning was required to 
obtain and verify these results. Such figures seem to oppose the understanding that Scholar’s 
coverage of Arts and Humanities suffers from a lack of digitized journal publications and 
minimal open access, at least when compared to results obtained through these other search 
engines.  
These publications were spread across 935 unique journals, though 71% of these articles (2101) 
were concentrated within only 20% of journals (187), while 80% of journals (749) showed 
fewer than three publications on the topic. These results roughly conform to one of the central 
laws of bibliometric analysis, Bradford’s law of scattering, which holds that within any 
academic field a small number of core journals will publish most of the material while most 
journals (non-core) will each publish only a few relevant articles to any given topic 
(Leimkuhler, 1967). For researchers, Bradford’s law indicates the exponential increase in effort 
to identify and analyse material that falls beyond the core journals of a given subject (Gordon, 
1998), where finding relevant articles beyond a subject’s core publications offers little reward 
while requiring a significant amount of extra effort, leading such articles to have significantly 





Figure 21: Number of articles retrieved (per year)  
Similarly, 20%, or 621 of the 3109 unique authors within this extended database were 
associated with over half of all publications (61% or 1812), while 96% of authors (2992) were 
recorded as having published three or fewer times on the subject within the collected results. 
Conversely, 4% or 124 authors were responsible for 26% percent of all publications in the data 
set. These results roughly correlate to Lotka’s inverse square law of bibliometrics which holds 
that “for every 100 authors contributing one article, 25 will contribute 2, 11 will contribute 3, 
and 6 will contribute 4 each” (Turnbull, 1999). While Lotka’s law would expect closer to 186 
authors to have written 4 or more articles, rather than the 111 recorded in these results, this 
variance is not unprecedented within Arts and Humanities which are typically more fragmented 
than their scientific counterparts, and publications are often spread across a larger range of 
scholars (Sugimoto and Larivière, 2018). Furthermore, Peacebuilding's interdisciplinary nature 
makes it unsurprising that these findings do not conform precisely with bibliometric predictions 
given the immense diversity in scholarly backgrounds contributing to the subject area. 
Without attempting to discredit the results of larger statistical studies such as those carried out 
by (Sillanpaa and Koivula, 2010) and (Bright and Gledhill, 2018), their claims to accurately 
reflect the field of PACs is problematic in light of their reliance on individual databases. 
Sillanpaa and Koivula (2010) use Journal Impact Factor to identify the top journals in the 
seemingly limited WoS database, and then proceed to further restrict the scope of their analysis 
by analysing only texts with 27 citations or more (relatively popular texts from a bibliometric 
perspective). Bright and Gledhill (2018), on the other hand, surveyed scholars from Peace and 
















rankings, but then use Scopus in isolation to obtain data for their analysis, missing journals 
such as Peacebuilding, a Peace and Conflict studies journal dedicated to transformative and 
critical analysis, alongside a host of potentially relevant articles. Furthermore, their actual 
analysis of whether the discipline is divided by writings on peace or conflict is not nuanced 
enough to distinguish between those dedicated Peace and Conflict scholars and those scholars 
simply studying topics related to peace or conflict (for example, scholars of security studies, 
international relations, or political science). These problems can be forgiven in noting that both 
studies are less concerned with the critical capacity of Peace and Conflict studies, and it is 
likely that their potentially limited datasets manage to capture mainstream thinking accurately. 
However, it must be noted that these approaches blur the conceptual distinction between PACs 
as a discipline and peace and conflict studies as an area of study, possibly weakening the 
analytical distinction upon which the discipline was founded.146   
Appendix 4.1.3: Delineating the core of Critical Peacebuilding Studies 
From these measures it was possible to identify a nucleus of authors that were most engaged 
with critical peacebuilding scholarship, as well as journals most likely to publish works on the 
subject. In line with other studies surveying disciplines, a clear threshold was introduced to 
limit the scope of analysis and increase the likelihood that results would accurately reflect those 
engaged with theories of critical peacebuilding. The threshold was set to scholars authoring or 
co-authoring 4 or more of the 2967 articles captured within the data base.147 This threshold is 
arbitrarily established and could have been set at a different level or included other metrics 
(such as the impact factor of articles or the journals they were published in). However, it was 
believed that such refinements would reduce the likelihood of critical voices being captured as 
such metrics would likely be biased towards popular or mainstream work. Thus, considerations 
such as an articles’ impact factor were not considered for dataset selection, as this research 
explicitly sought to understand areas of marginalised critique. 
Table 20: Final Dataset Article Distribution by Database 
 Total Articles Duplicate Articles Unique Articles 
Scholar 539 (33 Scopus, 24 WoS) 389 
Scopus 173 (33 Scholar, 26 WoS) 21 
 
146 This author is aware of one other significant bibliometric study of PACs that uses Google Scholar. Undertaken 
by Millar and Lecy (2016), they utilize a constrained snowball sampling method to ensure only highly cited 
references are downloaded. It is likely that this approach greatly reduced the number of incorrectly indexed 
citations (along with the amount of data being analysed), but given that Scholar’s database is dynamic, this makes 
their study unreproducible and thus, at best, an indication of the divisions between disciplines. 
147 Given that authors only needed to be frequently, not solely, engaged in theories of critical peacebuilding, the 





Web of Science 162 (24 Scholar, 26 Scopus) 19 
All Databases  93 duplicates 605 
This resulted in a core of 111 authors (3.57%) who contributed to 21% of the total dataset. 
Reducing this threshold to 3 articles increased the number of authors by 117 (or to 7% of all 
authors) but only captured an additional 10% of articles (or 336).148 Raising the threshold to 5 
articles reduced the number of authors being analysed to 73 or 2% of all contributing authors, 
and reduced the number of works being analysed to under 19% of the data set (582). While 
setting the threshold at 5 or more articles would still have produced a sufficient sample size 
(with a 5% margin of error and 95% confidence level), it was deemed necessary to extend the 
sample size to 4 articles given of the qualitative manner in which these articles are analysed 
and the desire to include a larger variety of academics to more accurately identify critical 
voices.  
Table 21: Primary Scholars within dataset (organised by location) 149 
Name and location 
Berents, Helen (Australia) Hilhorst, Dorothea (Netherlands) Goodhand, Jonothan (U.K) 
Boege, Volker (Australia) 
Van Leeuwen, Mathijs 
(Netherlands) Heathershaw, John (U.K) 
Dinnen, Sinclair (Australia) Verkoren, Willemijn (Netherlands) Jackson, Paul (U.K) 
George, Nicole (Australia) Aghedo, Iro (Nigeria) Jones, Briony (U.K) 
Goldsmith, Benjamin E 
(Australia) Gleditsch, Nils Peter (Norway) Kappler, Stefanie (U.K) 
Kent, Lia (Australia) Karlsrud, John (Norway) Kelly, Rhys (U.K) 
Shepherd, Laura J (Australia) Lidén, Kristoffer (Norway) Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas (U.K) 
 Miklian, Jason (Norway) Mac Ginty, Roger (U.K) 
Wallis, Joanne (Australia) Stokke, Kristian (Norway) Megoran, Nick (Australia) 
Wilén, Nina (Belgium) Greener, Bethan K (New Zealand) Millar, Gearoid (U.K) 
Blanco, Ramon (Brazil) Jackson, Richard (New Zealand) 
Murshed, Syed Mansoob 
(U.K) 
Ahmed, Kawser (Canada) Lee, SungYong (New Zealand) Nagle, John (U.K) 
Baranyi, Stephen (Canada) Hudson, Heidi (South Africa) Newman, Edward (U.K) 
Byrne, Sean (Canada) Murithi, Tim (South Africa) Peterson, Jenny H (U.K) 
Charbonneau, Bruno (Canada) Kester, Kevin (South Korea) Podder, Sukanya (U.K) 
Donais, Timothy (Canada) Tellidis, Ioannis (South Korea) Pogodda, Sandra (U.K) 
Karari, Peter (Canada) Aggestam, Karen (Sweden) Pospisil, Jan (U.K) 
Le Billon, Philippe (Canada) Baaz, Mikael (Sweden) Pugh, Michael (U.K) 
Maiangwa, Benjamin (Canada) Björkdahl, Annika (Sweden) Richmond, Oliver (U.K) 
Mitchell, Audra (Canada) Hegre, Håvard (Sweden) Roberts, David (U.K) 
Paris, Roland (Canada) Höglund, Kristine (Sweden) Robin, Simon (U.K) 
 
148 These numbers were calculated by individual scholar assigned to paper given the extent of work that would be 
required to account for co-authorship, suggesting that in actual fact the number of articles that would be added to 
the analysis overall would be marginally smaller than has been indicated here. 
149 Please note, authors location was determined by their primary institutional affiliation noted in publications 




Peou, Sorpong (Canada) Jarstad, Anna K (Sweden) Schuberth, Moritz (U.K) 
Sedra, Mark (Canada) Kostić, Roland (Sweden) Sriram, Chandra Lekha (U.K) 
Skarlato, Olga (Canada) Krampe, Florian (Sweden) Taylor, Laura K (U.K) 
Zürcher, Christopher (Canada) Orjuela, Camilla (Sweden) Turner, Mandy (U.K) 
Albrecht, Peter (Denmark) Selimovic, Johanna M (Sweden) Woodhouse, Tom (U.K) 
Moe, Louise Wiuff (Denmark) Barakat, Sultan (U.K) Walton, Oliver (U.K) 
Munive, Jairo (Denmark) Bell, Christine (U.K) Visoka, Gëzim (Ireland) 
Mouly, Cécile (Ecuador) Braniff, Marie (U.K) 
Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba 
(USA) 
Piiparinen, Touko (Finland) Brett, Roddy (U.K) Autesserre, Séverine (USA) 
Finkenbusch, Peter (Germany) Brown, Kristian (U.K) Barnett, Michael (USA) 
Grimm, Sonja (Germany) Chandler, David (U.K) Firchow, Pamina (USA) 
Groß, Lisa (Germany) Cooper, Neil (U.K) Gartzke, Erik (USA) 
Wolff, Jonas (Germany) de Guevara, Berit Bliesmann (U.K) Joshi, Madhav (USA) 
Zanker, Franziska (Germany) Franks, Jason (U.K) McCandless, Erin (USA) 
Belloni, Roberto (Italy) Gippert, Birte Julia (U.K) 
Mitchell, Sara Mclaughlin 
(USA) 
Onditi, Francis (Kenya) Gleditsch, Kristian (U.K) Peterson, Timothy M (USA) 
  Zanotti, Laura (USA) 
In regard to the method of triangulation outlined above, had all three databases not been used 
to collect research outputs, a significant number of authors would have been missed out from 
the analysis. WoS, for example, returned no articles for 21 of the core authors identified within 
this dataset, and Scopus returned no articles for 13.150 Though this thesis did not use journals 
as a factor of exclusion or inclusion, all three databases also returned different results for what 
would and would not be considered a core journal. Such results suggest that PACs scholars 
should not rely on any one database alone when searching for research, but used a multi-tooled 
triangulation method such as employed by this thesis to garner a sufficient understanding of 
the field.  
It is incorrect to assume that every academic who sought to critically analyse peacebuilding 
appeared in this dataset; using different keywords and techniques to identify key authors would 
undoubtedly produce different results. The 111 scholars identified within this thesis comprise 
a highly constructed list that bear no ontological status as a group. They reflect a variety of 
disciplines, utilize a range of methodological approaches, and are scattered across the axis of 
critical and problem-solving theory. What they do represent however, is a group of scholars 
who make up a coherent, yet fluid, community engaged with critical conceptions of 
peacebuilding between 2005 and 2017.  
 
150 For example, the following authors would have all been excluded had this method of triangulation not been 




The discourse analysis highlighted several such prominent academics who were not contained 
within the primary dataset (see table below). There are a variety of reasons that such scholars 
may have been excluded, including technical and human error, but also due to the criteria set 
to identify them. For example, while Mark Duffield is a critical scholar who has written 
numerous times on peacebuilding, within the time period  captured within this thesis his work 
on international peacebuilding was primarily published in numerous books and book chapters 
which were not captured by the search. Another scholar’s absence, Morgan Brigg, was noted 
by several scholars as the dataset was being confirmed. While much of his research overlaps 
with post-colonial themes of development, Brigg’s works were only cited 14 times by articles 
within the dataset – potentially given much of his focus is on indigenous understandings and 
processes, rather than peacebuilding as it was reflected within this thesis. Other scholars such 
as Alexander Bellamy (University of Queensland), Kevin P Clements (Otago University), and 
Florian Kuhn (Helmut Schmidt University) were well known by this researcher, however their 
absence as a primary author within the dataset can perhaps best be explained by their slightly 
less critical (as it was sought within this thesis) approach to studies of international 
peacebuilding. Ultimately, while this researcher wanted to include several of the scholars 
within the table below (notably, Goetze and Jabri), the wider focus enabled through the 
discourse analysis, and that many of these scholars appeared in the dataset for their co-authored 
pieces, meant that their voices could still be included in understanding the discourse. 
Table 22: Notable scholars absent as focus authors within primary dataset  
Bellamy, Alexander Goetze, Catherine 
Brigg, Morgan Jabri, Vivienne 
Chiyuki, Aoi Jarvis, Lee 
Clements, Kevin Kenkel, Kai Michael 
Curtis, Devon Kuhn, Florian 
De Coning, Cedric Ramsbotham, Oliver 
Dillon, Michael Reid, Julian 
Duffield, Mark Thakur, Ramesh 
Escobar, Arturo Tull, DM 




APPENDIX 4.2: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
While the coding of articles was primarily designed to identify and understand the various 
similarities and dissimilarities within the data sample, it also sought to understand how 
criticality had changed within the discourse through time and foci. As noted in Chapters 4 and 
5, the purpose of assigning a ‘criticality code’ was to rank articles (however subjectively) to 
understand how criticality was interpreted and performed by scholars. While the theoretical 
framework laid out in chapter 3 provided several research areas to focus on, the grounded 
theory approach of coding meant that there was no a priori understanding of how these areas 
might manifest within the data sample. While critical issues (such as a critique of the 
international order) were known by the coder, what this might entail and how one might critique 
this were largely unknown. As such, the coding schema was continually developed and revised 
throughout coding until the end where, after discussions with several scholars, final values 
were assigned. The following section unpacks this schema in more detail for readers interested 
in some of the considerations that went into this process, while coding summaries of individual 
articles is available online. 
For scholars familiar with the problem-solving/critical theory dichotomy, these categories 
broadly reflect the scale utilized within this thesis, as seen in the table below. While there are 
significant overlaps between the two scales, the orthodox scale was not considered nuanced 
enough to highlight those more radical elements outlined through the theoretical framework. 
The notion of subversive knowledge explicitly sought radical transformative knowledge that 
would challenge the status quo and (non-emancipatory) power. Thus, where critical theory is 
often seen to illuminate emancipatory space, and is often normative, it also frequently fails to 
contextualise analysis upon metanarratives (Schuurman, 2009) or offer alternative orders 
(Visoka, 2018). Rather than be overcome by cyclical debates about what is, and is not 
criticality, an alternative schema was devised to highlight those issues which emerged from 
PACs and critical approaches (chapters 2\3). This schema aimed to be provocative, explicitly 
seeking transformation of both the objectives of peacebuilding and the international order in 
the pursuit of more aspirational peace. 
Table 23: Comparing Problem-Solving/Critical Theory with Subversive Knowledge  
Stabilisation Knowledge  Subversive Knowledge 
 Problem-Solving Critical Problem-
Solving 
Critical Theory  





The theoretical framework and the understanding of criticality developed in chapters 2 and 3 
allowed for particular insights as to what issues critical theorists might seek to address, though 
precisely how these would manifest in the text was not understood until coding had been 
completed and variables could be reassessed and revised. The following section explains the 
considerations made during coding and its process, while the section following that explores 
the scale of criticality with references to texts. 
Coding process and considerations 
Articles were examined by reading the abstract, introduction, discussion and conclusion 
sections first, with specific themes, arguments and their contributions being coded as points of 
reference along the way. In line with the GT approach undertaken, if the author had not been 
coded before, if more clarification was needed on particular arguments, or if new ideas and 
conclusions emerged or were alluded to, the bodies of the article were skimmed and coded as 
well. Following this, the ‘analysis’ nodes were determined by rereading any points of reference 
alongside the articles’ introduction and conclusions and comparing them to previously 
examined articles and the broader aims of this thesis. Finally, technical nodes (such as author, 
year and country of analysis) were coded, and a short summary of the article’s contribution and 
coding decisions was made.  
Several considerations were involved in the coding of criticality and primary contribution area, 
which were tied to this author’s own interpretation of parrhesia (chapter 3) and PACs (chapter 
3). This desire for not only transformative, but radical critique, coupled with a methodological 
approach which focused on language, allowed for an analysis of texts that not only considered 
the ideas being posited and critiqued, but the ways in which they were encountered by the 
reader. Taking the notion of fearless speech to heart, the analysis sought to consider both the 
contribution made by an article, as well as the context in which it was made, pursuing 
indications of radical and transformative intent. Thus, the suggestions and inferences made by 
an article were noted, but also the way in which these solutions and the study itself was framed. 
Did the author seek to improve or transform a peacebuilding practice or objective? What were 
their justifications for doing so? Did they hope that this would be more successful in instilling 
peace, or did they hope that the transformation of the process would lead to a new type of 
peace? For example, calls for local ownership were made frequently throughout the data set, 
and it was considered important to discern the scale to which authors hoped that this ownership 
would transform the type of peace that might emerge, should their suggestions be enacted. Did 




this might be, and what this might look like? Perhaps more important was the extent to which 
they considered where the transformation of peace might occur – at the conceptual, local, 
national or international level? And how were these terms defined? Was this transformation of 
peace envisioned for one particular state, or for many? Could it transform not only the post 
conflict peace, but the peace in other countries, including non-postconflict ones as well? Or, 
more critically, was the primary contribution of the article a critique of a particular process 
where the suggestion of grounding it within local norms and customs was made simply to 
ensure that international (Western) norms and practices became more congruent making them 
less likely to be resisted? Simply put, was the article transforming peacebuilding, or was it 
improving methods of managing conflict? 
Many questions about the rationale and possible outcome of these works were considered 
during the coding process, and while answers to such problems were generally unstated and 
needed to be inferred, the coder sought to offset the subjective nature of such an analysis by 
drawing understandings from the language employed by the authors themselves – ambling 
through their writings and following the semantic sign posts laid out to guide readers to 
particular conclusions and insights. At times, phrasing was clearly endowed with intent, 
arguing for a methodological alteration to enhance international peacebuilding techniques, or, 
conversely, calling for transformational and radical departures to current practices which 
explicitly draw on local understandings and ideas of emancipation. At other times, language 
was used in ways which gave the impression of paying lip service to certain, especially critical, 
terms. As explored in more detail in chapter 6 and 8, such works seemed to ignore the 
etymological roots or socio-historic context in which these concepts arose and, arguably, 
should be engaged with. Still, at other times, wording was less revealing of an author’s intent, 
and their particular ideas or conceptualisations provided a better opportunity to understand the 
context and potential outcome of their argument. 
A significant consideration which was used to delineate the more radical or foundational 
critiques from their issue-focused peers was found within those texts which demonstrated an 
explicit awareness of external or systemic factors of conflict promotion (paradigm critiques). 
For instance, while scores of debate situated the problematic of peacebuilding on external 
intervention’s liberal ideals and processes, more critical work was also seen to reflect upon the 
conflict promoting elements of the World Order (a la Cox, 1981). While such scholars might 
still become entangled in critiques of a particular practice, they also paid attention to broader 




engaging with, for example, the makeup of the international or economic system and the 
legitimacy of violence. Alongside these articles were those that explicitly engaged with and 
considered the objectives of peacebuilding, or the type of peace being sought. While numerous 
authors attempted to situate their critiques as having the potential to lead to a better peace, those 
that took the time to unpack what this meant, how this might be achieved, and for whom this 
new peace was designed, were much rarer and typically signalled a more transformative 
agenda. As such, more critical work was seen to take both the notion of peace and 
‘transformation’ to heart and posit alternatives to both the processes of peacebuilding as well 
as its outcomes, engaging with or advancing alternative orders or arrangements of power.  
For example, a critique of land reformation and redistribution practices within a post-conflict 
state could focus on how this particular process is carried out and the ways in which some 
groups may be left out of the process, advocating greater inclusion of marginalised peoples (an 
‘improvement’). It could also critique the way in which these processes are informed by 
external norms of liberalism and private property, which clash with indigenous understandings 
of land, and potentially suggest how either the problems caused by these differences might be 
overcome or that the notion of private property as it has been instilled in this post-conflict state 
requires further consideration (‘critical improvement’). If the author brings further external or 
systemic considerations into the article, such as how the private ownership of land coupled 
with the effects of ‘free market’ capitalism lead to the wholesale destruction of environments 
and therefore have long lasting impacts on the ability to reduce conflict or achieve peace, this 
article might be considered transformative or radically transformative, depending on the scale 
of critique, the suggestions made, and the degree to which these were advocated.  
As noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, criticality is not synonymous with pessimism or simply 
‘attacking the system’ and a substantial component lies in its ability to generate alternative 
solutions and orders. While it was not possible to evaluate the long term emancipatory and 
transformative capacity of every solution and alternative posited within the data set in great 
detail, the target to which suggestions were made by authors (practice, objectives or concepts) 
were important in relation to an article’s criticality. While critical theories typically consider 
articles that provide practice or policy-oriented solutions to be less radical than their 
counterparts, given how such solutions often reify rather than transform the wider structures of 
inequality and conflict, this correlation is not automatic. Indeed, a significant amount of 




the hope that this might transform the type of peace being achieved.151 While such claims 
appeared frequently throughout the data set, the rational behind them was often convoluted and 
complex, requiring a much deeper evaluation than the coding process would initially allow. 
Instead, these arguments were unpacked and explored in a more normative manner (chapter 6 
and 7) before the coding of articles were finalised (chapter 5).  
Ultimately, given the desire of this thesis to identify radical and transformative theories of 
peacebuilding, the suggestions that articles made, implicitly or explicitly, were of great interest 
to the coder and were often noted as points of reference. Despite this interest, and in an attempt 
to balance the divisions between theoretical and practical advancements, the critical 
consideration of a suggestion was weighted into the nodes of ‘analysis’ to which they most 
impacted, rather than being coded on its own. Here, suggestions informed the ‘primary area of 
contribution’ by being balanced alongside the problematique identified within an article. If the 
conclusions and suggestions drawn by the author critiqued a different level (for example, the 
problem identified by an author was a theoretical issue, but the conclusions, suggestions and 
discussions were more oriented towards practice) then the article was typically coded in favour 
of the latter, given this was the final take away of a reader and, as indicated by the author, was 
the area in which their analysis was ultimately seen to impact. The suggestions made by an 
article were also important in assessing its criticality, and again, language and context became 
an important indication of how radical and transformative authors considered their ideas to be 
and the extent to which they were designed to transform or simply improve the current order. 
Ultimately, suggestions that targeted the operational level of peacebuilding, without drawing 
on its wider context or indicating how practical improvements might alter the type of peace 
being produced, were considered less transformative and were more likely to be coded as an 
improvement or critical improvement. 
A further point of note are those articles that remained decidedly neutral in both their 
exploration of peacebuilding’s many problems and the manner in which they recounted their 
findings to readers, presenting no explicit argument, solutions, or further insights. While this 
researcher understands that not every article is designed to fix a problem, and some phenomena 
are researched to simply provide clarity or a greater understanding, these texts were typically 
coded into the ‘improvement’ node, given their lack of explicit or implicit transformative 
 
151 I refer here primarily to scholarship on local ownership which argues for greater inclusion of local norms and 
practices in peacebuilding efforts, in the hope of achieving a ‘more durable peace’. The merits of these claims and 




ambition. While this might give some readers cause for concern, given that such work might 
be undertaken purely for the benefit of the Ivory Tower in which they and their colleagues 
reside, it seemed fair to assume that such work might ‘improve something for someone’ and 
thus it should be categorised alongside the plethora of other articles which conclude their 
inquiry by highlighting how they ‘have brought about’, or ‘deepened our understanding of a 
phenomenon’ which might, if expanded upon by others, ‘improve peacebuilding’. 
In line with this last sentiment, it must be noted that in the eyes of this somewhat idealistic and 
naïve researcher, one initially overlooked insight to emerge out of the coding (and later 
interviews) were the diverse array of reasons that compelled people to write on peacebuilding 
or become academics in the first place. While this might, at times, have led to pieces of work 
being judged unfairly, assessing them against a normative contribution to which they never 
aspired, this researcher is unapologetic for this outcome. Indeed, given the topic in question, 
researchers who take the time, resources, and effort to explore the lives of the dispossessed, 
who continue to exist in a world designed to benefit the few, out of pure intellectual curiosity 
and with no moral or normative ambition, do themselves and academia a disservice. 
Expanding on Criticality Coding 
While brief explanations of the coding categories that emerged have been provided in chapter 
5, the following section expands on these typologies for readers to grasp a better understanding 
of differences. While for many this may be of little interest, it is provided here primarily as 
supplementary material for those who require more detail. 
The following section explores these codes through examples. This is not to indicate each and 
every variation of the coding, but to highlight the broad factors that distinguished articles into 
different groupings. For further information, please refer to the coding booklet provided in the 
following section and the coded dataset (online) which contains summaries of coding decisions 
for each article. Alternatively, more information and quotes can be provided through an 
NVIVO output on request.  
Status Quo texts: While most scholars within the dataset expressed a desire to help the subjects 
of international peacebuilding, status quo texts were those most muted in normative intent. 
Often these would undertake large scale quantitative analyses to test the explanatory possibility 
of a theory. 6 of the 9 articles coded to this level focused heavily on the ties between economics 
and peace (a central component of the (neo)liberal and democratic peace thesis). However, as 




less to do with their analytic foci, than their lack of prescription, normative and 
transformational intent, and awareness of structural or systemic factors (such as how capitalist 
economics are themselves a cause of violent conflict). 
For example, Peterson and Quackenbush (2010) undertook a large-scale quantitative analysis 
of the relationship between the type of peace settlement, dyadic trade, and conflict reoccurrence 
between 1885 to 2000 (p.363). They argue that imposed settlements are more stabilizing than 
other types of political settlement, even when considering future and current trade relations. 
Their article does not normatively engage with its content and only proffers the understanding 
that forced settlements have historically led to greater peace(/stability). Irrespective of the 
validity of this claim, their article was written in an exceptionally neutral fashion (failing to 
indicate an emancipatory or transformative intent). Their focus on the ‘durability’ of peace 
denoted a violence/non-violence binary, which failed to consider the quality or desirability of 
the peace sought and achieved, nor did they engage with wider systemic or structural factors 
in a meaningful way. While it is likely that these authors had no interest in such discussions, 
from the perspective of the theoretical framework employed within this thesis, their article was 
seen to reify the status quo, where forced peace settlements backed with economic incentives 
might achieve stability and better manage the post-conflict other. Similarly themed, yet slightly 
more critical articles were undertaken by Gartzke (2012), and Murshed and Mamoon (Murshed 
and Mamoon, 2010), both of whom were coded as ‘improvement’ texts on the basis that while 
they were equally un-transformative in intent and critique, they did account for the broader 
negative impacts of the global economic system – which was recognised by the coder as a more 
tacit critique of systemic factors (see coded dataset for more). 
Improvement texts were typically more policy oriented than status-quo texts and often 
overcame the perceived neutrality of the latter by prescribing solutions (whether wrongly or 
rightly). While the focus and approach of their analysis were often more critical than the former 
category, they overwhelmingly critiqued the methods and practices of peacebuilding in un-
transformative ways, or prescribed solutions without critical intent.  
For example, (Krampe, 2016) looks at micro power projects within Nepal to show how these 
provide significant socio-economic benefits for local communities while weakening 
state/society relations, given it is not the state providing for communities. While Krampe feels 
that this deeper understanding might improve peace processes through the consideration of 




state, and no deeper conceptualisation of peace is provided. In a similar vein to Paris’s notion 
of institutionalisation before liberalisation (2004), Krampe argues that this process is ultimately 
positive, and state legitimacy could follow it after. Thus, while Krampe focuses on local 
communities and societal relations (a common theme amongst critical scholarship), there is 
only a muted desire to transform methods of peacebuilding, with no critical engagement with 
the types of peace desired, or systemic and structural constraints that could undermine these 
processes (including geopolitical considerations). The socio-economic benefits in this instance 
can be seen to placate rather than necessarily empower local communities, given this argument 
does little to increase the direct and democratic accountability of the state, but ‘improves’ local 
lives enough that they may not rebel (for similar arguments, see Bloom, 2017). Despite this, 
the act of prescribing (as well as the focus on the local) indicates a more normative and critical 
intent than the prior status-quo texts. 
Other articles could be seen to undertake similarly critical analyses but appeared to tacitly or 
explicitly reify the current system in ways that more critical texts did not. For example, (Hegre, 
2008) undertook a relatively critical analysis on the causes of conflict with no discussion of 
peace, (P. Jackson, 2009; Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, 2017) sought to improve the 
implementation of peace agreements without critiquing their content and the type of peace 
sought (chapter 7), while (Lemay-Hébert, 2009b; Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011) offered 
exceptionally descriptive accounts for peacebuilding failures with little normative or critical 
imagining of how these could be interpreted to transform rather than simply improve methods. 
There are numerous cases like these and labelling these texts as ‘improvements’ was not to 
infer that their findings were invalid or unhelpful. Instead, it is to suggest that, without deeper 
and more explicit efforts, such works could only ever improve the methods and practices of 
peacebuilding, increasing the efficiency in which post-conflict states could reach a minimalistic 
version of peace rather than an aspirational one.  
Critical Improvement texts often differed from their less critical counterparts in their 
increased normative, transformative or emancipatory language and focus. While their 
prescribed solutions and the potential outcome of their research was still seen to reify or 
improve the current system, this was less of a given than with ‘improvement’ texts. Like 
‘critical problem solving’ texts (Brown, 2013), these articles utilized critical approaches to 
study peacebuilding from a more emancipatory position, often with a deep focus on local 
understandings, actors, and needs. However, they also frequently prescribed solutions which 




objectives or the larger international system. By aiming for some improved quality of peace 
without determining precisely what this might entail (Chapter 7), these texts ended up 
producing a wide range of solutions that would reify, rather than reimagine, the current system. 
Despite this, these texts were often explicit in their normative intent to change or transform 
peacebuilding, and their perceived criticality was more a consequence of their failure to target 
wider structural factors, or engage more meaningfully with the types of peace desired.  
A good example of this approach can be found in (Wallis, Jeffery and Kent, 2016). Here, the 
authors argue that there has been a hybrid turn in which liberal international and local 
peacebuilding processes have become increasingly merged and co-located. They argue that, 
while this has been positive in its ability to derive more locally contextualised solutions and 
peace, local demands have often been misappropriated, damaging legitimacy and the 
possibility of long-term reconciliation. Though authors are interested in transforming the status 
quo (seen here primarily as the state) their solution is for international actors to spend more 
time understanding existing approaches to better assist in constructing bottom-up, hybrid 
peacebuilding processes. Such sentiments occur frequently within literature on local 
ownership, where the problem of international peacebuilders lies in their failure to fully 
understand the local, or to only rhetorically engage with local actors. This leads to a range of 
solutions which seek to increase international efforts and abilities to foster a greater experience 
and understanding of the local (Chapter 8). As such, this article is certainly critical, and the 
solutions are well intended, however they target the practices and methods of peacebuilding in 
the hope that new outcomes might be achieved without necessarily critiquing (or reimaging) 
the broader objectives of peace, or the wider systems in which post-conflict states will be 
integrated through the liberal peace project. 
Many of the articles within this code could constitute a form of ‘theory testing’. They drew on 
texts which had elaborated on more critical variants of peace or theoretical frameworks, and 
then applied these to understand a variety of post conflict contexts. For example, Podder 
(2013), and Maiangwa and Suleiman (2017), use the lens of hybridity to understand the failings 
of liberal peace interventions in Africa. Both draw primarily on (Mac Ginty, 2010a) for their 
analytical framework and claim that the exclusionary practices of international actors fail to 
engage with local understandings. Podder, for failing to understand local perceptions of 
security and insecurity in Liberia, and Maiangwa and Suleiman for failing to engage with the 
informal spheres of society. Both articles suggest that to overcome these issues, international 




to set agendas directly, or by being more cognisant of their everyday wants and needs. A 
plethora of similar articles exist (see, for example, (Jarstad and Olsson, 2012; Wallis, 2012; 
Brett, 2013) which undertake a range of similar studies in different environments to call for 
increased local ownership and understandings. While such calls are undoubtedly warranted, 
their transformative capacity is dubious (chapters 7\8). The solutions continually target 
international actors’ to be more aware and cognisant, yet in such a way that radical 
transformations are unlikely to occur. For example, Podder’s (2013) article which essentially 
calls for increased democratic oversight of security provisions does not challenge the 
legitimacy of violence writ large, only how it manifests in the post-conflict state by particular 
actors. Maiangwa and Suleiman (2017) on the other hand, effectively call on international 
actors to increase the congruence of the liberal peace by better contextualising it upon the post-
conflict other’s norms and customs. Both solutions are valid but challenge the practices and 
methods of operations in the hope of achieving different outcomes. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with this approach in theory, however these studies often seemed to engage with these 
more radical peace types as platitudes, claiming that their work contributed to these larger and 
more radical efforts, but with little consideration of how (Chapter 7). By merely stating that an 
article contributed to these greater understandings, the more radical and emancipatory intent 
often seemed to be diminished (Chapter 8), and the focus of these articles became simply about 
applying a new theoretical framework to understand a peace operation, and then produce a 
series of iterative solutions (typically ‘increased local ownership’) to improve the 
international’s engagement with local communities.  
Transformative Texts occupied an unusual space between critical improvement texts and 
radical transformative texts. While, as a whole, these were often more critical than the former 
(in terms of the target of their analysis, awareness of systemic factors, etc.) they could also be 
perceived as more critical due to their failure to prescribe solutions. Thus, where a radical 
transformative text might be differentiated by its prescription of new objectives, and a critical 
improvement text might be less critical by prescribing improved peacebuilding techniques, 
transformative articles often only prescribed new frameworks or understandings for further 
analysis. This failure posed significant problems for coding, given the understanding that 
critical theories needed to posit alternative orders, rather than simply critique them (Cox, 1981; 
Schuurman, 2009; Visoka, 2018). Because of this, while these texts were often more critical in 
their approach and awareness of systemic issues, their failure to prescribe more than an 




Reinterpreting events or noting how further research might lead to more emancipatory and 
transformative understandings of peace or peace processes was not the same as constructing 
these endeavours themselves. As it seemed unusual to consider articles that offered little utility 
beyond academic analysis more helpful to subaltern populations experiencing intervention or 
to efforts challenging systemic factors than those similar works which also envisioned how 
such research might be utilized, critical improvement articles and transformative articles were 
regarded rather similarly in terms of their radical and transformative potential. 
Where such texts did posit suggestions, these were often quite similar to critical improvement 
texts – but were typically more explicit in their emancipatory focus and awareness of structural 
or systemic issues. For example, Moe (2011), looked at how legitimacy was constructed and 
undermined in Somaliland through the notion of hybridity. She views hybrid outcomes as 
potentially emancipatory and positive forces in the transformation of post-conflict states which 
might facilitate institutions beyond the established Westphalian order. Moe argues that more 
constructive and emancipatory variants of hybridity might be achieved by supporting 
contestation and positive mutual accommodation between alternative socially sanctioned 
norms and sources of legitimate authority, or alternative, if international actors were to work 
with difference rather than try and resolve and supress it (similar to theories of agonism). Thus, 
while Moe clearly indicates a more radical and transformative intent, their solution targets 
international actors calling for them to engage in different ways with local groups, which may 
allow for alternative peace processes and types to emerge through the accommodation of 
difference.  
A similar point is made by Aggestam and Strömbom (2013), who provide a critical analysis of 
the enabling and constraining conditions of NGOs working in Palestine and Israel. These 
authors argue that while many local NGOs attempt to challenge hegemonic discourses, they 
are often excluded by these processes which are driven and dominated by elites. They call for 
the re-politicisation of peace processes to allow for more diverse opinions, putting peace back 
into the public arena, and making international donors more aware of local diversity. This, they 
argue, could allow for discussions of alternative objectives and types of peace to emerge which 
address the structural and material conditions limiting peace. While this process is explicitly 
calling for a change in methods and conceptualisations to allow for a transformation of 
objectives, like Moe, it seeks to do this by challenging the practices and methods of intervention 
itself. Thus, while analysis and intent is more critical than the Wallis article above, the outcome 




despite desiring transformation of the types of peace and structures of political communities, 
they are unable to uncover these novel attempts themselves, and must instead critique methods 
and practices in order to open up these potentially emancipatory spaces. Like the local turn 
before it, whether such efforts will be rhetorically implemented or simply ignored becomes 
something out of their grasp. They have outlined what should be done, and other can follow 
through with finding out how. Where their article might differ to critical improvement texts by 
their more explicit radical intent, these scholars are unable to formulate what these visions 
might look like themselves in clear and coherent ways. The argument developed within this 
thesis is not that we should dictate the local, but instead undertake similar processes and efforts 
within our and the international system writ large. 
Most commonly, the suggestions or solutions posited by transformative texts suggested new 
research endeavours or frameworks for analysis. For example, Kappler’s (2013) article on 
research and academia occupies a more traditional ‘critical theory’ position in its critique of 
the frameworks and tools employed by scholars. This reflexive article assess how research can 
be affected by local agency and resistance and suggests ways to improve research 
methodologies and ensure greater sensitivity and academics by academics while countering the 
local impacts of shaping research narratives. As such, this article’s transformative capacity lies 
in the future ability of scholars to more accurately undertake research, rather than in its 
conclusions and critiques itself, which while aware of the methodological constraints on 
scholars, does little to consider and counter the larger structural issues within academia which 
distort and de-radicalise critical and subversive emancipatory knowledge (chapters 8\10).  
Further yet, some articles were transformative in their analysis, yet failed to posit any 
suggestions at all. For example, (Turner, 2015) analyses Palestinian aid efforts through a 
‘counterinsurgency’ lens. She critically reframes international peacebuilding failures as 
Palestinian successes by arguing that the objective of international peacebuilding is not to build 
a state, but to secure populations through managing instability to supress violent conflict, rather 
than transform the factors that lead to it. Thus, Turner critically assesses a particular 
peacebuilding operation and accounts for the ways in which Great Power politics continue to 
perpetuate the conflict and hinder Palestinian efforts to obtain peace. This, however, is done 
without the prescription of new objectives or methods of peacebuilding, and thus her critique, 
while cognisant of exogenous issues, is firmly grounded on their endogenous repercussions 
which would require further efforts for its critical reframing to become emancipatory or 




Radical Transformative texts were seen to most closely reflect this author’s understanding 
of subversive knowledge. While these texts critiqued a variety of areas, they often made an 
effort to challenge the objectives of peacebuilding and the types of peace being sought. They 
were notably more radical and transformative in their intent and language than other codes and 
drew heavily on post-colonial literatures and understandings of the subaltern, emancipation, 
and social justice. While prescriptions were not necessarily more frequent or critical than 
transformative texts, and a significant number continued to challenge frameworks and 
understandings, they were often significantly more reflexive of how research was influenced 
by structural dynamics and impacted on the lives of post-conflict peoples.  
For example, Mitchell (2013) critiques how the uptake in PACs programmes providing 
opportunities for students to undertake ‘field’ research has created an extractive relationship 
whereby vulnerable people are objectified as learning resources (which, can arguably be 
extended beyond students to researchers). Mitchell ties this practice to structural factors within 
universities and wider global politics which have increasingly required these forms of 
experience for employment opportunities etc., despite the minimal benefit that such research 
has for students. To this end, Mitchell suggests alternative research techniques which would be 
more cognisant of the damage caused. While Mitchell does not reimagine peacebuilding’s 
objectives, her critique understands how structural and systemic issues of the neoliberal 
academy have caused researchers themselves to harm vulnerable peoples through exploitative 
knowledge producing practices, and has laid out solutions as to how these factors might be 
reduced. Such reflexive critiques of academia’s role in producing and promoting conflict were 
considered radical, as while many scholars attempt to minimise the harmful impacts of their 
research, they often fail to consider who exactly their research benefits and how this may have 
been shaped and influenced by oppressive institutions (see chapter 10). Thus, reflexive pieces 
such as that by de Guevara and Kostić (2017), who consider the impacts of the neoliberal 
university on research, and Shepherd’s (2016) remarkably reflexive piece in which she 
considers her own positionality and privilege affect the discourse of peacebuilding were coded 
as radically transformative for their consideration of factors that academics themselves need to 
resist if we are to increase the transformative and emancipatory potential of peacebuilding 
scholarship (chapters 7 and 10).  
While alternative types of peace or objective were occasionally envisioned by scholars, (for 
example, Belloni, 2007; Roberts, 2011; Jones, 2014), critiques could also be considered radical 




(2012), for example, contests the understanding of violence inherent in intervention, where 
international violence is seen as legitimate and different to the illegitimate violence of the post-
conflict other. She argues that such distinctions show how violence is often framed spatially 
(between local and international) but realised temporally (between the moment of crisis and 
intervention), where the long term structural conditions of possibility seen to stem from 
international intervention somehow increase its legitimacy. The dearth of critique surrounding 
the legitimacy of violence and arms trade which the North profits from was considered a 
significant failing by this author (chapter 7). Thus, arguments made by scholars such as Jackson 
(2015, 2017a, 2017b), which called for a radical reconsideration of these factors, not just in the 
minds of scholars but as a central component of peacebuilding were considered radical both in 
their critique of our understanding and in their explicit desire to formulate the entire phenomena 
of peacebuilding around such concepts. The table below presents the code book used during 
coding with a description of each variable considered.  
 
 
Table 24: Critical Discourse Analysis Core Code Book 
Variable Codes Secondary Code Descriptions 
Document Type     Document Type has been noted primarily for the purpose of being able to 
compare the impacts of case study versus normative article approaches - though 
also to make note of particular types of critique. 
  Case Study   Article relies heavily on empirical data and observations to draw conclusions. 
    Primary International 
Focus 
The primary focus of critique is on international or external actors (for 
example, about a particular practice, method, or objective). 
    Primary Post-Conflict 
Subject Focus 
The primary focus of the critique is on the post-conflict subject (national, local 
or societal level). Typically studies will focus on local norms or customs in the 
search for alternatives or ways in which local actors resist or manipulate 
international actors and processes (such as studies which focus on subaltern 
forms of knowledge or peace) 
    Mixed Article focuses on both actors in a relatively equal manner. For example,  it 
might look at how local and international processes and customs clash to 
produce new ones (for example, hybridity and friction), or how international 
and national actors work to disarm or assimilate rebel groups. 
  Conceptual/ 
Theoretical 
  The article is primarily a theoretical or conceptual contribution - empirical data 
may be used to illustrate and clarify points, but this is for demonstrative 
purposes. Articles typically focus on particular methods of peacebuilding (e.g. 
democracy promotion), objectives (e.g. free market economy) or types of peace 
(e.g. local peace). 
  Technical 
Article 
  Articles which have been coded slightly differently given the specific nature for 
which the document was written 
    Academic Critique Academic articles are primarily focused upon academia itself, for example, 
'state of the field' articles empirically assess what academics have contributed 
to the discourse of peacebuilding, where critiques of particular academics or 
their theories criticise a particular approach or understanding that has been 
posited. While such articles can be appear as case studies or normative 
 
 
critiques, given the focus of this thesis they have been segregated for clarity if 
they explicitly target 'the field' of academia. 
    Introductory Article This article is typically an introductory piece to a special edition of a journal or 
topic. When appropriate, such articles were typically skim read to check if they 
made little original argumentative contribution themselves. These articles were 
later excluded from coding to avoid problems with identifying the extent to 
which the work was original or paraphrasing other articles within the special 
issue, where comments could not easily be attributed to an author. 
    Review Article While the selection process typically omitted book reviews and the like, 
occasionally articles were included in the data set if they were thought to 
contribute an original argument beyond the content being reviewed.  
    Opinion piece Articles of this nature were typically written in a much more informal manner 
and presented a normative argument built around an academic’s experience. 
Given such articles typically engaged less with other academics (through 
citation and acknowledgement) they were separated into their own category for 
clarity.  
Country Focus     Articles were coded to a particular country or institution depending on their 
primary focus of critique. For example, if an article was about peace processes 
in Sierra Leone it was coded to the relevant country node, furthermore, if an 
article was about EU peace processes in Sierra Leone both the institution and 
country node were coded. Not all articles were coded to this node, as not all 
articles focused on a particular country or peace operation. 
  Country X   Country of focus coded 





    Three large categories were recorded to determine the primary problematique, 
conclusion and contribution of articles. The primary problematic was derived 
by understanding the problem or question that articles sought to address and 
could typically be discerned from the introduction of an article. The primary 
conclusion area sought to understand the author’s final and most emphasised 
contribution as laid out in their discussion and conclusion – for example, if they 
posited a range of solutions, what were these targeting? The primary 
 
 
contribution was the coders interpretation of the articles core argument and 
solutions. Though this often matched the primary conclusion area of the article, 
occasionally the coders interpretation of the contribution differed to that which 
was given by the reader. For example, an article may conclude by claiming a 
contribution to creating some better variant of peace (objective) but provide 
only practice based solutions (practice). By providing two codes for this output, 
both the author’s and coder’s interpretation could be noted. 
  Frameworks, 
Concepts, 
Theories 
  Primary area was considered a critique or establishment of a framework, 
theory, or concept relating to peacebuilding. Such articles tended to be more 
normative in nature, or sought to present a new way to understand 
peacebuilding 
 Understanding  Primary area was a new interpretation or understanding of a phenomenon. This 
node was considered a sub-node of ‘Frameworks, Concepts, Theories’, where a 
new understanding was typically posited as a new ‘theory’ by scholars. It was 
separated for clarity by the coder so that a greater understanding of empirical 
theory testing (which ‘understandings’ were typically derived from) could be 
garnered.  
  Objectives   Objective here was conceptualised as the type of peace that was being sought 
or established, or what peacebuilding sought to achieve - rather than the 
outcome of a particular peace operation or the objectives of a particular 
method/practice. The purpose of this node was to more clearly identify works 
which contributed to understandings of peace as an objective, rather than the 
processes used to create that peace. 
  Practice   Articles were coded here when they primarily concerned a particular peace 
operation (e.g. the Columbian peace process) or practice (i.e. set of methods 
used to achieve peace). 
Criticality Code     The purpose of this code was to provide an indication of how radical or critical 
a text was in relation to the theoretical framework and understanding of 
subversive knowledge provided in chapter three. Coding represented an ordinal 
scale, where the distance between each of these codes was unknown and the 
previous codes could not be added together to calculate an articles criticality. 
 
 
 Status Quo  These typically focused on practices and methods, utilized a less ‘critical’ 
approach and focused on quantitative or large statistical analyses. They 
provided few solutions and expressed little transformative or emancipatory 
intent and were neutral rather than normative. 
  Improvement   These texts typically focused on the practice and methods of peacebuilding, 
undertook a limited critical approach and provided solutions which improved 
peacebuilding. They expressed little transformative or emancipatory intent but 
were often normative indicating scholars’ desire to assist post-conflict subjects. 
  Critical 
Improvement 
  Articles here typically focused on the practice or conceptualisation of 
peacebuilding without necessarily concerning the type of peace that would 
follow a more successful implementation. Critiques were often limited to a 
particular post-conflict state or the post-conflict paradigm, and rarely 
considered wider structural factors that hinder peace efforts (such as the 
international economic system). They were often normative and indicated a 
strong desire to improve or transform peacebuilding and obtain a better variant 
of peace. However, as solutions typically targeted the practices of 
peacebuilding rather than its objectives, this intent was often considered 
rhetorical.  
  Transformative   Transformative articles were typically more normative and utilized a more 
critical approach (often factoring in systemic and structural issues). They most 
often targeted conceptualisations and frameworks of peacebuilding and 
expressed a strong normative and emancipatory intent. Articles did not often 
pose radical solutions beyond understanding and theorising about 
peacebuilding 
  Radical 
Transformative 
   Articles were radically critical, indicating a strong normative and 
emancipatory intent. They considered structural and systemic issues, often 
undertook research in new areas that contracted previous studies or had been 
largely unconsidered. They offered radical solutions which targeted objectives 
or were tied to an explicit normative desire to transform the objectives of 
peacebuilding through their solutions. They were reflexive of the role of 
academia and the Global North in perpetuating conflict or the limitations of 
researchers to understand the subaltern.  
 
 
        
Field of Critique: Illustrative nodes 
 
The remaining codes were developed to identify the key areas that an article concerned itself with, particular arguments and findings that were made, and general 
observations about a text. The purpose of these codes were to highlight points of interest which had assisted in the criticality coding (for example, recommendations 
for further research), or points that should be further researched (for example, scholarly works that were not in the dataset but appeared pertinent to analysis). The 
grounded theory approach utilized within the coding meant that points were not coded systematically to generate outputs for quantitative analysis (i.e. how many 
articles argued against top-down peacebuilding) but instead, whenever new insights or arguments had been made. As such, these codes should be considered 
‘illustrative’ in that as the number of articles coded increased, the amount coded to these nodes tended to diminish as arguments and insights became iterative or 
repetitive.  
Code Description 
 Critical Conflation with Local  Author claims particular study, argument, or instance is informed by critical theories by drawing explicitly, and only, on 
notions of local ownership. 
 Critiques Framework or Understanding  Author critiques a particular framework, theory, conceptualisation, or understanding of phenomena 
Critiques Methods  Author critiques a particular process or method of peacebuilding or analysis 
Critiques Objectives  Author critiques a particular objective (as stated by the author), outcome, or type of peace 
Noted critical Approach  Author notes their or another's work as being 'critical' 
Observes or Describes Author observes or describes a particular instance (for example, the steps of a peacebuilding operation) using primarily 
neutral language and without overtly positing a particular framing of said instance. 
Reflexive of Academia  Author reflects on the institutions and influences on and of scholarship. 
Reflexive of Structure or System Author reflects on wider structural or systemic issues beyond the scope of a post-conflict state. 
Suggests Framework Author suggests a new or modified framework to better understand a particular case, process, or objective of 
peacebuilding. 
Suggests Understanding Author suggests a particular understanding or explanation of an operation, process, or objective of peacebuilding. 
Suggests Methods Author suggests particular methods for undertaking peace operations (or, in some rare cases, for studying peace processes) 
 
 
Suggests Objectives Author suggests particular objectives of peacebuilding - typically a type or aspect of peace that would be desirable. While 
many suggestions were made by authors for more 'local ownership' of a particular process, this was considered a shift in 
method rather than objective of peacebuilding, and thus such instances were coded as methods, while aspects of peace 
were coded as objectives.  
Suggests Further Research Author suggests further research in a particular area or using a particular conceptualisation 
Examples of criticality Occasionally a particular critique or suggestion was also recorded for its criticality, the scale of which were reflective of 
broader arguments made within this thesis. These included the same nodes of criticality that were assigned to articles, with 
the addition of ‘Transformative Local Ownership’ to demarcate articles that were transformative but on in relation to their 
calls for local ownership. 
MISC Extra notes and observations that were used for example’s in writing when attempting to demonstrate or justify particular 
coding decisions. Nodes included a range of themes such as; ‘constructs new framework or typology’, ‘misinterpretation 









Limitations of software 
During the coding of articles, several software limitations emerged that may have adversely 
affected the coding of results. First, the textual analysis features of NVIVO that were used to 
identify initial trends often struggled to recognise text in older publications whose typesetting 
had not been updated by publishers. NVIVO does not list these occurrences, which appear to 
have occurred in relation to parts of text (rather than the whole article), making it difficult to 
ascertain precisely how often text was excluded from searches. However, during the process 
of omitting technical text (references, bibliographies, figures, titles etc.) from the dataset to 
ensure NVIVO’s textual analysis was only carried out on an authors’ analysis (rather than 
bibliographic information which was instead undertaken through the CNA) two texts were 
identified as causing the programme significant difficulty. While statistically irrelevant, in an 
attempt to overcome this issue, terminology searches which were used for illustrative purposes 
throughout this thesis were further verified by reproducing the searches manually on PDFs. 
A secondary limitation of NVIVO was that, while it is capable of dealing with large quantities 
of data, the sheer number of PDFs, nodes, sub nodes, queries, cases, and links which were 
created and modified during the coding process occasionally exceeded the capacity of the 
programme, causing it to crash or fail to update nodes. While this was obvious for technical 
and analysis codes, the failure for ‘points of reference’ (used to collate evidence of coding 
decisions) were not always evident, given the sheer number produced and volume of text they 
contained. To address this issue and make coding decisions more transparent, analysis codes 
were collated in excel alongside a short summary of the article and explanation of coding 
decision, while example nodes were used only for illustrative purposes and if data needed to 
be checked and coding decisions revisited. 
Coding decisions 
Perhaps most problematic, is the practical difficulty in evaluating an articles criticality in 
relation to its context in a substantive manner. As arguments around local ownership can 
testify, many critical theories are in fact revolutions, translations, or refinements of previous 
critical theories. The rationales for last decade’s calls for local-ownership and bottom-up 
peacebuilding (which build on Lederach, 1997) reflect similar calls made within PACs during 





earlier (Chandler, 2010a). Given the extended duration of peacebuilding like activities and 
surrounding research it is difficult to ascertain the originality of knowledge or its influences. 
At what point should we consider articles calling for local ownership to be unoriginal or simply 
orthodox? When does the refinement of an old idea become significant enough to be considered 
in isolation? When critiquing scholars for their ability or inability to adequately contest the 
structures and systems of power, such considerations become important, as what might seem 
repetitive or iterative to some readers could be original and ground breaking to scholars who 
were unaware of similar work or who did not have access to existing research (whether because 
of language issues or institutional constraints). While answers to such questions could 
undoubtedly be made and defended by scholars, these differ depending on who is asked and 
when. Thus, while this researcher sought to assess work in relation to the discourse writ large 
(irrespective of publication dates) given the aims of this thesis, it must be acknowledged that 
much of the work coded less critically for being repetitive or iterative may have been 
pioneering and transformative upon its original publication. Given there is no readily available 
way to verify when an idea was first fermented and the different timelines and processes that 
each research output underwent during the publishing and peer-reviewal process, the most that 
can be asked for by this researcher is that others do not reiterate individual criticality coding 
independently of this larger study and condemn the merits of particular scholarship without 
considering that the interpretation of texts contained within this thesis is based off a reading of 
these texts in 2018/2019 and is thus based off a rather limited context. 
Second, is understanding that as critical theory becomes more accepted and prominent, it 
becomes less radical and thus less critical. Here, one would expect a pioneering article to be 
considered more critical than work which draws on and replicates its findings. While this might 
be the case for a study that sought only to determine criticality in relation to Critical Theory, 
the normative framework posed here was developed to consider and evaluate the discourse as 
a whole more than it was to isolate and point to ‘has-been’ critical articles (no disrespect 
intended). Subsequently, it is possible that some collections of articles have been coded less 
critically than veterans to the field might imagine if they were pioneering texts in an area which 
had been compelling enough to be accepted and reproduced by other scholars (who themselves 
should have been considered less critical in comparison). This is especially true for the 
discussion of hybridity (chapter 8), where the temporal analysis of critically shows how earlier 





that they enabled. On the other hand, this decision enabled the thesis to more clearly display 
areas of research that remained at the fringes of the discourse. Again, the thesis provides a 
snapshot of the criticality as it is read now, rather than over time.  
Third, this thesis is less interested in presenting a historical genealogy of criticality in PACs 
than it is in assessing how scholarship can be understood today. Though the historical overview 
it provides could enable assessments of whether scholars are more critical now than they were 
yesterday, no such binary narrative is provided within the pages of this thesis which seeks 
instead to understand how criticality has been utilized to contest the discourse. The patterns 
and nuances surrounding criticality that emerged during the analysis, while temporarily 
situated, are often more systemic, and the snapshot of the discourse that is provided, while 
reflective, is hoped to inform future scholarship rather than condemn the past. The accusation 
that scholarship is not critical is not a meant as a slur towards the hard work of its authors, but 
a normative argument to be more radical.  
APPENDIX 4.3: INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were undertaken in a semi structured manner to allow discussions to unfold and new 
avenues of enquiry to be explored dynamically and in response to comments made by 
participants. Interviews typically began by outlining the aims of the research project and 
findings from the CDA and CNA. Following this, interview participants were asked a series of 
questions designed to build an understanding of the perceived role of academia in international 
peacebuilding, their own positioning and contributions, and the constraints and barriers on 
academic research.  
For example, scholars were asked about what role they felt scholars might have in contesting 
the discourse of international peacebuilding and how this might be undertaken (the relationship 
between theory and policy). They were asked about their understanding of critical approaches 
to peacebuilding and the role that their research had in improving or contesting practice. 
Finally, they were asked about barriers on academic research and the extent to which they felt 
publishing norms and institutional pressures impacted on their work. Discussions were fluid 
and while most lasted between 1 and 2 hours, occasionally there was not time to cover all 
talking points. Despite this, these interviews were integral to building up a clearer picture of 





to contest or improve peacebuilding, how they drew on scholarship within the Global South, 
and what alternatives to the liberal peace existed. 
Expressions of interest were gathered by emailing potential interview participants directly, 
stating the aims and how they might benefit my research. Following this, and ethics approval 
form was sent which explained in more detail the steps involved, which had been passed by 
the ethics approval committee at Otago University in 2017. 
Chapter 5 Appendix 
APPENDIX 5.1: TOP WORDS 
The following table lays out the top 50 invoked words within the dataset (excluding common 
function words such as do, and, it, the, etc.). No further analysis was undertaken on these 
patterns beyond understanding the relationships between peace and war, and international and 
local (as discussed in chapter 5).  
Table 25: Top 50 words across articles 
Word Count Word Count Word Count 
peace 23617 government 6367 justice 4408 
international 16089 violence 5988 rather 4315 
local 15853 society 5783 level 4153 
state 15203 community 5778 well 4086 
political 15175 post 5694 national 4061 
liberal 10507 economic 5463 groups 3951 
peacebuilding 10237 civil 5282 processes 3950 
security 8962 rights 5218 even 3922 
conflict 8203 however 5133 democracy 3910 
actors 7834 human 5102 support 3883 
war 7788 people 5051 different 3827 
power 7785 institutions 5012 two 3813 
conflict 7451 building 4982 order 3787 
social 7195 many 4924 governance 3751 
development 6893 often 4861 democratic 3744 
process 6747 policy 4784 legitimacy 3682 






APPENDIX 5.2: COUNTRY CRITICALITY 
Unfortunately, undertaking an in-depth analysis of how criticality differed by region was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, during coding several patterns emerged which are 
suggestive of differences between the regions, which might be further explored in future 
research. The table below shows the criticality of each region according to the coding of their 
articles. It tentatively suggests that scholarship within the U.K. was coded most critically, 
followed by Northern Europe. While North American scholarship was coded least critical. 
Given numerous articles contained multiple authors, occasionally from a variety of regions, 
such a table can only be considered indicative as there is no way to verify the influence that 
each author had upon a particular research output. 








Status Quo 0 1 13 2 0 
Improvement 38 37 38 10 10 
Critical Improvement 67 62 26 15 10 
Transformation 42 26 10 5 6 
Radical Transformation 22 23 2 4 3 
Though these patterns were not able to be explored in any further detail, this author believes 
that such trends are dependent on geographic location (where scholars tend to influenced by 
their immediate peers, as suggested in the CNA), PhD supervisor (who mentored a particular 
academic), and the historical institutions of which they are a part or have been influenced by. 
For example, scholars in Sweden were frequently coded as more problem-solving than their 
counterparts within the United Kingdom, but were typically more critical than their Norwegian 
colleagues who often approached the field from a more IR perspective, and undertook large 
scale quantitative studies similar to many North American scholars. Canadian and North 
American scholars tended to be less sceptical of international peacebuilding efforts. 
APPENDIX 5.3: GRAEF AND RICHMOND TABLE 
The following table presents the results from reproducing the bibliometric analysis undertaken 
by Richmond and Graef (2012). As explored in chapter 5, though this dataset is more reflective 
or international relations texts than critical peace texts, it demonstrates how critical scholars 





scholars are unaware of such texts, it does indicate that these scholars feel such discussions are 
less relevant for the matters they discuss, potentially reflecting the lack of ‘big picture’ 
challenges to the international order and state centric system identified in chapter 6.  
Table 27: Frequency of dataset’s source articles citations of key IR texts (as identified by 
Richmond and Graef 2012)  
Theory/Author Year Publication References 
Classical IR Citations  Total 11 
Machiavelli 1532 The Prince 1 
Hobbes 1651 Leviathan 2 
Locke 1689 Two Treatise of Government 6 
Kant 1788 Critique of Practical Reason 0 
Clausewitz 1832 On War 2 
 
Idealism Citations  Total 9 
Angell, Norman 1909 The great illusion 8 
Keynes, John Mayanard 1936 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money 0 
Zimmern, Alfred E. 1911 The Greek Commonwealth 0 
Woolf, Leonard 1916 International Government 1 
 
Classical Realism Citations  Total 13 
Carr, Edward H. 1939 The Twenty Years Crisis 6 
Morgenthau, Hans 1948 Politics Among Nations 7 
Kennan, George F. 1951 American Diplomacy: 1900-1950 0 
Wight, Martin 1960 Why is there No International Theory 0 
Niebuhr, Reinhold 1932 
Moral Man and Immoral Society a study in ethics 
and politics 0 
 
Neo-Realism Citations  Total 11 
Kissinger, Henry 1957 Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy 0 
Waltz, Kenneth 1979 A Theory of International Politics 4 
Walt, Stephen 1987 The Origins of Alliances 0 
Gilpin, Robert 1981 War and Change in International Politics 2 
Jervis, Robert 1976 
Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics 0 
Huntington, Samuel 1992 The Clash of Civilizations 5 
    
English School Citations  Total 24 
Bull, Hedley 1977 The Anarchical Society 11 
Dunne, Timothy 1998 
Inventing International Society: A History of the 
English School 4 
Butterfield, Herbert 1965 The Whig Interpretation of History 0 
Wheeler, Nicholas 2000 
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 






Neo-Liberalism Citations  Total 28 
Keohane, Robert 1984 
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World political economy 6 
Nye, Joeseph 1973 Power and Interdependence 6 
Krasner, Stephen 1983 International Regimes 2 
Doyle, Michael W. 1986 Liberalism and World Politics 14 
 
Normative Theory Citations  Total 6 
Rawls, John 1971 A Theory of Justice 3 
Brown, Chris 1992 
International Relations Theory: New Normative 
Approaches 2 
Frost, Mervyn 1996 
Ethics in International Relations: a Constitutive 
Theory 1 
Nussbaum, Martha 2001 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach 0 
 
Constructivism Citations  Total 19 
Wendt, Alexander 1999 A Social Theory of International Politics 11 
Onuf, Nicholas 1989 
World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social 
Theory and International Politics 0 
Ruggie, John 1993 
Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations 3 
Kratochwil, Friedrich 1989 Rules, Norms, and Decisions 2 
Finnemore, Martha 1996 National Interests in International Society 1 
Waever, Ole 2007 Securitization and Desecuritization 2 
 
Critical/Post-Structural IR 
Citations  Total 80 
Giddens, Anthony 1986 The Constitution of Society 7 
Foucault, Michel 1980 Power/Knowledge 18 
Waker, R.B.J 1993 
Inside/Outside International Relations as Political 
Theory 13 
Ashley, Richard K 1984 The Poverty of Neo-Realism 0 
Cox. Robert W. 1981 Social Forces, States and World Orders 30 
Linklater, Andrew 1998 The Transformation of Political Community 12 
 
Post-Colonialism Citations  Total 70 
Said, Edward 1979 Orientalism 13 
Spivak, Gayatri C 1988 Can the Subaltern Speak? 25 
BhaBha, Homi 1994 The Location of Culture 22 
Anderson, Benedict 1983 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism 10 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Citations  Total 156 
Mitrany, David 1943 A Working Peace System 4 
Burton, John 1987 Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook 1 





Azar, Edward 1990 The Management of Protracted Social Conflict 9 




Citations  Total 20 
Escobar, Arturo 1995 
Encountering Development: The Making and 
Unmaking of the Third World 13 
Harvey, David 2003 The Condition of Post-Modernity 0 
Appadurai, Arjun 1996 
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization 6 
Scholte, Jan A. 2000 Globalization: A Critical Introduction 1 
 
Feminisim Citations  Total 16 
Enloe, Cynthia H. 1989 
Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist 
Sence of International Politics 9 
Cohn, Carol 1987 
Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense 
Intellectuals 1 
Elshtain, Jean B. 1987 Women and War 3 
Tickner, J. Anne 1992 
Gender International Relations: Feminist 
Perspectives on Achieving Global Security 2 
Sylvester, Christine 1994 
Feminist Theory and International Relations in a 
Postmodern Era 1 
APPENDIX 5.4: CITATION NETWORK ANALYSIS EXTENDED 
Several additional citation network analyses were undertaken to expand on and verify the 
results shown in chapter 5. The following appendix lays out these maps for readers to better 
understand how the relationships explored throughout the thesis manifest through 
bibliometrics. As in appendix 4.2, for many readers this information may be unnecessary, 
however, given the exploratory nature of citation network analysis some readers may find these 
supplementary and confirmatory analyses useful. 
Appendix 5.4.1: Bibliographic Coupling of Source Documents 
A bibliographic coupling analysis was undertaken of source documents within the dataset. As 
in chapter 5, this analysis groups articles within the primary dataset depending on the similarity 
of their bibliographies. Figure 22 below maps 519 articles (those not connected to the main 
body were removed to increase the clarity of the map). In total, these texts were connected by 
35242 links (total link strength, 65286) indicating a coherent and well connected dataset, 
grouped into 9 clusters through VOSviewer, which confirm the findings from the CNA laid out 
in chapter 5. The most interlinked texts were:  
• Richmond, OP (2011) Critical agency, resistance and a post-colonial civil society) had 





• Richmond, OP & Mac Ginty (2015) Where now for the critique of the liberal peace?. 
Link Strength 1221. 
• Chandler, D (2013) Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking ‘hidden’ 
agency and ‘resistance’. Link strength 958. 
• Mac Ginty, R & Richmond (2013) The Local Turn in Peace Building: a critical agenda 
for peace. Link strength 912. 
• Richmond, OP (2009) Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local 
Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding. 






Figure 22: Bibliographic coupling of source documents  
Appendix 5.4.2: Inter-citation Analysis of Authors 
Citation network analysis can also be used to understand the relationships between the authors 
of source documents within the dataset. Where bibliographic coupling of source documents 
shows the interrelatedness of works based off the references they jointly cite, a citation network 





instances in which these texts directly cite one another (inter-citation analysis). While this 
method of CNA is useful in its ability to show the transmission of ideas between texts and their 
authors more directly, when employed in a dataset of this scope (2005-2017) it could be 
considered less accurate given it takes 5 or so years for patterns to emerge in such a way that 
they can be analysed predictably (van Eck and Waltman, 2010; Zhao and Strotmann, 2015). 
Because of this, the CNA below maps the networks between authors, rather than individual 
texts, in the hope that this might diminish the influence of time given it charts links between 
scholars rather than their individual articles. As noted by Zhao and Strotmann, this method of 
analysis tends to replicate “power law-like distributions and a small number of highly cited 
objects (e.g., authors) are normally cited by an extremely large number of documents” (Zhao 
and Strotmann, 2015). Indeed, the decision made here to trace authors rather than articles 
comes at the expense of newer scholars to the field who’s prevalence is likely to be 
underwhelming given they will likely have fewer publications than veterans, and these will be 
less cited given the temporal element of inter-citations. For verification purposes, this is carried 
out in the next section on source documents.  
In addition to these limitations, due to a formatting error, citations between source documents 
within the dataset were not always identified by VOSviewer. While this error only impacts the 
analysis within this and the next section (inter-citation analysis between source documents), it 
must be noted that some 230 documents were affected (primarily newer publications). To 
verify the integrity and comprehensiveness of these results, a similar map was generated 
through bibliometric information published on the COCI Database152 (which obtains its 
material primarily from CrossRef). Though it produced similar results, the bibliometric 
information contained within this data set was less extensive than that compiled within this 
thesis and thus was disregarded as a substitute. Given the broader aims of this thesis, and the 
minor contribution made by this particular analysis, which confirms relationships apparent in 
the findings of Chapter 5 rather than identifies new ones, it is believed that these results remain 
illustrative of the primary data set and worth examining.  
The figure below shows the results of this analysis, mapping 271 authors (due to co-authorship) 
of the 577 articles which contained bibliometric information within the dataset. These authors 
are connected by 9034 links (citations), with a total link strength of 45139. The default 
 





weighting and thresholds of VOSviewer were seen to produce the clearest results (see van Eck 
and Waltman, 2013). Where the location on the map is dependent on the number of citations 
between these scholars, unlike the previous maps within this thesis, the size of each node is 
determined by that authors number of publications within the dataset. This option was seen to 
more accurately display the dominance of particular authors and the epistemic communities in 
which they were involved.  
Like in other maps, it shows the dominance of David Chandler, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver 
Richmond who all appear relatively close to the centre of the map (due to their extensive corpus 
of publications and inter-citational links). In the top right (red) are the quantitative scholars 
(primarily from the U.S.A and Norway), and in the bottom left are the Canadian scholars such 
as Sean Byrne. The orange scholars are primarily Swedish scholars, and the groups within the 











Appendix 5.4.3: Inter-citation of Source Documents 
As in the previous section, an inter-citation analysis was carried out on the primary or source 
documents within the dataset. As above, the relationships shown here are only indicative due 
to a formatting issue which prevented VOSviewer from recognising every citation between 
source documents. 
The figure below shows the relationships between source documents using the default settings 
on VOSviewer, mapped and scaled by the number of citations. It contains 337 source 
documents (non-connected documents were omitted for legibility) 28 clusters, and 816 links 
between documents. In the middle of the map in green are (primarily) Richmond and Mac 
Ginty’s works. Chandler’s works are towards the bottom in red and purple, while the Swedish 
and Dutch scholars stem off towards the left. The Norwegians and U.S.A scholars are located 
more to the top right of the map, Millar’s works stem to the top left. The position of Richmond, 
Mac Ginty and Chandler are again centrally located, given their high number of publications 
and large number of scholars who cite these key works.  Again, this map reaffirms the networks 










Chapter 6 Appendix 
APPENDIX 6.1: CRITICALITY OF SCHOLARS CHALLENGING THE LEGITIMACY OF 
VIOLENCE 
Chapter 6 seeks to assess the ‘limits of criticality’ within the dataset by exploring the dearth of 
scholarship critiquing fundamental and systemic issues of the international order which are 
typically seen to be conflict promoting. In this chapter it is noted that the legitimacy of violence 
is rarely challenged within texts. While one might assume that most scholars abhor violent 
conflict and their membership within PACs and focus on international peacebuilding indicates 
their desire to reduce violent conflict,  as noted by Jackson (2017a), ideas such as pacifism 
appear to be subjugated knowledge. By failing to challenge the necessity of violence, or its 
legitimacy (especially as it applies to all actors, not simply post-conflict societies), 
peacebuilding literature fundamentally fails to critique and propose alternatives to an 
exceptionally pertinent issue. The chapter finds that those that have critiqued such structures 
were, by and large, coded more critically than the dataset writ large because of this fact. The 
figure below compares the criticality code of those articles that drew on notions of non-violence 







Figure 25: Criticality of articles critiquing violence versus coded dataset  
Of the 76 articles which were noted as discussing issues of non-violence and pacifism, 40 had 
been coded for criticality. As can be seen from the figures above, those that critiqued violence 
(by discussing pacifism, nonviolence, or the legitimacy of violence) have a higher proportion 
of ‘radical transformative’ articles and less ‘improvement’ articles in comparison to the coded 
dataset writ large. 
Chapter 7 Appendix 
APPENDIX 7.1: TOP 50 PEACE TYPES 
Table 27 below shows the top 50 invoked types of peace within the dataset. As discussed in 
chapter 7, the primary invocation of peace referred to the liberal peace, which was most often 
drawn on to critique it and the practices undertaken to achieve it. The next most popular type, 




























peace, was often invoked in a more positive fashion. The following section provides a brief 
overview of the most popular peace types within this dataset, focusing on their critical capacity.  
Table 28: Top 50 Peace Types by invocation 
Name Invocations Name Invocations 
Liberal Peace 3223 Stable Peace 35 
Democratic Peace 524 Inclusive Peace 35 
Sustainable Peace 379 National Peace 34 
International Peace 355 Virtual Peace 28 
Hybrid Peace 258 Long Term Peace 27 
Everyday Peace 243 Future Peace 26 
Local Peace 219 Systemic Peace 22 
Positive Peace 140 Constitutional Peace 21 
Negative Peace 106 Effective Peace 21 
Emancipatory Peace 105 World Peace 20 
Postliberal Peace 103 Global Peace 20 
Durable Peace 102 Traditional Peace 20 
Comprehensive Peace 77 Western Peace 20 
Contemporary peace 76 Universal Peace 19 
Victor Peace 74 Indigenous Peace 19 
Civil Peace 64 Institutional Peace 18 
Lasting Peace 54 Post Conflict Peace 18 
Critical Peace 49 General Peace 15 
Capitalist Peace 42 External Peace 15 
Regional Peace 41 Domestic Peace 14 
Social Peace 40 Relative Peace 13 
Formal Peace 38 Good Peace 13 
Quality Peace 38 Interstate Peace 12 
Fragile Peace 37 Legitimate Peace 12 
Kantian Peace 36 Limited Peace 12 
APPENDIX 7.2 CONCEPTUALISING PEACE 
As discussed in chapter 7, a variety of different conceptualisations of peace emerged within 
the dataset during coding. To veterans of PACs, many of these will be familiar and no further 
explanation is needed. To others however, it might prove useful to briefly explore how these 
were elaborated on within the dataset itself. The following section briefly outlines these 
conceptualisations and how they emerged within the dataset. It argues that, despite the variety 





challenge the Liberal Peace, rather, they emphasise different, or replace particular 
characteristics. Following this, the invocations by year are charted to show how there has been 
an increasing willingness to engage with these terms, even if this has not necessarily been 
matched by meaningful theoretical discussions. 
The primary invocation of peace in the NVIVO dataset referred to the Liberal Peace which 
was drawn on by just over half of all articles (invoked 1887 times in 296 articles). This is hardly 
surprising given international peacebuilding is seen to attempt to establish a Liberal Peace 
through its practices and methods (liberal peacebuilding). This peace was invoked for a variety 
of reasons by scholars: from those arguing for its implementation (Paris, 2004) or against its 
implementation; or that it is the only robust conception of peace that exists and should be 
further developed (Quinn and Cox, 2007; Paris, 2010); to arguments that it does not exist as a 
robust conception of peace (Selby, 2013). While the coherence of the liberal peace may be 
somewhat debatable, given peacebuilders have been unable (and perhaps unwilling) to 
implement it holistically in a top-down fashion, its hegemony comprised of several consistent 
tenets seems undisputable. To this end, a comparative analysis by Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty 
(2014, p. 368) identifies five policy areas that are frequently focused on by peacebuilders which 
can be seen to make up the liberal peace: the promotion of democracy; the rule of law; an 
emphasis on human rights; security sector reform; and governance reforms.  
While Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty’s (2014) study made numerous caveats based on how its 
identified provisions may only be rhetorical, noting the mismatch between these aims and the 
often illiberal manner in which institutions were established, their subsequent studies expanded 
on these provisions by exploring how they were implemented in various peace accords (Lee, 
Mac Ginty and Joshi, 2016; Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, 2017). More recently they have argued 
that these provisions are at the heart of the Liberal Peace as it appears in policy and that there 
is a positive correlation between the implementation of the Liberal aspects of peace accords 
and the durability (read as longevity) of peace – though they note the difference between the 
duration and quality of ‘peace’ (Mac Ginty, Joshi and Lee, 2019, p. 23).  
The emphasis on these components is not static, and the prioritisation of these areas alters the 
type of Liberal Peace being sought. For example, an emphasis on the promotion of democracy 
often stems from a belief in the democratic peace thesis and has, at times, been referred to as a 





separate and enduring peace among liberal polities”, and it has been increasingly empirically 
verified by scholars (Goldsmith et al., 2017). Making up a component of the overarching 
Liberal Peace, democratic peace was mentioned 239 times within 71 articles (see, for example,  
Ellis, Mitchell and Prins, 2010; Gartzke and Hewitt, 2010; Coetzee and Hudson, 2012; Mitchell 
and Diehl, 2012; Creary and Byrne, 2014; Gartzke and Weisiger, 2014; Weisiger and Gartzke, 
2016; Goldsmith et al., 2017). These texts also illuminate many other variants of the liberal 
peace, such as the Kantian Peace, Republican Peace, Capitalist peace, etc., all of which are 
seen to form parts of the liberal peace. 
Despite this popularity within the dataset however, many texts invoked the Liberal Peace in a 
negative fashion, using it as a ‘strawman’ against which further enquiries into post-conflict 
spaces and critiques could be made. As established in chapter 5, where many scholars identified 
their problematique as the Liberal Peace, their critiques typically centred less on the type of 
peace sought than upon the methods and practices undertaken to achieve it  (liberal 
peacebuilding). Other more critical peace types do exist however, and these have been 
increasingly invoked by scholars within the dataset. The post-liberal peace is perhaps the most 
useful rubric through which to consider the variety of critical peace types (in the same manner 
that the liberal peace contains other liberal types). Within the dataset, this was most often 
developed by Richmond, and has, at various times, comprised emancipatory, everyday, local 
and positive notions of peace (see, for example, Richmond, 2009a, 2011a; Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2011a). Given its greater coherence, this particular peace type is explored in detail 
within chapter 7, while the remainder of this section accounts for some of its components and 
the other popular notions of peace as they emerged within the dataset before highlighting how 
invocation (if not theoretical development and engagement) of critical types has been 
increasing. 
The second most utilized variant of peace related to a Sustainable Peace which in a similar 
manner to other temporal notions of peace (durable, long lasting, permanent, etc.) refers to a 
particular characteristic – namely how long peace had occurred or could occur. Though some 





dimension,153 ‘sustainable peace’ appears to be invoked most commonly to denote temporal 
elements where scholars hoped to contribute to a more sustainable and thus long-lasting peace. 
As noted by Davenport, et al (2018), such conceptualisations of peace are commonplace in 
PACs, where peace is measured along a war/non-war dichotomy leading to minimalist 
understandings and less transformative critique. Thus, while these various terms may be used 
in an aspirational manner by some authors, they primarily, and most convincingly, refer only 
to the absence of violence over time (see, for example, McCandless, 2008; Donais, 2009b; 
Autesserre, 2011b; Khan and Byrne, 2016; Brett, 2017). 
While both International and Local Peace would appear to be spatially bounded concepts, 
International Peace most often referred to a generalist notion of peace, and was used 
synonymously with other concepts such as international order/stability/security etc. (see, for 
example, (Shepherd, 2008; Blanco, 2017). As such, the International Peace is not a particular 
type of peace, and authors that used this term did not attempt to ascribe characteristics to it, but 
instead used the term to denote a more universalist or general notion of stability. Local peace, 
on the other hand was used frequently to determine a more suitable or contextual peace and 
opposed the Liberal Peace rather than the International Peace. Again, the ‘local peace’ as it has 
been engaged with by academics appears to denote a characteristic of peace rather than a type 
of peace, whereupon it is locally driven, produced, or understood, and was often seen to form 
a component of emancipatory or everyday peace types. With the increasing number of scholars 
undertaking efforts to understand the ‘everyday’ peace (see chapter 7), it is likely that this term 
will become increasingly spatially bounded to refer to the peace as it relates to a particular 
locale – given the ‘local’ is not a coherent or unified entity.  
Positive or Negative Peace were rather frequently invoked terms and appear to be well 
understood, though somewhat undeveloped by commentators. It has been noted by others that 
while Galtung’s (1969) seminal article introducing these terms has generated significant 
discussion over the last half a century, understandings of ‘positive peace’ have suffered a dearth 
of theoretical development (Millar, 2019) and have declined in popularity (Gleditsch, 
 
153 For example, Höglund and Kovacs (2010, p. p.373,374) define a sustainable peace “as something other than 
merely the continued absence of war over time. It also contains a qualitative dimension, which concerns the 
consolidation of peace. When reaching this phase of the peace process, the termination of the war is no longer in 
focus, but rather the prevention of another one”. While their intent to impose a qualitative dimension is made 
explicit, it is unclear how successful they have been in shifting the focus away from the temporal and thus negative 





Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014). Within the dataset, these types of peace were more often drawn 
upon for aspirational purposes (‘towards a more positive peace’ - see, for example, Roberts, 
2011; Braniff and Byrne, 2014; Millar, 2014; Wilén, Ambrosetti and Birantamije, 2015; Wallis, 
Jeffery and Kent, 2016) or to demean an existing peace by labelling it as negative or minimalist 
(not war, but not much better). To commentators such as Davenport, et al (2018), the lack of 
development and utility in these peace types has been caused by their lofty yet fuzzy and 
problematic components, and they have argued to jettison the term in favour of more robust 
and measurable indicators of peace, rather than develop them further. As noted in chapter 7, 
while their alternative ‘peace continuum’ is useful in showing a scale of peace types and 
desirability, this author rejects the notion that all peace types need to be measurable. Such logic 
binds the aspirations of peace to our current experience and does not allow for radical new and 
more desirable understandings to emerge. 
Everyday Peace is largely seen to draw on the notion of the everyday theorised by De Certeau 
(Certeau, 1984). Its popularisation in recent years (see Figure 26 in the following section), it 
increasingly appears to be used as an alternative or synonym for ‘local’, and work drawing on 
the term often reads as an agenda for the inclusion of the everyday in the same way that earlier 
work called for the inclusion of local or societal voices (see, for example, (Berents and 
McEvoy-Levy, 2015). Thus, in a similar fashion to the local turn’s refocusing peace on local 
peoples, the everyday peace seems to relate more to answering the question of ‘whose peace?’, 
and offers little in the way of what an everyday peace should look like beyond including, and 
being sympathetic to, ‘everyday’ voices.154 Recently (and this trend looks set to increase over 
the next several years), there has been increase in literature seeking to understand everyday 
characteristics or indicators of peace, where scholars are undertaking qualitative and 
ethnographic studies to understand what peace is within the lives of everyday peoples . To this 
author, this trend reflects the broader relativist and pragmatic turn in PACs, discussed in 
chapter 7.  
 
154 Indeed, Richmond (2011a, p. 131), who has written extensively on the ‘everyday’ in relation to the post-liberal 
peace makes it clear that many of these same issues exist which show how undertheorized the term is and how 
little is known, stating “Local claims for autonomy and expressions of agency take multiple forms, connecting 
agency with resistance, with liberation (even in national terms), with emancipation and ultimately with hybridity. 
It might even be that it represents an attempt to ‘escape’ the state, subject status and statehood in general, and 
their propensity for predatory behaviour (even if only conscription, taxation and centralisation). Local agency may 
attempt to replace these with a more localised understanding of peace formation, requiring political resistance and 
even cultural refusal. It may lead to the emergence of parallel administrations, often decentralised, or significant 





Hybrid peace was invoked frequently by academics within the dataset, despite its position as 
a type of peace being rather unclear. Scholars originally positioned the liberal peace as a hybrid 
peace type (see Richmond, 2006a; Richmond and Franks, 2009b), though through the 
conceptual development of hybridity and critical forms of peace it came to be associated with 
a post-liberal peace (see, Richmond, 2011a). Where negative types of hybrid peace were seen 
to reflect elements of colonial rule and fail to account for local experiences, positive variants 
are seen to have “resolved such contradictions through active rather than passive everyday 
agency” (Richmond, 2015, p. 50). The quality that lies at the heart of this peace type is its 
mediation between the Liberal and Local, whereupon a hybrid peace is seen to accommodate 
or contextualise Liberalist notions within post-conflict societies to produce ‘a more positive’ 
peace – though this can also lead to a negative peace depending on how it is implemented (see, 
for instance, (Richmond, 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016; Visoka and Richmond, 2016). 
Hybridity as a concept is discussed in detail in chapter 8, however it is worth noting here that 
it appears to have no analytical properties or characteristics itself beyond its mediation between 
other forms of practice or objectives (primarily liberal and local, or international and illiberal).  
Perhaps the most critical alternative to the Liberal Peace was an Emancipatory Peace. Though 
it was referenced 105 within the dataset, discussion and development was primarily undertaken 
by Oliver Richmond who authored and co-authored 22 of the 31 articles invoking it. 
Furthermore, other authors who drew on this peace type generally appear to have worked with 
Richmond previously (for instance, Gezim Visoka and Roger Mac Ginty), suggesting that it 
remains a relatively fringe notion. This is not to say that this peace type should be ascribed to 
Richmond in the same manner that many ascribe Positive and Negative Peace to Galtung 
however, but simply to note that beyond immediate and interpersonal relationships, this peace 
type has been relatively overlooked, with scholars more interested in its particular 
characteristics (local, everyday, hybrid etc.) than the need for a more robust conceptualisation 
and alternative to the liberal peace. Most invocations of emancipatory peace beyond these 





beyond a passing mention.155 Indeed, 17 of the articles within the dataset invoked the term only 
once, and typically only to indicate an awareness of this strand of research, or advocate for a 
‘more emancipatory peace’.  
Emancipation, understood simplistically, refers to the identification of systems and structures 
of domination and their dismantlement and replacement by oppressed peoples (often referred 
to as the subaltern). While a heavily contested concept, the current dynamism and fluidity of 
power structures has led to increasing debate by theorists as to exactly who needs emancipation 
and from what, given the lack of a significant yet clear power dynamic as previously identified 
through colonial rule (as discussed by Fanon in Wretched of the Earth), during the Cold War, 
or within international economic structures (noted by Karl Marx).  
Perhaps the clearest definition of emancipatory peace utilized within the dataset referred to 
Richmond’s A Post-Liberal Peace whereupon it was defined as “an everyday form of peace, 
offering care, respecting but also mediating culture and identity, institutions, and custom, 
providing for needs, and assisting the most marginalised in their local, state, regional and 
international contexts” (Richmond, 2011a, pp. 3–4). Further work by Richmond and Visoka 
(2016) which sought to understand what an emancipatory peace in Kosovo would look like 
theoretically deepened this notion, linking emancipatory peace to understandings of the local, 
hybridity and post-liberalism,156 noting how peacebuilding efforts had thus far led to a negative 
hybrid peace but that a “positive and more emancipatory peace” might be possible (ibid, p.112). 
In the context of Kosovo, they argue that an emancipatory peace “should be understood as a 
transformative process after negative hybrid peace, whereby a positive hybrid peace emerges 
and overcomes structural and agential impediments to create space for local emancipation, 
justice, and equality and co-existence with regional and international structures” (ibid, p.113). 
To these authors, emancipatory peace needs to be reclaimed for the everyday, away from its 
historical roots in political theory and philosophy which tied it to problematic Western or 
 
155 For example, Nick Megoran (2011b) draws on the term to establish a critical peace agenda within PACs. 
During a literature review he writes how the discipline of International Relations and Richmond have contributed 
to critiquing the Liberal Peace whilst striving for an emancipatory peace “emphasising justice for marginalised 
actors achievable through ideal forms of democracy, an approach developed through post-structural theorisation 
that critiques the universalising of critical theory and is more sensitive to the ways in which discourses and 
institutions of peace can perpetuate exclusion and injustice” (Ibid, p.180), though he does not attempt to develop 
or engage with this conceptualisation in any further significant manner. 
156 They argue that a “localized emancipatory peace would represent a hybrid mix of both international and local 





Liberal (colonial) notions of progress. Like many other critical conceptions of peace, 
Richmond and Visoka have boasted a long list of potential benefits that might emerge through 
the notion of emancipatory peace. This peace would go beyond the liberal peace to signify, 
localized efforts for forming peace by peaceful means, autonomous from elite predation and 
external intervention but able to draw upon external support where necessary to prevent conflict 
actors from establishing blockages to peace, for security, resources, knowledge, and 
accountability. It enables citizens to improve their rights, material conditions, access to public 
services, and security and to maintain identity where necessary. (ibid, p.113) 
What is clear from literature on emancipation is its lack of shared or unified understanding. An 
emancipatory peace (if it could be conceptualised) would be significantly different, depending 
on who was calling for it (for example, a Marxist might seek emancipation from international 
and domestic economic structures, whereas a Liberalist might seek emancipation through those 
very same economic structures and the rule of law, etc.). As more recent efforts (see, for 
example, Llewellyn, 2018) to understand emancipation have realised, the term is contextually 
bounded, and while restricting it to subalterns and the oppressed might seem like a simple way 
to challenge power dynamics, these terms are continually changing making such a distinction 
largely unsuitable.157 For commentators on international peacebuilding, it is unclear just how 
useful this term has been in critiquing both practices and methods beyond its original 
understandings of autonomy and self-determination during the colonial era. While there 
appears to be an increasing appetite to engage with the term and apply it to the growing body 
of literature drawing on the Anthropocene (which contrasts emancipation from human created 
social structures with ecological sensitives), it is clear that the various elements of an 
emancipatory peace, as they have been invoked by authors within the dataset, do not constitute 
 
157 For example, where much peacebuilding literature today conceptualises emancipation from liberal peace 
interventions, forty years earlier it is entirely feasible to consider a country seeking emancipation from Communist 
rule via elements of the liberal peace. To this end, recent efforts by Lindahl (2019) to develop the concept of 






a peace by themselves but a set of issues that must be taken into account – methodological 
issues, rather than an established or aspirational state of being or aspirational themselves.158  
Summary 
Many other alternative and potentially critical conceptualisations of peace have also been 
elaborated on (such as quality peace, durable peace, lasting peace, or (less desirably) a virtual 
peace), though there is not the space nor the need to unpack these in more detail here (for a 
broad yet rather shallow analysis, see Davenport, Melander and Regan, 2018). Ultimately, what 
can be concluded from these varieties of peace that are often invoked seemingly in opposition 
to the liberal peace, is that they focus on different levels and actors (interstate, domestic, 
community and individual), and are made up of a series of often overlapping characteristics 
which are re-prioritised according to scholarly preference.  
The identification of a coherent alternative to the liberal peace is made difficult by the fact that 
the liberal peace itself is often susceptible to change depending on who is invoking it, where 
the priority of its various characteristics are continually being altered. As such, many of these 
critical peace types appear to simply reprioritise or replace particular elements of the liberal 
peace. As argued in chapter 7, critical conceptions of peace themselves are rarely articulated 
in such a way as to contradict the liberal peace outright, and instead scholars typically draw on 
various liberal and critical characteristics to emphasise a more contextually reflective peace 
type, as is the case with the post-liberal peace. This is somewhat understandable, as scholars 
have little desire to eschew a focus on human rights or democratic and representative 
governance. Where chapter 7 has argued that relativistic notions of peace are increasing as 
scholars attempt to understand types of peace in relation to their context, this has led to an 
increased engagement with these more critical characteristics, which may yet expand into 
efforts to construct a viable, radical, and aspirational alternative to the liberal peace. Then 
again, as the past 60 or so years of scholarship on peace might suggest, it may not.   
 
158 While writings on emancipation have traditionally benefitted from the liberal frameworks of cosmopolitanism 
and justice, more recent works draw on the post-liberal or post-colonial epistemes (see Gray (2014), Post-
liberalism: Studies in political thought for writings on post-liberalism, and Prashad (2012), The Poorer Nations 
and works by Jabri for post-colonial variants) to connect understandings of the ‘good life’ within a planetary 
understanding which have emerged through recent literatures on the Anthropocene (see Connolly (2017), Facing 
the Planetary). This more recent conception calls for equality within legal, political and economic frameworks 






APPENDIX 7.3 CHARTING PEACE ENGAGEMENT 
The dominance of the Liberal Peace within peacebuilding policy has been reified by the very 
scholarship which critiques it (Davenport, et al., 2018a). Though it was typically invoked in a 
negative manner, as scholars illuminated the numerous problems that were attributed to its 
implementation (and then confirmed, and reconfirmed these findings), the extent to which it 
was invoked in comparison to perceived alternatives offers one indication of the preference of 
academics to critique rather than produce and suggest radical alternatives. In total, only 127 
articles within the dataset engaged with more critical variants of peace (local peace 108 times 
within 49 articles, hybrid peace 184 times in 48 articles, post-liberal peace 141 times in 34 
articles, everyday peace 65 times in 32 articles32/65, emancipatory peace 31 times in 65 
articles), assessing these invocations over time suggests that there is an increasing willingness 
by PACs scholars to engage with alternatives. Figure 27 below plots invocations of several 

















Figure 26: Invocations of peace type by year  
The relatively sporadic engagement early on with these critical conceptions of peace would seem 
reasonable given that many of these variants are relatively new, at least to studies of peacebuilding, and 
were only popularised during the period captured within the dataset through several concerted 
publishing efforts. Hybrid peace, for example, which is not in itself a distinct type of peace despite 
being frequently referred to as such, has two sharp increases in usage following special editions in 
journals which were explicitly devoted to hybridity and its surrounding conceptualisations.159 One can 
also see how, following calls for hybrid variants of peace, scholars began (or at least accelerated) efforts 
to understand and conceptualise notions of ‘local peace’ which were seen to be the antithesis to the 
liberal peace, upon which hybrid elements could be mediated.160 While the number of invocations of 
the liberal peace continues to far out way critical alternatives, it is evident that the popularisation of 
critical approaches to international peacebuilding that occurred after 2005 has led to an increased 
attention on critical peace types. 
 
159 See chapter 8 for more details on this trend. 
160 This trend remains true even if synonymous terms such as ‘illiberal peace’ (which was often contrasted against 
the liberal peace in hybrid discussions by Scandinavian authors) are included. However, for the sake of clarity, 
















Chapter 8 Appendix 
As with understandings of peace, veterans to the field of peacebuilding will be well versed in 
the concept of hybridity which dominated the discourse around 2013 and continues to receive 
significant scholarly attention. For other readers, and those wanting to better understand its 
emergence and theoretical nuances, a more detailed analysis is provided below which informed 
the discussion in chapter 8. Appendix 8.1 briefly accounts for the emergence of hybridity 
within the dataset, before exploring the various conceptualisations that were posited by scholars 
(8.2), and their origins (8.3). Finally, (8.4) outlines the additional NVIVO coding which was 
used to analyse these hybrid works. As noted in chapter 8, a caveat must be made here in that 
the explanation of these conceptualisations draws on their original and most influential (by 
citation) invocations. As academics utilized these terms in different ways, their meanings and 
foci were often conflated, and the understanding of hybridity today has been altered through 
scholarly contestation. Despite this, it is important to note the origins of these terms so that we 
can understand how they were contested and to what purpose.  
APPENDIX 8.1: EMERGENCE 
While in the natural sciences, such as biology and chemistry, conceptualisations of hybridity 
are relatively concise, its usage within the extended fields of social science is often fraught 
with complications stemming from the difficulty in discerning at which point something is 
hybridized. Hybridity’s original application to social phenomena carried negative connotations 
and was used to denigrate mixed-raced peoples or those with ‘impure’ blood, the arguments of 
which were especially prevalent in European colonial understandings (Kraidy, 2008). As 
already noted, one of the most significant issues regarding discussions on hybridity stems from 
its many overlapping conceptualisations. The term hybrid itself originates from the Latin 
hybridia and refers simply to the conjoining of two entities to produce something new, leading 
to its usage as an adjective. Hybridity, on the other hand, is a noun which typically refers to the 
state of being hybrid, while ‘hybridized’ is both the past-tense and past-participle of this term. 
In peacebuilding scholarship, all three terms are used to refer, not to peoples, but institutions, 
norms, practices, and regimes. This usage has not been without controversy however, and 
significant divisions emerged through rigorous and often unwieldy discussions, made all the 
more confusing by academics conflating its utility between adjectives and nouns, processes 





The prolific rise in interest with hybridity is not confined to literature on peacebuilding and the 
terms ‘fashionable status’ is evident in a variety of academic disciplines (Kompridis, 2005, p. 
318), suggesting that PACs could be considered a late comer to its fan club. The increased 
policy and academic interest in hybridity within the field of peacebuilding has generally been 
attributed to the need to account for two decades of mixed peacebuilding results emanating 
from top-down methods (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 71). Indeed, read in the context of broader shifts 
in peacebuilding thinking, the increased interest in hybridity after 2005 seems perfectly logical 
given the need for practitioners, policy makers, and academics to reconcile the increased 
interest in ‘bottom up’ peacebuilding approaches espoused in the mid 1990’s, with the growing 
body of works critiquing the ‘top-down’ liberal peace that rose out of this, and several 
significant paradigm shifts occurring within the international system, including the 
securitisation of humanitarian aid, conceptions of ‘failed states’ following 9/11, an increase in 
neoliberal rationales coinciding with several shocks to the global financial system, and the 
steady dismantlement of Western claims of superiority which had solidified following the 
collapse of the Cold War. 
Reflecting the extent to which such discussions dominated scholarship in peacebuilding studies 
over the past decade, hybridity (and its correlating terms) were mentioned in 250 articles within 
the dataset. Despite this frequent usage, as seen in figure 27  below, the majority of articles in 
the dataset only mentioned ‘hybrid’ once (88) or twice (60), showing the extent to which 
authors sought to draw on, show awareness of, or situate their work alongside the popular 
concept, even if they weren’t necessarily engaging with it in any meaningful manner. Figure 
28 shows that while there was a steady increase in the number of articles mentioning hybridity 
following 2008, after several significant attempts to conceptualise the term around 2012, 
interest waned - though several recent publications outside of the dataset indicate that its rein 
is in no way over (see, for example, Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo, 2018; Wallis et al., 2018). 
Indeed, despite the drop in publications invoking the term since 2013, figure 29 shows that it 
continues to be drawn on frequently, suggesting that while its popularity may have decreased, 






Figure 27: Number of times 'hybrid' mentioned per article  
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Figure 29: Total number of hybrid (and affixes) invocations by year  
Understanding how the concept has been used by scholars is immensely important, as a 
“reference to hybridity does not automatically bear the same potential or significance from one 
use to another” (Wallis et al., 2018, p. 23). Indeed, one must be continually cognisant of the 
linguistic versatility of the term, primarily between its use as an adjective or a noun, which 
leads to a significant amount of vagueness in the critiques and conclusions of which it is a part.  
Surprisingly, distinguishing between the terms linguistic use is not always immediately 
apparent and, as will be argued, has potentially led to many misguided understandings and 
criticisms. Thus, for the purposes of clarity, the following definitions will be used within this 
chapter henceforth, unless otherwise noted: 
• ‘hybrid’ will refer to the state of being hybrid, whereas Hybrid will denote a particular 
conceptualisation (for example, Hybrid Political Order or Hybrid Peace Governance). 
• ‘hybridity’ will refer to the concept of hybridity (as outlined in ‘hybridity as a lens’ 
below), unless written as ‘hybridity (n)’, referring to the noun. Occasionally for 

















referring to the concept. More general theories of hybridity will be referred to as 
‘theories of hybridity’ or ‘hybrid theories’.161 
Though there are numerous ways in which hybridity can be defined and utilized, appendix 8.2 
draws on the 3 primary uses as they emerged within the data set; hybridity as a political order, 
hybridity as a lens, and hybridity as peace governance.162 The multitude of ways in which 
hybridity has been used by academics will be unpacked before the four conceptualisations are 
outlined and contrasted with one another. The origins of hybridity will be explored to explain 
the various differences between these conceptualisations after which critiques will be briefly 
addressed and the chapters own critiques are laid out in the discussion section. 
APPENDIX 8.2: CONCEPTUALISING HYBRIDITY 
The term hybrid had been used in relation to peacebuilding prior to the 2005 catchment of the 
thesis dataset, though this was most often in line with its definitional, rather than conceptual 
use developed within disciplines of post-colonial and development studies. Indeed, initial 
invocation of the term within the data set (2005, 2006 and some in 2007) refer not to these 
deeper conceptualisations explored in Chapter 8 and here, but simply to ‘hybrid’ things – such 
as peace or institutions. Substantial conceptual engagement with the term is more clearly seen 
to unfold from 2008 onwards, and though its use has been sporadic throughout the 12 years of 
this data set, interest seems to have diminished somewhat following heated conceptual 
contestation between 2012-2014. 
Given the versatility of the term, hybrid and its various affixes were used in countless ways 
throughout the data set. Numerous articles would invoke it as a noun or adjective (hybrid 
institution, hybrid tribunal etc.) while others drew on the term as an analytic or heuristic device, 
applied to a multitude of subjects, objects and processes. Given the plethora of hybrid 
 
161 This distinction, while seemingly irrelevant, stems from this authors belief that the positioning of words 
indicates subtle differences in the conceptualisation of terms. For example, ‘Hybrid Political Order’ has a different 
connotation to ‘a political order that is hybrid’. Where the latter suggests that being hybridized is one feature of 
the political order, the former defines the political order on its hybridized nature. Rather than hybridity (n) being 
a characteristic of that order, it becomes its main signifier. The importance of word order here, though to many it 
may have been undertaken unconsciously, is not insignificant. While it is understandable that studies on hybridity 
(n) would focus on this characteristic of the political order, it also seems to imply an active element in the hybridity 
– as if it was not naturally occurring but something that we can monitor and either advocate for or against. The 
latter conception, on the other hand, accounts for both passive and active forms of hybridity, but does not 
immediately lead readers to assume that this is the order’s most important feature. 
162 Hybrid peace is considered less relevant for what chapter 8 sought to do given it focuses on peace rather than 
peacebuilding. A brief definition can be found in appendix 7.2 (above) and deeper conceptualisations can be found 





scholarship, numerous scholars have sought to categorise approaches to the term. These 
existing studies often distinguish, not between the individual uses of the term, but on what the 
overall study seeks to accomplish. For example, Moe has argued that some reflexive critiques 
of hybridity have divided scholarship that focuses on the “internal dynamics of ordering in 
post-conflict settings” found in discussions of Hybrid Political Orders (HPOs), and scholarship 
which focuses on how “external international donors and agendas interact, contest and merge 
with local actors and dynamics of ordering”, such as those conceptualisations produced by Mac 
Ginty and Richmond (Moe, 2011, p. 148). Another prominent division has been made between 
studies which utilize hybrid terms in an instrumental or prescriptive approach, and those which 
use it only analytically or descriptively (Peterson, 2012; Millar, 2014; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2016). More recently, some scholars have added a worthwhile third division, which 
focuses on international efforts to devise hybrid solutions of governance and order from 
metropolitan centres, nuancing instrumental studies with a post-colonial or Marxist lens which 
sees the prescription of hybridity from beyond the post-conflict environment as less legitimate 
(Wallis et al., 2018).  
Coding of the dataset also identified numerous subtle semantic divisions in how hybridity and 
its affixes were utilized by academics, which correlated with its conceptual fragmentation. For 
example, there are divisions in prescriptive hybrid accounts where hybridity (n) may be 
prescribed to create ‘hybrid orders’ (or to explain already existing hybrid orders) and those 
who seek to use hybrid outputs as a stepping stone to Denmark – or a more Western stylised 
(neo)liberal democratic state. Another way of making this division could be by differentiating 
between studies that utilize hybridity empirically or conceptually, where the former analyses 
hybridity (n) as it emerges in the world (focusing on various institutions or outcomes) and the 
latter use Hybridity (C) as a framework or lens for understanding these different outcomes. 
Each of these studies cuts the same term in a multitude of overlapping but simultaneously 
contrasting ways, which, when not fully extrapolated on, allow for simplistic conflations or 
criticisms to be made. As argued within chapter 8, it is this authors contention that these 
conflations reduce the emancipatory potential of the term and further devalue it by expanding 
its recognition of the hybridised nature of phenomena so far beyond the international-local 
dichotomy that its critical normative raison d’être is lost. 
These studies have produced numerous worthwhile findings and observations and yet, while 





does not account for how differing utilizations are often conflated and muddy the conceptual 
waters even further. While the distinction between studies of Hybridity (C) that are prescriptive 
and descriptive are undeniably interesting, they ignore the fact that descriptive and analytic 
studies can themselves be used to create instrumental or prescriptive outcomes – calling in to 
question the worthwhileness of such critiques. Thus, this Appendix seeks to make a more 
rudimentary distinction and remain cognisant of the conceptual location in which hybridity is 
identified by academics – between processes, agents, and outcomes. These three interrelated 
spheres represent the realm of possible foci for studies, whereupon agents comprise the various 
entities interacting or encountering one another (both actively and passively) through the 
process of hybridity (n) which produce and affect particular outcomes, which may be seen as 
static and fixed only within that precise moment of analysis. Hybrid agents refer to the variety 
of actors, norms, practices, policies, processes etc. which are differentiated by a plethora of 
categories (international/local, liberal/illiberal, etc.), while the processes of hybridity (n) refer 
simply to the actual interaction, encounter or engagement whereupon they may affect each 
other in all manner of ways. While such language conveys some form of active ingredient, it 
is worth noting that hybrid processes can be passive or unintended, simply occurring through 
various encounters between already hybridised (n) entities. Hybrid outcomes refer to that which 
is produced from this interaction – though it is important to note that this output is neither static 
nor fixed at any point during this process, which is ongoing and continual. The following 
section will explore the three main conceptualisations of hybridity that emerged within the data 
set in relation to the aforementioned divisions. While these various terms have been contrasted 
before,163 to the best of this authors knowledge, no such comparison charting the origins of 
each conception exists.  
Hybridity as Political Order 
Though the term ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs) appeared numerous times in peacebuilding’s 
related fields prior to 2007, its usage typically emanated from the disciplines of human 
geography and sociology, to describe rather than critique political arrangements.164 HPOs as 
they are understood within Peace and Conflict Studies today can be largely attributed to a 
 
163 See, for example, the special section in the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding ‘Taking the Hybridity 
Agenda Further’ (2015) Volume 9, Issue 1. 
164 See, for example, Millán and Romeo, 2004 and Hopkins, 2007. While more critical and robust endeavours 
exist, such as Dillion and Reid’s (2000, p. 128) article where they conceptualise global liberal governance as a 






research programme headed by the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies 
(University of Queensland) entitled “Towards Effective and Legitimate Governance: States 
Emerging From Hybrid Political Orders” which was funded by the Australian Agency for 
International Development (Boege et al., 2008).  
Though the outputs of this project were published in a range of centre research papers and 
journals (including Political Science, International Peacekeeping and the Peace Review), 
bibliometric analysis shows that the conceptual development of the term benefitted 
significantly from its inclusion in the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation in 2008 
from where most scholars cited it. This NGO produced handbook is designed to offer a living 
corpus of knowledge for academics and practitioners engaged in conflict transformation, and 
allowed for a robust exchange between HPOs founders and its critics early on (see, for instance, 
Boege et al., 2009b). 
HPOs, as conceptualised by this research programme, debuted in 2007 when authors asked 
whether “new kinds of ‘hybrid’ political institutions can evolve that will combine the 
comparative advantages of both the classic Weberian system and traditional or customary 
institutions” (Foley et al., 2007, p. 46). Their intent was to reconceptualise the narrative of 
‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states, which are “not yet properly built”, as hybrid political orders, which 
would open up new areas of critique and the acceptance or tolerance of a variety of state and 
governance systems (Boege et al., 2008). Though the term has undergone a number of 
reiterations and refinements since (most recently by Wallis et al., 2018), a series of articles and 
volumes published in 2008 and 2009 can be seen to reflect the core innovations from, and 
influences upon, the concept – both because these papers were published as outputs from the 
original research programme, and given these articles’ strong relationship with the term, as 
evidenced through their notably higher rates of citation. 
Overview 
To these authors, the need for recognising HPOs stems from an acknowledgement that the 
Weberian state is rarely found outside of OECD countries. While orthodox approaches to peace 
and statebuilding considered alternative forms of governance and political order as something 
to fix, hybrid political orders sought to shift this narrative to one in which alternative orders 
and systems could instead be accommodated and improved. Key to this reframing effort was 
the understanding derived from studies of local-ownership and the liberal peace that orthodox 





as they were ‘illegitimate’ and did not reflect the socio-historic origins and cultures prevalent 
in those countries. Where local ownership advocated for explicit bottom up approaches to 
peacebuilding, HPOs stressed the recognition of a plurality of systems, norms and institutions 
which emerged through the interpenetration and intermingling “of the formal state on the one 
hand and the norms and institutions of the informal (traditional, customary) sphere on the 
other” (Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009, p. 5). ‘Hybridity’ was neither something to be ignored 
nor suppressed, and local agency was deemed vital to peacebuilding efforts to ensure societies 
were included rather than alienated from the systems and institutions being constructed around 
them (Boege et al., 2008). 
The term ‘hybrid’ was seen to “encompass a variety of non-state forms of order and governance 
on the customary side” and focused “on the combination of elements that stem[ed] from 
genuinely different societal source[s] which follow[ed] different logics” and “affirm[ed] that 
these spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, but permeate each other and, 
consequently, give rise to a different and genuine political order[s]” (Boege et al., 2008). To 
these authors, hybrid orders were neither negative nor positive, and could be conceived of as 
an alternative, or emerging type of state by scholars, policymakers and practitioners, who, 
armed with this understanding, could continue to draw on Western models of the state, while 
at the same time acknowledge and work with difference. 
This conceptualisation of hybridity is neither unique in its use of the term ‘hybrid’ (though it 
may have been the first interpretation within PACs) nor in what it sought to accomplish, as 
several other existing concepts bore significant similarities to it (quasi-statehood, 
neopatrimonialism, institutional bricolage, etc.).165 To its founders however, HPO’s point of 
difference emerged in its broadened analytic scope which, through its acceptance of informal 
or non-state forms of order and governance, allowed for deepened understandings of the 
“combination, interaction and mutual penetration of institutions of governance” (Boege et al., 
2008). 
These scholars argued that the construction of HPOs was not an “ambition” but a “normative 
goal that has to be achieved” (Boege et al., 2009b, p. 88), and within their writing there is a 
clear prescriptive element which sees HPOs as a way forward for peacebuilding efforts. For 
 






example, scholars uncovered hybrid elements in East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and 
Somaliland and argued for the consideration of hybridity as “the starting point” of operations, 
in which ways of accommodating the formal and informal could be sought by local and 
international actors to produce new “forms of statehood… which are more capable, effective 
and legitimate than those generated by narrowly conceived western models of the state” (Boege 
et al., 2008). HPOs are thus an existing reality, and these academics were simply calling for 
their recognition and an improved understanding of them. This could assist in identifying ways 
to improve peace and statebuilding efforts, constructing new orders, which, by definition, 
would also be hybrid. 
Development and use  
The dual purpose of hybrid political orders, which are both the problem (as everything is 
already hybrid (Canclini, 2005) and the solution (because top-down peacebuilding ignores the 
societies and institutions that peace is being built for) becomes more problematic as scholars 
begin to apply the concept empirically. This has led to numerous studies of post-conflict states 
whereupon scholars have described or identified positive and negative, or legitimate and 
illegitimate instances of hybridity (see, for instance, Wallis, Jeffery and Kent, 2016) – 
judgements that are exceptionally problematic given they are made from an academics’ 
subjective biases and preferences about peace and governance, which, as argued in chapter 5 
and 7, often remain unstated or only fleetingly engaged with. Thus, while many of the findings 
and conclusions drawn through studies of HPOs can be seen to reaffirm (and, in fairness, 
expand) on already existing arguments made through lenses such as local ownership, HPO’s 
conceptualisation of these matters becomes increasingly problematic when coupled with a 
normative desire to ‘help’ others and a surface-level tolerance of alterity.  
Where many critiques have been levelled at international actors for attempting to prescribe or 
utilize hybrid approaches and incorporate local understandings and practices in a disingenuous 
manner (chapter 8), the local has also been accused of co-opting or misusing hybridity. Boege 
et al again point to several instances of governments within the Global South trying to 
“deliberately incorporate traditional authorities, in order to strengthen state capacities and 
legitimacy” which are noted as “reinforcing the authority of the state” rather than establishing 
genuine partnership (2009a, p. 8). This problem of being unable to differentiate between 
genuine and predatory partnership is not new to the field of peacebuilding and has been 





of hybridity to these problems, which, as is argued in chapter 8, unnecessarily complicates and 
confuses critiques and solutions. All the while, its perceived tolerance of alternatives and 
seeming rejection of Western supremacy potentially diminishes the potential for resistance by 
obscuring biases and preferences by shifting them from the explicit to the implicit realm, 
making them harder to resist and critique, as they have to be proven to exist before they can be 
addressed. 
Critiques 
HPOs were developed from within a very particular normative mindset. The terms inception 
did not develop out of the neutral or unbiased pursuit of scientific research, but from an explicit 
desire to reconceptualise and challenge the dominant perception of ‘difference’ as ‘failed’ or 
‘failing’ within the international peacebuilding community.166 But did this reconceptualization 
emerge because its authors wished to accept difference, or did they simply wish to recognise 
it?167 The very title of the research programme “Towards Effective and Legitimate Governance: 
States Emerging From Hybrid Political Orders” highlights two core assumptions held by its 
funders and founders which continually emerge within their writings; a Western and modernist 
notion of ‘progress’ (towards effective and legitimate governance), and a more subtle bias in 
that HPOs  were a starting rather than finishing point, potentially casting them as a somewhat 
less-desirable phenomenon (the progress was directed towards ‘states’ emerging ‘from’ 
HPOs). When attesting to the benefits of HPOs, its founders claim:  
‘social engineering’ of state-building is not possible, but on the other hand it would be fatalistic 
– and cynical – to leave it all to an ‘organic’ historical process, likely to mean bloodshed, 
injustice and misery – as the history of European state formation amply demonstrates. One has 
to search for middle ground. The concepts of hybrid political orders and positive mutual 
accommodation might pave the way for attaining such middle ground… This approach can also 
contribute to a reorientation of external assistance. The possibilities of externally influencing 
governance structures can be re-examined, shifting the focus from narrow models of state-
building to understanding and engaging with hybrid institutions. (Boege et al., 2008, p. 15) 
 
166 Though conceptually different, it is worth noting that HPOs were developed in the same department in which 
Alex Bellamy works – who alongside Paul D Williams was a founder and core advocate of R2P, which was 
unanimously accepted by the UN two years earlier. Though these terms are drastically different in what they 
advocate, both concepts seem to share a normative intent and belief in Western interventionism.  
167 Where recognition implies a continued to desire to change or transform a phenomenon, and acceptance an 





That social engineering from top-down methods of state and peacebuilding operations had 
failed was an observation made, not through the conceptualisation of HPOs (though they are 
able to recognise this), but understandings of local-ownership and critiques of the liberal peace 
put forward a decade earlier (and one can find still earlier instances within writings on colonial 
practice168). Perhaps more interesting here is the explicit assumption that post-conflict societies 
will be unable to state or peace build alone, and require Western intervention to assist them. 
While this potentially hubristic assertion is based off a salient observation and noble desire to 
ensure post-conflict states avoid several hundred years of violent nation and statebuilding, it 
also assumes that because we have gone through this violent process before we are somehow 
in a better position to advise others on how to avoid it, and that this is most desirable path 
forward. This conveniently ignores how the last 100 years of conflict in many of these states 
were the result of earlier (and maybe less genuine) efforts to assist these countries, notably 
through colonial undertakings, Cold War politics, and the more recent need to integrate them 
within a globalised market to ensure economic growth – or  less problematic resource 
extraction. 
This assumed ‘right to peacebuild’ is coupled with a secondary and much ignored tension 
relating to issues of ‘knowing’ when peace and statebuilding will no longer require 
international intervention (Chandler, 2010a). Undertaking acts of peacebuilding through a 
Western or Liberal conception of peace and governance, at least hypothetically, sets some form 
of benchmark that needs to be met. HPOs on the other hand confuse this benchmark, leading 
to questions of at which stage a country might be ‘peaceful’ enough to no longer justify or 
require support (or, more cynically, when a state is hybridised enough to be recognised and 
understood by Western epistemologies of peace and governance to no longer be considered a 
threat to global peace and security)?169 
Hybridity as a lens 
While numerous authors have engaged in discussions of Hybridity in relation to international 
peacebuilding, the works of Jason Franks, Roger Mac Ginty, Audra Mitchell, Oliver Richmond 
and David Roberts were relatively early entrants to its critical conceptualisation (rather than its 
 
168 See Chandler (2010a, pp. 169–187) for a good summary of this progression. 
169 While the liberal peace is not homogenous enough to be able to point to an exact point when exit would be 
permissible for international peacebuilders, several authors have noted how the hybrid acceptance of difference 
could be used to justify and de-escalate operations in response to diminishing peacebuilding funds and the shifting 






critique). Simplistically it could be understood as an on the ground reality and process that 
needed to be recognised, however the deeper notion that these authors disparately and 
collectively put forward drew on post-colonial and development literature to conceive of 
hybridity as a lens or framework through which relations of power within peacebuilding 
endeavours could be understood. Though this conceptualisation was not homogenous, and 
divisions and nuances appeared throughout its development,170 at its baseline there were 
significant overlaps which differentiated this more critical conceptualisation from the other 
variants of hybridity discussed within this appendix and chapter 8. While care will be taken to 
illustrate initial conceptual differences between authors when they occur, the following favours 
the understandings proffered by Mac Ginty, given the robust conceptualisation he offers  of 
hybridity as a lens, as opposed to its other manifestations (see, for instance, (Mac Ginty, 2010a, 
2011; Ahram et al., 2016).171 A further point to note is that no critique of this variant of 
hybridity will be offered in this appendix, given this has been undertaken throughout chapter 8 
where its interactions with other understandings have been contrasted to understand its 
problematic components. For those interested in more detailed critiques, see Nadarajah and 
Rampton, 2015; Allen and Dinnen, 2017; Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo, 2018; Wallis et al., 
2018).  
Overview 
In a similar vein to those writing on HPOs, the conceptualisation of hybridity that was initially 
integrated into the PACs toolkit contested the negative perception of political ‘hybridity’ (or 
‘difference’) held within the Global North (Mac Ginty, 2010a), and believed that a better 
understanding of international aid’s function might emerge by exploring the collision between 
the local, traditional,  informal or indigenous and the external or international spheres 
(Peterson, 2012, p. 10). To its proponents, hybridity was seen to consist of the “composite 
forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different 
groups, practices, and worldviews” (Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2013, p. 8). It was a condition 
that arose from the multiple and varied top-down and bottom-up interactions, rather than the 
“grafting together of two separate entities to create a third” (Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2013, 
 
170 For example, though Audra Mitchell and Oliver Richmond write on the concept together early on, Mitchell 
later criticises Richmond’s inability to move beyond the local/international binary which is seen to reify a narrative 
of local resistance against a powerful and controlling international (see Mitchell, 2011). 
171 For example, despite Richmond’s extensive engagement with hybridity, this was typically in relation to a 
‘hybrid peace’ rather than the framework of hybridity (see, for example, Richmond, 2006a, 2015; Richmond and 
Mitchell, 2011a). The focus on Mac Ginty was also decided upon based off feedback during interviews, in which 





pp. 4, 8) like HPOs and HPG arguably became. Its study, to Richmond and Mitchell, involved 
the examination of a 
range of practices, responses and agencies – including plural forms of acceptance and 
appropriation, resistance and the exertion of autonomy… [where] in the process of 
hybridisation, actors [both locally and internationally based] reshape the norms, institutions and 
activities in question by means of everyday practices such as verbal interaction, organisation 
and even overt conflict. (Richmond and Mitchell, 2011b, p. 1) 
A key concern of theorists using Hybridity was to understand conceptions and locations of 
power, to discern between its multitude of forms, and to understand why peacebuilders have, 
in light of top down critiques, been so unsuccessful at recalibrating interventions to play “to 
the strengths of local and external actors” (Mac Ginty, 2010a, p. 408). While Hybridity sought 
to reset the balance of peacebuilding research which tended towards formal and elite political 
actors at the expense of the informal, it also problematised categorisations of modern versus 
traditional, formal versus informal, Western versus non-Western, international versus local 
(etc.) (Peterson, 2012, p. 20). As a lens, Hybridity is thought to challenge the binaries that often 
dominated studies of peacebuilding and offer a way to overcome “hegemonic narratives of 
conflict and internationally supported peace interventions” by encouraging “us to critically 
question the contents and fixity of categories, and to be aware of the fluidity of conflicts and 
their actors” (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 2).  
A core component to understanding hybridity was the notion of ‘prior hybridity’(Canclini, 
2005) which acknowledged how our concepts, norms, and practices were already a product of 
a long process of hybridisation, and that no ‘pure’ entity existed. This understanding makes 
using Hybridity to identify how two components interact to produce a third, or, to place blame 
on a particular actor for poor peacebuilding outcomes, meaningless, as hybridity is only one 
facet of a much larger historical process of interaction, forcing analysts to recognise that “there 
is no good versus evil, no right or wrong, just a series of iterations and in-betweens to be 
analysed and judged on their own merits” (Peterson, 2012, p. 12). In spite of this understanding 
that all societies are affected by the subtle and long-term processes of social negotiation and 
interchange (Mac Ginty and Sanghera, 2013), theorists using hybridity sought to reject the 





variety of different studies and frameworks,172 and by holding that some networks or structures 
were more fixed or less open to hybridisation than other (Mac Ginty, 2010a; Millar, 2014). For 
example, Mac Ginty proposed a four part model to understanding hybridity as a process (2010a, 
2011, 2013a) which considered how different types of peace emerged from the interactions 
between local and international actors guided by, 
the ability of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures to enforce compliance with their 
will; the incentivising powers of liberal peace agents, networks, and structures; the ability of 
local actors to resist, ignore, or adapt liberal peace interventions; and the ability of local actors, 
networks, and structures to present and maintain alternative forms of peacemaking. (Mac Ginty, 
2011, p. 69) 
Such understandings of hybridity led to one of many fractures amongst peacebuilding theorists, 
and a rise in vehement critiques between those who, despite notions of prior hybridity sought 
to prescribe it within peacebuilding, and those, who, despite conceiving of varieties of 
hybridity, sought to examine it as a process, and use it analytically to overcome the relativist 
quagmire (Mac Ginty, 2010a, p. 398) – though not all were convinced by this argument (see, 
for example, Zaum (2012). 
Ultimately, the value of Hybridity was seen in its ability to reassess both the liberal peace and 
the criticisms it faced while simultaneously eschewing the ‘romanisation of the local’ (Mac 
Ginty, 2011, pp. 68–69). Mac Ginty (2011, p. 68) summarises the benefit of hybridity through 
its ability to: 
[move] beyond two-dimensional notions of an all-powerful international community and 
weakened local actors who are bereft of the powers to resist, subvert, or negotiate the imposition 
of the liberal peace” rejecting the notion that “the liberal peace – as a set of actors, norms, and 
intervention programmes – is not an all-powerful Leviathan that can unroll its liberal 
Commonwealth without hindrance from local power structures and norms, and from its own 
contradictions.  
Hybridity, reflecting elements of complexity theory, thus becomes a conceptual tool to explore 
the dynamics of power and agency within local and international groups while recognising 
“that no two interventions are identical in terms of implementation, processes or impacts” 
 
172 For example, Mac Ginty’s (2010a, 2011, 2013a) four point conceptualisation of hybridity, Millar’s 
(2014) disaggregated hybridity, Richmond’s (2015) understanding of local-liberal hybridity and negative 





(Peterson, 2012, p. 12). Its focus on agency and interaction allows for an account of the 
multitude of responses that groups and individuals may have to intervention, including attempts 
to accept, reject, co-opt, or benefit from different initiatives and elements (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 
10). Recognising a variety of responses and interactions, and how these changed between actors 
and over space and time allowed for a deeper analysis of not only ‘negative’ acts of resistance, 
but the positive and potentially transformative aspects such interactions might generate. Thus, 
Hybridity was seen to provide an excellent tool to assess and understand the emancipatory and 
transformative aspects that local agency might have on peacebuilding operations and was soon 
coupled with studies of resilience and adaptability (Krampe, 2014; Chandler, 2015), resistance 
(Richmond, 2010, 2012c; Visoka, 2011),  and contestation (Charbonneau, 2012) among others.  
Vital to more critical conceptualisations of Hybridity was the notion of mimicry developed 
through the understanding of hybridity proffered by Bhabha (1994) (though other scholars such 
as Franz Fanon have also developed the concept, see Jabri, 2014). Colonizers expected the 
colonized subject to adopt their codes of behaviour whilst at the same time retaining their 
ontological difference (for if the subjects of colonialism were the same as their colonizer, the 
colonial project would no longer be needed). Through repetition, these acts and behaviours 
were performed in front of the colonizer, however the colonial subjects often preformed them 
in exaggerated manners which subtly mocked the colonizer and challenged their control. Thus, 
where hybridity focused on the colonial encounter, mimicry showed one of the performances 
in which external norms and actions were re-appropriated in potentially emancipatory ways. 
Despite the importance of this concept to understanding the emancipatory potential of 
hybridity, mimicry was rarely mentioned by articles within the dataset173 where scholars 
recognised how the interaction between international and local actors produced unexpected 
outcomes, but without necessarily seeing these divergences as emancipatory acts of local 
agency to be promoted or emphasised.  
Perhaps most importantly for this thesis is that hybridity allowed (but does not require) studies 
to consider alternatives to the liberal peace. While some of the typologies of hybridity certainly 
ascribed normative values on the various outcomes that were generated through it (negative 
and positive hybridity for example Meagher, 2014; Visoka and Richmond, 2016), the 
conceptualisation also allowed for the neutral or disinterested observation of alterity. As 
 





evidenced by similar conceptions such as that of HPOs, there is an increasing willingness by 
scholars to reframe liberal peacebuilding’s failings as alternative political and governmental 
arrangements, and Hybridity extended this to all aspects of society including investigations of 
what peace was and how it might be improved (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 69). 
Development and use 
While Richmond appears to have written the most on this conceptualisation early on, 
significant theoretical development was undertaken by a number of scholars (see, for instance, 
Roberts, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2010a, 2011; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011c).174 Despite this, it’s 
popularisation does not appear to have occurred until 2012 when a special issue devoted to the 
concept, titled ‘Hybridity in Peacebuilding and Development’ (Journal of Peacebuilding & 
Development, Volume 7, Issue 2). This was guest edited by none other than Roger Mac Ginty 
and Gurchathen Sanghera (an International Relations lecturer at St Andrews specialising in 
postcolonial studies) and consisted of 9 articles which engaged in a rather robust conceptual 
debate. Perhaps, somewhat unfortunately for this particular conceptualisation of hybridity, it 
was published in the same year as a special issue on Hybrid Peace Governance which offered 
a considerably different (and arguably less critical) conceptualisation of a parallel term. To 
make matters worse, the collection of essays held within its covers did little to proffer a unified 
understanding of hybridity itself, though this did not appear to be its aim, which by its editors 
own admission made “clear the utility of the hybridity concept in multiple contexts” (Mac 
Ginty and Sanghera, 2013, p. 6).  
Hybridity as a conceptual framework and as a typology has been used in a plethora of studies 
since its initial foray into peacebuilding around 2008. It has also been used to accomplish a 
variety of different, occasionally contradictory, analyses. Unlike the other conceptions of 
Hybridity discussed throughout this appendix, this particular interpretation seems to have 
suffered from its lack of ability to capture and project a single unified brand and corresponding 
theory. As is argued in chapter 8, the many uses of hybridity as a term and as a concept have 
led to considerable conflation and thus confusion as to its usage. Unlike HPOs or HPG which, 
perhaps given the manner and terminology through which they were introduced, Hybridity 
suffers from that which it describes – it is itself hybrid. That is not to say concerted efforts to 
conceptualise Hybridity within PACs did not occur, and several special issues have lent 
 
174 Indeed, it appears that Richmond may have originally come across the term as it was applied to peacebuilding 





considerable weight and utility to its conceptualisation alongside a plethora of books devoted 
to the topic– unfortunately this has not represented a unified or homogenous understanding 
either. 
Hybridity as Peace Governance 
A concerted effort to proffer the conceptualisation of Hybrid Peace Governance (HPG) was 
published in a special issue of Global Governance in 2012 which bore its name and contained 
a collection of 9 articles outlining its conceptual development and utilization.175 The edition 
was guest edited by Roberto Belloni (Italy) and Anna Jarstad (Sweden), and included a variety 
of articles by colleagues and practitioners, following a workshop in Montreal in early 2011 
(Jarstad and Belloni, 2012, p. 6). 176  
To date, the introductory article by Jarstad and Belloni (2012) and Belloni’s (2012) piece 
remain the strongest and clearest endeavours to propagate the term within PACs. To these 
authors, the bargaining and promotion of one’s own values, norms and practices amongst local 
and international actors leads to situations of HPG where “contrary elements exist alongside 
each other in a context where violence, actual or potential, continues to play an important role” 
(Jarstad and Belloni, 2012, p. 1). Though the language used by its authors points towards a less 
critical intent than the other theories of hybridity above, it too defines ‘hybrid’ to be the 
condition in which international and local (or liberal and illiberal as they define it) norms, 
institutions and actors interact, co-exist and produce new outcomes, as Western liberal ideas 
become “compromised in practice” (Belloni, 2012; Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). 
To better understand HPG, Belloni and Jarstad outline a typology of hybridity within post-
conflict state institutions (which is then empirically tested throughout the special issue). Similar 
to Mac Ginty’s (2011, p. 69) typology of hybridity (though this is not mentioned), Belloni and 
Jarstad seek to identify different arrangements of hybridisation and speculate on the positive 
or negative outcomes that may be produced. The typology is split by two intersecting axis – 
the liberal and illiberal, and peace and war. Belloni clarifies the liberal-illiberal axis in his own 
 
175 Global Governance is an academic journal edited by Tom Farer and Timothy D. Sisk in association with the 
Academic Council of the United Nations System.  
176 Most authors in this edition were either geographically proximate (for example, Jarstad, Höglund, Orjuela 






article (2012) as one that comprises three hybrid arrangements177 intersected through a 
war/peace continuum which further delineates the various types of hybrid outcome.178  
Though Belloni states that the ‘liberal-illiberal axis’ builds on the delineation laid out by 
Kraushaar and Lambach (2009, p. 4) in their discussion of HPOs, it is important to note his 
change in terminology from theirs (which echoes their Australian colleagues and is split 
between formal and informal institutions) and the tantalizingly similar, yet fundamentally 
different, Liberal-Local division proffered by Richmond (2009b). The secondary axis is 
potentially even more problematic in its separation of war and peace, where war is represented 
by civil war, ‘clashes/pockets of violence’ are the intermediary, and a ‘state monopoly of 
violence’ is considered peace (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012, p. 3). This invokes a negative notion 
of peace that does not seek to be transformational or utilize the aspirational elements of 
hybridity found in the works of Bhabha, Mac Ginty or Richmond (for example).  
While a shallow comparison of HPG and HPOs might consider them as two sides of the same 
coin, there are subtle ontological, epistemological, and normative differences which separate 
not only the authors utilizing the terms, but the terms themselves. Notably, HPG concerns the 
governing of hybridity (and hybrid peace) through “security, legal, political, economic and 
social systems” (Belloni, 2012, p. 24). This analytical shift, though less apparent in practice (or 
scholarly writing), seeks to focus the concept on the multitude of ways in which hybridity is 
governed by liberal and illiberal actors through their interactions, rather than to first understand 
what the hybrid orders are before finding ways to improve them. 
Development and use 
Other studies, such as that undertaken by Höglund and Orjuela (2012), seek to ground the 
concept of HPG empirically. Here, the utility of HPG is seen to be its understanding of the 
context in which peacebuilding actors operate. They argue that while there is general support 
for hybridity in Sri Lanka, international divisions have allowed illiberal international power to 
 
177 The first arrangement is one in which “informal, traditional and illiberal norms and practices may influence 
the working of formal democratic institutions”, The second, is where “traditional nonstate actors may be formally 
integrated into formal state structures”, but may also involve the “inclusion of international, not local, nonstate 
actors within domestic institutions” and the third, in which “liberal state institutions may be dominated by violent 
nonstate actors and institutions” (Belloni, 2012, pp. 25–26). 
178 The first arrangement is that of the Westphalian liberal-peaceful state, the second instance represents the 
Victors Peace, the most frequent of the arrangements, which represents a truce where peace “is combined with 
predominantly illiberal norms, institutions and practices” (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012, p. 2). The third conception, 
the divided state, is liberal but still in a state of conflict, and the fourth, anarchy, one in which the state is both 
illiberal and in conflict -where “peacebuilding has resulted in the coexistence of illiberal and liberal norms, 





influence and shape domestic issues negatively (ibid). HPG is seen to uncover and illuminate 
“the great diversity of postwar societies in which peace is to evolve and take root” (ibid, p.101), 
though they note that simplistic understandings of the fusion between “liberal internationals 
and illiberal locals needs to be refined”, considering the reverse is also true (ibid, p.91). They 
also state that “the way that peace was achieved is an important factor in understanding the 
particular type of hybrid peace governance that is developing in Sri Lanka” (Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2012, p. 93), and indicate a clear intent to focus on how this hybrid peace may be  
governed (in the sense of managed, produced, and controlled), as opposed to the more neutral 
HPO which seeks to understand the orders that emerge more passively. It is interesting to note 
that this article, like many in the special issue, almost pointedly fail to engage with alternative 
conceptualisations of hybridity despite it being relatively unclear precisely what HPG provides 
for their understanding that others do not. 
Indeed, upon reading many of the articles within the special issue, it is difficult to understand 
the choice by many of these scholars to utilize HPG over existing theories or alternative 
conceptions of hybridity. For example, an article by Jarstad & Olsson (2012) utilizes HPG to 
understand ownership in Afghanistan, and argues that local ownership is key to understanding 
the interactions between international and local actors, given asymmetrical power relations. 
While HPG certainly nuances their analysis, it is unclear how an understanding of HPG 
contributes in a critical or transformative manner to their writing which concludes by 
highlighting the need for international actors to consider “who the local owner should be”, 
“what is to be locally owned” and “when local ownership should be introduced” (Jarstad and 
Olsson, 2012, pp. 116–117), starkly contrasting the aforementioned critical conceptions of 
hybridity and reflecting earlier top-down attempts to undertake bottom-up peacebuilding.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Critiques 
While the authors claim that hybridity is positive, they stress the importance of local agency 
while painting a bleak picture of institutions or peace that exist beyond our liberal spectrum. 
Liberal governance is characterised as legitimate and desirable, whereas illiberal governance 
seems to be the opposite. For example, Belloni and Jarstad (2012, p. 3) write that, 
liberal peace governance actors include civil servants, politicians, open civil society, free media, 
police, and judges. Hybrid peace governance empowers additional actors such as local chiefs, 
traditional and religious institutions, rebel groups, warlords, and mafia groups. Moreover, liberal 





rights whereas hybrid peace governance also encapsulates illiberal values such as patrimonialism, 
religious orders, authoritarian rule, and the notion that international human rights are secondary 
vis-à-vis state sovereignty. (Emphasis added) 
While this might be a point of fact to these authors, such conceptualisations reflect little of the 
emancipatory aspirations of Hybridity or acceptance of alterity evident in HPOs. This is not to 
say that HPG is entirely devoid of critical or emancipatory intent however, simply that in 
comparison to these other studies, the language and foci appears to mute the legitimacy of local 
challenges to liberal understandings. One of the few acknowledgements of these other hybrid 
conceptualisations is made by Belloni (2012, p. 22), who attempts to situate HPG as the 
overarching rubric (or the governance) of these different types of hybridity: 
Different levels of violence may also persist despite the signing of a peace agreement. Boege 
et al. refer to this situation as a “hybrid political order” wherein different power claims and 
logics of order overlap and intertwine. This condition has also been described as a “local liberal 
hybrid” [Richmond]; and as one of “institutional multiplicity” wherein different sets of rules of 
the game, often at odds with one another, coexists in the same territory. In this article, I adopt 
the concept of hybrid peace governance in order to describe the hybrid condition prevailing in 
conflict areas.  
HPG, as these authors define it, appears to represent an existing phenomenon that they are 
simply attempting to categorise. Despite the overlaps with previous and existing innovations 
in peacebuilding literature these are not seen to be looking at similar occurrences but are 
explaining how HPG comes about. Belloni explains how game-theory, path-dependence 
theory, literature on incentives and disincentives, and critical theories all “account for the 
emergence of hybrid peace governance” in various ways (Ibid, p.30).179 Thus, these authors 
attempt to situate it as an overarching theory of which all previous theories work towards 
explaining. 
Ultimately, the brief selection of articles which draw on HPG point to the most normative and 
instrumentalist variant of hybridity to emerge within the dataset – though it also appears that 
 
179 Barnett and Zurcher, though not using the term ‘hybridity’, suggest that its emergence can be explained through 
“the interaction between international and domestic actors with different interests and agendas” leading to 
“compromised peacebuilding” (Belloni, 2012, pp. 27–28). Path dependence theory on the other hand points to 
how multiple outcomes can be produced or disrupted depending on interactions early on in an intervention, while 
international incentives show the bargaining strategies undertaken by actors to encourage particular behaviours 
and critical theory “emphasizes the dissonance and even friction between international priorities and local 





the terms life was short lived. Perhaps suffering from a dearth of theoretical and conceptual 
development by scholars, it appears that most of the works within the special issue were drawn 
on for their empirical rather than conceptual contributions. The following year, HPG’s fate 
appeared sealed as many of its founding authors proffered the notion of friction, which like 
HPG before it, attempted to look at the interplay between local and international actors, and 
subsumed understandings of hybridity within its theoretical framework (see Björkdahl et al., 
2016). 
Summary: Contrasting Conceptions  
From the brief explorations of hybridity above, it is apparent that there are a variety of overlaps 
and distinctions between each conception. While each has originally critiqued different aspects 
of the peacebuilding encounter (governance, political orders, and interactions), in scholarship 
these divisions have been blurred and repurposed depending on the scholar drawing on them. 
Ultimately, the hybrid experience within peacebuilding literature demonstrates how academic 
contestation can repurpose, conflate, and dull concepts. 
Indeed, what differs between these conceptualisations most is not the various elements within 
them, but how academics have wielded them. By understanding the location in which scholars 
identify hybridity, this point of difference between each conception emerges most clearly. 
HPOs and HPG tended to point to institutional or state arrangements, focusing on a particular 
point of time to argue that these were hybridised, which was either negative (typically co-opted 
by local elites), positive (reflected liberal and local norms), or neutral (no clear normative 
indication was given as to whether the outcome was desirable – similar to studies of Hybridity). 
These studies would then reflect on either the prior or current actions, practices, and institutions 
which led to the hybrid reality to explain how it came about before suggesting ways to improve 
it, typically by increasing genuine local ownership or making some element more reflective of 
the post-conflict society. Hybridity (C) on the other hand, while often utilized in a similar 
fashion to HPOs and HPG, was more explicitly focused on the interactions and approaches, 
than the precise outcomes that occurred, though this distinction appears to have grown 
increasingly rhetorical over time as the terms were conflated. Thus, the simplest distinction to 
make between these conceptualisations would be that HPOs focused on the ‘political order’ 
(which was most often the post-conflict government), HPGs focused on the governance of 
institutions and practices (though in a similar way to HPOs), whereas hybridity focused on the 





The three conceptualisations clearly share an analytical focus on the interplay between actors, 
norms and institutions, typically characterised within the international/local dichotomy. While 
significant arguments have been made against hybridity and its focus on the international/local 
binary and erasure of difference, more recent critical overlays which shift the focus onto other 
levels and different groupings of actors (such as, simultaneity (Albrecht and Moe, 2014), 
stakeholder analysis (Ngin and Verkoren, 2015), resistance and contestation (Nadarajah and 
Rampton, 2015), materialism (Mac Ginty, 2017), spatial (Heathershaw and Lambach, 2008; 
Allen and Dinnen, 2017; Forsyth et al., 2017), multi-scalar adaptation (Zanker, 2017), and a 
host of other nuances laid out within Lemay-Hébert and Freedman, 2017) redirect rather than 
overcome this problem. While the analytical nuances that have been achieved by these 
developments are undoubtedly useful, their effort to shift the term away from the 
international/local binary has come at the expense of diminishing the post-colonial origins of 
the term, and the acknowledgement of the post-conflict subjects agency has coincided with 
reduced scholarly critique of the hegemonic and oppressive international. 
Since these variants of hybridity were published, they have undergone significant and 
fundamental changes. Where the notion of HPO was drawn on relatively infrequently by 
scholars within the dataset originally, ongoing work (primarily by academics located within 
Australia) have conceptually deepened the term and produced (or articulated) seemingly more 
sincere understandings and accommodations of alterity (see Wallis et al., 2018). These same 
scholars, and other critical works (see, for instance, Forsyth et al., 2017; Lemay-Hébert and 
Freedman, 2017) suggest that the conceptualisation of Hybridity developed by Richmond, 
Mitchell, Roberts and Mac Ginty has cemented itself as the most useful variant of the concept. 
However, its critical and post-colonial intent have been stripped away in this process, both by 
critical theorists attempting to counter prescriptive hybridity by emphasising its analytical 
purpose, and by prescriptive theorists conflating it with their own normative endeavours to 
improve peacebuilding. Another facet which can be used to understand these variations stems 
from the origins accredited to each conception, which explored in further detail in the following 
appendix.   
APPENDIX 8.3: ORIGINS OF HYBRIDITY 
While the conceptualisation of hybridity can be seen to stem from numerous origins, within 
the dataset the term was typically attributed to several dominant texts and authors. The 





8 to understand how the conflation of hybrid theories diminished its emancipatory and 
transformative potential as its post-colonial narrative was replaced by PACs scholarship. 
As stated in chapter 8, identifying where scholars attributed the origins of hybridity was 
undertaken qualitatively during coding (see appendix 8.4 below). Each invocation of hybridity 
and its surrounding text were read to understand the context in which it had been used. 
Scholar’s typically identified its perceived origins within the first several times of invoking the 
term (either within the introduction of their article, or its literature review and methodology), 
or not at all. Care was taken to discern instances in which a study of hybridity had been invoked 
purely for its empirical finding, which were of less interest to this coder as they typically 
offered no understanding or unpacking of what hybridity was. Where early invocations of 
hybridity were typically disassociated with the conceptual rather than definitional meaning, as 
its popularity grew within PACs, so too did the number of perceived origins as new or more 
relevant framings were produced and drawn on. Table 29 below provides an overview of the 
key texts to which articles within the dataset attributed the origins of hybridity and the number 
of times each was invoked for this purpose. Explanations of each cluster is elaborated on below.  
Table 29: Origins of Hybrid Theories (as identified by this author)  
Cluster Text Citations 
Hybrid Political Orders Series of texts published by the Australian working group 
on Hybrid Political Orders (primarily Boege, Volker; 




Texts from special edition (most commonly Jarstad, A. K., 
& Belloni, R. (2012). Introducing Hybrid Peace 
Governance : Impact and Prospects of Liberal 
Peacebuilding. Global Governance, 18, 1–6.). 
7 
Oliver Richmond Total 36 
Richmond (2009) Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming 
Liberalism: Liberal–Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a 
Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding’, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3(3): 324–344 
13 
Richmond, O. (2011). A post-liberal peace. 12 
Richmond, O. (2014). Failed Statebuilding.  4 
Richmond, O. (2005) The Transformation of Peace, 
Basingstoke. 
3 
Richmond, O. (2015). The dilemmas of a hybrid peace: 
Negative or positive? Cooperation and Conflict, 50(1), 50–
68.  
3 
Richmond Peace in IR 2008 - post liberal peace 1 





Mac Ginty (2010) Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between 
Top Down and Bottom Up Peace 
25 
Mac Ginty (2011) International Peacebuilding and Local 
Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace 
4 
Mac Ginty, Roger ‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the 
Liberal Peace’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.43, No.2, 
2008, pp.139–63. 
1 
Post-Colonial Works Total 22 
Bhabha, 1994  16 
Canclini, 2005 2 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 2000 1 
Darby, Phillip. 2009. ‘Rolling Back the Frontiers of 
Empire: Practising the Postcolonial’. International 
Peacekeeping 16 (5): 699–716. 
1 
Scott, JC. (2009) The art of not being governed. Yale 
University Press 
1 
Miscellaneous Texts Total 10 
Bliesemann De Guevara, ‘Limits of Statebuilding’, 111–
128; Meagher, ‘Strength of Weak States’, 1073–1101. 
1 
Millar, G. (2014). Disaggregating hybridity: Why hybrid 
institutions do not produce predictable experiences of 
peace. Journal of Peace Research, 51(4), 501–514.  
4 
Roberts, D. 2008. Hybrid Polities and Indigenous 
Pluralities Advanced Lessons in Statebuilding, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 
2 
Biological Origins 2 
Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. (2016). The fallacy of 
constructing hybrid political orders: A reappraisal of the 
hybrid turn in peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping, 
23(2), 219–239. 
1 
Total  126 
In total, 79 of the 250 articles which drew on hybridity gave some indication of where they 
considered its conceptual or theoretical origins to stem from (126 noted origins), with many 
texts noting multiple origins at the same time. While this was often to refer to various instances 
of the same cluster (referencing multiple texts on hybridity published by Richmond for 
example), at other times scholars presented the breadth of scholarship on hybridity by drawing 
on multiple conceptualisations (most often HPOs and Hybridity). For example, Tholens & 
Groß (2015, p. 249) introduce hybridity by drawing on Mac Ginty (2010a) and Jarstad & 
Belloni (2012), as well as noting the alternative overarching concept of friction (Björkdahl and 
Höglund, 2013; Millar, 2013). 
While the table above shows how Richard’s work was frequently cited in such endeavours, a 





conceptualisation of hybrid peace than Hybridity. For example, A Post-Liberal Peace (2011a, 
chap. 5) was cited 12 times, yet its discussion of hybridity is primarily in articulating how a 
post-liberal peace could be a liberal-local hybrid peace. Mac Ginty’s (2010a) text Hybrid 
Peace: The Interaction Between Top Down and Bottom Up Peace on the other hand, seems to 
have enjoyed more diverse and consistent engagement by scholars (cited 25 times), despite 
being greatly expanded upon in his book International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: 
Hybrid Forms of Peace the following year. As noted in chapter 8, it appears that much of the 
conceptual contestation surrounding hybridity occurred in 2012 and 2013, and this pattern 
could be understood both by the fact that Mac Ginty’s (2011) book may not have enjoyed 
widespread readership by this time, and due to its expanded focus on ‘hybrid peace’ rather than 
simply hybridity.  
Perhaps more important is the understanding that Mac Ginty and Richmond’s 
conceptualisation of Hybridity (and indeed, hybrid peace) are relatively similar, given the two 
authors worked together to develop this notion early on, and again to defend their 
conceptualisation after it had been misappropriated (see, Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016). 
Their work is intrinsically tied to the notion of hybridity put forward by post-colonial 
scholarship, notably Bhabha (1994), and can largely be seen to contextualise this concept 
within PACs and international peacebuilding. As argued within chapter 8 however, while these 
scholars appear to have successfully advocated the understanding of hybridity as a process 
rather than an outcome, their attempts to transpose the international/local binary and post-
colonial’s emancipatory sensibility (alongside concepts like mimicry) were less successful and 
potentially allowed for the deradicalization of the terms transformative potential. These 
variants are briefly explored below, before additional hybridity codes are outlined in appendix 
8.4.   
Post-Colonial and Development Studies Literature: 
While numerous scholars from the Global South have discussed hybridity in some way or 
another (see Spivak, 1994; and Said, 1994), one of the most influential and perhaps critical 
discussions of the term has been undertaken by Homi K Bhabha (1994), whose work featured 
prominently in more critical interpretations of hybridity. This understanding of is intimately 
linked to the colonial encounter, where it was used to explore the fuzzy space between the 
coloniser and colonised. Bhabha was most interested in whether we have a cultural essence 





explored through the notion of diffarance, which is neither an expression of one culture or 
another, but the hybrid space in between both. Peterson (2012, p. 11) claims that it is Bhabha’s 
notion of the ‘contact zone’ (i.e. between local and external) and the creation of ‘new forms’ 
(i.e. non-liberal or post-liberal) that resonate most clearly in current usages of hybridity within 
the fields of peace and development studies. In these analyses, the traditional ‘colonial power’ 
under scrutiny (primarily European states, but also neocolonial powers such as America) is 
replaced by liberal, externally driven aid interventions.  
Hybridity can account for the continual processes of interaction between norms, institutions 
and understandings, and can even lead to (or produce) new realities. Perhaps most importantly 
to this conceptualisation of hybridity is the overt concern with power asymmetries within the 
colonial experience. Taking hybridity away from this context and ignoring the imperial legacy 
of the term in which it manifested is exceptionally problematic, given it was this recognition 
and normative impetus that gave the term its critical and normative allure. While the 
phenomenon of hybridity can emerge in numerous relationships, its emancipatory potential can 
not be as easily repurposed, leading to an analytic framework which seeks only to understand. 
Hybridity and Hybrid Peace 
As noted by Millar (2014, p. 504), Richmond’s conceptualisation of hybridity evolves over 
time. Within the dataset, his first use of the term is in relation to ‘hybrid peace’ (2006a) which 
he uses to describe the liberal peace and account for its variable realisations in post-conflict 
states. Over the next several years Richmond begins to draw on notions of agonism and the 
everyday to produce a more prescriptive variant of the hybrid peace that differentiated between 
positive (desirable) and negative (undesirable) types (Richmond, 2009b). This later became a 
component of his post-liberal peace (2011a). The second conceptualisation of hybridity that 
Richmond works with largely draws on those developed by Bhabha (1994) and Mac Ginty 
(2010a) and himself, where it as used as a framework or heuristic device for exploring peace 
interventions by focusing on processes, practices and experiences to understand how varieties 
of peace are produced. To Richmond, divisions manifest within a ‘local-liberal’ dichotomy 
which was initially applied to describe the ‘local-liberal’ hybrid peace in A Post-Liberal Peace 
(2011a). Drawing on Schmeidl and Karokhail (2009), Richmond (2009b, p. 336,337) unpacks 
‘malevolent form[s] of hybridity’ and proffers an understanding of it as a process that manifests 
in both negative and positive agencies and needs to be seen as part of the agonistic terrain of 





both a type or characteristic of peace, and a process that leads to these different forms of peace. 
Both of these conceptualisations, Richmond (2011a, p. 9) argues, are founded on “an ontology 
that is not exclusive but open to difference”, and he draws heavily on the works of Bhabha, 
Spivak and Hindess to develop and situate his writing.  
This latter notion is intrinsically tied to the understanding of Hybridity proffered by Mac Ginty 
(2010a, 2011), who originally draws on a range of scholars (including Richmond, 2009b and 
Said, 1994), but greatly nuances his conceptualisation through the works of Bhabha (1994) and 
Comaroff & Comaroff (2012) (among others). The post-colonial origins and impetus of Mac 
Ginty and Richmond’s conceptualisation of Hybridity is clearly outlined in their (2016) 
defence of it, where they note that hybridity is “a long term process involving social 
negotiation, co-option, resistance, domination, assimilation and co-existence - in other words 
a phenomenon best viewed through a post-colonial lens” (p.221). They then proceed to claim 
that the most significant contribution of the work which has drawn on it, “has been its 
encouragement for critical reappraisals of orthodox and traditional ways of understanding the 
political and cultural world” (Ibid, p.224). As such, the critical and emancipatory attributes of 
hybridity, to Mac Ginty and Richmond, are clearly located within its post-colonial application 
and given they were the most prolific scholars to draw on Bhabha’s conceptualisation, it 
appears as if they acted as a bridge between post-colonial scholarship, but ultimately failed to 
transmit its more radical emancipatory understandings which relied on surrounding notions 
such as mimicry.180  
Hybrid Political Orders  
The understanding of hybridity developed within scholarship on HPOs, as noted in the above 
appendix, is considerably different to that which emerges from post-colonial scholarship and 
Mac Ginty and Richmond noted above. The main purpose of these scholars in positing this 
variant was to counter the understanding of failed states (by allowing alterity) whilst allowing 
for deeper considerations as to how locally owned peacebuilding processes might be 
operationalised. Indeed, its founding authors state that they draw on the term hybrid as: 
it is broad enough to encompass a variety of non-state forms of order and governance on the 
customary side (from (neo-) patrimonial to acephalous); it focuses on the combination of 
elements that stem from genuinely different societal sources which follow different logics; it 
 
180 Within the hybridity dataset, Richmond drew on Bhabha 49 times, Mac Ginty 20 times, Jenny Peterson 8 times, 





affirms that these spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, but permeate each other 
and, consequently, give rise to a different and genuine political order. (Boege et al., 2008, p. 
10) 
Its authors feel that their concept is similar to neopatrimonialism developed by Erdmann and 
Engel (2007), but is broader in what it encompasses, given that areas of the Global South 
(notably within the Pacific where they focus) are not dominated by neopatrimonial orders 
(Boege et al., 2008, p. 10). Ultimately, their invocation of the term ‘hybrid’ is entirely unrelated 
to its conceptual use within post-colonial literatures, and the origins of their concept are more 
closely related to governance structures such as clientelism or patronage and focus on 
outcomes, rather than the hybrid space between actors. Despite this, and as was argued in 
chapter 8, scholars writing on Hybridity drew on this conceptualisation for its empirical 
findings, and to the detriment of their analytic framework conflated the two notions. 
Hybrid Peace Governance 
Though hybrid peace governance emerged much later than the other two conceptualisations of 
hybridity, like HPOs, it has no clear origin in these overlapping concepts. Similar to Hybridity, 
its authors claim that hybrid refers to space or condition where norms, institutions and actors 
interact or clash, though this is delineated between liberal and illiberal, rather than international 
and local groups (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). In this introductory piece, no indication or 
reference is given to existing notions of hybridity, and in its footnotes, the authors accredit its 
emergence to a series of workshops funded by the International Studies Association (Ibid, p.6). 
This is not the case for all articles however, and Belloni (2012), Krause (2012), and Strazzari 
& Kamphuis (Strazzari et al., 2012) all reference existing scholarship, though with the 
exception of Krause, this is not in any significant manner. Belloni (2012), for example, 
references Mac Ginty, Richmond, Roberts and those works on HPOs, but primarily in an 
attempt to situate these existing understandings of hybridity under the rubric of HPG, while 
Zahar (2012) makes no effort to engage with this scholarship at all.  
While it is certainly not the case that these authors were required to engage in theoretical and 
conceptual discussions with these existing hybrid terms, it is not entirely clear why their notion 
of HPG was needed and why it emerged when it did. Given the dearth of scholarship that drew 
on the term in the following years, and the establishment of ‘friction’ the following year by 
many of these same authors, it is unclear what HPG afforded that existing notions could not. 





similarities with the concept of HPOs which had increasingly been used to understand issues 
of governance since 2009, and critical theorists, by expanding the focus of hybridity to focus 
on all manner of hybrid phenomena (such as hybrid violence, or hybrid economies) which 
weakened its ability to critique power dynamics within the peacebuilding encounter.  
Miscellaneous Texts 
Finally there were a variety of texts that were not categorised within these previous clusters 
(though Mac Ginty and Richmond’s (2016) was put within this group for purposes of clarity 
as it was written by both authors). Indeed, this text, like those of Millar (2013, 2014) could not 
really be considered ‘origin’ texts of hybridity, given they were more often critiques of how 
hybridity had been developed and utilized (similar to Peterson, 2012). Thus, this cluster has 
been included simply for the sake of consistency, given these texts were referenced in the 
introductions and literature review of articles to establish the notion of hybridity, in a similar 
manner as the aforementioned clusters (with the exception of the article by David Roberts).   
The figure below shows how invocations of these various origins shifted throughout the 
duration of the dataset. Most notable is the increased dominance of Richmond and Mac Ginty’s 
























Figure 30: Temporal analysis of hybrid origins 
APPENDIX 8.4: ADDITIONAL CODING FOR HYBRIDITY  
To grasp hybridity as it has been espoused by critical peacebuilding academics, the 250 articles 
within the ‘hybridity dataset’ were analysed to understand how hybridity was used, including 
attempts to define, contest, conceptualise, or refer to it. To do this, every instance of the word 
‘hybrid’ was assessed within these texts for relevance to this chapter as not every invocation 
was required (or helpful) in understanding its meaning in an author’s work. As one could 
imagine, those articles that only mentioned hybridity once or twice were generally not ‘about’ 
hybridity, and were simply referencing the term to indicate their awareness of the literature 
(such as in a literature review for example), or in a throw away manner to argue, for example, 

































By systematically checking the context of ‘hybrid’ mentions and their corresponding 
references, it was possible to build a picture of the general conceptualisations and 
understandings of the term, as well as mischaracterisations and mis-referenced or misread 
work. Drawing on the coding from previous chapters and building up an understanding of what 
each of the prominent works on hybridity discussed a deeper understanding of these 
surrounding works was garnered, which enabled this author to better understand the context in 
which hybridity was referenced. This was important, especially when attempting to understand 
the numerous works which did not offer any significant theoretical discussion of the term but 
referenced other studies to situate their understandings instead.   
To improve the results generated through this process, an additional code book was developed 
which combined the coding of those articles within the primary data set as well as new codes 
specifically related to hybridity. Like in the previous chapters, a grounded theory approach was 
utilized to construct and later merge nodes which were used in the analysis. The primary 
considerations made by this author were: 
• What was the conceptualisation of hybridity used within the text (hybridity, hybrid 
peace governance, hybrid political orders, hybrid peace, hybrid approaches etc.)? 
• What was the purpose of hybridity in the article? (was hybridity something to be 
analysed (as in a hybrid outcome or process), a lens to analyse something through, or a 
something to be critiqued and developed?) 
• What were the noted origins of the term? 
• What were the lessons learnt from using hybridity (explicitly tied to the concept) and 
the supposed benefits of the term? 
• How was hybridity used? (was it critiqued, was it a negative statement or agreeance, or 
a meaningless invocation?) 
A somewhat noteworthy and initial indicator of an articles engagement with hybrid themes was 
the precise terminology it drew on to discuss the concept, where those works that mentioned 
‘hybridity’ rather than surrounding terms such as ‘hybrid political orders’ or ‘hybridization’ 
(for instance) were more likely to offer a deeper conceptualisation of the term (121 articles). 
While one must be cautious when drawing on such correlations, this semantic identifier grew 
more prevalent as competing conceptualisations were unpacked and contrasted, leading to the 





‘hybrid peace’, despite the way in which numerous authors drew on references from all three 
conceptualisations and conflated the semantic variants of these terms. 
Depending on the article in question, it could be coded to numerous nodes. For example, if an 
article  mentioned hybridity but gave no indication of the conceptualisation, origins, or clear 
indication of intent and utility, the article may have been noted as ‘not relevant’ (either off 
topic or not offering enough engagement to draw any immediate conclusions about the terms 
usage). In total 132 texts (including explicit ‘throwaway’ mentions for referencing purposes) 
articles were coded to nodes within the data set, while 118 were deemed as having minimal 
engagement with the term.  For the additional coding schema used, see the table below. These 
codes were used to help the researcher identify the extent to which articles engaged with 
hybridity, why they drew on it and who they attributed their conceptualisation for, the impact 
this had on their conclusions and findings, and other factors which were useful for 
understanding the impact of the term within peacebuilding studies.  
Table 30: Additional Hybridity Codes 
Variable Codes Description 
Referenced Origins of 
Hybridity 
Biology 
Hybrid Peace Governance 
Hybrid Political Orders 
Roger Mac Ginty Texts 
Oliver Richmond Texts 
Post-Colonial Literature 
Miscellaneous Texts 
Where ever hybridity was 
invoked, the references attributed 
to it and the context for drawing 
on them was noted to understand 
where scholars drew their 
understanding of hybridity from. 
Conceptualization of 
hybridity 
Hybridity as lens 
Hybridity as Peace 
Hybrid Political orders 
Hybrid Peace Governance 
Miscellaneous conceptualsiations 
Which variant of hybridity was 
referred to by scholars (for 
example, did they discuss hybrid 
political orders, or simply 
hybridity?).  
Lessons Learnt from 
Hybrid Approach 
Analysis proves utility of concept 
Benefits of using hybridity 
Wherever scholars noted that 
hybridity had brought about some 
benefit, or proved something 
(typically within the conclusion), 





Purpose of hybridity in 
article 
Empirical analysis of hybridity 
Hybridity secondary element in empirical 
study 
Conceptual study of hybridity 
Hybridity secondary element in conceptual 
study 
In what way did hybridity inform 
the article. Was hybridity tested 
empirically, or drawn on in an 
empirical study? Or was it a 
conceptual article contesting the 
notion of hybridity? This was not 
coded for articles that had only 
minimal engagement with the 
term. 
Examples of use Critical Hybridity This code was for reference 
purposes only, so that the coder 
could note particular instances in 
which scholars were critical of 
hybridity, invoked the term for its 
definitional rather than 
conceptual sense, noted problems 
or negative instances of hybridity, 
or drew on the term in an 
unnecessary manner. 
Critiques hybridity 
Engages with mimicry 




Un critical use of hybridity 
Unnecessary usage 
APPENDIX 8.5 CRITICALITY OF HYBRIDITY EXAMPLES 
Chapter 8 notes that as hybridity and its surrounding terms were popularised, the emancipatory 
and transformative potential of the term diminished in proportion to the number of less critical 
conceptualisations. While the number of transformative and radical texts drawing on the term 
remained relatively consistent since 2008, following 2010 there was a significant, and 
increasing trend in ‘improvement’ and ‘critical improvement’ texts, as more scholars drew on 
the term, in less radical ways.  
A substantial portion of these texts contained what have been termed empirical or theory testing 
texts within this thesis, whereupon scholars took these new critical approaches and tested their 
explanatory capability in post-conflict environments. For example, Donais & Knorr (2013) 
draw on hybridity to understand how local societies are often left out of peacebuilding 
processes, despite the general acceptance of, and substantial number of existing calls for 
increased bottom-up efforts and top-down sensitivity. Similar examples include those texts 
from the special issue on hybrid peace governance, as well as articles such as by Skarlato, 
Byrne, Ahmed & Karari (2016).While such scholarship utilized hybridity to understand the 
power imbalance between local and international actors, the need for hybridity in such an 
analysis is less clear, and their critiques typically reified existing understandings rather than 





More critical texts, such as that by Ngin and Verkoren  (2015), offer a similar analysis of the 
interactions between international private investors and local interests, but in a more normative 
manner, critically challenging the desire of peacebuilders to strengthen the state and promote 
the rule of law. Their analysis draws on both hybridity and stakeholder analysis to analyse the 
dichotomy, and argues more clearly that peacebuilding approaches tend to favour commercial 
and government elites, but that by pressuring local societies to force government action, it may 
empower local actors to resist unjust practices and external blueprints. 
In 2017 there was an increase in improvement texts again, and more recent scholarship such as 
(Wallis et al., 2018) (though not coded within this thesis given it fell out of the dataset 
collection time frame) appears to continue this empirical trend. Such texts utilize the critical 
framework of hybridity (to analyse the process or encounter between groups) but provide more 
policy oriented solutions, and fail to adopt the same emancipatory sensibility which was more 
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